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PREFACE
This book has its origin in a conference held in the Axelborg Hall in Copenhagen 
last year. Axelborg Hall, built in 1920, was the second largest secular building in 
Copenhagen at the time, surpassed only by Parliament. The Danish Cooperative Bank, 
for which Axelborg was originally built, went bankrupt in 1925, only five years later. But 
the building itself  survived and now boasts a colorful history of  nearly one hundred years 
of  different owners and tenants, with banking by far the dominant theme. It seemed the 
perfect venue for a conference on central banking at a crossroads.
However, as esteemed speakers and eager participants arrived to the venue on the 
morning of  29 January last year, Axelborg Hall lay shrouded in darkness, as did indeed the 
entire building and a few blocks around it. Helped only by the dim light of  a few candles, 
Professor Charles Goodhart delivered his opening talk masterfully to an audience of  
several hundred, most of  whom could perhaps hear but not see much. Halfway through 
Goodhart’s talk, the lights came back on. And from there, it was smooth sailing. 
A generous reading of  post-crisis central banking would say that an exceptionally 
difficult situation was handled just as masterfully. Out of  a dark and dangerous event, 
came a stronger mode of  central banking, reinvented and with new resilience. Others 
will say that in the world of  central banking, darkness is still the order of  the day, as we 
chase systemic risk and try to tame phenomena of  which we still have only insufficient 
understanding.
The contributions in this book fall between these two poles, perhaps with a slight 
bias towards a worried take on the trajectory of  central banking in recent years. While a 
certain measure of  concern may be shared by all contributors, the approaches taken and 
conclusions reached by different authors vary considerably. This was a defining feature 
of  the talks given at the conference too, in which many (but not all) of  the chapters 
originate. 
We hope the book will reach a wide audience. And we hope that you, the reader, 
will get beyond page twelve. This is how far the average reader of  the e-book version of  
Tomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century gets, according the e-reader statistics. 
The odds that we achieve this may not exactly be great, perhaps. But it’s more likely, at 
least, than beating Piketty on copies sold.
We have little doubt that many of  those in attendance of  the conference will remember 
the event for Goodhart’s candlelit keynote. Reading a book on central banking is unlikely 
to produce similarly poetic imagery. But perhaps you will remember it for the elegant 
cover page? Or, for the exceptional set of  high-profile experts in the field, and how we 
managed to blend in a few up-and-coming scholars? More likely, you won’t remember 
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it at all! Don’t worry; as Ingrid Bergman famously said, “happiness is good health and a 
bad memory”. 
Finally, we should like to take this opportunity to say a few words of  gratitude. The 
conference – without which there would have been no book – was sponsored by the 
Danish Central Bank, the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST), 
Danske Bank, Nordea, Nykredit, the Danish Bankers’ Association, and the Danish 
Institute for International Studies (DIIS). We thank all of  these organizations for their 
generous support. And without the efforts of  colleagues at DIIS – especially those of  
María Retana, Signe Terney Larsen and Jette Kristensen – there wouldn’t have been a 
conference to sponsor, nor would there have been candles to get it started. So the final 
word of  gratitude goes to María, Signe and Jette.
On behalf  of  the editors,
Jakob Vestergaard, Copenhagen, 14 October 2014
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Charles Goodhart, Daniela Gabor,  
Ismail Ertürk, and Jakob Vestergaard
Background and Key Themes
Since the collapse of  Lehman Brothers, central banks and regulatory authorities in 
general have been confronted with difficult questions. The global financial crisis made 
apparent that the analytical models of  the Great Moderation period failed to capture 
the changing nature of  financial intermediation and the complex business models 
of  transnational banks operating across different jurisdictions. In turn, despite few 
theoretical certainties with which to draw upon, central banks have played key roles 
in responding to the crisis and in trying to devise more adequate modes of  regulation 
and intervention. First, in the immediate aftermath of  the crisis, it was the central bank 
governors of  Basel Committee member countries that amended the existing Basel II rules 
and methodologies for capital adequacy. Second, it was the Financial Stability Board, 
with much the same country membership as the Basel Committee and with central 
bank governors gathered around the negotiating table, which identified principles and 
guidelines for the resolution of  distressed banks. And last but not least, it was the central 
banks that replaced conventional tools with new instruments and practices that extend 
their mandate and blur the traditional separation from private financial markets. For the 
past five years, central banks have intervened in both public and private debt markets, 
taking on functions of  market makers or dealers of  last resort. In this book, we propose 
to explore these developments and set them in the context of  the European crisis.
The most comprehensive national regulatory response to the crisis came from the 
USA, where the Dodd–Frank Act specifically aimed at regulating the business models of  
banks by removing the risky proprietary trading from the investment banking activities in 
bank conglomerates and moving over-the-counter derivatives trading to the exchanges. 
The Vickers Report in the UK, too, aimed at separating investment banking from the 
retail banking activities of  universal banks, but in a less clear way, by proposing the 
ring fencing of  retail from investment banking. Such ring fencing would involve different 
capital-adequacy rules for retail and investment banking activities within the same bank 
holding company. Technically, the Dodd–Frank and the Vickers initiatives have many 
differences, but both have the common goal of  protecting both retail depositors and 
taxpayers from risky investment banking activities in universal banks. Such regulatory 
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interventions obviously will have significant implications for bank business models as they 
will have a direct impact on how profits are generated in investment banking activities. In 
the EU, the Liikanen Report, too, was primarily driven by the need to keep retail banking 
safe from such risky investment banking activities.
The book is divided into four sections. The first, “Bank Capital Regulation,” examines 
in detail the Basel III agreement, identifying the key novelties vis-à-vis its predecessor, 
Basel II, as well as its main shortcomings. While Basel III introduces several useful 
regulatory tools—notably, a leverage ratio, liquidity requirements, and a countercyclical 
capital buffer—significant weaknesses remain. The continued predominance of  ratios 
of  capital to risk-weighted assets is unfortunate, particularly in the context of  an 
industry that operates on dangerously low levels of  equity capital, and has proven the 
ability to improvise practices of  regulatory arbitrage that can counteract the intended 
consequences of  Basel risk calculations. In addition to an in-depth assessment of  the 
Basel III agreement, chapters in this section question the notion that increasing the 
equity capital of  banks would be costly to society and critically review alleged efforts to 
recapitalize Europe’s banks.
The second, “Bank Resolution,” explores key questions raised and lessons learnt 
from the global financial crisis. Its starting point is that authorities lacked the necessary 
tools to intervene effectively and quickly enough, resulting in resolutions that were both 
messy and costly—and where taxpayers were often left to foot the bill. Several specific 
questions will be explored: What are effective regimes for regulating and resolving (ailing) 
banks? How does the political context influence these regimes and what lessons can be 
learned from new models adopted in different parts of  the world? Last but not least, 
how can regulators overcome the challenges of  resolving banks operating across different 
jurisdictions?
The third, “Central Banking with Collateral-Based Finance,” develops two 
interconnected themes: the challenges that market-based finance pose for the conduct of  
central banking in periods of  economic stability as well as during crises; and, through a 
critical theoretical angle, the increasing role that governments play for financial markets 
as manufacturers of  high-quality collateral or safe assets. Contributors to this section 
examine several different mechanisms through which market-based financial systems 
interact with the conduct of  central banking. What are the defining features of  market-
based finance that make it imperative to reassess the established models of  central 
banking? How can central banks manage the relationship between money and collateral? 
How did debt, and in particular government debt, itself  become the most common form 
of  collateral in the financial system? How do practices of  collateral intermediation affect 
financial stability and systemic risk? Are these practices different across jurisdictions and 
how relevant are these differences for central banks? What broader political questions 
about the governance of  markets does collateral raise for central banks and governments?
The fourth, “Where Next for Central Banking?” examines fundamental issues about 
the trajectory of  central banking and its new, central role in sustaining capitalism. The 
global financial crisis has shaken the foundations of  the deceptively comfortable pre-
crisis central banking world. Although the traditional lender-of-last-resort role of  central 
banks is short-term and transitional, the new unconventional balance sheet policies of  
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central banks that have been performed through a series of  quantitative easing (QE) 
programs are indeterminate in duration and size. The US Federal Reserve has announced 
that quantitative easing will continue until unemployment reaches a desirable level 
and, similarly, the European Central Bank is prepared to do “whatever it takes” to save 
the euro. These new modes of  intervention have significant allocative and distributive 
consequences, and yet they remain outside democratic control. Central banks today hence 
face not only economic, intellectual, and institutional challenges, but also the challenge 
of  introspection. Can the traditional principles of  central bank independence survive the 
shift to market-based finance? If  not, what form should the relationship between central 
banks and governments take? Can such challenges be addressed independently, or is 
global coordination through new institutions such as the Financial Stability Board the 
answer to the global nature of  financial markets?
There are important analytical connections between the four sections. The new 
regimes for regulation and resolution may encourage financial innovation to produce 
safe assets and high-quality collateral, while a rethink of  central banking models beyond 
the traditional lender of  last resort will have regulatory consequences. The quintessential 
task of  the central bank, as Borio puts it in his contribution, is no longer only to react to 
changes in inflation with interest rate measures. Since the crisis, central banks’ liquidity 
provision—through standard facilities as well as through unconventional measures such 
as quantitative easing—has taken center stage. Yet, liquidity regulation is also one key 
priority of  the Basel III Liquidity Rules, with the explicit purpose of  shifting funding 
models onto longer-term sources. Thus, a return to interest rate instruments may require 
central banks to take into account, through their liquidity management operations, the 
regulatory demands for liquidity in Basel III. This goes to the heart of  ongoing debates 
about how to integrate monetary policy and financial stability concerns, suggesting that 
the current consensus on macroprudential policies may need further refining to consider 
possible overlaps, or even conflicts, between policy objectives.
Another cross-cutting theme engages with the distinctive challenges that the financial 
crisis and its regulatory aftermath have raised for governments. Across the contributions in 
the book, governments appear in different guises. Through a resolution lens, governments 
may be forced to bear the costs of  poorly designed resolution regimes, particularly when 
these involve cross-border banks under ill-defined supervisory responsibilities. Discussions 
of  regulation and collateralized finance conceive of  governments as manufacturers 
of  high-quality liquid assets to be held under Basel III liquidity requirements or used 
as collateral to raise market funding. A legitimate, if  not often-posed question in this 
respect is whether regulatory and market initiatives may be overburdening governments 
as much as crisis responses appear to have overburdened central banks. For example, 
some governments may not be supplying enough government bonds for their banking 
sector to be able to comply with Basel LCR (Norway, Denmark). Should that translate 
into exemptions from Basel rules for such banks? Conversely, since the European 
sovereign debt crisis, the “risk-free” status of  some (high-income) sovereigns has come 
under question, often because repo markets stopped treating their bonds as high-quality 
collateral because of  the burden that bank rescues posed on government finances (e.g. 
Ireland). Can and should governments, in their guise of  collateral manufacturers, be 
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entrusted with financial stability when their fiscal positions are exposed to automatic 
stabilizers and bank rescue costs? Or rather, is it the case that new forms of  coordination 
between central banks and governments are necessary to preserve stability in the financial 
markets of  the future, dependent on high-quality liquid assets?
Interconnectedness within and across borders, between banks and non-bank 
intermediaries, also matters. Fragile connections within the financial sector may result 
in systemic risk, particularly where these reflect business models based on leverage, and 
driven by tax and regulatory arbitrage. Thus, regulatory structures and bank resolution 
procedures may need to become more complicated when banking institutions are closely 
interconnected on and off  the balance sheet through cross-border networks of  complex 
credit claims.
The crisis has dispelled the illusions that central banking could be a scientific 
endeavor, firmly grounded in rigorous models, supported by communicative strategies 
whose ultimate goal was to train financial markets to interpret the central bank’s interest 
rate signals adequately. Rather, the rapid pace of  financial innovation, including the 
growth of  the shadow banking sector, has posed significant challenges to the existing 
institutional and political order, challenges that scholars will be researching in detail over 
the next decade. Central bankers now live in a world of  multiple instruments (interest 
rates, collateral framework, macroprudential tools, forward guidance) and multiple 
objectives (price stability, unemployment and financial stability). Resolving potential 
conflicts between these objectives will require technocratic, and for some deeply 
political, judgments that throw into question the dominant paradigm of  central bank 
independence. Cross-border coordination, the crisis has shown, is crucial, while the 
institutional architecture to enable such coordination is yet to be developed. Researchers 
will have to theorize the mechanisms through which central banks with competing 
domestic priorities—most pressing, at this point, the pace of  exiting unconventional 
measures—can cooperate to contain cross-border spillovers, and the extent to which, 
in the absence of  cooperation, the careful use of  capital controls will become the new 
normal in the post-crisis global financial system. Finally, the structural implications of  the 
ongoing efforts to re-regulate finance are yet to be fully understood. What would central 
banking look like in a world where intermediation moves from highly regulated banks 
into the shadow banking world?
Overview of  Chapters
Part 1: Bank Capital Regulation
Andrew Haldane notes that since the mid-1990s, banking regulators globally have 
allowed banks the discretion to use their own models to calculate capital needs. Most 
large banks today use these models to scale their regulatory capital. This self-regulatory 
shift was made with the best of  intentions. Yet its consequences have been predictable. 
Self-assessment has created incentives to shade reported capital ratios. As elsewhere, 
a regulatory regime of  constrained discretion has given way to one with too much 
unconstrained indiscretion. Incentives will always exist to shift risk to where it is cheapest. 
 INTRODUCTION 5
No tax or regulatory system can fully avoid those incentives. However, some regimes may 
be better at constraining those incentives than others. The current mix of  complexity and 
self-regulation may provide too few constraints. Complexity has meant that avoidance 
and arbitrage can flourish behind a curtain of  opacity. In addition, self-regulation has 
meant that even as one wormhole is closed, others can be created in their place.
This calls for regulatory repair. Without change, the current regulatory system 
risks suffering, like the LIBOR fixers, from reputational damage. Fortunately, there 
are early signs that regulatory change is afoot to place tighter constraints on this (in)
discretion. Making greater use of  simple, prudent regulatory metrics could restore 
faith, hope, and clarity to the financial system to the benefit of  banks, investors, and 
regulators alike.
Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer examine what they see as the 
fallacies and irrelevant facts in debates about bank capital regulation (Chapter 3). 
In so doing, they particularly counter the pervasive view that “equity is expensive,” 
which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit 
markets adversely. The authors find that arguments made to support this view are either 
fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk 
premium that must go down if  banks have more equity. It is thus incorrect to assume that 
the required return on equity remains fixed as capital requirements increase. It is also 
incorrect to view higher taxes paid by banks as a social cost. Policies that subsidize debt 
and indirectly penalize equity through taxes and implicit guarantees are distortive. Any 
desirable public subsidies to banks’ activities should be given directly and not in ways 
that encourage leverage. Admati and colleagues conclude that bank equity is not socially 
expensive, and that high leverage is not necessary for banks to perform all their socially 
valuable functions, including lending, deposit taking, and issuing money-like securities. 
On the contrary, better-capitalized banks suffer fewer distortions in lending decisions and 
would perform better. The fact that banks choose high leverage does not imply that this is 
socially optimal, and high leverage may not even be privately optimal for banks. Setting 
equity requirements significantly higher than the levels currently proposed would entail 
large social benefits and minimal, if  any, social costs. To achieve better capitalization 
quickly and efficiently, and prevent disruption to lending, regulators must actively control 
equity payouts and issuance. If  the remaining challenges are addressed, more prudent 
and properly designed capital regulation in which banks are forced to rely on significantly 
more equity and less debt funding can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of  banks 
in the economy.
In “Complexity, Interconnectedness: Business Models and the Basel System” (Chapter 4), 
Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson, and Roulet argue that the main hallmarks of  the 
global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with 
other people’s money: excess leverage; default pressure resulting from contagion and 
counterparty risk; and the lack of  regulatory and supervisory integration and efficient 
resolution regimes. From this point of  departure, the authors look at whether the Basel 
III agreement addresses these issues effectively. Basel III has some very useful elements, 
notably a (much too light “backup” only) leverage ratio, a capital buffer, a proposal to 
deal with pro-cyclicality through dynamic provisioning based on expected losses, and 
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liquidity and stable-funding ratios. However, the authors show that Basel risk weighting 
and the use of  internal bank models for determining them leads to systematic regulatory 
arbitrage that undermines its effectiveness. Empirical evidence about the determinants 
of  the riskiness of  a bank (measured in this study by the distance to default) shows that 
a simple leverage ratio vastly outperforms the Basel T1 ratio. Furthermore, business 
model features (after controlling for macro factors) have a huge impact. Derivatives 
origination, prime broking, etc. carry vastly different risks to core deposit banking. Where 
such differences are present, it makes no sense to have a one-size-fits-all approach to 
capital rules. Capital rules make more sense when fundamentally different businesses are 
separated.
Vestergaard and Retana examine the alleged recapitalization of  Europe’s 
banks, demonstrating that the procedures orchestrated by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) were little but a smokescreen for regulatory inaction (Chapter 5). When 
publishing the results of  the recapitalization exercise, the EBA reported that European 
banking had been successfully recapitalized and now was in a much stronger position, 
with a much strengthened capital base and overall resilience. Vestergaard and Retana 
question this assessment. The recapitalization orchestrated by the EBA was based on 
a capital assessment methodology that has been subject to considerable criticism. The 
methodology of  basing regulatory capital requirements on risk-weighted assets is a less 
reliable indicator of  banks’ soundness and resilience than ratios of  capital to total assets. 
The chapter compares the assessments undertaken by the EBA—all of  which are based 
on risk-weighted assets—with data on leverage ratios, defined as equity capital to total 
assets. By equity capital criteria, the recapitalization of  European banks was insufficient at 
best. Only 7 out of  24 banks actually increased their ratio of  equity capital to total assets. 
Second, the least well-capitalized banking sector among the larger Eurozone countries 
is not Spain or Italy, but Germany, closely trailed by France. The banking sectors of  
Spain and Italy have equity to total assets roughly double the size of  those of  Germany 
and France. Third, European banking remains far below the levels of  equity capital 
recommended by scholars—and hence, remains vulnerable to shocks, and dependent 
on various forms of  state subsidies, guarantees, and bailouts. Finally, the EU’s new 
capital requirement regulation and directive, CRD4, will institutionalize the European 
reluctance to recapitalize its banks, and hence impede rather than improve the resilience 
of  European banks.
Part 2: Bank Resolution
In “Bank Resolution in Comparative Perspective” (Chapter 6), Charles Goodhart 
notes that one key lesson of  the recent financial crisis has been that standard bankruptcy 
procedures are inappropriate in the case of  a bank. Instead, we need a special resolution 
regime (SRR) for banks, Goodhart argues, enabling the financial authorities to intervene 
in a failing bank to handle its demise in a variety of  ways as might seem best. The 
establishment of  an SRR is to be buttressed with two further reforms. The first is that 
the ratio of  potentially loss-absorbing capital to (risk-weighted) assets should be greatly 
increased. The second reform involves making advance plans for periods of  extreme 
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difficulties for large and systemic banks, in the shape of  recovery and resolution plans 
(RRPs). The first part, the “recovery” segment, requires the bank to think how it might be 
able to survive periods of  extreme pressure (e.g. by selling assets or by borrowing, perhaps 
by establishing some kind of  contingent put option). The second part, the “resolution 
plan,” requires the bank to organize its affairs in such a way as to facilitate and expedite 
intervention by the official agency established under the SRR for the purpose of  resolving 
failed banks (should the recovery part of  the RRP prove insufficient). Even with such 
arrangements in place, considerable complications remain, however. Goodhart discusses 
strengths and weakness of  single versus multiple entry point approaches as well as issues 
relating to the timing of  intervention, the scope of  deposit insurance, and mechanisms 
for bail-in. He concludes that the future of  not only the process for bank resolution, but 
also of  the structure of  the wider financial system, remains in doubt. We may know what 
kind of  ultimate equilibrium state, for the financial system, we might like to attain, but 
the empirical evidence clearly suggests that we have very little clear idea of  how best to 
get from here to there.
Martin Čihák and Erlend Nier undertake a review of  the global evidence on 
resolving problem banks (Chapter 7). In response to the global financial crisis, many 
countries are considering or have made changes in their regimes for resolving problem 
banks, Čihák and Nier note. In most cases, this has involved carving banks out of  general 
bankruptcy regimes, and moving toward early intervention and resolution regimes 
specifically designed for banks. Such special regimes typically give more powers to central 
banks and other financial authorities, and reduce the involvement of  the judicial system. 
This chapter provides a critical review of  the reforms in bank resolution regimes around 
the globe, building on updated information from recent global surveys, including the 
updated Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey organized by the World Bank. The 
chapter identifies features of  a well-designed and well-implemented bank resolution regime 
that can be helpful in containing the fiscal costs and limiting the impact of  a bank failure 
on financial stability, both in the home country and in foreign jurisdictions. It highlights 
the issue of  rules versus discretion: these regimes provide wide discretion to financial 
authorities to act in resolving the problem bank, but they also need to contain clear rules 
to ensure that timely action occurs, and that it withstands subsequent legal challenges. 
The chapter notes that while the conceptual reasons for SRRs for banks are strong, such 
regimes are not a panacea, and need to be complemented by other measures. In addition, 
real-life resolution regimes have important limitations and shortcomings that reduce their 
effectiveness. Indeed, Čihák and Nier’s review of  the post-crisis reforms suggests that legal 
and regulatory changes, while going in the right direction, have not fully addressed the 
underlying incentive breakdowns highlighted by the global financial crisis.
Focusing on “Bank Resolution in New Zealand,” David Mayes considers whether the 
proposals for a bail-in of  creditors that is currently being implemented as a way to resolve 
systemically important banks in New Zealand would also work in the EU/EEA (Chapter 8). 
This method, labeled “open bank resolution,” but more appropriately described as “bank 
creditor recapitalization,” is particularly relevant in the light of  the resolution procedures 
adopted in Cyprus in March 2013, which have many aspects in common, Mayes argues. 
While New Zealand is unusual in having a highly concentrated banking sector owned 
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by Australian banks, aspects of  the scheme are transferable. However, other aspects of  the 
scheme make it unlikely that it will actually be used, mainly because there is no deposit 
insurance, and hence ordinary depositors would be part of  the compulsory bail-in. This 
not only increases financial instability by encouraging a bank run before insolvency, but 
is unlikely to be politically acceptable at the time, as depositors are voters. The chapter 
considers five key issues: first, the New Zealand requirement that the parts of  the cross-
border bank be divisible along jurisdictional boundaries and capable of  operating on 
their own immediately on resolution; second, whether resolution can be successful if  
home and host countries do not cooperate; third, whether the writing down of  creditor 
claims is the best method of  bailing in; fourth, whether such a resolution can actually be 
completed rapidly enough so that the bank can, in effect, remain “open”; last, whether it 
can actually operate without provoking an early bank run. Mayes concludes that while the 
proposals appear practically feasible and transferable to other jurisdictions, particularly 
given the concerns of  the Liikanen and Vickers Reports over the division of  banking 
groups’ activities, it is unlikely that bailing in ordinary depositors would be preferred to 
the bailing in of  bondholders after the resources of  the shareholders, subordinated debt 
holders, and other junior creditors have been exhausted.
Part 3: Central Banking with Collateral-Based Finance
In his chapter, Manmohan Singh asks what happens when central banks become 
important players in collateral markets. Quantitative easing programs change the relative 
price(s) of  money and collateral, and in doing so reshape what Singh calls the “collateral 
space.” In the old collateral space, private financial actors, typically non-banks, could 
meet growing collateral demand from the financial system by reusing collateral. Collateral 
thus flows at a velocity that allows it to support various repo transactions simultaneously. 
In contrast, the new collateral space is characterized by increased complexity and is 
complicated by new actors: central banks, regulators, and collateral custodians. These 
have a differentiated impact on collateral velocity, and therefore on financial lubrication. 
Thus, central banks’ purchase of  high-quality assets, through quantitative easing, slows 
collateral flows since central banks hold these in silos with zero velocity by definition. 
Regulatory demands for high-quality assets are expected to similarly drain collateral 
from financial markets.
Singh explores various channels through which collateral shortages may be alleviated 
in the future. He first notes that manufacturers of  AAA securities, although lower in 
number since the European sovereign debt crisis, will continue to increase supply. 
Fine-tuning some regulatory demands may also play an important role. Central banks 
may follow the example of  the Reserve Bank of  Australia, and engage in collateral 
transformation. In the medium term, assuming no major dislocation in financial 
markets, central banks can unwind sizable good collateral from their balance sheet and 
alleviate shortages (if  any). However, release of  collateral from central bank balance 
sheets may not be as easy as quantitative easing, since repo rates cannot exceed policy 
rates, especially where central banks continue to price excess reserves/money favorably. 
The US Federal Reserve strategy to release collateral through reverse repos has doubtful 
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effects on financial lubrication since it does not permit onward re-pledging. Thus, for 
some key jurisdictions (e.g. the USA), fine-tuning the price of  money and the price of  
collateral will remain a challenge.
Daniela Gabor explores the importance of  collateralized bank-funding strategies for 
the design of  monetary policy measures during the crisis (Chapter 10). In so doing, the 
chapter first provides a taxonomy of  crisis measures that distinguishes between market-
based and bank-based crisis measures. Until 2012, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of  England deployed the first (quantitative easing), while the European Central Bank 
(ECB) preferred bank-based measures (long-term refinancing operations) that it argued 
would fit better with the bank-based nature of  the European financial system. Gabor 
argues that this distinction is moot where banks rely on collateralized funding, as large 
European banks do. The chapter highlights a crucial policy challenge in monetary unions 
with integrated funding markets: banks’ access to market funding depends on existing 
portfolios of  marketable collateral; in the Eurozone, these are mainly composed of  
sovereign bonds. This is an important, if  yet underexplored structural change in the actors 
and trading strategies in sovereign bond markets with crucial implications for the conduct 
of  central banking during a crisis. Collateral management is intimately linked to leverage 
and relies on mark-to-market risk management strategies. This sharpens the pro-cyclicality 
of  sovereign bond markets, and in doing so, ties bank-funding conditions to the sovereign’s 
funding conditions. Yet the institutional architecture of  central banks is ill-suited to deliver 
bank stability under these conditions. Political and institutional factors constrain the central 
bank’s ability to stabilize the most important market for collateral, the sovereign bond 
market. This worsens “two-way risks” between the counterparty (bank) and the collateral 
(sovereign bond), further deteriorating both bank and sovereign funding conditions, 
particularly under a limited degree of  internationalization of  collateral portfolios. For 
this reason, the ECB’s outright monetary transactions (market-based) succeeded where 
successive rounds of  long-term refinancing operations (bank-based) failed.
Nina Boy takes a step back from the immediate question of  how collateral impacts 
the conduct of  central banking. She instead unpacks the assumption that sovereign debt 
should be treated as a safe asset, an assumption that has guided regulatory initiatives such 
as Basel III. How did debt, and in particular government debt, itself  become the most 
common form of  collateral in the financial system? In other words, how did government 
debt become “safe”?
The safety of  sovereign debt corresponds to the establishment of  sovereign creditworthiness: 
from sovereign bonds being charged a significantly higher interest rate than commercial 
loans in the Middle Ages, to them circulating as “unsecured”—that is, no longer requiring 
additional security in the form of  either collateral or a high interest rate, but trading merely 
on “full faith and credit.” Corporate bonds, by contrast, when unsecured, have to compensate 
with a higher interest rate or, if  secured, imply the pledge of  specific assets as collateral, 
and the issuer “paying” for the extra safety by receiving a lower interest rate than on a 
comparable, unsecured bond. As such, sovereign safety has underwritten the rise of  collateral-
based finance, and plays a crucial role for both financial lubrication and financial stability. But 
the question receives additional interest with the “increased questioning of  sovereign debt 
representing a genuine risk-free rate” (BlackRock 2011) following the sovereign debt crisis.
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Going beyond the standard assumption underpinning modern finance theory and 
standard economics that sovereign debt is safe, the chapter first offers an economic 
historian’s account of  the establishment of  sovereign creditworthiness. In order to grasp 
a critical dimension of  this process of  accreditation, attention must be turned to the wider 
cultural context, in particular that from which the discipline of  history has traditionally 
sought to distinguish itself: literary fiction. Drawing on influential studies in the field of  
the “new economic criticism,” the chapter traces the role of  fictional realism in making 
the financial fictions of  fiat money and sovereign bonds creditworthy.
Part 4: Where Next for Central Banking?
Claudio Borio notes that the global financial crisis has shaken the foundations of  the 
deceptively comfortable pre-crisis world of  central banking (Chapter 12). Pre-crisis, the 
quintessential task of  central banks was seen as quite straightforward: keep inflation 
within a tight range through control of  a short-term interest rate, and everything else will 
take care of  itself. Everything was simple, tidy, and cozy. Post-crisis, many certainties have 
gone. Price stability has proven no guarantee against major financial and macroeconomic 
instability. Central banks have found themselves reaching well beyond interest rate policy, 
aggressively deploying their balance sheet in a variety of  “unconventional” monetary 
policies. As a result, the line between monetary and fiscal policy has become blurred 
precisely at a time when public sector debts are ballooning and sovereign risk is rising 
again. And many increasingly question the very ability of  central banks to maintain 
inflation within acceptable ranges, notably to avoid deflation.
Central banks now face a threefold challenge, Borio argues: economic, intellectual, 
and institutional. Borio puts forward a compass to help central banks sail in these largely 
uncharted waters. First, the tight interdependence between monetary and financial 
stability will need to be fully recognized and policy frameworks adjusted accordingly. This, 
in turn, will require bolder steps to develop analytical frameworks in which monetary 
factors play a core role, not a peripheral one as hitherto—an intellectual rediscovery of  
the roots of  monetary economics. Second, there should be a keener awareness of  the 
global as opposed to the purely domestic dimensions of  those tasks. The common view 
that keeping one’s house in order is sufficient for global stability should be reconsidered. 
This calls for an intellectual shift that is analogous to the one that has already occurred 
in financial regulation and supervision, from a microprudential to a macroprudential 
perspective. Finally, the autonomy of  central banks will need to be protected and 
strengthened.
The ballooning of  central bank balance sheets after the 2007 crisis in core capitalist 
countries has attracted the critical attention of  economists and financial media, notes 
Ismail Ertürk. Monetarist economic theory instinctively problematizes such an 
expansion of  central bank balance sheets as an inflationary phenomenon. A Minskian 
perspective that questions the neutrality of  money in neoclassical economics, on the 
other hand, justifies central bank activism as necessary to bring capitalism back to 
stability after inevitably destabilizing endogenous credit expansions. Regardless of  
these different theoretical framings, there clearly is a policy convergence in both liberal 
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market economies and coordinated market economies, whereby central banks use 
unconventional monetary policies to generate growth and employment. In his chapter, 
Ertürk proposes an alternative framing of  unconventional central bank policies after the 
2007 crisis by shifting the focus to the role of  central banks as holders of  long positions on 
sovereign debt and non-tradable bank assets. In the process of  injecting liquidity to the 
dysfunctional post-crisis banking system through quantitative easing programs, central 
banks have ended up investing in sovereign risk and bank credit risk with unintentional 
allocative and distributive consequences. This so-called central bank put is on a capitalism 
that hardly achieves positive growth rates in core capitalist countries. The risks of  holding 
long positions on low-growth capitalism include unknowable exit costs to the economy 
and society in core capitalist countries.
Sheila Dow argues that the problem of  insufficient collateral for the financial 
system is a product of  weak economic conditions and financial instability, which has 
eroded confidence in the valuation of  assets, and that this has been compounded by 
central bank independence (Chapter 13). In order to consider further the relationship 
between central banks and governments, it is necessary to go back to first principles and 
consider what society needs from central banks, Dow stresses. The role of  the central 
bank is then explored as being to provide a stable financial environment as a basis for real 
economic activity. This involves the provision of  a safe money asset; proactive regulation, 
monitoring, and supervision of  (institutionally separated) retail banks which supply 
this asset, as well as the wider banking system; and lending to government as required, 
subject to maintaining the value of  the currency. The evolution of  this traditional role in 
relation to banks and government is analyzed in terms of  collateral, emphasizing their 
interdependencies. As a result, it is argued that central banks should not be independent 
of  government, but rather that the traditional, constructive, mutual relationships between 
central banks, retail banks, and government be restored.
Annelise Riles addresses a central challenge for international financial regulatory 
systems today: the management of  the impact that global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs) have on the global economy, given the interconnected and 
pluralistic nature of  regulatory regimes. Her chapter focuses on the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) and proposes a new research agenda for the FSB’s emerging regulatory 
forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of  the new governance 
(NG), a variety of  approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and 
experimental than traditional forms of  governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG 
tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of  problems in a pluralistic regulatory 
order, but they are unlikely to be suitable for all problems. As such, this chapter proposes 
that analyses of  the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be 
effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG 
model.
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Marking your own exams is a perilous pursuit. Stephen Levitt of  Freakonomics fame looked 
at abnormalities in test scores in Chicago public schools when these tests were marked 
by the schools’ own teachers (Jacob and Levitt 2003). He found systematic evidence 
of  upgrading of  scores in elementary schools by teachers marking, in effect, their own 
exams.
More recently, the LIBOR scandal has exposed many of  the same self-regulatory 
problems. The incentives to shade their self-assessed LIBOR exam grades have proved 
to be too much, for too many, for too long. As we now know, systematic misreporting 
resulted. The self-regulatory model was again found wanting.
Yet there is one area of  finance where self-regulation continues to stage a last stand—
bank capital standards. Since the mid-1990s, banking regulators globally have allowed 
banks the discretion to use their own models to calculate capital needs. Most large banks 
today use these models to scale their regulatory capital. In doing so, they are, in essence, 
marking their own exams.
This self-regulatory shift was made with the best of  intentions. Yet its consequences 
have been predictable. Self-assessment has created incentives to shade reported capital 
ratios. As elsewhere, a regulatory regime of  constrained discretion has given way to one 
with too much unconstrained indiscretion.
This calls for regulatory repair. Without change, the current regulatory system risks 
suffering, like the Chicago teachers and the LIBOR fixers, from reputational damage. 
Fortunately, there are early signs that regulatory change is afoot to place tighter constraints 
on this (in)discretion.
The Emergence of  Self-Regulation
To understand how we ended up here, it is useful to explore the historical contours of  the 
regulatory debate. This is a history in roughly four chapters.
Chapter 1 covers the period prior to the agreement of  the first Basel Accord in 1988. 
Until then, a patchwork of  national regulatory frameworks for capital adequacy operated. 
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Some countries set capital adequacy standards based on simple measures of  bank equity 
to assets—a leverage ratio. Others, including in the USA, used risk-based standards with 
risk weights set by regulators for a small set of  asset categories.
Chapter 2 begins with the introduction of  the Basel Accord. This was a landmark 
agreement: the first-ever genuinely international banking accord, based around an 8 
percent bank capital ratio, with internationally set risk weights applied to a small set of  
banks’ assets. The accord was explicitly designed to lean against an international “race 
to the bottom” in capital-adequacy standards (Goodhart 2011). It also helped ensure a 
level international playing field.
Chapter 3 commences with the Market Risk Amendment to Basel I in 1996 and 
continues through to the Basel II agreement of  2004. These were a direct response to the 
perceived failings of  Basel I. In particular, the lack of  granularity in risk weights under 
Basel I was felt to have created arbitrage possibilities, with risk migrating to lower risk-
weighted asset categories.
Permitting the use of  banks’ own internal models to calculate risk weights provided 
for such granularity. It also aligned regulatory capital with banks’ own economic capital 
calculations, thereby prospectively reducing arbitrage incentives. By setting internal 
model-based capital charges below those from simple standardized approaches, Basel 
II provided banks with strong incentives to upgrade their risk management technology.
The move from regulator-set to model-set capital charges had two significant 
side effects. First, it added materially to complexity. For a large, complex bank, the 
numbers of  calculated risk weights rose from five to hundreds of  thousands, perhaps 
millions. Second, the use of  models moved decision-making on risk weights from 
regulators to banks. Once a model was admitted, the system was essentially self-
regulatory.
The final chapter, Basel III, commences in 2010. Experience during the financial 
crisis demonstrated both that capital had been set too low and that it had been defined 
too broadly. Basel III raised the level, and narrowed the definition of  bank capital. In 
those respects, it was a very significant improvement over its predecessors. At the same 
time, the complexity and self-regulatory aspects of  Basel II remained in Basel III.
Each of  these historical chapters was a logical response to the perceived problems 
of  the day. Even with the benefit of  hindsight, these steps seem like sensible ones. In 
particular, there appear to have been three key objectives behind the evolution of  
international bank regulation over the period.
 • First, to level the international playing field and prevent a race to the bottom in capital 
adequacy standards, in particular under Basel I.
 • Second, to align regulatory capital with risk by improving the risk sensitivity of  capital 
standards, in particular under Basel II and III.
 • And third, to reduce incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and create incentives 
to upgrade risk management, in particular under Basel II and III.
All of  these responses were understandable and, in concept, laudable. The question is 
whether, with the benefit of  hindsight, they have been successful.
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Unfulfilled Ambitions
Leveling the playing field
The rationale for the original Basel Accord was that it would effectively defuse an 
international race to the bottom by setting a common, internationally set capital standard. 
But the use of  risk weights, in particular those based on internal models in calculating 
banks’ capital ratios, provided an alternative avenue through which this race could be 
run. And empirical evidence suggests this race may have continued apace.
Figure 2.1 plots the average risk weight applied to the assets of  17 major international 
banks over the period 1993 to 2011, together with a trend line. The trend is steeply and 
strikingly downward sloped, falling on average by 2 percentage points each year. Banks’ 
average risk weight (risk-weighted assets per unit of  assets) has almost halved, falling from 
over 70 percent in 1993 to below 40 percent at the end of  2011 (see also Blundell-Wignall 
and Atkinson 2011).
There are three possible interpretations of  this trend. One is that banks’ assets, in 
aggregate, are around half  as risky today as they were 20 years ago. A second is that 
banks are twice as good at managing these risks as they were 20 years ago. In the light 
of  the crisis, which unearthed huge risks on banks’ balance sheets accumulated over this 
period, neither proposition rings especially true.
To see why, consider the evolution of  an alternative measure of  risk—simple 
bank leverage. In the pre-crisis boom, bank leverage rose steadily to reach historically 
unprecedented levels. This signaled high and rising bank risk (Figure 2.2). Indeed, bank 
leverage and bank risk weights moved in opposite directions over this period, with a 
correlation coefficient of  minus 0.6. While the risk traffic lights were flashing bright red 
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Figure 2.1. Average risk weights(a)
Source: Banker and bank calculations.
(a) Weighted average risk weights of  Deutsche Bank, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Barclays, Citigroup, UBS, 
BAML, BONY, Commerzbank, ING, JPM, LBG, RBS, Santander, State Street, UniCredit, and 
Wells Fargo. Data are not available for the remaining G-SIBs.
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The subsequent financial crisis has made clear which traffic light signal was at fault.1 
The boom was leverage fuelled and so too has been the subsequent bust. At least at an 
aggregate level, bank risk weights appear to have borne, at best, a tenuous relationship 
with risk. At worst, they were a contrarian indicator.
That takes us to a third potential explanation for the downward trend in risk 
weights, one familiar from every other field of  self-regulation—the system has been 
gamed or arbitraged (Blum 2008; Masera 2012). Under a self-assessed standard, 
banks may have both the incentive and the ability to shade downward risk weights, 
or to switch to lower risk-weighted asset categories, thereby boosting reported capital 
ratios. The aggregate evidence is consistent with this having occurred secularly and 
on a significant scale.
Firm-specific evidence is also consistent with this hypothesis. A survey by McKinsey 
in 2012 found that 65 percent of  firms were engaged in “RWA optimization” of  some 
form (Babel et al. 2012). And the recent US Senate investigation of  the J. P. Morgan 
“whale” incident is the latest in a long line of  identified misdemeanors sourced in model 
manipulation. In short, while one of  the original aims of  the Basel Accord was to prevent 
a race to the bottom, the move to risk-based capital adequacy standards may in fact have 
accelerated it.
What, then, of  the second objective of  the original Basel Accord—leveling the 
international playing field? From an economic perspective, a level playing field would 
imply that banks with equivalent portfolios should hold a broadly equivalent amount 
of  capital. The most compelling test of  this hypothesis comes from the hypothetical 
portfolio exercises (HPEs) recently conducted in the UK and internationally. These take 
Figure 2.2. Average risk weights and leverage(a)(b)
Source: The Banker and Bank calculations.
(a) Sample consists of  Deutsche Bank, HSBC, BNP Paribas, Barclays, Citigroup, UBS, BAML, BONY, 
Commerzbank, ING, JPM, LBG, RBS, Santander, State Street, UniCredit, and Wells Fargo. Data 
are not available for the remaining G-SIBs.
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a set of  common portfolios and ask how much capital banks’ internal models would set 
against them.
Three UK exercises have been undertaken, in 2007, 2009, and 2011, for a subset of  
banking assets: corporate exposures, sovereign exposures, and banking exposures. Figure 2.3 
demonstrates the range of  variation in default probabilities for these three sets of  asset 
across UK banks, while Figure 2.4 shows differences in risk weights across these portfolios 
in 2011, the most recent estimates.
The range of  cross-bank variation is enormous. Default probabilities differ by factors 
of  between five and ten. Risk weights differ by a factor of  between three and five. There 
is no sign of  this range having shrunk over time. The Basel III reforms will raise banks’ 
capital standards by a factor of  between three and four. These cross-bank differences 
would be sufficient to absorb fully those reforms.
Figure 2.3. Variability of  default probability 
estimates(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)
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Source: FSA, and bank calculations. Source: FSA, and bank calculations.
(a) Based on the results of  the FSA’s hypothetical 
portfolio exercises for 2007, 2009, and 2011.
(b) Results are based on portfolios comprising assets 
rated by all respondents in the sample (co-rated).
(c) Portfolios differ between the exercises in 2007, 
2009, and 2011. Results have been normalized by 
the mean.
(d) Sample sizes differ: six to twelve in 2007 and seven 
to thirteen in 2009, depending on portfolio, and 
eight in 2011.
(e) The bars show the maximum/minimum ranges. 
The values on top of  the 2011 results indicate the 
maximum/minimum ratio.
(a) Based in the results of  the FSA’s hypothetical 
portfolio exercise for 2011.
(b) Results are based on portfolios comprising 
assets rated by all respondents in the sample 
(co-rated).
(c) The sample includes six banks.
(d) The bars show the maximum/minimum 
ranges. The values on top of  the 2011 results 
indicate the maximum/minimum ratio.
The Basel Committee has recently undertaken its own HPE on a wider range of  international 
banks, focusing on the trading book (Basel Committee of  Bank Supervisors [BCBS] 2013). 
Figure 2.5 summarizes the range of  variability in capital requirements for certain trading 
book metrics (VaR, stressed VaR [sVaR], and the incremental risk charge [IRC]), while 
Figure 2.6 focuses on the IRC charges for a set of  particularly complex models.2
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Figure 2.5. Risk weight variability in the 
trading book(a)(b)(c)(d)
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Source: BCBS. Source: BCBS.
(a) From the BCBS hypothetical portfolio exercise 
for the trading book.
(b) Sample consists of  15 banks.
(c) Values have been normalized by the median. 
For each model, the ranges represent the 
simple average of  the normalized minima 
and maxima for all portfolios the model 
was applied to. For the all-in portfolio, the 
supervisory multiplier was held constant.
(d) Numbers on bars indicate maximum/
minimum ratios.
(a) From the BCBS hypothetical portfolio exercise 
for the trading book.
(b) Sample consists of  15 banks.
(c) Values have been normalized by the median.
(d) Numbers on bars indicate maximum/minimum 
ratios.
The variation is again enormous. Calculated trading book risk weights differ by 
factors of  three to five, even for simple metrics such as VaR. For some of  the more 
complex metrics, such as IRC, the range of  variation needs to be shown on a log 
scale. For some portfolios, it runs to three figures. For one, it runs to four, with 
one bank’s model suggesting US$1 of  capital, and another’s over US$1000 for an 
identical exposure.
These inconsistencies are likely to be an understatement of  the true problem. As they 
cover only a subset of  the banks using internal models, these exercises may significantly 
underestimate variability across the bank population. The portfolios covered by existing 
HPE exercises have also tended to be relatively simple. More complex portfolios would 
probably result in wider cross-bank variability. The Basel Committee is currently 
undertaking an equivalent exercise for banking book assets.
There is a delicate line to tread between useful diversity in model outputs on the one 
hand and useless inconsistency on the other. It is clear we are currently on the wrong side 
of  this line. If  a regulatory regime can generate capital ratios of  5 percent, 10 percent, 
and 20 percent for three identical banks, it is not a robust basis for assessing capital 
adequacy. In short, the objectives of  the original Basel Accord are at risk. Complex self-
regulation has added speed to the race to the bottom and an incline to the international 
playing field.
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Complexity and risk sensitivity
One of  the conceptual lynchpins of  the model-based, self-regulatory approach was the 
desire for risk sensitivity. As a matter of  principle, it is difficult to question risk-based 
regulation. The practical question is whether that has been achieved.
On the face of  it, the very act of  risk-weighting assets would appear to guarantee a 
greater degree of  risk sensitivity than, say, using a risk-unweighted leverage ratio. Yet 
this intuition is wrong on two counts. It is wrong empirically because it ignores the risks 
that come from modeling. And it is wrong theoretically because risk across banks’ whole 
portfolio may bear little relationship to the aggregated risk of  each of  its parts.
Take model risk: this pollutes the signals from a risk-based capital ratio. In work at the 
bank, we have explored this trade-off  between model risk and risk sensitivity. If  model 
risk is sufficiently large, a risk-based capital ratio may in fact perform worse in predicting 
bank default than a leverage ratio. That is because the noise associated with imprecise 
risk weights can drown out the signal. A leverage ratio, unpolluted by model risk, may 
provide clearer risk signals.
While slightly counterintuitive, this result is well understood in many fields outside 
of  finance (Gigerenzer 2007). It is why complex, risk-weighted algorithms have been 
found to perform poorly out-of-sample when predicting everything from sports events 
to medical diagnoses, from shopping habits to portfolio choices (Haldane and Madouros 
2012). Overfitting the past makes for fragile predictions about the future. Unweighted 
measures, without noise pollution, have often been shown to do better.
Whether they do so in bank regulation is, ultimately, an empirical question. The 
noise around estimated risk weights cannot be observed directly, but empirical evidence 
is illustrative. For example, if  estimated risk weights can differ across banks by factors 
ranging from three to a thousand, this suggests a high, sometimes deafening, amount 
of  model noise. Historical errors in estimated risk weights are also illuminating. For 
example, trading book risk weights during the crisis were found to be miscalibrated by 
factors of  up to 50.
A common driver behind these fragilities may be the shortness of  the samples used 
for model estimation. It is well known that small sample problems are especially acute 
when the underlying distribution of  outcomes is tail heavy, as with financial time series. 
The Basel regime imposes constraints on so-called look-back periods. For example, the 
minimum sample period for VaR models in the trading book is one year, though most 
models in practice use between one and two years. For the banking book, the minimum 
look-back period is between five and seven years, with actual samples lying between five 
and twenty years.
From a robustness perspective, samples this short are, quite literally, a recipe for 
disaster. At most, they would encompass one cycle or extreme event. Some would fail to 
cover even that. This would leave the tail of  the risk distribution empirically underfitted 
and the body overfitted. In other words, estimated risk weights are very likely to be least 
reliable when regulators are most reliant on them. By construction, when it matters most, 
risk weights are likely to be of  long noise and short signal.
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Theoretical objections to risk weighting are no less deep-seated. One key issue 
is aggregation (Masera 2012). Regulation has focused on ever-more granular and 
precise risk estimates for individual assets. Fewer attempts have been made to consider 
correlations across broad asset classes, other than in parts of  the trading book. Yet it is 
these correlations that fundamentally determine risk across a banking portfolio. Indeed, 
this is perhaps the key lesson finance theory has taught us over the past half-century.
There is a cruel irony here. One of  the great pre-crisis mistakes was to look at risk in the 
financial system institution by institution, atom by atom. Doing so resulted in regulators 
missing the systemic crisis of  a lifetime. Yet, an asset-by-asset, atom-by-atom approach to 
risk measurement still lies at the heart of  the post-crisis regulatory framework.
A second conceptual problem with risk weighting is that it takes no account of  the 
collective consequences of  banks’ asset allocation decisions. For example, no account is 
taken of  the externalities, positive or negative, that banks’ portfolio choices may give rise 
to. This may lead to risk weights being miscalibrated from the perspective of  the financial 
system as a whole and the wider economy.
As an example, take lending to the real economy—for example, to finance 
infrastructure, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), or trade. These asset choices 
are likely to be positive for medium-term growth and, hence, indirectly, for credit risk 
in the financial system. In other words, this portfolio allocation is likely to deliver positive 
externalities for the wider economy.
By contrast, lending within the financial system may have the opposite effect. It raises 
interconnectivity in the system, thereby amplifying systemic risk (Haldane 2009). In other 
words, this portfolio choice may drive negative externalities for the financial system and 
wider economy.
In an ideal world, these risk externalities would be taken into account in the setting of  
risk weights—for example, by raising risk weights on intra-financial system lending and 
lowering it on growth-positive lending. In practice, there is scant evidence of  this having 
happened. Indeed, if  anything, the current risk-weighting system appears to generate the 
opposite set of  incentives.
Figure 2.7 looks at the average risk weight assigned by UK banks to different 
counterparties, some in the financial system, and others in the wider economy. The 
differences are stark. Mortgage risk weights are double those on lending to financial 
institutions. For large companies, risk weights are treble those on lending within the 
financial system. For SMEs, they are quadruple. Those are probably not the risk weights 
a benevolent dictator, charged with supporting the economy and armed with a PhD in 
welfare economics, would choose.
The acid test of  whether these empirical and theoretical concerns about risk 
weighting have merit comes from assessing the evidence. Do risk weights help in signaling 
bank failure? There have been a number of  recent studies comparing the predictive 
performance of  Basel risk-based capital ratios and simple leverage ratios for bank failure. 
The results are both striking and surprising.
Studies by the IMF (2009), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010), Haldane and Madouros 
(2012), Mayes and Stremmel (2012), Brealey et al. (2011), Berger and Bouwman (2013), 
Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2013), and Hogan et al. (2013) perform a horserace between 
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different bank solvency measures, using a variety of  techniques, samples, and controls. 
Despite these differences, the conclusion they draw is broadly consistent: leverage ratios 
perform as well, and in most cases better than risk-weighted alternatives in predicting 
bank failure.
These results appear to be stronger for large banks, often using internal models, than 
for smaller banks typically using standardized approaches (Haldane and Madouros 2012). 
This is not altogether surprising given that model risk is largest among banks making 
greatest use of  models and with the largest portfolios. It is also the case that no measure of  
bank capital adequacy, by itself, provides a full-proof  forecast of  impending bank failure: 
the predictive power of  all solvency metrics, leverage or otherwise, is fairly low.
Nonetheless, these results send a sobering message. Even on risk-sensitivity grounds, 
risk-based capital measures may often be trumped by risk-insensitive alternatives. The 
noise in risk weights may be drowning out the signal. Granularity may not improve risk-
sensitivity; it could even worsen it by amplifying model risk. And given that uncertainty, 
simpler metrics may often provide a more robust signal of  solvency.
Risk shifting and robustness
A third argument used to justify risk-based frameworks is that they help defuse incentives 
to engage in “risk shifting” or other types of  regulatory arbitrage (Kahane 1977; Kim 
and Santomero 1988). Risk shifting refers to incentives to shift portfolios toward higher-
risk, higher-return assets. These incentives are likely to be strongest when risk is not well 
aligned with return—for example, under an equally weighted leverage ratio. Indeed, this 
powerful logic justified moving to risk-based capital standards in the first place.
Figure 2.7. Average risk weights for major UK banks by counterparty(a)(b)
Sources: Bank of  England, FSA regulatory returns and Bank calculations.
(a) Based on June 2011 data for Barclays, HSBC, LBG, Nationwide, RBS, and Santander UK.
(b) Cover credit and counterparty credit exposures.
(c) Financial firms other than regulated banks and investment firms are included within ‘Other 
corporates’.
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Historically, there have certainly been episodes when risk shifting appears to have 
been important. For example, the movement by banks into Latin American debt in the 
1980s; the loading-up on zero-risk-weighted OECD sovereign debt in the 1990s; and 
the extension of  zero-weighted 364-day lines of  credit in the 2000s. Yet, in these cases, 
the problems seem to have been generic: miscalibration of  risk weights.
A few studies have looked at the evidence on risk shifting more systematically. For 
example, Furlong (1988) looked at the behavior of  around one hundred US bank-holding 
companies after the introduction of  the leverage ratio in 1981. While banks’ average 
riskiness increased, there was no difference in behavior between regulatory-constrained 
and unconstrained banks. This suggests risk shifting was not too potent a factor. Sheldon 
(1996) reaches the same conclusion when considering the move by international banks 
to Basel I.
One possible reason why risk shifting may have been difficult to detect is that risk-
based capital standards coincided with the shift to a much more complex regulatory 
framework. Complexity has an important impact on risk-shifting incentives—and not 
in the ways in which some have suggested. For example, some have argued that simpler 
rules are easier to arbitrage. The evidence suggests the exact opposite.
Take the tax system: simple linear tax schedules are typically found to be more 
robust to problems of  tax arbitrage than complex rules (Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 
1999). Why? Because complexity increases the number of  loopholes through which 
the tax avoider can slip. Indeed, evidence suggests that complexity of  the tax system 
may be the single largest determinant of  tax avoidance across countries (Richardson 
2006).
The same logic carries across to financial regulation. Regulatory complexity creates 
wormholes. At a macro level, cross-country studies suggest that regulatory complexity, 
in particular the use of  internal models, appears to have had an important bearing on 
bank failure (Čihák et al. 2012). At a micro level, the parts of  the regulatory framework 
that have been most prone to arbitrage are those where complexity and opacity has been 
greatest—for example, the trading book.
Incentives will always exist to shift risk to where it is cheapest. No tax or regulatory 
system can fully avoid those incentives. However, some regimes may be better at 
constraining those incentives than others. The current mix of  complexity and self-
regulation may provide too few constraints. Complexity has meant that avoidance and 
arbitrage can flourish behind a curtain of  opacity. And self-regulation has meant that 
even as one wormhole is closed, others can be created in their place.
Taken together, this evidence does not paint an especially encouraging picture. Many 
of  the intended aims and purported advantages of  a complex, risk-based regulatory 
approach may not have materialized in practice. Worse, some of  the assets of  the risk-
based approach may even have become liabilities.
Unintended Consequences
So much for the intended consequences of  the shift to self-regulatory standards. What of  
the unintended consequences? Three are worth noting.
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Cost of  compliance
First, regulatory complexity comes at a cost—the cost of  compliance. These costs are 
borne, in the first instance, by the regulator and regulated firms. The costs of  moving 
to Basel II and the emergence of  internal models are difficult to calculate. But external 
estimates put it at tens of  billions of  dollars.
For European banks, the costs of  implementing Basel III are estimated at over seventy 
thousand jobs per year (Harle et al. 2010). For US banks, the costs of  Dodd–Frank are also 
estimated to be tens of  thousands of  jobs. The costs of  Solvency II, the new capital standard 
for European insurance companies, have been put at tens of  billions of  euros—and it is 
unclear even whether this standard will be implemented. At the same time, regulators have 
continued to bulk up their own resources in the face of  a rising tide of  regulatory rules.
Ultimately, these costs are borne not by regulators or regulated firms, but by general 
taxpayers and bank customers. These come in the form of  higher taxes, lower savings 
rates, and higher lending rates. If  system stability can be achieved in simpler ways, these 
are deadweight costs to society.
The unlevel playing field
A second unintended consequence of  the move to a model-based regulatory framework 
is that it has tended to work in quasi-discriminatory ways. In particular, it has tended to 
discriminate both between small and large banks and between new entrants and existing 
incumbents in the amounts of  capital they are required to hold even against identical 
exposures.
The reason for this is that small or new entrant banks will generally adhere to Basel 
I or to simple standardized approaches for measuring risk. In general, they will have 
neither the data nor the technology to support internal model approaches. But simpler, 
standardized approaches tend to require much higher amounts of  capital than internal 
model approaches. Indeed, this was a design feature of  Basel II.
Figure 2.8 demonstrates those differences among the major UK banks for a selection of  
portfolios. For an identical corporate exposure, a small bank on Basel I or a standardized 
Basel II approach holds, on average, twice as much capital as a large bank using models. 
For retail mortgages, these differences are larger still. Some internal model-based banks 
attach a risk weight to mortgages of  as little as 5 percent. A standardized-approach bank 
would need to hold at least nine times that amount in capital.
These design features of  Basel II were intended to provide incentives to banks to move 
to internal models and thereby improve their risk management. The link from the use 
of  models to improved risk management is at best tenuous. But more fundamentally, 
this design feature may also have potentially perverse consequences for systemic risk and 
competition.
Under the existing approach, capital charges will tend to be highest for those small, 
simple banks posing least risk to the financial system as a whole. The systemic risk tax is 
regressive. This regressivity will tend to worsen the too-big-to-fail problem, by providing 
regulatory incentives for the large to become larger still. The capital surcharges recently 
agreed for systemically important institutions, while helpful, are unlikely to retilt this balance. 
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Capital regulation may also have acted as a barrier to banking entry, raising the bar for 
new entrants. Neither outcome (higher risk and lower competition) is desirable from a 
societal perspective.
Transparency and market discipline
A final unintended consequence is lack of  transparency. A large bank may have literally 
thousands of  models, hundreds of  thousands of  outputs, and several million inputs. 
The height of  this information mountain makes scrutiny and aggregation of  regulatory 
capital calculations near impossible for either investors or regulators.
The combination of  complexity and manipulation has led to a loss of  faith by 
investors in model outputs, and in particular, risk weights over the past few years. Surveys 
of  investors suggest a fairly deep-seated skepticism about risk weights, with only a small 
fraction believing them trustworthy (Figure 2.9). From a low base, investor faith in these 
risk weights has continued to fall fast (Figure 2.10).
These concerns appear to be reflected in the pricing of  bank risk. Bank investors 
appear to have moved toward using simpler metrics, such as leverage ratios, when 
assessing capital adequacy. There is a positive correlation between banks’ leverage ratios 
and their market price-to-book ratios (Hoenig 2013). No such correlation exists for banks’ 
regulatory capital ratios. Investors seem to have begun pricing the solvency risk they best 
understand.
The lack of  transparency about and investor trust in risk weights has important 
implications. For regulators, a lack of  transparency can damage the power of  market 
discipline in constraining risk taking—the so-called pillar 3 of  Basel. Or, put differently, 
the complexity of  pillar 1 of  the Basel Tower (regulatory rules) risks emasculating pillar 3 
(market discipline). Pillar 1 has become Popeye’s forearm, Pillar 3 his bicep.3
Figure 2.8. Average risk weights for major UK banks under different approaches(a)
Source: Pillar 3 disclosures, bank calculations.
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For investors, uncertainty about banks’ true capital adequacy is priced. Where there is 
uncertainty, they will factor a premium into banks’ cost of  capital. That may be one of  
the reasons why many of  the world’s largest banks have continued to trade at a discount 
to their equity book value. Until the fog around banks’ capital adequacy is reduced, 
including regulatory-induced fog, banks’ cost of  capital may remain high.
Where Next?
Taken together, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the current regulatory 
system, however well intentioned, needs root-and-branch repair. The good news is that 
regulators internationally are increasingly coming to recognize that fact and have slowly 
begun the process of  repair. In the past year, the Basel Committee has begun work to 
improve the “simplicity and comparability” of  the regulatory framework. And earlier this 
year, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors committed the regulatory 
authorities to improve comparability of  regulatory standards.
The practical question is what might be done to improve the credibility of  the 
framework. In the spirit of  moving forward the debate, some possible practical ingredients 
follow.
Greater transparency
One simple way of  alleviating some of  the uncertainty around the existing regulatory 
framework would be through improved transparency, in particular around models and 
risk weights. Some encouraging progress has been made on this front recently. In 2012, 
the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force (EDTF) of  the Financial Stability Board produced 
Figure 2.9 Survey responses to “How 
much do you trust risk weights?”(a)
Figure 2.10. Survey responses to “Has your 
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Source: Barclays Capital. Source: Barclays Capital.
(a) Based on survey responses of  over one 
hundred and thirty investors carried out in H1 
2012 of  perceptions over the previous year.
(a) Based on survey responses of  over one hundred 
and thirty investors carried out in H1 2012 of  
perceptions over the previous year.
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a set of  recommendations for improved bank transparency. This included greater 
disclosure around the models used to calculate risk weights.
At present, banks are at various stages of  progress in implementing these EDTF 
recommendations. For example, a number of  UK banks made good progress toward 
compliance in their end-2012 accounts. A firm future commitment by global banks to 
meet the EDTF recommendations would be a material step in the direction of  improving 
transparency about regulatory capital ratios.
What the EDTF recommendations, by themselves, cannot achieve is an assurance of  
prudence in risk weights. This would require disclosure of  alternative benchmarks for 
capital adequacy. For example, last year, the Swiss National Bank requested that Swiss 
banks publish standardized measures of  credit risk as a benchmark alongside model-based 
measures. This would provide information on how prudent different banks were being in 
their model-based estimates. This, too, might be useful if  thought through globally.
A more valuable set of  disclosures still would come from conducting HPE on a 
systematic and comprehensive basis internationally—systematic in the coverage of  
different assets, comprehensive in the coverage of  institutions. Making the results of  
those exercises available to bank supervisors would enable actions to be targeted at banks 
deviating materially from the pack. Going one step further, making those HPE results 
available to investors would enable them better to price (im)prudence.
Any or all of  these disclosure initiatives would help reduce uncertainty. At the same 
time, disclosure can only ever be a partial solution. For example, by itself, it can do nothing 
to streamline regulatory complexities. In some instances, disclosure could even accelerate 
the race to the bottom—for example, if  naming resulted not in shaming, but cloning.
Imposing floors
A second, more intrusive regulatory intervention would be to place greater regulatory 
constraints on banks’ internal models. Tightening up the process around supervisory 
model approval might be one element of  that. One practical step would be to impose 
much longer look-back periods than the current minima. Another would be to require an 
extended period of  out-of-sample testing prior to model approval.
A third would be imposing direct restrictions on models—for example, by introducing 
floors on risk weights. Prompted by concerns about imprudently low risk weights, a 
number of  regulators internationally have imposed floors in the past year—for example, 
in the UK, Hong Kong, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. In the USA, the Collins 
Amendment to the Dodd–Frank Act requires banks using internal models to meet a 
100 percent floor based on a simple, standardized approach.
The imposition of  floors can usefully help cut off  the tail of  firms, or portfolios, where 
low risk weights are being set. In that way, it can help prevent capital falling to imprudently 
low levels. But setting floors also poses some difficult calibration questions. At what level, 
and level of  granularity, should floors be set? And based on what benchmark?
Answers to those questions can fundamentally reshape incentives. For example, if  
a floor is set at 100 percent of  the standardized approach, this will effectively remove 
incentives to move to models in the first place. Anything short of  a 100 percent floor, 
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while improving prudence, would not curtail complexity and inconsistency in capital-
adequacy standards.
Prioritizing leverage ratios
One more radical way of  doing so would be to place a greater emphasis on measures that 
rely neither on models nor on risk weights—for example, through a simple leverage ratio. 
Basel III made significant headway in this regard. Once implemented, it will introduce 
for the first time an internationally agreed 3 percent leverage ratio as a backstop to risk-
based capital measures.
The question is whether this formulation goes sufficiently far in tackling problems 
of  consistency, incentives, and uncertainty affecting risk-based standards. Is 3 percent 
inadequate? And, relatedly, should the backstop instead be a front stop? A widening array 
of  officials and academics have recently opined on both questions, often answering yes to 
both (Admati and Hellwig 2013; Systemic Risk Council 2012; Johnson 2013; Haldane 2012; 
Hoenig 2013; Fisher 2013; Norton 2013; King 2013; Stein 2013; Brown and Vitter 2013).
The recent legislative proposal by US senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter is 
one of  the most radical proposals to date. It advocates a tiered set of  leverage ratio 
standards, rising to 15 percent for banks with assets in excess of  US$500 billion. Risk-
based standards would be jettisoned entirely. From a simplicity and robustness perspective, 
it has attractions.
At the same time, the Brown–Vitter proposals clearly raise a host of  practical 
questions. They are sufficiently far north of  existing capital standards that they are 
perhaps at best seen as a (possibly distant) long-term resting place, not a practical near-
term objective. There is also a question of  whether removing risk-based standards is 
necessary or desirable. Placing leverage and risk-based standards on a more equal footing 
might give us the best of  both worlds, with them acting jointly as regulatory bookends.
Whatever the merits of  particular proposals, it is entirely right that the official sector 
should continuously assess whether the financial system has adequate capital insurance 
to deal with too-big-to-fail problems. The emerging consensus, within academia, 
officialdom, and among market participants, is that it has not. Despite enormous progress 
in developing policy proposals, too-big-to-fail is an itch that remains unscratched.
Were this debate to conclude that greater capital insurance was necessary, this would 
pose challenges to the world’s largest banks—but also opportunities. A more prudent capital 
rule could, over time, give regulators greater assurance. Too-big-to-fail could, over time, be 
removed from our lexicon. Overcomplex regulation could, over time, be streamlined from 
our legislatures. Supervisors and compliance officers could, over time, be re-employed as 
brain surgeons. And banks, over time, could be left to run themselves, albeit within predefined 
constraints. This is a deal a foresighted CEO, or indeed official, might wish to strike.
Conclusion
Over the course of  the past 20 years, banking regulation has edged in a self-regulatory 
direction for understandable, but self-defeating reasons. The regulatory regime has tilted 
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from constrained discretion to unconstrained indiscretion. It will be a long journey home, 
but that journey has started. Making greater use of  simple, prudent regulatory metrics 
could restore faith, hope, and clarity to the financial system to the benefit of  banks, 
investors, and regulators alike.
Notes
1 Market-based measures of  bank riskiness, such as CDS spreads or credit ratings, are also 
consistent with this interpretation. If  anything, these suggest the panel of  banks is as risky or 
riskier today than 20 years ago.
2 The European Banking Authority (EBA) has also looked at the degree of  consistency of  
European banks’ risk weights, though not using an HPE methodology. It too found large cross-
bank discrepancies.
3 With thanks to Jason Kravitt.
References
Admati, A., and M. Hellwig. 2013. The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to 
Do about It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Aikman, D., P. Deb, F. Farag, V. Madouros, T. Neumann, V. Saporta, and K. Wagman. 
(Forthcoming). “Has the Quest for Risk Sensitive Capital Requirements Achieved Its Aims?”
Babel, B., D. Gius, A. Gräwert, E. Lüders, A. Natale, B. Nilsson, and S. Schneider. 2012. “Capital 
Management: Banking’s New Imperative.” McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, no. 38.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2013. Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme: Analysis 
of  Risk-Weighted Assets for Market Risk. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Online: http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs240.pdf  (accessed August 8, 2014).
Berger, A., and C. Bouwman. 2013 (forthcoming). “How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance 
during Financial Crises?” Journal of  Financial Economics.
Blum, J. 2008. “Why Basel II May Need a Leverage Ratio Restriction.” Journal of  Banking and 
Finance 32 (8): 1699–1707.
Blundell-Wignall, A., and P. Atkinson. 2011. “Global SIFIs, Derivatives and Financial Stability.” 
OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2011 (1): 167–200.
Blundell-Wignall, A., and C. Roulet. 2013. “Business Models of  Banks, Leverage and the Distance-
to-Default.” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2012 (2): 7–34.
Brealey, R., I. Cooper, and E. Kaplanis. 2011. “International Propagation of  the Credit Crisis: 
Lessons for Bank Regulation.” Journal of  Applied Corporate Finance 24 (4): 36–45.
Brown, S., and D. Vitter. “Ending Too Big to Fail: Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness 
Act.” US Senate bill summary. Online: http://www.brown.senate.gov/download/tbtf-bill-
summary (accessed August 8, 2014).
Čihák, M., A. Demirguc-Kunt, M. S. Martinez Peria, and A. Mohseni-Cherghlou. 2012. “Bank 
Regulation and Supervision around the World: A Crisis Update.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series, no. 6286.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., E. Detragiache, and O. Merrouche. 2010. “Bank Capital: Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis.” Policy Research Working Paper Series, no. 5473.
Fisher, R. 2013. “Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’: A Proposal for Reform before It’s Too Late.” Remarks 
before the Committee for the Republic, Washington, DC. Online: http://www.dallasfed.org/
news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130116.cfm (accessed August 8, 2014).
Furlong, F. 1988. “Changes in Bank Risk-Taking.” Federal Reserve Bank of  San Francisco Economic 
Review, Spring: 45–56.
Gigerenzer, G. 2007. Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of  the Unconscious. New York: Penguin/Allen Lane.
 CONSTRAINING DISCRETION IN BANK REGULATION  31
Goodhart, C. 2011. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of  the Early Years, 1974–1997. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haldane, A. 2009. “Rethinking the Financial Network.” Speech delivered at the Financial Student 
Association, Amsterdam.
———. 2012. “On Being the Right Size.” Speech delivered at the Institute of  Economic Affairs’ 
22nd Annual Series, 2012 Beesley Lectures, London.
Haldane, A., and V. Madouros. 2012. “The Dog and the Frisbee.” Speech given at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of  Kansas City’s 36th economic policy symposium, “The Changing Policy 
Landscape,” Jackson Hole, WY.
Härle et al. 2010. “Basel III and European Banking: Its Impact, How Banks Might Respond, and 
the Challenges of  Implementation.” McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, no. 26.
Hindriks, J., M. Keen, and A. Muthoo. 1999. “Corruption, Extortion and Evasion.” Journal of  
Public Economics 74: 395–430.
Hoenig, T. 2013. “Basel III Capital: A Well-Intended Illusion.” Speech delivered to the International 
Association of  Deposit Insurers 2013 Research Conference, Basel.
Hogan, T., N. Meredith, and C. Pan. 2013. “Evaluating Risk-Based Capital Regulation.” Mercatus 
Center Working Paper Series, no. 13-02.
International Monetary Fund. 2009. “Global Financial Stability Report.” Chapter 3. Online: http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/pdf/chap3.pdf  (accessed August 8, 2014).
Jacob, B., and S. Levitt. 2003. “Rotten Apples: An Investigation of  the Prevalence and Predictors 
of  Teacher Cheating.” Quarterly Journal of  Economics 118: 843–78.
Johnson, S. 2013. “Higher Bank Equity Is in the Public Interest.” Online: http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2013-03-03/why-higher-bank-equity-is-in-the-public-interest.html (accessed August 
8, 2014).
Kahane, Y. 1977. “Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of  Financial Intermediaries.” Journal of  
Banking and Finance 1 (2): 207–18.
Kim, D., and A. Santomero. 1988. “Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation.” Journal of  Finance 
43 (5): 1219–33.
King, M. 2013. Evidence given before the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. UK 
House of  Commons, March 6, 2013. Online: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/c606-xl/c60601.pdf  (accessed August 8, 2014).
Masera, R. 2012. “Bank Capital Standards: A Critical Review.” LSE Financial Markets Group 
Paper Series, Special Paper no. 215.
Mayes, D., and H. Stremmel. 2012. “The Effectiveness of  Capital Adequacy Measures in Predicting 
Bank Distress.” Paper presented at the 2013 Financial Markets and Corporate Governance 
Conference.
Norton, J. 2013. “A More Prominent Role for the Leverage Ratio in the Capital Framework.” 
Remarks delivered to the Florida Bankers Association, Orlando, February 6.
Richardson, G. 2006. “Determinants of  Tax Evasion: A Cross-Country Investigation.” Journal of  
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 15: 150–169.
Sheldon, G. 1996. “Capital Adequacy Rules and the Risk-Seeking Behaviour of  Banks: A Firm-
Level Analysis.” Swiss Journal of  Economics and Statistics 132: 709–34.
Stein, J. 2013. “Regulating Large Financial Institutions.” Remarks delivered at the IMF Conference, 
“Rethinking Macro Policy II,” Washington, DC. Online: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/stein20130417a.pdf  (accessed August 8, 2014).
Systemic Risk Council (2012), “Comment Letter re: Regulatory Capital Rules,” http://www.
systemicriskcouncil.org/2012/10/systemic-risk-council-letter-on-regulatory-capital-rules/
US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, (2013), “JP Morgan Chase Whale Trades: 
A Case History of  Derivatives Risks and Abuses”, Vol. 1 (2013) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/




FALLACIES AND IRRELEVANT FACTS  
IN THE DISCUSSION ON CAPITAL  
REGULATION
Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo,  
Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer1
Introduction
As the financial crisis of  2007–2008 has compellingly shown, highly leveraged financial 
institutions create negative externalities. When a bank is highly leveraged and has little 
equity to absorb losses, even a small decrease in asset value can lead to distress and 
potential insolvency. In a deeply interconnected financial system, this can cause the 
system to freeze, ultimately leading to severe repercussions for the rest of  the economy.2 
To minimize social damage, governments may feel compelled to spend large amounts 
on bailouts and recovery efforts. Even when insolvency is not an immediate problem, 
following a small decrease in asset values, highly leveraged banks may be compelled to 
sell substantial amounts of  assets in order to reduce their leverage; such sales can put 
strong pressure on asset markets and prices and, thereby, indirectly on other banks.
Avoidance of  such “systemic risk” and the associated social costs is a major 
objective of  financial regulation. Because market participants, acting in their own 
interests, tend to pay too little attention to systemic concerns, financial regulation 
and supervision are intended to step in and safeguard the functioning of  the 
financial system. Given the experience of  the recent crisis, it is natural to consider 
a requirement that banks have significantly less leverage—that is, that they use 
relatively more equity funding so that inevitable variations in asset values do not lead 
to distress and insolvency.
A pervasive view that underlies most discussions of  capital regulation is that “equity is 
expensive,” and that equity requirements, while offering substantial benefits in preventing 
crises, also impose costs on the financial system, and possibly on the economy. Bankers 
have mounted a campaign against increasing equity requirements. Policymakers and 
regulators are particularly concerned by assertions that increased equity requirements 
would restrict bank lending and would impede economic growth. Possibly, as a result 
of  such pressure, the proposed Basel III requirements, while moving in the direction of  
increasing capital, still allow banks to remain very highly leveraged (Blundell-Wignall et al., 
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this volume). We consider this very troubling, because, as we show below, the view 
that equity is expensive is flawed in the context of  capital regulation. From society’s 
perspective, in fact, having a fragile financial system in which banks and other financial 
institutions are funded with too little equity is inefficient and, indeed, “expensive.”
We examine various arguments that are made to support the notion that there are 
social costs associated with increased equity requirements. Our conclusion is that the 
social costs, if  there were any at all, of  significantly increasing equity requirements for large 
financial institutions would be very small. All the arguments we have encountered that 
suggest otherwise are weak when examined from first principles and in the context of  
optimal regulation. They are based either on fallacious claims, on a confusion between 
private costs to banks and social costs to the public, or on models that are inadequate 
from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. We show that equity requirements 
need not interfere with any of  the socially valuable activities of  banks, including lending, 
deposit taking, or the creation of  “money-like” liquid, and “informationally insensitive” 
securities that might be useful in transactions. In fact, the ability to provide social value 
would generally be enhanced by increased equity requirements, because banks would 
be likely to make more economically appropriate decisions. Among other things, better-
capitalized banks are less inclined to make excessively risky investments that benefit 
shareholders and managers at the expense of  debt holders or the government.3
Capital Structure Fallacies
Capital requirements place constraints on the capital structure of  the bank—that is, on 
the way the bank funds its operations. Any change in a bank’s capital structure changes 
the exposure of  different securities to the riskiness of  the bank’s assets. In this section, we 
take up statements and arguments that are based on confusing language and faulty logic 
regarding this process and its implications. The debate on capital regulation should not 
be based on misleading and fallacious statements; thus, it is important to ensure that they 
are removed from the discussion.
What is capital and what are capital requirements?
“Every dollar of  capital is one less dollar working in the economy” (Steve Bartlett, 
Financial Services Roundtable, reported by Floyd Norris, “A Baby Step toward 
Rules on Bank Risk,” New York Times, September 17, 2010).
Fallacy: “Capital represents money that banks must set aside and keep idle, and it 
cannot be used productively.”
Assessment: This statement and the above quote are false and misleading. They 
confuse the two sides of  the balance sheet. They portray capital as idle and thus 
costly. In fact, capital requirements address how banks are funded, not what assets 
they invest in or hold, and they do not require setting aside funds and not investing 
productively; once reserve or liquidity requirements are met, all bank capital can be 
deployed to make loans or otherwise invest and earn market returns or higher.
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The discussion about bank capital is often clouded by confusion between capital 
requirements and liquidity or reserve requirements. This confusion has resulted in 
routine references in the press to capital as something banks must “set aside” or “hold 
in reserve.” Capital requirements refer to how banks are funded, and, in particular, the 
mix between debt and equity on the balance sheet of  the banks. There is no sense in 
which capital is idly “set aside” by the banks. Liquidity or reserve requirements relate to 
the type of  assets and asset mix banks must hold. Since they address different sides of  the 
balance sheet, there is no immediate relation between liquidity or reserve requirements 
and capital requirements. However, if  there is more equity and less debt on the balance 
sheet, liquidity concerns may not be as acute, because creditors have relatively fewer 
claims, and the probability of  insolvency is smaller; hence, a run by creditors is less of  
a problem to be concerned about. High equity can therefore alleviate concerns about 
liquidity.
Equity simply represents an ownership claim in the form of  common shares of  stocks, 
such as those traded on stock markets. Equity is considered as a cushion or a buffer 
because its holders do not have a hard claim against the issuer; if  earnings turn out to be 
low or even negative, the bank can lower its payout to equity holders without any notion 
of  default.
Equity requirements and balance sheet mechanics
Fallacy: “Increased capital requirements force banks to operate at a suboptimal 
scale and to restrict valuable lending and/or deposit taking.”
Assessment: To the extent that this implies balance sheets must be reduced in 
response to increased equity requirements, or that deposits must be reduced, this 
is false. By issuing new equity if  necessary, banks can respond to increased capital 
requirements without affecting any of  their profitable or socially valuable activities.
While one should be concerned about the effects proposed regulations might have on the 
ability of  banks to carry out their core business activities, increasing the size of  the equity 
cushion does not in any way mechanically limit the ability of  a bank to lend. To see this, 
consider a very simple example.
Assume that capital requirements are initially set at 10 percent: a bank’s equity must 
be at least 10 percent of  the value of  the bank’s assets.4 For concreteness, suppose that 
the bank has US$100 in loans, financed by US$90 of  deposits and other liabilities, and 
US$10 of  equity, as shown in the initial balance sheet in Figure 3.1. Now assume that 
capital requirements are raised to 20 percent. In Figure 3.1, we consider three ways in 
which the bank balance sheet can be changed to satisfy the higher capital requirement, 
fixing the value of  the bank’s current assets. One possibility is shown in Balance Sheet 
A, where the bank “de-levers” by significantly scaling back the size of  its balance 
sheet, liquidating US$50 in assets, and using the proceeds to reduce total liabilities 
from US$90 to US$40. In Balance Sheet B, the bank satisfies the higher 20 percent 
capital requirement by recapitalizing, issuing US$10 of  additional equity and retiring 
US$10 of  liabilities, and leaving its assets unchanged. Finally, in Balance Sheet C, the 
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bank expands its balance sheet by raising an additional US$12.5 in equity capital and 
using the proceeds to acquire new assets.
Note that only when the bank actually shrinks its balance sheet, as shown in A, is the 
bank reducing the amount of  lending it can undertake. In both B and C, the bank can 
support the same amount of  lending as was supported by the original balance sheet.
In Balance Sheet B, some liabilities are replaced with equity. Specific types of  
liabilities, such as deposits, are part of  a bank’s “production function” in the sense that 
their issuance is related to the provision of  transactions and other convenience services 
that the bank provides to its customers. At first glance, therefore, Balance Sheet B might 
seem to imply that higher capital requirements force the bank to reduce its supply of  
deposits, which would be socially costly if  the associated services are both profitable for 
the bank and beneficial for the economy. In practice, however, deposits are not the sole 
form of  bank liabilities. For example, non-trivial portions of  bank finance, especially for 
large commercial banks, come in the form of  long-term debt. Replacing a portion of  
this long-term debt with equity will increase bank capital without reducing its productive 
lending and deposit-taking activity.5 Given the fact that banks are not wholly funded by 
deposits, banks can meet increased capital requirements without reducing the amount of  
their deposits or the amount of  their assets.
It is also possible for a bank to comply with higher capital requirements in a way that 
does not reduce the dollar value of  either the liabilities or the assets. Balance Sheet C 
meets the higher capital requirements while keeping both the original assets (e.g. loans) 
and all of  the original liabilities (including deposits) of  the bank in place. Additional 
equity is raised and new assets are acquired. In the short run, these new assets may 
simply be cash or other marketable securities (e.g. Treasuries) held by the bank. As new, 
attractive lending opportunities arise, these securities provide a pool of  liquidity for the 
bank to draw upon to expand its lending activity.
It is important to emphasize that, as long as the bank is currently solvent, Balance Sheet C 
is always viable; the bank should be able to raise the desired capital quickly and efficiently 
through, for example, a rights offering. Indeed, the inability to raise the capital needed to 
move to Balance Sheet C provides definitive evidence of  the bank’s insolvency (Admati 
et al. 2013).
Figure 3.1. Alternative responses to increased equity requirements
Balance sheets with reduced leverage (higher equity to assets)Initial balance sheet
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To summarize, in terms of  simple balance sheet mechanics, the notion that increased 
equity capital requirements force banks to reduce lending and/or deposit-taking activities 
is simply false. Banks can preserve or even expand lending activities by changing to 
Balance Sheets B or C.
Equity requirements and return on equity
Fallacy: “Increased equity requirements will hurt bank shareholders since it would 
lower the banks return on equity (ROE).”
Assessment: This is false; a reduction in ROE does not indicate decreased value 
added. While increased capital requirements can lower the ROE in good times, they 
will raise ROE in bad times, reducing shareholder risk.
One concern about increasing equity capital requirements is that such an increase will 
lower the returns to the bank’s investors. In particular, the argument is often made that 
higher equity capital requirements will reduce the banks’ ROE to the detriment of  their 
shareholders.
This argument presumes that ROE is a good measure of  a bank’s performance. 
Since ROE (or any simple measure of  the bank’s return) does not adjust for scale or 
risk, there are many potential pitfalls associated with this presumption. Using ROE to 
assess performance is especially problematic when comparisons are made across different 
capital structures. The focus on ROE has therefore led to much confusion about the 
effects of  capital requirements on shareholder value.
We illustrate the consequence of  an increase in equity capital on ROE in Figure 
3.2. This figure shows how the bank’s realized ROE depends on its return on assets 
(before interest expenses). For a given capital structure, this dependence is represented 
by a straight line.6 This straight line is steeper the lower the share of  equity in the 
bank’s balance sheet. Thus, in Figure 3.2, the steeper line corresponds to an equity 
share of  10 percent, the flatter line to an equity share of  20 percent. The two lines 
cross when the bank’s ROE is equal to the (after-tax) rate of  interest on debt, assumed 
to be 5 percent in the figure. Above that level, ROE is indeed lower with higher 
capital. Below the 5 percent level, however, ROE is higher with higher capital, as the 
cushioning effect of  higher capital provides downside protection for equity holders 
and reduces their risk.
The figure illustrates the following key points:
 • For a given capital structure, ROE does reflect the realized profitability of  the bank’s 
assets. But when comparing banks with different capital structures, ROE cannot be 
used to compare their underlying profitability.7
 • Higher equity capital requirements will tend to lower the bank’s ROE only in good 
times when the return on assets is high. They will raise the ROE in bad times when 
the return on assets is low. From an ex ante perspective, the high ROE in good times 
that is induced by high leverage comes at the cost of  having a very low ROE in bad 
times.
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On average, of  course, banks hope to (and typically do) earn ROE well in excess of  the 
return on their debt. In that case, the average effect on ROE from higher equity capital 
requirements would be negative. For example, if  the bank expects to earn a 6 percent 
return on its assets, then it would expect a 15 percent ROE on average with 10 percent 
capital, and only a 10 percent ROE on average with 20 percent capital. Is this effect a 
concern for shareholders?
The answer is no. Because the increase in capital provides downside protection that 
reduces shareholders’ risk, shareholders will require a lower expected return to be willing to invest 
in a better-capitalized bank. This reduction in the required expected return on equity and 
debt will offset the reduction in the average ROE, leading to no net change in the value 
to shareholders (and thus the firm’s share price). Indeed, in the above example, if  the 
equity investors required a 15 percent expected return initially, we would expect their 
required return to fall to 10 percent due to the reduction in risk with the increase in the 
firm’s capital.8 As shareholders continue to earn their required return, there is no cost 
associated with the increase in equity capital.
Capital structure and the cost of  capital
Fallacy: “Increased equity requirements increase the funding costs for banks because 
they must use more equity, which has a higher required return.”
Assessment: This argument is false. Although equity has a higher required return, 
this does not imply that increased equity capital requirements would raise the banks’ 
overall funding costs.
The example of  the previous section exposes a more general fallacy regarding equity 
capital requirements. Because the required expected rate of  ROE is higher than that on 
debt, some argue that if  the bank were required to use more of  this “expensive” form of  
funding, its overall cost of  capital would increase.
This reasoning reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of  the way in which risks 
affect the cost of  funding. While it is true that the required ROE is higher than the 
required return on debt, and it is also true that this difference reflects the greater riskiness 
of  equity relative to debt, it is not true that by economizing on equity one can reduce 
capital costs. Economizing on equity itself  has an effect on the riskiness of  equity, and, 
therefore, on the required expected return of  equity. This effect must be taken into 
account when assessing the implications of  increased equity capital requirements for 
banks’ cost of  capital.
Figure 3.2 indicates that the random fluctuations in the bank’s ROE that are induced 
by a given fluctuation in earnings are greater the less equity the bank issues. When the 
bank is funded with relatively more equity, a given earnings risk translates into less risk 
for its shareholders. Reflecting this reduction in risk, the risk premium in the expected 
ROE will be lower. Since the additional equity capital will generally reduce the bank’s 
bankruptcy risk, the interest rate on its debt will also be lower. These reductions of  risk 
premia in required rates of  return counteract the direct effects of  shifting from debt 
finance to equity finance, from an instrument with a low required rate of  return to an 
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instrument with a higher required rate of  return. The net effect need not increase the 
total funding costs of  the bank at all.9
Arguments Based on a Confusion of  Private and Social Costs
We now consider reasons why bank shareholders will resist attempts to increase capital. 
These include the loss of  tax and bailout subsidies associated with debt. All of  these 
costs to shareholders represent transfers to creditors or taxpayers. Thus, they are private 
rather than social costs. In assessing social costs, one must consider the immediate 
benefits to taxpayers and creditors that are the counterpart of  the private costs to 
shareholders. One must also consider the costs to third parties that are due to banks 
being highly leveraged and therefore very risky. As was seen in 2007–2009, distress 
or default of  banks, especially of  so-called systemic banks, can have severe, negative 
consequences for the rest of  the economy.
Tax subsidies on debt
Irrelevant fact: “Increased equity requirements increase the funding costs for banks 
because they reduce the ability of  banks to benefit from the tax shield associated with 
interest payments on debt.’’
Assessment: When debt has a tax advantage over equity, this statement is true. 
However, it is irrelevant to capital regulation in the sense that both capital regulation and 
taxes are matters of  public policy. The current tax code creates distortions by subsidizing 
leverage. These distortions can be eliminated, while preserving the same level of  
bank tax shields, at the discretion of  the government. This would neutralize the tax 
impact of  increased equity requirements.
Taxes should be structured to minimize the overall distortions they induce. In particular, 
taxes (and subsidies) should be set so as to encourage behavior that generates positive 
externalities, and to discourage behavior that generates negative externalities. By these 
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criteria, refraining from requiring banks to have more equity on the grounds that this 
would raise their taxes makes no sense. If  the prospect of  saving on corporate income 
taxes induces banks to be highly leveraged, this generates a negative externality, because 
the increase in leverage raises the probability of  a bank failure, weakening the financial 
system, and imposing losses on the broader economy. Given these externalities associated 
with high leverage of  financial institutions, tax policy should not encourage leverage. 
If  anything, tax policy should be designed to make banks internalize the social costs 
imposed by high leverage.
The current tax code can be thought of  as penalizing equity rather than subsidizing 
debt (Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan 2009; Boskin 2010). Poole (2009) estimates that 
reducing the corporate tax rate to 15 percent and not allowing financial institutions 
to deduct interest would result in the same total corporate tax expense as was actually 
incurred by these institutions.
More generally, even without fundamentally changing the tax code, it is quite 
straightforward to neutralize the impact of  increased equity capital requirements on 
the tax liabilities of  banks. Any tax subsidies lost due to a reduction in leverage can 
be easily replaced with alternative deductions or tax credits. If  indeed it is viewed as 
socially desirable to subsidize bank lending to individuals or small businesses who do not 
have a wide array of  financing options, a tax credit associated with bank lending to such 
borrowers would be more targeted, and would avoid the negative externalities associated 
with subsidizing bank borrowing.
Bailouts and implicit government guarantees
Irrelevant fact: “Increased equity requirements increase the funding costs for banks 
because they prevent banks from being able to borrow at the low rates implied by the 
presence of  government guarantees.”
Assessment: This statement is again correct, but it concerns only private, not social 
costs. Government guarantees that allow banks to enjoy cheap debt financing create 
numerous distortions and encourage excessive leverage and excessive risk-taking. 
Because of  the distorted incentives as well as the difficulty for governments to commit 
never to bail out banks, it is challenging to neutralize this effect by charging banks for 
the true cost of  the guarantees on an ongoing basis. In this context, equity cushions 
are particularly valuable, as they reduce the likelihood and cost of  the guarantees.
Explicit or implicit government guarantees immunize the banks’ creditors against the 
consequences of  a default by the bank. As a result, the default risk premium in the interest 
rates demanded by the bank’s creditors is lower and may even be zero. Institutions that 
benefit from such guarantees, for example, institutions that are deemed to be too big to 
fail, are therefore able to borrow at lower interest rates. The savings in capital costs that 
are thereby achieved are larger the more leverage the bank has.
The lower borrowing rates benefiting banks and their shareholders have a counterpart 
in the default risks borne by the taxpayer. Any consideration of  social costs must encompass 
the costs of  these risks to taxpayers. Once this is taken into account, one sees that the 
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effects of  government guarantees on borrowing rates provide no reason to refrain from 
requiring banks to have more capital. If  lower borrowing rates based on government 
guarantees induce banks to be highly leveraged, this imposes a negative externality on 
the rest of  the economy, because the increase in leverage raises the probability of  distress, 
and the resulting systemic risk.
Default risk may be unavoidable, but to the extent that there is a choice, the availability 
of  explicit or implicit government guarantees of  bank debt creates a bias toward choosing 
risky strategies to exploit the guarantees, providing shareholders with nice returns if  they 
succeed, and saddling the government with the losses if  they fail.
As is well known, such a bias toward choosing an excessively risky strategy is present 
even without government guarantees. The mere existence of  debt, with a payment 
obligation that is independent of  the bank’s asset returns, creates incentives for the bank’s 
shareholders, or for its managers acting on the shareholders’ behalf, to take risks according 
to the principle “Heads, I win; tails, the creditor loses.” Explicit or implicit government 
guarantees can greatly reduce the need for the insured creditors to worry about their 
bank’s strategy choices and default prospects. If  the government can be expected to step 
in when the bank defaults, the creditors generally have no reason to refrain from lending 
to the bank or to demand a significant default risk premium. The resulting arrangement 
may be far less desirable than even second best.
Systems providing safety nets to banks, including deposit insurance, the US Fed’s 
discount window, and lender of  last resort, can (and do) play a positive role as a stabilizing 
force, particularly in preventing the runs that have routinely plagued banks. It is often 
difficult to price explicit guarantees, and implicit guarantees clearly provide a subsidy 
to the institution whose debt falls under the implicit guarantees. In this case, the result 
is that leverage is again subsidized.10 Indeed, as discussed above, the system of  capital 
regulation is motivated by the recognition that guarantees generate distortions and moral 
hazards. Higher equity requirements, by requiring that those who own residual claims 
in the bank bear much of  the bank’s risk, reduce dependence on systems of  guarantees, 
and, instead, rely more on the private sector to provide safety to the financial system. 
Thus, they alleviate the distortions associated with the safety net.11
Debt overhang and resistance to leverage reduction
Irrelevant fact: “Issuing equity to decrease leverage is expensive because it will lower 
the value of  shares of  existing shareholders.”
Assessment: This statement is again correct but irrelevant to the policy debate. 
Any reduction in the value of  existing shares is matched by equal benefit to either 
creditors or taxpayers who would be bearing less downside risk (and providing fewer 
other subsidies to debt).
Reducing the leverage of  any firm may lower the value of  existing shareholders’ claims. 
First, given the tax advantage of  debt and the subsidies associated with implicit guarantees, 
the share price will decline to reflect the reduction in tax benefits and default subsidies. 
Second, if  the debt is currently risky, leverage reduction will reduce the risk to creditors, 
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and, thus, increase the value of  the firm’s (remaining) debt, which benefits creditors (or 
the deposit insurance and taxpayers who insure the debt) at the shareholder’s expense. 
The magnitude of  the decline in the share price provides direct evidence regarding the 
decrease in default risk achieved by the leverage reduction. Clearly, however, any cost to 
existing shareholders is not a social cost, but rather a transfer to existing creditors or taxpayers.
When a firm is highly leveraged and faces substantial default risk, the risk to creditors 
is manifested through higher yields paid to borrow (or lower prices for its existing debt 
for a fixed, promised payment). If  a borrower reduces leverage, this generally benefits 
existing creditors and increases the value of  their claims. The gain to creditors comes 
at shareholder expense, and this effect, similar to that of  debt overhang identified in 
Myers (1977), explains the strong resistance of  shareholders to leverage reductions. 
Myers (1977) coined the term “debt overhang” to explain shareholder resistance to 
raising equity to make new investments. Admati et al. (2013) show that this same effect 
is even more pronounced in the context of  recapitalizations—shareholders will resist 
any degree of  leverage reduction, no matter how inefficient the firm’s current level of  
leverage.
However, many bank shareholders have portfolios of  shares that typically include 
many other companies. Instability in banking, and especially financial crises that require 
bailouts and harm the economy, are costly to these shareholders. Those who benefit from 
high leverage are likely to be the banks’ managers and possibly shareholders whose entire 
wealth is concentrated at the bank. These individuals are not entitled to the subsidies 
and the upside of  risks taken at the expense and harm of  others. Thus, even if  leverage 
reductions, at least in the transitions, are costly to these individuals, forcing banks to 
reduce leverage is in the public interest.12
Equity Requirements and Bank Lending
“More equity might increase the stability of  banks. At the same time, however, it 
would restrict their ability to provide loans to the rest of  the economy. This reduces 
growth and has negative effects for all.’’ (Josef  Ackermann, CEO of  Deutsche Bank, 
November 20, 2009).
Fallacy: “Increased equity requirements would have an adverse effect on the lending 
decisions of  banks and will inhibit economic growth.”
Assessment: This statement is false. High leverage distorts lending decisions and 
because of  this, better-capitalized banks generally make better lending decisions. In 
particular, less leveraged banks are less inclined to make excessively risky investments 
or to pass up worthwhile loans due to frictions associated with high leverage.
When assessing the claim that increased capital requirements might cause banks to cut 
back on lending and charge more on the loans they make, note first that for many banks, 
particularly the large ones, loans represent only a small part of  the assets, suggesting 
they have plenty of  capacity for increased lending simply by substituting from other asset 
holdings.13
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Before attempting to analyze the claims that increased equity requirements would 
lead to a credit crunch, we must remember that the biggest credit crunch in recent 
memory, the total freezing of  credit markets during the recent financial crisis, was not 
due to too much equity, but in fact was due to too little equity, and to the extremely 
high levels of  leverage in the financial system. In other words, credit crunches arise 
when banks are undercapitalized. If  all banks have sufficient equity capital, they will 
have no reason to pass up economically valuable lending opportunities, and the risk 
of  future credit crunches is reduced. Quite clearly, lending was disrupted in 2007–
2008 from banks having too little equity to withstand the losses due to housing price 
declines. Studies have shown that banks with strong balance sheets were better able 
to maintain lending during the crisis, and suggest that “strong bank balance sheets 
are key for the recovery of  credit following crises” (Kapan and Minoiu 2013; see also 
Buch and Prieto 2012).
The fact that a highly leveraged bank is highly reluctant to raise equity to make new 
loans does not imply that well-capitalized banks lend less than thinly capitalized ones. 
The main impediment to bank lending is debt overhang and the only effective remedy is 
increased equity funding.14
High capital requirements will mitigate any potential debt overhang. Should a bank 
fall short of  these requirements, a solvent bank can raise its equity level by retaining 
profits and issuing new shares through a rights offering.15 Doing so would increase their 
lending capacity and, importantly, would increase their ability to continue making loans 
during downturns. Banks with more equity are less prone to booms and busts, and can 
maintain a smoother time path in terms of  lending.
In fact, we argue that if  banks have significantly more equity, they are likely not 
only to lend more, but also to make more appropriate lending decisions. Highly leveraged 
banks are generally subject to distortions in their lending decisions. These distortions 
may lead them to make worse lending decisions than they would have made if  they were 
better capitalized, resulting in either too much or too little lending relative to the social 
optimum. First, equity holders in a leveraged bank, and managers working on their behalf  
or compensated on the basis of  ROE or other equity-based measures, have incentives to 
make excessively risky investments, and this problem is exacerbated when the debt has 
government guarantees. Second, when banks are distressed, credit markets can freeze 
and certain loans will not be made due to the debt overhang problem discussed earlier. 
Valuable loans that are not made as a result of  debt overhang would be undertaken if  the 
bank were better capitalized, since in that case the value created by the loans would be 
captured by those who would fund it.
More appropriate lending decisions may involve reductions in some kinds of  lending. 
Such reductions, however, while annoying to the potential borrowers, may well be 
beneficial to the economy as a whole. For the economy as a whole, the objective is not to 
have as much lending as possible, but to have as much lending as is appropriate in view 
of  investors’ willingness and ability to bear risks. Excessive risk taking can take the form 
of  excessive lending. This should be avoided.16
Some of  the discussion of  the effects that capital requirements will have on banks’ 
lending decisions appears to involve the fundamental fallacies about capital structure 
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and banks’ cost of  capital that were discussed above. In order to avoid these fallacies, one 
must be very careful to account for changes in risk properly when considering how loans 
are made and funded. From a normative perspective, in a world without frictions and 
distortions, the decision on whether to make a particular loan or not should be independent 
of  the bank’s capital structure—that is, on how the bank is funded. The decision should 
depend only on whether the loan rate provides the bank with a sufficient premium to 
make the risks associated with the loan acceptable. This latter question, in turn, should 
depend only on the risk characteristics of  the loan and on the assessment of  these risk 
characteristics by investors in the market. Neither the bank’s other assets nor the bank’s 
capital structure should play a role.
It is true that increased equity capital requirements will remove some of  the subsidies 
banks capture through high leverage—namely, tax and implicit guarantees. If  taking 
away these subsidies causes banks to lend less, or to charge higher rates than is considered 
desirable, it may be desirable from a public-policy perspective to subsidize bank lending. 
If  lending needs to be subsidized because it is important for the economy, then more 
targeted and less costly ways must be found to provide such subsidies than encouraging 
banks to be highly leveraged.
Policy Recommendations
What is the appropriate equity capital requirement? Several studies have attempted 
to answer this question using a variety of  models to estimate the costs and benefits of  
increased equity requirements. Discussing and assessing the various empirical models 
that are used in these documents is beyond our scope here. However, it appears that 
the methods of  analysis used in most of  these studies fall prey to many of  the concerns 
identified in this paper.17
To attempt to give even a rough order-of-magnitude answer to the question of  what 
appropriate equity requirements should be, one must take into account the complex ways that 
capital ratios are calculated, something that we have not addressed in this paper. Requirements 
mostly refer to so-called risk-weighted assets, rather than the total assets of  a bank. Many 
important institutions have “core capital” equal to 10 percent or more of  risk-weighted 
assets under the Basel rules, but this is often no more than 1 to 3 percent of  total unweighted 
assets on their balance sheets. The use of  risk-weighted assets for capital regulation is based 
on the idea that the riskiness of  the assets should in principle guide regulators regarding how 
much of  an equity cushion they should require. In the recent financial crisis, however, assets 
that had zero-risk weights in the banks’ models could suddenly experience severe problems, 
and even lead to bank failures and bailouts.18 Any system of  capital regulation must come to 
terms with these issues.
Leaving aside the issue of  how one accounts for the riskiness of  banks’ assets, and 
taking as a benchmark current levels of  risk, one can discuss capital requirements in terms 
of  unweighted equity ratios—that is, equity capital relative to total assets (the off-balance 
sheet as well as on-balance sheet) held by the bank. Historical comparisons suggest that 
equity capital ratios as high as 20 percent or 30 percent on an unweighted basis should 
not be unthinkable (Alessandri and Haldane 2009). Such levels are considered minimal 
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for corporations outside banking, without regulation, and there is no reason banks cannot 
or should not rely much more on equity to fund their investments.
How would banks get to the point of  having much larger equity cushions? Should 
they be given many years to build up their equity capital? It is widely argued, and recent 
policy proposals recommend, that banks be given a very long time to adjust to new capital 
requirements. Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) based their recommendation on the 
claim that equity issuance might be costly if  investors fear that managers issue equity 
only when it is overpriced, which may then make banks reluctant to issue new equity to 
satisfy capital requirements. This problem can be alleviated if  regulators remove some of  
the discretion that banks might otherwise have with respect to equity issuance. By setting 
schedules for banks so that they must issue equity at specific times, investors will no longer 
be justified in making negative inferences about any particular bank based on the fact 
that it is issuing equity.19
Whatever the target equity ratio is, regulators should make sure to prohibit banks, for 
a period of  time, from making any payouts to shareholders.20 The eagerness of  banks to make 
these payouts is, in fact, evidence of  the conflict of  interest between shareholders on 
the one hand and debt holders or taxpayers on the other, because the funds paid out 
to shareholders are no longer available to pay creditors.21 If  done under the force of  
regulation, withholding dividends would not lead to any negative inference on the health 
of  any particular bank.
Arguments against higher capital requirements often do not directly address the 
merits of  such requirements, but are based instead on issues concerning the enforceability 
of  higher requirements. Specifically, warnings are frequently made that financial activities 
will move out of  the regulated part of  the financial system and into the unregulated 
part, the so-called shadow banking system. Given that institutions in the shadow banking 
system may have hardly any equity at all, such a development would increase the overall 
fragility of  the financial system.
Clearly, attempts to get around regulations were important in the buildup of  risk that 
led to the financial crisis. For example, financial institutions from Continental Europe 
used conduits and structured-investment vehicles located in Ireland or in New Jersey—
that is, shadow banking institutions in other jurisdictions—in order to invest in mortgage-
backed securities and related derivatives on a large scale and with a highly leveraged 
structure. The breakdown of  these shadow banking institutions in the summer of  2007 
played a major role in amplifying and transmitting problems in the US real estate and 
mortgage sectors, and turning them into a global financial crisis.
However, these issues only demonstrate that enforcement has been ineffective, and the 
weakness of  enforcement has been harmful. The expansion of  operations in the shadow 
banking system that contributed so disastrously to the crisis could easily have been avoided 
if  regulators had used the powers at their disposal. With practically no equity of  their own, 
the shadow banking institutions involved in the recent crisis would have been unable to 
obtain any finance at all if  it had not been for commitments made by sponsoring banks in 
the regulated system. These banks’ guarantees enabled the unregulated shadow banks to 
obtain funds by issuing asset-backed commercial paper. If  regulators had wanted to, they 
could have interfered on the grounds that the shadow banks were not really independent, 
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and the lack of  independence should have been recognized by putting them on their 
sponsoring banks’ balance sheets. Alternatively, if  the shadow banks were deemed to be 
independent, then the regulators should have ruled that the guarantees were in conflict 
with regulations limiting large exposures to individual parties. The fact that regulators 
saw fit not to interfere raises questions about the political economy of  financial regulation 
in the past decade, but not about the ability of  regulation in principle to prevent or limit 
regulatory arbitrage.
Regulatory arbitrage was more successful than it should have been, but it does not 
follow that we should avoid regulation. With such a conclusion, we would accept that we 
are helpless to prevent another crisis. Instead, we need to tighten both the regulations 
that we have and the defenses against regulatory arbitrage.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that arguments asserting that increased equity requirements for banks 
entail significant social costs are flawed. Why do we hear these arguments? One possible 
answer is given in the table on the last page. Both bank shareholders and bank managers 
have some strong incentives to maintain high leverage and to resist increased equity 
capital requirements. Government subsidies that reward debt and penalize equity 
financing benefit managers and some shareholders. These subsidies would be reduced 
if  equity capital requirements were increased. Of  course, arguments made by bankers 
against increased capital requirements are not automatically invalid just because it might 
be in their interest to oppose this stricter regulation. However, policymakers should be 
especially skeptical when evaluating claims that are not supported by strong arguments 
when those who make the claims have a personal interest in making the claims. As we have 
shown, the arguments that have been made in this policy debate are based on fallacies, 
irrelevant facts, or myths based on inadequate theories. Because the social benefits of  
significantly reducing bank leverage are significant, and because there are no significant 
social costs of  increasing equity requirements for banks, threats that increasing equity 
requirements would be harmful should not be taken seriously. High equity requirements 
need not interfere with any of  the valuable intermediation activities undertaken by banks 
and transitions to higher requirements can be managed relatively quickly.
Banking institutions clearly serve an important function in the economy by providing 
credit and creating liquid deposits. High leverage is not required for them to be able 
to perform these socially valuable functions. To the contrary, high leverage makes 
banking institutions highly inefficient and exposes the public to unnecessary risk and harm. 
When the possibility of  harm from the distress and insolvency of  banks becomes so large 
that governments and central banks must step in to prevent it, additional distortions arise. 
Current policies end up subsidizing and encouraging banks to choose levels of  leverage 
and risk that are excessive. Countering these forces with effective equity requirements is 
highly beneficial.
Threats that substantial increases in equity requirements will have significant negative 
effects on the economy and growth should not be taken seriously, because, in fact, it is 
weak, poorly capitalized banks and a fragile system that harm the economy. Transitioning 
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to a healthier and more stable system is possible, and highly beneficial, and would improve 
the ability of  the financial sector to serve a useful role in the broader economy.
We have based our analysis on an assessment of  the fundamental economic issues 
involved. Any discussion of  this important topic in public policy should be fully focused 
on the social costs and benefits of  different policies—that is, the costs and benefits for society, 
and not just on the private costs and benefits of  some institutions or people. Moreover, 
assertions should be based on sound arguments and persuasive evidence. Unfortunately, 
the level of  policy debate on this subject has not been consistent with these standards.
Notes
 1 This chapter is based mainly on Sections 3, 4 and 9 in Admati et al. (2013). Among other 
things, Admati et al. (2013, Sections 5–7) discusses unsupported claims that are inadequate 
for the policy debate (myths). It also explains (in Section 8) why equity dominates alternatives 
such as contingent capital and other debt-like securities that are complex, less reliable for loss 
absorption, and maintain distortions.
 2 See, for example, Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010).
 3 The key conclusions of  this paper are summarized in a letter signed by 20 academics; see 
“Healthy Banking System Is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks,” Financial Times, November 9, 
2010. For later elaboration, see Admati and Hellwig (2013a, 2013b, 2014).
 4 To keep the examples straightforward, we consider simplified versions of  capital requirements. 
The general points we make throughout this article apply to more complex requirements.
 5 According to the FDIC (March 31, 2010), domestic deposits at US commercial banks totaled 
US$6,788 billion, which represented 56.2 percent of  total assets, while equity represented 10.9 
percent of  assets. This leaves 32.9 percent of  the assets, which is almost US$4 trillion in non-
deposit liabilities.
 6 More precisely, ROE = (ROA × A – r × D) / E = ROA + (D / E) (ROA – r), where ROA is the 
return on assets before interest expenses (i.e. EBIT × (1 – Tax Rate) / (Total Assets)), A is the total 
value of  the firm’s assets, E is equity, D is debt, and r is the (after-tax) interest rate on the debt.
 7 For example, a manager who generates a 7 percent ROA with 20 percent capital will have an 
ROE of  15 percent. Alternatively, a less productive manager who generates a 6.5 percent ROA, 
yet has 10 percent capital, will have an ROE of  20 percent. Thus, when capital structures differ, 
a higher ROE does not necessarily mean a firm has deployed its assets more productively.
 8 To see why, note from Figure 3.2 that doubling the bank’s capital cuts the risk of  the bank’s 
equity returns in half  (the same change in ROA leads to half  the change in ROE). Thus, if  
shareholders initially required a 15 percent average return, which corresponds to a 10 percent 
risk premium to hold equity versus safe debt, then with twice the capital—because their 
sensitivity to the assets’ risk (and thus their “beta”) has been halved—they should demand half  
the risk premium, or 5 percent, and hence a 10 percent required average return.
 9 Continuing our earlier example, given 10 percent equity capital, the required return was 15 
percent for equity and 5 percent for debt, for an average cost of  10% × 15% + 90% × 5% = 
6%. With 20 percent equity capital the required return for equity falls to 10 percent (with a 5 
percent cost of  debt), leading to the same average cost of  20% × 10% + 80% × 5% = 6%.
10 On the size and distortions associated with bailouts and the safety net, see Akerlof  and Romer 
(1993), Alessandri and Haldane (2009), Gandhi and Lustig (2010), Haldane (2010), Kane 
(2010), Carbo-Valverde et al. (2013), Davies Richard and Tracey (2012), and Kelly, Lustig, and 
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh (2012).
11 The safety net of  the banking sector is expanding rather than contracting. Whereas 45 percent 
of  bank liabilities in the USA were implicitly or explicitly guaranteed in 1999, this had grown 
to 59 percent in 2008 (Walter and Weinberg 2002; Malysheva and Walter 2010).
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12 In our work on the “leverage ratchet effect” (Admati et al. 2014), we argue that high leverage 
may well also be privately inefficient.
13 J. P. Morgan Chase, for instance, in June 2013 had only US$700 billion in loans out of  assets that 
exceeded US$2 trillion. Indeed, its loans were actually less than the US$1.2 trillion it had in deposits.
14 Cheap loans to banks (as in the long-term refinancing operation [LTRO] of  the European 
Central Bank in 2012) or injections of  “capital” in the form of  preferred shares or subordinated 
debt (as in the Capital Purchase Program that was part of  the Troubled Assets Relief  Program 
[TARP] in the USA in 2008/2009) are not necessarily effective in promoting lending. This type 
of  support does not reduce effective leverage, and hence does not reduce the debt overhang 
problem. Acharya and Steffen (2014) refer to the LTRO as “the greatest carry trade ever.” See 
also Louise Armistead, “ECB’s LTRO Plan Flops as Banks Cut Lending,” Telegraph, March 28, 
2012. Cole (2012) shows that banks receiving capital injections from the TARP failed to increase 
their small-business lending, and instead decreased their lending by even more than other banks.
15 If  banks are unprofitable and therefore unable to raise equity, some consolidation of  the 
industry may be called for, even if  that implies less lending; in this case, less lending is likely to 
mean less wasteful lending.
16 Boom-and-bust cycles in lending are a constant feature of  modern history. Houses that were 
financed with subprime mortgages, and which are now standing empty and decaying, provide 
just one illustration of  how wasteful such excessive lending can be.
17 See BIS (2010a), Bank of  Canada (2010), and IIF (2010). The methodological shortcomings of  
these studies are discussed in Admati et al. (2013).
18 Hellwig (2010) suggested that the notion of  measuring risks is itself  an illusion, and that in 
practice, the risk-calibration approach provides banks with too much scope for manipulating 
their models so as to “economize” on equity capital.
19 Requirements should be formulated in terms of  amounts of  equity that must be raised rather 
than ratios of  assets. If  requirements are formulated as ratios, debt overhang effects may give 
banks an incentive to fulfill the requirements by deleveraging rather than by raising equity.
20 Acharya et al. (2013), Acharya et al. (2011), and Goodhart et al. (2010) suggest restrictions on 
dividends as part of  prudential capital regulation.
21 For example, the largest 19 US banks paid out US$131 billion to their shareholders between 
2006 and 2008, and these funds were not available to make loans or pay creditors as the 
financial crisis escalated. The US government invested about US$160 billion in these banks 
starting in fall 2008 and in 2009 within the TARP program, effectively replenishing the funds 
in the form of  preferred shares and subordinated debt.
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Chapter 4
COMPLEXITY, INTERCONNECTEDNESS:  
BUSINESS MODELS AND THE  
BASEL SYSTEM
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson,  
and Caroline Roulet1
Abstract
The main hallmarks of  the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on 
too much risk with other people’s money: excess leverage and default pressure resulting 
from contagion and counterparty risk. This paper looks at whether the Basel III agreement 
addresses these issues effectively. Basel III has some very useful elements, notably a (much 
too light “backup”) leverage ratio, a capital buffer, a proposal to deal with pro-cyclicality 
through dynamic provisioning based on expected losses, and liquidity and stable funding 
ratios. However, the paper shows that Basel risk weighting and the use of  internal bank 
models for determining them leads to systematic regulatory arbitrage that undermines 
its effectiveness. Empirical evidence about the determinants of  the riskiness of  a bank 
(measured in this study by the distance to default) shows that a simple leverage ratio vastly 
outperforms the Basel T1 ratio. Furthermore, business model features (after controlling 
for macro factors) have a huge impact. Derivatives origination, prime broking, etc. carry 
vastly different risks to core deposit banking. Where such differences are present, it makes 
no sense to have a one-size-fits-all approach to capital rules. Capital rules make more 
sense when fundamentally different businesses are separated.
I. Introduction
The Basel Committee of  Bank Supervisors (BCBS) has continued to lead the process of  
bank microprudential reform since the global financial crisis in 2008/9, evolving a set 
of  proposals collectively referred to as Basel III.2 The latter is a vast improvement over 
Basel II, which created an across-the-board cut in capital for banks prior to the largest 
crisis since the 1930s. The BCBS proceeded to revise Basel II by adding onto it a vast set 
of  complex new rules. The primary focus of  the BCBS is on capital rules applied to risk-
weighted assets; it has not been charged with examining the structural business models 
of  banks to which these capital rules apply. By necessity, the process has been one of  
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policy “on the run,” which was not able to benefit from any evidence-based research. As 
more and more data on banks since the crisis comes to hand, this situation is changing, 
and the relative importance of  business model factors, and capital and liquidity rules 
in influencing the riskiness of  banks, can be tested. This paper reviews the Basel III 
proposals, presents new evidence about the factors determining the riskiness of  banks, 
and asks whether structural reform of  banks’ business models is a necessary part of  the 
reform process.
There are two broad paths to bank failure: fundamental insolvency and/or liquidity 
crises typically arising from counterparty risk. A sudden decline in asset values (if  properly 
marked to market) can wipe out bank capital. But the very risk of  this in a crisis makes 
counterparties unwilling to lend, which is especially problematic when banks need cash 
and/or liquid securities to meet margin calls for derivatives transactions, repos, and other 
collateral needs.3 This depends very much on the structural business model of  banks. Bad 
assets, on the other hand, are easier to hide, particularly when they are illiquid, rely on 
mark-to-model valuations, and/or are held to maturity in banking books.4 These assets 
may take many years to mature, at which time their true recovery value is realized. If  it is 
below the previously reported value, write downs will follow, and this can go on for some 
years after a crisis. Banks in this position (latent insolvency with bank and regulatory 
forbearance) are often forced into deleveraging and asset sales. Less important banks are 
sometimes forced to fail, though this discipline has been more common in the USA than 
in Europe. Where banks are systemically important, governments do intervene to lessen 
the deadweight losses to the economy from a systemic crisis, and this sort of  implicit 
guarantee can lead to the underpricing of  risk, causing leverage and counterparty risk to 
be higher than it would otherwise be. The bank is rewarded if  the strategy works and the 
taxpayer bears the risk alongside shareholders if  it fails.
Historically, policymakers have at times, particularly in the USA, combined capital 
rules with policies that constrain the business models of  banks (such as Glass–Steagall). 
But this was gradually undermined by the great push for deregulation in the past few 
decades. At the national level, regulators are implementing the capital rules in different 
ways, and are also combining this with some attempts to constrain certain aspects of  
what banks actually do—bank business models (Vickers, Volcker, Liikanen, and Swiss’s 
“separability” requirements). This paper first looks at the Basel system historically, and 
then summarizes most of  the key problems with it that contributed to the failure of  
regulation to avoid the recent global financial crisis. In Section II, the paper summarizes 
the recent Basel III proposals, and Section III critically analyzes them. Section IV 
presents new empirical evidence on leverage and business model features that make 
banks risky, and hence need to be addressed by regulation. This section asks whether 
Basel III addresses these issues appropriately. Finally, Section V, in conclusion, provides a 
summary of  the main arguments.
II. The Basel System Historically
Capital regulations under Basel I came into effect in December 1992 (after development 
and consultations since 1988; BCBS 1988). The aims were to require banks to maintain 
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enough capital to absorb losses without causing systemic problems and to level the playing 
field internationally (to avoid competitiveness conflicts): a minimum ratio of  4 percent for 
Tier 1 capital (which should mainly be equity less goodwill) to risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
and 8 percent for Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital (certain subordinated debt, etc.).5 The Basel 
I risk weights were fixed by the BCBS. A “revised framework” known as Basel II was 
released in June 2004 (BCBS 2004) after many issues arose with Basel I, most notably that 
regulatory arbitrage was rampant (Jackson 1999). Basel I gave banks the ability to control 
the amount of  capital they required by shifting between assets with different weights on 
balance sheet, and by securitizing assets and shifting them off  balance sheet—a form of  
disintermediation. Banks quickly accumulated capital well in excess of  the regulatory 
minimum, and capital requirements, in effect, had no constraining impact on banks’ risk 
taking.
Basel II cut risk weights across the board and introduced an enormous moral hazard 
into the pillar 1 capital rules for large complex banks by letting them use their own 
internal risk models to determine the riskiness of  assets to which risk weighting would 
apply. Total RWA is based on a complex system of  risk weighting that applies to “credit,” 
and adds on a calculation of  market risk (MR) and operational risk (OR), which are 
calculated separately:
Equation 4.1
RWA = 12.5 (OR + MR) + ∑i wi Ai
where: wi is the risk weight for asset I, and Ai is asset I, OR and MR are directly 
measured and grossed up by 12.5 for 8 percent equivalence, and credit risk is the sum of  
the various asset classes, each weighted by its appropriate risk weight. Banks were to be 
able to choose between: first, a simplified approach (for smaller institutions without the 
capacity to model their business in risk terms) by using revised fixed weights; second, an 
approach based on external ratings; and third, an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach 
for sophisticated banks, driven by their own internal rating models. This paper focuses 
mostly on the latter banks, which are central to the issues of  counterparty risk and 
systemic issues.
The IRB approach requires banks to specify the probability of  default (PD) for each 
individual credit, its loss given default (LGD), and the expected exposure at default 
(EED). This requires highly complex modeling and aggregation, and offers banks with 
the necessary expertise the possibility of  deriving more risk-sensitive weights. This 
approach requires the approval of  the bank’s supervisor. By proposing this system, the 
BCBS contributed directly to the buildup of  leverage that was one of  the principle causes 
of  the crisis.
In previous studies, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson focused on several major problems 
with the Basel II approach; notably, portfolio invariance (no penalty for concentration; 
Gordy 2003); the assumption of  a single global risk factor;6 the pro-cyclicality of  Basel; 
inconsistent internal models used for calculating risk weights and subjective inputs; 
unclear and inconsistent definitions (particularly capital); the inadequate treatment 
of  interdependence risk (especially in the area of  derivatives);7 and the failure to deal 
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with business models and the problem of  “too big to fail” (TBTF) (so that pillar 3 could 
never work). This latter TBTF aspect is important, not so much because traders and 
shareholders are not punished by failed strategies—they are—but rather because other 
risk-taking institutions can assume that their counterparty positions will not default if  the 
bank that they deal with is TBTF. Risk taking is underpriced as a consequence. This issue 
relates to the structure of  banks and their resolvability; while it directly affects the capital 
risked by a bank, it has not been the main focus of  the BCBS.
III. The Basel III Reforms
Basel III looks to deal with the above issues by raising the quality of  capital, by adding 
buffers for large banks, by adding charges for counterparty credit risk, and by considering 
a very weak leverage ratio (BCBS 2001, June). Basel III also aims to deal with liquidity 
coverage issues in the light of  problems that arose in relation to meeting counterparty 
commitments (derivatives and repos in particular). It is also working on stable funding 
to avoid excessive dependence on short-term wholesale funding to fund long-term 
assets. Greater monitoring and disclosure to supervisors of  risk factors (e.g. contractual 
mismatches) not otherwise directly addressed in the regulations are also mentioned.
The main features of  capital-regulation reform are as follows:
• Raising the quality consistency and transparency of  the capital base: Basel III stresses that 
quality equity is the best form of  capital and hence requires multiple deductions from 
common equity (goodwill; minority interest; deferred tax assets net of  liabilities; bank 
investments in its own shares; bank investments in other banks, financial institutions, 
and insurance companies with the 10 percent rule; provisioning shortfalls; and other 
minor deductions, such as the banks’ defined-benefit pension scheme holdings of  the 
bank’s shares). Criteria for Tier 2 capital are toughened: it must be subordinate to 
depositors, have a five-year minimum maturity, and there must be no incentives to 
redeem. Tier 3 capital is abolished. Common equity T1 (CET1) as a percentage of  
RWA is to be phased in from 3.5 percent in 2013 to 4.5 percent by 2015, and total Tier 
1 from 4.5 percent to 6 percent over the same period.
• Capital conservation buffer: Outside of  periods of  stress, a buffer is to be phased in to 2.5 
percent above the CET1 minimum by January 1, 2019. This may be run down in 
periods of  stress, and built up again afterwards (e.g. by reducing discretionary dividend 
distributions, buybacks, and staff  bonus payments).
• Dealing with pro-cyclicality: To deal with this problem, largely introduced by Basel 
II anyway, a countercyclical buffer will apply, which can vary in a range of  0–2.5 
percent, based on national authorities’ assessment of  excess credit growth, weighted 
by the operations of  the bank in all its different jurisdictions. More forward-looking 
provisioning shortfalls to be deducted from equity should also be seen in the context of  
addressing pro-cyclicality, as should the longer run calibration of  the PD in modeling 
risk.8
• The 2019 introduction of  a leverage ratio: The BCBS is proposing a parallel run (2013 to 
2017) that could result in a 3 percent leverage ratio based on Tier 1 capital, maintained 
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on a 3-month-ended basis from 2019. Banks have begun testing this now to see what 
it means for their businesses. Exposure consists of  on–balance sheet assets, plus 
derivatives at replacement cost with positive values (plus an add-on for potential future 
exposure, e.g. 5 percent or 10 percent), plus securities financing, plus other off–balance 
sheet exposures (with a 100 percent credit conversion factor). Legally valid bilateral 
netting of  derivative transactions is allowed for calculating derivatives exposure.9 For 
written credit derivatives, the full notional value is to be used in the exposure measure, 
but any purchased CDS on the same reference entity can be netted if  its remaining 
maturity is equal to or greater than the written derivative. Collateral received cannot 
be netted against derivatives exposure; the replacement cost of  derivatives must be 
grossed up by any collateral used to reduce its net value. This is because collateral 
received does not reduce leverage, as the bank can re-hypothecate the collateral 
received. Collateral provided must gross up the exposure measure where it would 
otherwise reduce on–balance sheet exposure: under IFRS, the fall in cash assets is 
grossed up by a rise in receivables. Under GAAP, where derivative instruments are 
held off  balance sheet, the replacement cost is to be arrived at by summing the positive 
fair values. For credit derivatives, the full notional value of  written contracts must be 
reduced by any purchased CDS of  the same reference entity, where the maturity of  the 
purchased CDS is greater than the written CDS.
Dealing with systemic risk and interconnectedness:
• The Trading Book reforms of  2008: an incremental risk charge (IRC) equal to the estimated 
default and migration risk of  unsecuritized products over a one-year capital horizon (at the 
99 percent confidence interval), to allow for credit default and migration risk in bank trading 
books. These types of  losses cannot be captured in banks’ shorter-term VaR modeling. 
This is aimed at providing for the sort of  losses that resulted from banks unwinding trading 
book assets in illiquid markets in 2008; it has the effect of  adding to RWA.
Subsequently, Basel III attempts further to deal with interconnectedness risk by better 
calibration of  the capital rules:
• A capital requirement for counterparty credit risk (CCR): using stressed inputs, helping to 
remove pro-cyclicality that might arise from using current volatility-based risk inputs.
• Credit valuation adjustments (CVA): capital charges on positive exposures that are 
(therefore) associated with the deterioration in the creditworthiness of  a counterparty 
(as opposed to its outright default), valuing counterparty risk in bond equivalents, and 
applying the MR regulatory charge to such bond equivalents (after deducting the 
IRC). Transactions with a central clearing counterparty (CCP) can be excluded, as can 
certain non-material securities financing transactions. The CVA is calculated within 
each of  the netting sets and is then added across netting sets.10 Banks employ CVA 
desks to hedge with external counterparties to get CVA credit offsets to this charge.
• A pillar 1 capital charge for wrong-way risk: transactions with counterparties, especially 
financial guarantors, whose PD is positively correlated with the amount of  exposure. 
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This will be done by adjusting the multiplier applied to the exposure amount identified 
as wrong-way risk.
• An asset valuation correlation multiplier (AVC) of  1.25, to be applied to exposures to regulated 
financial firms with assets of  at least US$100 billion (since AVCs were 25 percent 
higher during the crisis for financial versus non-financial firms). This would have the 
effect of  raising risk weights for such exposures.
• The application of  tougher (longer) margining periods: as a basis for determining regulatory 
capital when banks have large and illiquid derivative exposures to counterparties.
• A zero risk weight for counterparty risk exposure with exchanges and CCPs: hence, creating an 
incentive to use exchanges and CCPs (since higher charges will apply for bilateral 
OTC derivatives).
Basel III deals with the liquidity coverage issues in the following way:11
• The liquidity coverage ratio: Banks are required to maintain a ratio equal to or greater than 
100 percent of  high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) to total net cash outflows for the 
next 30 days (enough to cover a stressed event).
• HQLA consists of  level 1 assets, which are mostly those used in central bank transactions, 
such as cash, central bank reserves, securities backed by some sovereigns and central 
banks; plus level 2 assets, category A (certain sovereign debt, covered bonds, and 
corporate debt), and category B (lower-rated corporate bonds, residential mortgage-
backed securities, and certain equities). Level 2 assets can be at most 40 percent of  
HQLA and 2B at most 15 percent.
• Cash net outflow consists of  payable liabilities (including off–balance sheet commitments) 
multiplied by the rates that they are expected to run down in a stressed event, less 
receivables times the rate at which they are expected to flow in. Inflows are capped 
at 75 percent of  expected outflows to ensure a minimum HQLA holding. In normal 
periods, the ratio is maintained, but can be used with supervisory approval in the event 
of  a stress event.
With respect to stable funding, the following proposals are under consideration:
• Net stable funding ratio: While work is still ongoing (to be reported in 2014), the proposal 
is that banks maintain a ratio equal to or greater than 100 percent of  available stable 
funding to required stable funding.
• Available stable funding is defined as: Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (100 percent) + preferred stock 
not in Tier 2 with maturity ≥ 1 year (100 percent) + liabilities ≥ 1 year (100 percent) + 
stable shorter-term retail and small-business funding (with ≤ €1m per customer) 
(85 percent) + less stable (e.g. uninsured non-maturity) retail and small-business funding 
(70 percent) + unsecured wholesale funding (50 percent). Central bank discounting is 
excluded to avoid overreliance on central banks.
• The required stable funding (RSF) is based on on–balance sheet and off–balance sheet 
exposures, and is defined as: cash, securities ≤ 1 year, loans to financial firms ≤ 1 year 
(0 percent) + unencumbered marketable sovereign, central bank, BIS, IMF, etc., AA 
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or higher with a 0 percent Basel III risk weight (20 percent) + gold, listed equities, 
corporate bonds AA– to A– ≥ 1 year, loans to non-financial corporate ≤ 1 year 
(50 percent) + loans to retail clients (85 percent) + all else (100 percent). Off–balance 
sheet exposures to be included are conditionally revocable and irrevocable credit facilities 
to persons, firms, SPVs, and public sector entities: a 10 percent RSF of  the currently 
undrawn portion. All other obligations will have an RSF set by the national supervisor.
In 2012, the BCBS launched the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP) 
to monitor the consistency of  the introduction of  Basel III in national jurisdictions, and 
to provide analysis on the outcomes. The first set of  findings published in January 2013 
are of  some concern—they show considerable variation in the risk weighting of  assets 
held in the trading book due to factors other than risk exposure.12
National approaches recognize that Basel III is not enough
The FDIC in the USA has long pointed to the problems with the Basel risk-weighting 
approach, which creates only the “illusion of  capital adequacy” (Hoenig 2013; Norton 
2013). The Collins Amendment to the Dodd–Frank Act, drafted by the FDIC, removes 
trust-preferred securities from Tier 1 capital, and establishes that there should be two 
floors for insured deposit institutions, bank and thrift holding companies, and systemically 
important non-bank financial companies: (i) not less than the generally applicable risk-
based capital leverage ratio requirements; and (ii) not quantitatively lower than these 
requirements as they were in effect for insured depository institutions as of  the date of  
the enactment of  the bill. In July 2013, the FDIC and the US Federal Reserve issued 
a joint statement referring to research that shows that the Basel III 3-percent leverage 
ratio would have done little to ameliorate the last crisis, and that eight TBTF US-insured 
bank-holding companies (BHCs) would have to meet a 5 percent leverage rule, and 
6 percent for insured depository institutions inside such groups, in order to be considered 
“well capitalized” for prompt corrective-action purposes. At the same time, the Volcker 
Rule (discussed below) was enacted to take up the issue of  separating banks from certain 
risky business activities—indicating agreement with those believing that bank risk could 
not be left to the Basel III standards alone.
The USA has introduced the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) 
exercise and approves the capital plans of  18 BHCs (Federal Reserve 2013). The capital 
required is based on rigorous stress-testing exercises. The USA has doubled the amount 
of  capital held by these 18 BHCs (to US$792 billion at the end of  2012 from US$393 
billion in 2008). In mid-December 2012, the USA proposed rules to deal with the 
operation of  large foreign bank organizations (FBOs) in the USA (Federal Reserve 2012). 
They will be required to create intermediate holding companies (IHCs) comprising all 
US banking and non-banking operations, and all US rules on leverage, separation, etc. 
will apply to the IHCs (but not to branches). These IHCs would therefore (if  the changes 
were implemented) face much tougher rules than in their home countries: US Basel III 
application, liquidity, and leverage rules. These separated IHCs would also miss out on 
wider group netting benefits for derivatives and repos. The equal treatment of  IHCs is 
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consistent with the OECD view that all financial promises should be treated equally in 
regulations, at least in the USA.
The UK follows Basel III, but puts more weight on national micro- and macroprudential 
regulation to be conducted within the Bank of  England. As with the USA, recent speeches 
by the Bank of  England have expressed grave reservations about the Basel III approach 
to capital rules, and the need to look at bank business models alongside them (Haldane 
2012, 2013). The Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) is working with individual UK 
banks to implement capital plans consistent with the recommendations of  the Bank of  
England’s new Financial Policy Committee (FPC). Where necessary, and based on stress 
tests, banks have to meet capital standards more exacting than Basel III. Following Lloyds, 
RBS, and Nationwide reviews, the most recent plan announced for Barclays includes 
new capital issuance, a disclosure plan for dividends, and the achievement of  a 3 percent 
leverage ratio by June 2014—some four years before the Basel III implementation of  
such a ratio. Recognizing that Basel III leaves business model risk issues on the table, the 
UK authorities have approved the ring fencing of  retail banking in the Vickers Report 
(discussed below).
Europe’s CDR IV follows Basel III more closely than in most other jurisdictions. 
However, following the 2011 stress tests, ministers at the EU summit in October of  that 
year agreed that a subset of  71 banks in the stress test should meet a CET1 ratio of  9 
percent by June 2010. The problem here, as noted below, is that banks can meet the 
target easily by adjusting (with their models and use of  derivatives) the ratio of  RWA to 
total assets (TA). Europe also aims to move to a banking union with one rulebook, but it 
has not sorted out how supranational regulation will work without a funded resolution 
regime. Europe too has recognized that Basel III does not address business model risk 
issues with its Liikanen Report. Discussed further below, it is the proposal on separation 
that more than any other needs major rethinking.
The OECD believes that questions of  capital and leverage must be considered 
alongside counterparty risk arising from banks’ business model issues: they are 
interdependent. These views are based on detailed empirical research using large panels 
of  bank data.
Assessing Basel III
Basel III represents an advance over Basel II, and more capital being required; the 
deductions from equity to improve the definition of  capital, the measures to counter 
pro-cyclicality, the revised LCR, and the NSFR idea might be singled out in this respect. 
However, using the portfolio invariance principle to add linear refinements to the Basel 
II capital rules adds complexity without considering the business models of  the banks to 
which they apply. This process is like creating a map on a one-to-one scale, by adding on 
more and more granular refinements. The above summary of  some of  the main features 
of  Basel III have been accompanied by countless detailed documentation, formulas, 
clarifications, and extensions. This goes on continuously, and examples from mid-2013 
alone include: revisions to the leverage ratio, loosening of  the LCR rules, and changes to 
the capital regulations for exposures to CCPs; a clarification on bank equity investment in 
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funds; LCR disclosure standards; updating the method for identifying global systemically 
important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) and suggesting higher loss-absorbency 
requirements for them; a consultative document for non-internal model methods for 
capitalizing CCR exposures; and much more. Since the Basel III reform process started, 
there have been literally thousands of  pages of  additional documentation. This certainly 
adds to bank administrative costs, where armies of  analysts are employed in risk control 
and compliance divisions; but the most important question really concerns whether 
despite all the complexity, it is likely to be the most effective approach to avoiding future 
crises.
There are two very basic problems with Basel III:
•	 First,	it	is	too	complex,	allowing	large	banks	plenty	of 	room	to	manipulate	it	with	both	
their models and derivatives, thereby avoiding effective control on leverage. In this 
respect, the RCAP finding in January for the trading book risk-weighting variations is 
no surprise.
•	 Second,	 notwithstanding	 all	 of 	 the	 above	 rules,	 Basel	 III	 has	 not	 dealt	 with	 bank	
business model issues that are at the heart of  TBTF underpricing of  risk and the 
interconnectedness that is associated with it. Instead, the BCBS puts its faith in the 
capital and liquidity rules, while moving derivatives toward exchanges and CCPs to 
handle counterparty risk, and this will alleviate the need for banks to hold capital 
where this is achieved.
Complexity and leverage
The financial system is a system of  promises, so the most basic regulatory principle 
for financial markets should be that those promises are always treated in the same 
way, no matter how they are measured with models, transformed, and/or shifted 
around in the global markets with derivatives. Basel III has continued with the Basel 
II IRB approach relying on banks’ own modeling of  the riskiness of  assets for the 
capital rule, and hence, one should not be surprised that banks will report vastly 
different levels of  capital to support an identical portfolio of  assets. In a sense, there 
is always going to be different Basel IIIs for every bank in the world. Furthermore, 
banks can still shift the promises around by transforming risk with derivatives 
(particularly CDS) to minimize their capital costs—including shifting them beyond 
the jurisdiction of  bank regulators—for example, to the insurance or hedge fund 
sectors in a least regulated jurisdiction. While the LCR and NSFR are still under 
discussion, the approach suggested also relies on banks’ estimated payables and 
receivables, and depositor behavior in crisis and non-crisis situations. It mimics the 
capital standards approach by constructing ratio constraints, assigning weights, and 
relying on bank modeling.
Risk weight optimization to reduce the ratio of  RWA to TA and hence the corpus 
to which the capital rule applies has always been a feature of  the Basel system.13 The 
objective of  listed banks is to raise the share price, which requires management to 
focus on a targeted ROE. Given that net profits at any point in time are constrained 
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by the bank’s business model and the level of  competition, the target ROE can be 
achieved by reducing the capital (K) they hold, so: K* = π/ROE*. But K* is also 
defined as a multiple of  RWA assets in Equation 1, dependent on OR, MR, and the 
weights wi. The latter becomes endogenous to the corporate objective of  maximizing 
the share price. As more complexity is added, the scope for endogenization of  the 
inputs to the capital and liquidity rules is increased. Banks can only be expected to 
take advantage of  this. Figure 4.1 shows the ratio RWA/TA for 27 GSIFI banks (i.e. 
21 GSIFI banks defined by the FSB and 6 former GSIFI banks that failed in the crisis, 
referred to earlier), and 564 non-GSIFI banks. The use of  models and derivatives to 
lower this ratio is systematic—it has the effect of  raising leverage per unit of  capital 
and improving the ROE.14 Since the trading book reforms of  2008, and during all of  
the Basel III consultation process, these trends have continued unabated: the recent 
RCAP exercise showing that the capital required to support the identical portfolio of  
assets varies so widely between banks is entirely consistent with the time series findings 
shown here.15
These problems related to complexity and leverage could be removed by moving 
to a simple, adequate leverage ratio, and leaving banks’ VaR modeling to their 
own internal risk controls without requiring it to be encompassed in, and hence 
contaminated by, the regulatory framework. Leverage, a key component of  bank 
risk, would be controlled directly, and would depend only on appropriate accounting 
rules. Unfortunately, however, the 3 percent Tier 1 leverage ratio “backup” goal 
being considered by the BCBS for 2019 is too lax. It allows leverage of  33-times 
capital and, in addition, banks are permitted to net derivatives transactions when 
calculating the leverage ratio. This latter arrangement has always puzzled the present 
authors: netting is a settlement concept, particularly in the event of  default, and it 
does not in any way protect a bank from market risk. Hence, netted derivatives are 
not an appropriate basis on which to base ex ante capital rules. Leverage ratios that 
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give rise to capital for ex ante market risk would be larger than those allowed under 
Basel III.
Figure 4.2 shows an aspect of  the crisis that lies at its very core—interconnectedness 
risk. The broken line shows the gross credit exposure (GCE) of  derivatives (the gross 
market value [GMV] minus netting) and the collateral demanded to cover those open 
derivative positions, according to the ISDA. From December 2007 to December 2008, 
the estimated collateral demanded rose from US$2.1 trillion to US$4 trillion; the net rise 
in collateral demanded was US$1.9 trillion; and collateral demanded has remained in 
the US$3.2 trillion to US$4 trillion range subsequently. These numbers are illustrative of  
the actual pressures that the banking system had to bear in the crisis years in respect to 
margin calls related to derivative and repo positions.
While derivatives enhance leverage and should be included in the leverage ratio, 
they also give rise to liquidity risk due to counterparty positions and the need to fund 
margin calls. New OECD empirical evidence based on a large panel of  bank data 
sheds light on which leverage concepts matter for bank risk and which do not, and 
how leverage interacts with the structural business models of  banks to determine 
overall risk. The findings show very clearly that risk weighting of  assets does not 
addresses the structural business model issues that lead to default risk. Indeed, leverage 
and derivatives are shown to interact in ways that simply cannot be addressed by a 
reasonable single capital rule.
Interconnectedness and business model risk
The process of  arbitraging the Basel capital rules and embracing the innovations in 
structured products resulted in the rapid growth of  wholesale funding of  securities 
(including repos) hedged by CDS.
Figure 4.2. The gross credit exposure (GMV minus netting) of  derivatives and collateral
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Derivatives had many advantages for TBTF banks:
•	 Shifting	ownership	of 	assets	enabled	both	the	regulatory	and	tax	system	to	be	arbitraged;	
CDS hedging to reduce capital requirements; and use of  interest rate swaps and CDS 
to arbitrage the tax system (at the very heart of  the structured products business).
•	 TBTF	banks	meant	that	counterparty	failure	was	highly	unlikely	to	result	in	positions	
not being paid out—and certainly, this belief  was proved valid with the AIG bailout 
by the US government. Risk was underpriced. TBTF implicit guarantees affect 
CDS and other spreads, and these spreads are built into bank internal risk modeling, 
systematizing the underpricing of  risk.
•	 With	respect	to	defaults,	both	US	and	EU	law	exempted	all	credit	collateralized	with	
securities, and any derivatives from the “automatic stay in bankruptcy,” and rules on 
cross-default clauses. The institutions dealing with these products could, in effect, 
front-run all others in the case of  defaults—pushing the risk to other creditors and the 
taxpayer—a phenomenon certainly illustrated in the Lehman default.
While GSIFI banks are the core of  the derivatives origination business, most banks were 
drawn into funding securities with repos, hedging them with CDS, and moving into the 
fee-for-sale securitization businesses. Many mortgage institutions (e.g. Countywide, see 
below) competed for loans to securitize assets, driving yields down, and moving into ever-
more marginal borrowers. In this respect, it is more correct to say that capital markets’ 
banking caused the subprime crisis, rather than the latter causing a crisis in the former.
Counterparty derivatives and repo risk that is  
separable from leverage rules
In a complex capital markets’ banking system, a crisis will result in asset price volatility, 
and a sharp rise in margin and collateral calls (see Figure 4.2). These have to be met. In 
normal times, the repo market and other forms of  lending adjust, and the system meets 
all of  its commitments. However, in a crisis, this lending dries up, and banks fail not 
because they are insolvent (even though they may well be), but because liquidity stops 
functioning. The central bank responses with respect to quantitative easing in the USA 
and LTROs in Europe need to be understood in this context—the inability to meet 
margin calls is the rapid path to default.
Figure 4.3 shows some elements of  the interconnectedness:
•	 The	broker-dealer	bank	A	is	engaging	in	derivative	transactions	with	two	counterparties	
B and C. Following the pale arrows for the case of  no clearing, bank A is down 100 
with B, and up 80 with C. It is therefore exposed to a loss of  80 in the event of  the 
default of  C. For bank A, the Basel III CVA charge would apply to the netting set with 
C (no offsets in the simple example, so it applies to the 80).
•	 A	is	also	down	a	net	20	when	bank	B	is	taken	into	account,	and	the	crucial	point	is	that	
this net 20 margin call has to be funded. Here there are choices, for example: (a) if  the 
bank has a sufficient pool of  liquid assets, in may sell them for cash, post collateral, and 
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treat this as a receivable; (b) it may use cash to take on offsetting derivatives positions; 
and (c) it may take a short-term repo loan (shown in Figure 4.3) with a clearing bank. 
But in a crisis situation, the amounts may be too large, and liquidity in the repo and 
derivatives markets may not be available.16 If  the broker-dealer cannot meet the margin 
call (e.g. Dexia), then it will default.
Collateral calls, tripartite repos, etc.
The typical tripartite repo transaction may involve a money market fund (MMF) earning 
a spread by providing finance to the broker-dealer A, with a clearing bank intermediating 
and requiring securities as collateral. Liquidity can suddenly dry up due to a sharp fall 
in the value of  the collateral pool, a refusal of  the MMF to roll over a loan, or a run on 
the deposits of  the MMF. In the event of  a liquidity halt, the broker-dealer will need to 
have liquid assets on its balance sheet to sell or pledge to meet the call, receive central 
bank support, or otherwise default. The tripartite repo clearing banks centralize risk 
and connect multiple institutions, so that interconnectedness risk is a major feature. It 
is inconceivable that the authorities in a crisis could allow a clearing bank to fail. This 
implicit guarantee to the clearing bank itself  causes risk to be underpriced.
Central clearing counterparties (CCPs)
Basel III appears to assume that counterparty risk can somehow be destroyed by shifting 
it to a CCP, where the CVA charge is zero. But the CCP needs capital, and it must model 
risk and set appropriate margins commensurate with that risk for all of  its counterparties 
like any other player. Following the dark arrows for the CCP case in Figure 4.3, the net 
exposure is still 20 for the system as a whole, as opposed to gross exposures of  270. Bank 
A still needs to sell assets or borrow in the repo market to meet its commitment to the 
CCP. The ability of  the CCP to guarantee the trades depends on its skill in setting initial 
and variation margins, as well as having sufficient capital to cover all default scenarios 
(the counterparties are holding a zero CVA charge for these trades). For example, with a 
major stress event, suppose that bank A suddenly owes a net 60, and the clearing bank 
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refuses to lend it in a crisis. Bank A will fail. The CCP would have to guarantee the trades, 
but may not have the capital to do so.
In effect, the CCP is akin to the role of  the clearing bank in a tripartite repo 
transaction. Market risk is not destroyed by a CCP, and the problem of  the underpricing 
of  that risk due to the TBTF implicit guarantee may be significantly worse. The CCP 
becomes a vital node, interconnecting multiple players in the financial system. The 
failure of  such a node would lead to multiple contamination effects compared to bilateral 
trading. Governments and central banks could not allow the CCP to fail. Furthermore, 
since competition between CCPs can only really take the form of  reducing collateral 
requirements to make the cost of  trading cheaper for counterparties, margins may be 
reduced, causing systemic risk to rise rather than to fall.
It also needs to be noted that it is the least risky parts of  the derivatives market that 
can be subject to clearing—for example, the large standardized and liquid interest rate 
swap market. Rather, it is the derivatives that cannot easily be cleared that were at the 
forefront of  the problem. The non-cleared derivatives market includes, inter alia, the 
following:
•	 Very	 long-term	 interest	 rate	 swaps	 (e.g.	 15–19	 years)	 sought	 after	 by	 pension	 and	
insurance companies for liability management. A part of  this market is non-standard 
and cannot be cleared.
•	 Single-name	CDSs.	The	CDS	has	the	potential	for	extreme	collateral	call	shifts	when	
the probability of  the default of  the reference entity increases. (These are popular for 
regulatory and tax arbitrage.)
•	 Swaptions—options	 on	 interest	 rate	 swaps	 (the	 rights	 to	 swap	 fixed	 and	 variable	
interest rates). This is a large market and is crucial in managing long-term interest rate 
risk across many industries. For example, if  rates were thought to rise in the longer run, 
then a firm would have the option (not obligation) to exercise a swaption to pay fixed 
rates, and to receive the rising floating rate interest payments. These can be up to thirty 
years to maturity and are highly illiquid. They are not eligible for clearing.
•	 The	forward	rate	agreement	market	for	currencies	with	long	horizons.
•	 Parts	 of 	 the	 overnight	 index	 swap	 market.	 The	 floating	 rate	 leg	 is	 based	 on	 the	
reference rate of  Fed funds or LIBOR, and it allows very short-term borrowers to 
manage interest rate risk inherent in sudden changes in the cost of  funding and income 
received on longer-term assets.
•	 Many	OTC	commodity,	energy,	and	equity	derivatives	cannot	be	cleared.
Consider the following example. If  a user takes a position in volatility with a swaption, the 
trader will typically hedge the market risk in the position with the notional amount of  the 
interest rate option equal to some percentage of  the swaption (the maturity and coupon 
of  the swap would mirror those of  the swap on which the swaption is based). But if  the 
swap is mandated to be cleared with the CCP and the swaption is executed bilaterally, 
there is no benefit in clearing the swap from a risk point of  view. The greater complexity 
may raise risk, and will certainly increase collateral costs compared to keeping the swap 
and the swaption together bilaterally.17
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CVA approach leads to concentration bias
Does the Basel III CVA charge deal adequately with counterparty risk? The CVA charge 
applies additively across netting sets. This creates an incentive for increased concentration 
in the derivatives market. If  B and C are one bank, forming a single new netting set, 
then instead of  exposure to a loss of  80, bank A will be exposed only to a net loss of  
20 within the netting set, and the CVA charge will be reduced (and reduced to zero if  
centrally cleared). The bank will be exposed to the same liquidity risk, but would hold less 
capital to deal with it. The Basel III CVA rule will encourage the larger broker dealers to 
trade with each other, raising the TBTF problem in the derivatives market and reducing 
competition. As noted in respect to leverage ratios, netting is a settlement concept, and 
it does not in any way mitigate market risk. Basing an ex ante capital rule on a settlement 
exposure concept makes little sense.
IV. New Empirical Evidence on Leverage and Interconnectedness Risk
While Basel III has propelled reform of  the capital rules, there has been no consensus on 
what to do about the risks created by the structure of  bank business models. Approaches to 
the latter include the Vickers recommendations (Blundell-Wignall, Wehinger, and Slovik 
2009; see also the Independent Commission on Banking 2011), the Volcker rule of  the 
Dodd–Frank Act (Dodd–Frank 2010, section 619), and the Liikanen proposal, which is 
influencing decisions in a number of  European countries, including France and Germany 
(Liikanen 2012). Most international organizations have focused on replacing Basel II 
with Basel III, on improved supervision, better disclosure, and cross-border cooperation. 
Better resolution regimes are proposed to deal with TBTF (e.g. IMF 2011, 2). Academics 
have stressed the difficulties of  interpreting rules based on separation proposals (Duffie 
2012), and some have been strongly against it (Goodhart 2011). However, these proposals 
have not been informed by empirical research on the determinants of  sudden moves of  
banks toward the default point. This section tests the Basel Tier 1 ratio, alongside a simple 
leverage ratio (with no Basel II netting), and the key business model attributes of  banks.
The distance to default
The starting point is to define a measure of  the riskiness of  individual banks that can 
serve adequately as the dependent variable in the panel regression study. The distance to 
default (DTD) is a measure that uses a combination of  a bank’s reported data and market 
information to calculate the number of  standard deviations the bank is from the default 
point, where the market values of  assets equals the book value of  debt. The formula to 
calculate the DTD is derived from the option-pricing model of  Black and Scholes (1973) 
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where   Vt: market value of  bank’s assets at time t, 
rf: risk-free interest rate, 
Dt: book value of  the debt at time t, 
σt: volatility of  the bank’s assets at time t, 
T : maturity of  the debt.
The calculation is set out in more detail in Appendix 1 of  Blundell-Wignall and Roulet 
(2012).
From 1997 to 2004, the DTD typically averaged 3 standard deviations in 69 large 
banks in the USA, UK, the Eurozone, and Switzerland.18 The weighted average DTD 
fell to 0 for banks in the UK and the USA, implying systemic insolvency, with many 
individual banks below the zero point. The average DTD fell to below 1 in Europe, with 
some major banks below the solvency point. The USA has recovered more quickly in 
2011/12, while many European banks are still not at a safe point. Figure 4.4 shows the 
DTD for individual banks (shown simply with a number on the horizontal axis) for the 
most recent year of  2012 (the UK and Swiss banks are shown with Europe). It is very 
clear that the US response to the crisis, with forced capital injections following proper 
stress tests on bank assets, has led to US banks moving back well above the safe zone of  
3 standard deviations, while European banks are more vulnerable.19
Modeling the DTD
A panel regression approach is used to explain the differences in DTDs across banks 
over the period 2004–12. The sample consists of  more than one hundred large, US and 
EU, internationally active commercial banks and broker-dealer banks by equity market 
capitalization. In addition, six banks that failed in the crisis, but which can be considered 
G-SIFIs (HBOS, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and 
Bear Stearns), are included. There are a total of  108 banks in the sample, consisting of  
21 FSB G-SIFI banks (excluding Asian and non-listed banks), 6 failed former G-SIFI 
banks, 2 banks with a system-wide importance in their related countries (i.e. Intesa San 
Paolo and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria),20 and 79 other large banks. Only publicly 
traded banks are included, because market data are required for the model. The data 
include all of  the banks that carry out the counterparty activities in derivatives and other 
securities that are a key focus of  this study.
The empirical model takes account of  bank size, macroprudential influences, leverage, 
and business model aspects. The equation is estimated with two alternatives for leverage: 
the leverage ratio and the regulatory capital approach of  the Basel Tier 1 ratio. The 
empirical model is specified in Equation 3, where the subscripts i and t denote the bank 
and the period, respectively:
Equation 4.3
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TA is a size variable relating to the TBTF issue, equal to the total assets of  the bank as a 
share of  total assets in the national banking system. It is expected to be inversely related 
to the DTD. K corresponds to the simple rule leverage ratio (LEV), which is expected 
to have a negative sign, or to the Basel Tier 1 ratio (T1), which is expected to have a 
positive sign. The equation is estimated twice, once with LEV, excluding the Basel capital 
concept, and once with T1, excluding the simple leverage ratio. TD is the sum of  the 
trading book and available-for-sale securities, and is expected to have a positive sign. The 
reason for this is that liquidity drives the banks’ path to default in practice when margin 
and collateral calls cannot be delivered. Liquid assets can be sold or used as collateral. 
WFD refers to wholesale funding as a share of  total liabilities and is expected to have 
a negative sign: higher wholesale funding typically at a shorter duration is less stable 
than deposits for funding longer-term assets.21 GMV refers to the gross market value 
of  derivatives as a share of  the banks’ TA—appropriately converting all US banks to 
the IFRS concept for consistency. GMV is expected to have a negative sign; this is the 
quintessential interconnectedness variable where volatility drives rapid changes in margin 
requirements. BETA is a systemic importance variable, defined as the covariance of  the 
firm’s stock price with the national stock market, using daily data to calculate annual 
observations, divided by the variance of  the national stock index. It is expected to have a 
negative sign on the grounds that the firm is more connected to the national macro and 
asset price cycle. Finally, %HPI refers to the annual percentage change in the national 
house price index, and is expected to have a positive sign on the grounds that rising prices 
improve a borrower’s equity in the home and vice versa. The two equations for the LEV 
and T1 alternatives are estimated for all banks, the G-SIFI banks, and the other large 
banks in the sample, using ordinary least squares (OLS). After testing for cross-section 
versus time-fixed versus random effects, and for the heteroskedasticity of  error, cross-
section and time-fixed effects are introduced into the regression. The regression results 
are shown in Table 4.1.22
Figure 4.4. Distance to default in 2012: US versus Europe
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Causality in the model is tested with an error correction test shown at the bottom 
of  the table: the DTD in the current year adjusts to a gap between the actual DTD 
and its predicted level in the previous year.23 All of  the error correction terms are large 
coefficients (rapid adjustment within the year) and are significant at the 1 percent level.
The equation containing the Basel Tier 1 ratio (the second column for all banks) is a 
test of  the null hypothesis that that the Basel risk-weighting approach to capital rules is 
related to the DTD, while the business model features are not (after controlling for the 
macro cycle risk factors). This hypothesis is rejected across all samples. The Basel Tier 1 
ratio appears to find no support as a determinant of  the DTD, while the business model 
features are significant mostly at the 1 percent level in the large sample, and for the 
G-SIFI group. The coefficient on derivatives in the second column is large compared to 
the equation with the leverage ratio shown in the first column, and is highly significant—
consistent with the earlier observations that the Basel system does not capture the 
interaction between derivatives and leverage on the one hand, and derivatives and 
counterparty risk on the other.
The simple leverage ratio in the preferred model in the first column (without 
derivatives netting) is well determined at the 1 percent level for the large sample, for the 
G-SIFI banks, and for the non-G-SIFI panels. The macroprudential variables in house 
prices and the market beta are correctly signed and significant at the 1 percent level 
across all models. The size of  a bank in its own market (TBTF) in the larger samples is 
significant at the 1 percent level.24
In terms or arguments relating to the business model, the GMV of  derivatives and 
wholesale funding have the expected negative signs and are significant at the 1 percent 
level for the full sample, and for the G-SIFI group, though not for the non-G-SIFI banks, 
which have only a small derivatives component in their portfolios. Trading assets have 
the expected positive signs that find support at the 5 percent level for the full sample and 
for the G-SIFI banks, but not in a sample that excludes the G-SIFIs. Notice that in the 
equation with the leverage ratio in the full sample, the size of  the derivatives coefficient 
is reduced somewhat compared to the model including the Basel Tier 1 ratio, but it 
remains highly significant. Two separable risks appear to be identified here: leverage 
(without derivatives netting) and, separately, derivatives as a counterparty and market 
risk argument. The positive sign for trading securities and its significance at the 5 percent 
level in the large sample suggests that derivative counterparty risks can be ameliorated by 
the holding of  liquid tradable assets, which provide liquidity in the face of  margin and 
collateral calls.
No one capital rule will suffice
When the DTD measure is back engineered to calculate the additional amount of  capital 
that would be required by banks through the crisis period to keep the level above 3 
standard deviations (a safe level, implying a less than 1 percent chance of  default, where 
extreme market volatility does not take the bank quickly to the zero level), it becomes 
clear that the capital rule cannot be considered independently of  the business model of  
the bank. In 2009, the 69 large US and European banks used in such a back-engineering 
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exercise had US$1.6 trillion in capital, but those below 3 standard deviations in the DTD 
would have required US$4.5 trillion more to stay at the safe level (almost a quadrupling). 
It is also clear that the bulk of  additional capital was required by the G-SIFI banks, 
because of  what they do in businesses unrelated to deposit taking and lending: in the 
capital markets, origination (including derivatives), market making (prime broking), and 
underwriting. These are different businesses, which bring very different risks, particularly 
where margin and collateral calls are concerned. To hold capital even remotely near 
the levels needed in the good times to be safe in a tail risk event would seem to be 
unreasonable.
Overall, leverage is only one aspect of  risk, and where vast differences in business 
models are concerned, it makes no sense to aim for a one-size-fits-all capital rule. Such 
a single rule does not exist. It is for this reason that the OECD argues for separating the 
fundamentally different business model features in a non-operating holding company 
(NOHC), where the subsidiaries are ring fenced in a legal structure that is binding. In 
the case of  a separation between a core deposit-taking bank and a securities subsidiary, 
the structure implies explicitly that the creditors of  the latter cannot chase the assets and 
capital of  the former (and vice versa). This ensures that the risks of  these very different 
businesses will be priced according to where they are taken, without the implicit subsidy 
of  a TBTF bank. The cost of  capital and credit will rise for the securities subsidiary and 
the business will be smaller for the same allocation of  capital from the non-operating 
parent. The securities subsidiary will not be TBTF.
Concluding Remarks
Basel II proposed changes to the capital requirement rules that allowed large banks to 
run their own internal models to calculate the riskiness of  the assets to which the capital 
rules would apply, introduced pro-cyclicality into those rules, and did so at a time when 
financial innovation made it easier for banks to shift risk via securitization, CDS, and 
off–balance sheet exposures. Banks systematically reduced the ratio of  RWA/TA and 
had insufficient capital to deal with the crisis as it emerged. This crisis had at its core both 
leverage and interconnectedness risk related to the changing business models in banking.
In reforming Basel, the BCBS sought to add linearly greater complexity to the system 
utilizing the Basel model properties of  portfolio invariance. This complexity has made it 
even more difficult to bring capital rules into alignment for all financial institutions—it 
has not achieved the regulatory principle that the financial promises should be treated in 
the same way no matter where they are shifted. Furthermore, the panel regression results 
showed that the DTD is correlated with the simple leverage ratio, but not at all with 
the Basel Tier 1 ratio; yet, despite the evidence, the reform process continues to focus 
on allowing banks to run complex models for risk weighting to control leverage, while 
business model features that have strong independent effects on the DTD have not been 
the subject of  coordinated, global reforms.
The Basel add-on proposals for interconnectedness risk and central clearing are 
untested, and there has been no sign that the size of  derivatives businesses and repo 
funding in G-SIFI banks will be reduced by the Basel reforms. The CVA charge applies 
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at the netting set level, and is additive across netting sets. Like other aspects of  Basel, the 
approach does not reward diversification. A large number of  netting pools will mean 
less scope for cross-product netting, which will add to a positive CVA charge. If  larger 
G-SIFI banks choose to deal more and more with each other, they increase the scope 
for cross-product netting and reduce the CVA charge. Hence, the Basel rule encourages 
more concentration in derivatives; it increases the TBTF problem in derivatives rather 
than reducing it. Furthermore, netting is a settlement process concept; it provides no 
protection for market risk. Basing capital rules on the netting pool is not in the interests 
of  the future stability of  the financial system.
As noted before, the panel regression results suggest that a simple leverage ratio is 
essential, but it cannot compensate for the large impact on the DTD of  business model 
features. This brings the discussion back to the necessity of  structural separation and 
where the lines for separation should be drawn. The bank regulators’ paradox is that 
large, complex, and interconnected banks need very little capital in the good times, but 
they can never have enough in an extreme crisis. Separation of  fundamentally different 
business segments is required to deal with this problem.
Notes
 1 Adrian Blundell-Wignall is the special advisor to the OECD secretary-general for financial 
markets, and the deputy director of  the Directorate of  Financial and Enterprise Affairs. Paul 
Atkinson is a former deputy director of  the OECD and the principal of  NHA Economics. 
Caroline Roulet is an OECD economist and analyst. The views in this paper are those of  the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of  any member government of  the OECD.
 2 See all of  the BCBS references below.
 3 Similarly, fear of  insolvency can lead to a “run” on deposits. This can be the most rapid path 
to default.
 4 Such as level 2 and level 3 assets.
 5 Banks may use a default risk weighting or a sophisticated internal model approach to define 
how risk assets are—the lower the risk, the lower the weight for capital purposes. A third tier 
of  capital is defined in the Market Risk Amendment to the original accord.
 6 See Gordy (2003, 23): Almost prophetically, he says, “A single factor model cannot capture 
any clustering of  firm defaults due to common sensitivity to these smaller scale components 
of  the global business cycle. Holding fixed the state of  the global economy, local events in, for 
example, France are permitted to contribute nothing to the default rate of  French obligors. If  
there are indeed pockets of  risk, then calibrating a single factor model to a broadly diversified 
international credit index may significantly understate the capital needed to support a regional 
or specialized lender.”
 7 See, for example, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008), Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 
(2010), OECD (2009), and Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2011).
 8 The Basel III proposals are broadly consistent with the 2009 independent Geneva Report; see 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009), which favors leaning into the credit cycle. However, the authors 
propose that microprudential policy should fall to national Financial Stability Authorities 
(FSAs), consolidating all financial institutions at a national level, while macroprudential 
policy should fall to the national central bank, which would coordinate site inspections, and 
other roles with the FSA. National FSAs are recommended, as national authorities pay in 
the case of  defaults. But international coordination should be achieved with supervisory 
colleges.
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 9 See BCBS (2013b); the sum of  all positive and negative mark-to-market values, but not 
including any contracts with walk away clauses—e.g. where there are no obligations to a 
defaulter counterparty.
10 The notional of  the bond is the EAD of  the counterparty (treated as fixed); the maturity of  the 
“bond” is the effective maturity of  the longest-dated netting set of  a counterparty; and the time 
horizon is one year (as opposed to the ten-day period for MR).
11 This was softened greatly compared to the original cash and government bonds focus, as it 
became clear that collateral shortage was a major issue. See BCBS (2013a, January).
12 See BCBS Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (2013, January). In fact, for portfolios 
of  identical assets, the gap between the highest to the lowest capital needed to support the 
portfolio was 300 percent.
13 Basel II permitted sophisticated banks to model the riskiness of  their own portfolios to calculate 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) to which the capital rules were applied—an approach that continues 
under Basel III. By reducing the ratio of  RWA to TA, banks are able to minimize the capital 
required to conduct their activities, and hence to expand leverage. The change in SEC rules 
in 2004 allowed investment banks to be supervised on a consolidated entities basis, in place of  
the strict SEC limitations on leverage. This was equivalent to the regulatory minimum that US 
banks would need to operate in Europe. The huge problems with the move to Basel II were 
at the heart of  the problem. See Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008, 2010, 2011, 2012), 
Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson, and Roulet (2012), and Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012).
14 The BCBS has started to look at risk weight manipulation via modeling and to take it more 
seriously; see BCBS (2013).
15 Variants of  this chart and commentary may be found in Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008, 2011).
16 It is surprising how many economists, bankers, and financial analysts point out that these 
clearing banks got through the crisis without failing, as though this suggested that the structures 
were safe. These views make no allowance for the massive support and bailouts that banks 
received from governments (particularly in the USA). Allowing AIG to fail, for example, could 
have collapsed the entire edifice. This is not the structure that is desirable for the future.
17 In other words, the delta and gamma of  a long-dated interest rate hedge may end up residing 
in different silos.
18 This sample includes the largest publicly traded commercial banks in the USA and in Europe 
with TA that exceed US$50 billion. The G-SIFI banks comprise 21 of  the G-SIFI banks in the 
USA and Europe, as officially defined by the FSB in November 2011. Banks are left out where 
the data did not extend back to 1997.
19 A standard deviation of  2 implies a 5 percent chance of  default, which is too high for the global 
financial system.
20 Their average TA and total market capitalization from 2004 to 2012 are higher than these of  
the smaller G-SIFI banks, as defined by the FSB (i.e. Nordea Bank).
21 This is short-term (including repo) and some longer-term debt securities that need to be rolled—
it excludes deposits, equity, subordinated debt, and derivative liabilities from total liabilities.
22 This set of  results adds a further year to that reported in Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2012).
23 The error correction equation takes the lagged residuals of  the panel regression and allows for 
one lagged change in the dependent variable.
24 This is true at the level for all banks and in the other large bank samples, but not for the smaller 
sample of  G-SIFI banks only. The reason for this appears to be that all G-SIFI banks are large 
and there is less size diversity compared to the larger samples.
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Chapter 5
AT THE BRINK OF INSOLVENCY:  
SHALLOW RECAPITALIZATION  
EXERCISE FAILS TO BOLSTER  
EUROPE’S AILING BANKS
Jakob Vestergaard and María Retana
I. Introduction
“European banks have made significant progress in boosting their capital positions 
and in strengthening the overall resilience of  the European banking system,” said 
Andrea Enria, Chairman of  the European Banking Authority, when the results of  
the recapitalization exercise were published. “More than €200bn has been injected 
into the European banking system,” he continued, and European banks “are now in 
a better shape to finance the real economy.” (EBA 2012b, 1)
In this chapter, we show how misleading this characterization is. The recapitalization 
orchestrated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) was based on a questionable 
capital assessment methodology.1 Basing regulatory capital requirements on risk-
weighted assets (RWA) is a much less reliable indicator of  banks’ soundness and resilience 
than simpler ratios of  capital to total assets (Acharya et al. 2011). We therefore compare 
the assessments undertaken by the EBA—all of  which are based on RWA—with data on 
leverage ratios, defined as equity capital to total assets.
The key findings are as follows. First, by equity capital criteria, the recapitalization 
of  European banks was insufficient at best, and little but a smokescreen in many cases. 
Only 7 out of  24 banks actually increased their ratio of  equity capital to total assets. 
Second, the least well-capitalized banking sector among the larger Eurozone countries is 
not Spain or Italy, but Germany, closely trailed by France. The banking sectors of  Spain 
and Italy have equity to total assets roughly double the size of  those of  Germany and 
France, contrary to what one might have expected. Third, European banking remains 
several quantum leaps away from the levels of  equity capital recommended by scholars—
and, hence also remains vulnerable to shocks, and dependent on various forms of  state 
subsidies, guarantees, and bailouts. Fourth, the EU’s new capital requirement regulation 
and directive, the CRD4, will institutionalize the European reluctance to recapitalize its 
banks, and hence impede rather than improve the resilience of  European banks.
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Our finding that equity capital levels in European banking are far below the 15 percent of  
total assets recommended in the bank capital regulation literature is not surprising. What is 
more surprising, however, is that large parts of  European banking are undercapitalized, even 
when the internationally agreed minimum requirement of  3 percent equity capital relative 
to total assets is used as the benchmark. Although this minimum equity capital requirement 
is not yet legally binding for banks, it is quite troubling that a large part of  European banking 
is undercapitalized, even by a minimum standard that is widely agreed to be far too low.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews two approaches taken by the EBA in 
assessing the capitalization and resilience of  European banks; Section 3 presents new empirical 
material, demonstrating that European banking remains dangerously undercapitalized; 
Section 4 discusses key limitations of  the European recapitalization exercise; Section 5 
reviews Europe’s implementation of  Basel III in Europe in the fourth Capital Regulation 
Directive (CRD4), noting that this legislation is likely to further institutionalize the observed 
reluctance to seriously recapitalize Europe’s banks by imposing a de facto ceiling on capital 
requirements; and finally, we offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
II. Stress Tests and Recapitalization Exercises
To assess the health and resilience of  its banking industry, European authorities launched 
three different initiatives in the period from early 2011 to mid-2012. First, a stress test exercise 
examined the resilience of  European banking to an adverse macroeconomic scenario. Second, 
a Basel III monitoring exercise assessed capital levels in European banks under current rules 
vis-à-vis full implementation of  Basel III rules. Thirdly, the EU capital exercise calculated 
which banks would need to recapitalize by what amounts of  new capital if  they were to meet 
a temporary 9 percent requirement for “Core Tier 1” (CT1) capital. In this section, we briefly 
review two of  these efforts: the 2011 stress test exercise and the recapitalization exercise.
From stress tests to recapitalization
During the months of  March and April 2011, a stress test exercise of  90 European banks 
was conducted by the EBA. The goal was to assess the resilience of  European banks to an 
“adverse but plausible” scenario, involving a deterioration of  macroeconomic variables as 
well as sovereign stress.2 The biggest banks in each country were included in the stress tests, in 
descending order, adding banks until at least 50 percent of  each national banking sector was 
covered. The main findings of  the stress test exercise, published in July 2011, were as follows:
•	 Only	8	banks	fell	below	the	5	percent	minimum	threshold	for	CT1	capital,	while	16	
banks had a CT1 between 5 percent and 6 percent.
•	 Under	 the	 stressed	 scenario,	 20	 banks	 fell	 below	 the	 threshold	 of 	 5	 percent	 CT1	
capital.
•	 Only	18	of 	the	90	banks	included	in	the	stress	test	were	able	to	maintain	a	ratio	of 	CT1	
capital to RWA of  over 10 percent in the stressed scenario.
In the event of  just a moderately stressful scenario (such as envisaged by the EBA), only one 
in five European banks would maintain a reasonably solid capital base. Thus, although 
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only eight banks officially “failed” the stress tests, in fact, only a small proportion of  
European banks appeared to be well capitalized.
In October 2011, the European Council launched a “comprehensive package aimed 
at addressing the deterioration of  macroeconomic and market conditions,” including 
a “capital exercise” for European banks (Bisio et al. 2011). First, the EBA undertook 
an assessment of  the capitalization of  a sample of  70 European banks. These were all 
the banks that participated in the 2011 stress test exercise, excluding the 20 Spanish 
banks that participated voluntarily. Banks’ capitalization levels were assessed against a 
benchmark of  9 percent CT1 capital ratio. The 9 percent requirement was framed as an 
“exceptional and temporary capital buffer” and explicitly aimed to “provide reassurance 
to markets about the bank’s ability to withstand a range of  shocks and still maintain 
adequate capital” (EBA 2011c, 1).
Twenty-seven banks were singled out for the recapitalization exercise. The aggregate 
capital shortfalls of  this set of  banks were estimated to amount to €76 billion. The EBA 
asked national authorities to require banks to strengthen their capital positions so as to meet 
the 9 percent requirement for CT1 capital (as a share of  RWA) by June 2012. One year 
later, on October 3, 2012, the EBA published the final results of  the EU recapitalization 
exercise. The total recapitalization amounted to €115.7 billion for the 27 involved banks. 
This was, in the view of  EBA, in considerable excess of  the €76 billion capital shortfall 
initially identified for these banks.3 “The vast majority of  banks in the sample meet the 
required ratio of  9 percent,” the EBA noted, and for those banks that did not meet the 
9 percent CT1 ratio, “backstop measures” were being implemented (EBA 2012a, 3). 
The message communicated by the EBA was that by summer 2012, European banking 
had significantly recapitalized; all European banks now had capital bases above the 
9 percent CT1 capital threshold, a criteria seen as stricter than the requirements of  the 
recently agreed international standard, Basel III. The recapitalization had strengthened 
the capital base of  the European banking system and had increased its overall resilience, 
without any significant adverse impact on lending into the real economy, the EBA 
contended (EBA 2012a, 4).
Scapegoating Southern European banks?
The EBA’s assessment of  the capital shortfall of  European banks has been subject to 
considerable criticism, mainly on the following three grounds: the absence of  a serious 
stress scenario, reliance on bank self-reporting, and a too modest a recapitalization 
target (Acharya et al. 2012; Jenkins 2011). Viral Acharya and colleagues estimated 
that for the recapitalization to have been adequate, the largest European banks would 
have needed a total of  between €600 and €800 billion of  additional capital—that is, 
between five and seven times as much as the capital shortfalls estimated by the EBA. 
We will discuss the adequacy of  the recapitalization in much more detail in Section 
3 below. For now, it is important to highlight a less discussed, but equally problematic 
aspect of  the assessments undertaken by the EBA: the stress test data released by the 
EBA made the European banking crisis seem mainly Southern European, when in 
reality, it was not.
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Among the small group of  eight banks officially failing the stress tests, all but one 
were Southern European. Of  course, these eight banks were the ones that caught 
the attention of  the media. For those that wanted to dig deeper, what was offered 
additionally by the EBA was a list of  20 banks that had less than 6 percent CT1 capital. 
Although this list included two German banks and one Austrian bank, it still seemed 
to suggest that the undercapitalization of  banks was mainly a Southern European 
problem.
Two rather serious qualifications must be noted, however. First, the failing of  a small 
set of  Southern European banks had more to do with questionable methodological 
choices than with banking realities, and, second, if  the average levels of  capitalization of  
banking sectors are compared, Southern European banks fare just as well or significantly better 
than German and French banks, depending on the criteria applied. When undertaking 
its 2011 stress tests, the EBA chose to deploy a new capital category, instead of  utilizing 
the standard capital categories of  the international Basel III framework, as it had done 
in its stress tests the year before.
In a situation where it was widely believed that the stress test would need to be 
tougher than in the previous years, the EBA could have adopted a simple ratio of  
equity capital to total assets, it could have raised the Tier 1 ratio that it had used 
the year before (from 6 percent to, say, 9 or 10 percent), or it could have done both, 
stipulating that to pass the stress tests, banks would need to have equity capital above 3 
percent of  total assets and Tier 1 capital of  above 9 percent of  RWA. This would have 
been in line with recent developments in the context of  the Basel III Accord, endorsed 
by G20 leaders just months before the European stress test exercise was set in motion. 
Instead, the EBA invented a new capital category: CT1 capital. The toughening of  
the stress tests consisted in the adoption of  a stricter definition of  capital than for Tier 
1. But this fell far short of  adopting a criterion of  highest quality capital, as would 
have been the case if  the leverage ratio had been chosen. Further, the tightening of  
the capital definition vis-à-vis the 2010 stress tests was compromised by a lowering 
of  the ratio itself. The 6 percent Tier 1 capital requirement was replaced with a 5 
percent CT1 capital requirement—and the net differences then became very small, 
to say the least.
Why did the EBA pretend to toughen the stress tests as opposed to actually toughening 
them? To answer that, consider what would have happened if  they had indeed adopted 
stricter criteria. Table 5.1 shows what the results would have been if  the stress tests 
had operated with higher ratios of  capital to RWA or a leverage ratio of  3 percent 
(equity capital to total assets). In each of  these three scenarios, quite a few large German 
and French banks would have failed, including Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, BNP 
Paribas, and Societé Generale.4 Had such results been published, it would have been 
apparent to markets as well as the general public that the European banking problem 
was not so much a Southern European problem, but one that struck at the heart of  the 
Eurozone.
Two reasons may explain the “methodological choices” of  the EBA. First, the EBA 
wanted only a small set of  banks to fail the stress test, and it wanted these to be relatively 
small banks from countries in the periphery of  the Eurozone. The criteria of  a 5 percent 
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CT1 capital ratio made it possible to argue that the criteria were now tougher than 
before, while at the time identifying only a handful of  Southern European banks as 
troubled.
On closer scrutiny, it turns out that the portrayal of  the banking crisis as mainly 
Southern European is even more misleading than what is suggested by the above data. 
For when the more relevant criterion of  equity capital to total assets is considered (instead 
of  various risk-weighted measures), the picture is turned upside down: German and 
French banks are then by far the least well capitalized in Europe, as we shall now see.
III. The Continued Undercapitalization of  European Banking
A clear finding of  recent studies in the bank capital regulation literature is that there 
should be more regulatory focus on equity capital relative to total assets than on broader 
measures of  capital relative to RWA (more on this in Section 4). The EBA not only 
focused on the least informative capital ratio, the CT1 capital ratio, but also did not report 
leverage ratios, nor release data for total assets so that analysts could calculate non-risk-
weighted ratios themselves.
In this section, we estimate leverage ratios for 25 out of  the 70 banks included in 
the recapitalization exercise, as well as aggregate estimates for the four key Eurozone 
countries: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. We also report the data for the banks in 
the UK that account for 50 percent of  total assets of  the country’s banking sector, as a 
point of  reference. Before explicating the results, a brief  comment on our methodology 
in arriving at the data is warranted.
Methodology
Our main interest is to estimate leverage ratios (equity to total assets) for all German, 
French, Italian, and Spanish banks involved in the recapitalization exercise, as of  June 
2012, so as to be able to compare this (more solid) measure of  capitalization with the 
Table 5.1. Number of  banks that would have failed the 2011 stress test according to three 
different benchmarks
Results of  the stress test after the effects of  capital issuance and mandatory restructuring plans 
publicly announced and fully committed by April 30, 2011
Country CT1 ratio 9%
December 2012




Germany 9 7 9
France 4 2 2
UK 4 2 1
Spain 4 2 1
Italy 5 4 2
Source: EBA data released with the final results of  the stress-test exercise.
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CT1 capital relative to RWA deployed by the EBA. More specifically, we make three such 
comparative assessments:
•	 What	is	the	trend	in	bank	capitalization	from	December	2011	to	June	2012	(as	assessed	
by these two different capital ratios)?
•	 What	 are	 the	main	bank-by-bank	differences	 in	 capitalization	 levels	 (as	 assessed	by	
these two different capital ratios), both before and after the recapitalization?
•	 What	are	the	main	differences	across	the	four	countries,	in	terms	of 	the	average	level	
of  capitalization of  their banking sector (as assessed by these two different capital 
ratios), both before and after the recapitalization, and in the period from 2005 to 2011?
The two main data sources are the results released by the EBA and Bankscope, respectively. 
From the data released by the EBA, we have taken data on CT1 capital, common equity, 
and RWA, whereas leverage ratio data are from Bankscope. However, given that data on 
total assets as of  June 2012 were not released by the EBA, and also are not available in 
Bankscope (where the latest available total assets figures are from late 2011), we have had 
to estimate this part of  the dataset ourselves.
We arrived at this admittedly rough estimate of  total assets by assuming that the ratio 
of  RWA to total assets was the same in June 2012 as it was in December 2011, and then 
imputing total assets from the figures for RWA given by the EBA. While this may seem 
a somewhat crude assumption, we should like to stress that it is most likely a conservative 
assumption. Considering the continuous downward trend of  the ratio of  risk-weighted 
to total assets, it is more than difficult to imagine a substantial reversal of  that trend 
over the six-month period in question. In other words, our estimate is more likely to 
underestimate than overestimate total assets—and hence, by implication, is more likely 
to overestimate than underestimate leverage ratios.
Finally, we arrived at country-level data by aggregating data for all banks that 
participated in the stress test exercise. Given that this set of  banks covered over 
65 percent of  the EU banking system’s total assets, and at least 50 percent of  the national 
banking sectors in each of  the member states—and also included all the largest banks 
for each country—we find it reasonable to assume that this procedure provides a good, 
and probably slightly conservative characterization of  the European banking sector as 
a whole.5
Overall results
The first question we set out to answer in our critical assessment of  the European 
recapitalization plan is the following question: Did the recapitalization plan have a 
significant impact on the leverage ratios of  banks in these key Eurozone countries?
Table 5.2 shows the evolution of  CT1 ratios and leverage ratios between December 
2011 and June 2012 for the Spanish, German, French, and Italian banks that participated 
in the recapitalization exercise. The results are telling. All but two banks in the sample 
increased their CT1 ratio in the period analyzed. On the other hand, when it comes to 
leverage ratios, only 7 out of  24 banks in the sample improved their position, 16 banks 
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Table 5.2. The failed European recapitalization exercise
December 2011 June 2012















France BNP Paribas 0.31 9.6% 3.56% 10.9% + 3.42% –
France BPCE SA 0.49 9.1% 2.78% 10.0% + 4.90% +
France Crédit Agricole SA 0.30 9.6% 2.48% 10.7% + 3.25% +
France Société Générale 0.30 9.0% 3.59% 9.9% + 2.92% –
Germany Bayerische 
Landesbank
0.38 9.7% 3.47% 10.3% + 3.02% –
Germany Commerzbank AG 0.36 9.9% 3.79% 12.2% + 4.09% +
Germany DekaBank Deutsche  
Girozentrale
0.19 11.0% 2.50% 11.7% + 2.19% –
Germany Deutsche Bank AG 0.18 9.6% 2.56% 10.2% + 1.80% –
Germany DZ Bank AG-
Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank
0.25 9.5% 1.85% 11.6% + 2.84% +
Germany HSH Nordbank AG 0.34 10.3% 3.75% 10.0% – 3.37% –
Germany Hypo Real Estate 
Holding AG
0.08 24.2% 2.02% 21.6% – 1.68% –
Germany Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg
0.29 9.2% 2.85% 9.9% + 2.85% =
Germany Landesbank  
Berlin AG
0.28 12.3% 1.21% 12.7% + 3.49% +
Germany Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
0.37 7.3% 3.08% 9.5% + 3.30% +
Germany WGZ-Bank AG 0.20 10.1% 3.06% 10.4% + 2.07% –
Spain Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria 
SA
0.55 9.4% 6.85% 9.9% + 5.26% –
Spain Banco Popular 
Español SA
0.68 7.4% 6.45% 10.3% + 5.58% –
Spain Banco Santander SA 0.45 9.4% 5.77% 9.5% + 3.79% –
Spain Caja de Ahorros 
y Pensiones de 
Barcelona-LA 
CAIXA
0.53 9.2% 6.24% 11.1% + 5.39% –
Italy Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena
0.44 9.5% 5.28% 10.8% + 3.87% –
Italy Banco Popolare 0.67 7.1% 6.08% 10.2% + 6.88% +
Continued
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suffered a drop, and 1 bank did not experience any change. No bank was even remotely 
in the region of  the 15 percent leverage ratio recommended in the bank regulation 
literature—and seven banks were below the modest 3 percent minimum requirement for 
equity capital to total assets stipulated by Basel III (six of  these are German banks and 
one is French).
These data do not lend themselves easily to as optimistic an assessment as the one given 
by the EBA when releasing its report. On the contrary, it should give rise to considerable 
concern that for two out of  three banks involved in the European recapitalization 
exercise, the ratio of  equity to total assets actually fell.
The core of  the problem is in the core of  the Eurozone:  
German and French banks
This somewhat gloomy picture, based on bank-by-bank data, is further reinforced 
when country-level data are considered. Figure 5.1 plots the average leverage 
ratios by country for the period from 2005 to 2011. As is immediately evident, the 
banking systems in the four countries analyzed have been severely undercapitalized 
throughout the period when assessed against the 15 percent equity capital to total 
assets benchmark.
What is more surprising perhaps is that German and French banks, which seemed 
healthier than the Spanish and Italian banks when assessed in terms of  risk-weighted 
capital ratios, have fared significantly worse in terms of  leverage ratios throughout this 
period. In fact, while Spanish and Italian banks have been consistently above the Basel 
recommendation of  a 3 percent leverage ratio, the German and French banking sectors 
have remained below this threshold for most of  the period.
To illustrate the geographical composition of  the European undercapitalization of  its 
banks further, consider a comparison of  average leverage ratios with average CT1 and 
average Tier 1 ratios for the same set of  banks (Table 5.3).
December 2011 June 2012















Italy Intesa Sanpaolo 0.50 10.2% 7.87% 10.9% + 5.52% –
Italy UniCredit SpA 0.50 8.3% 5.97% 10.4% + 5.14% –
Italy Unione di Banche 
Italiane SCpA-UBI 
Banca
0.70 8.6% 7.90% 10.4% + 7.28% –
Source: Bankscope and EBA: http://www.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise2012/ RECAP_2012_dataset.
zip. Spanish Bankia SA and Portuguese Portigon AG are excluded from the table, since both were under 
restructuring at the time.
Notes: (*) Estimated using RWA figures from the EBA and total asset figures from Bankscope. 
(**) Authors’ estimation.
Table 5.2. Continued
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German banks have a significantly higher level of  capitalization than Spanish, 
Italian, and French banks when CT1 and Tier 1 ratios are used as a benchmark. But 
when the benchmark is the leverage ratio, these same German and French banks 
are significantly undercapitalized as compared to Italian and Spanish banks. This 
result is not driven by outliers. None of  the German and French banks included in 
the sample had a leverage ratio above 3.6 percent, while no Spanish or Italian bank 
had a leverage ratio below 4.5 percent or 6.3 percent, respectively.6 In brief, the data 
make it abundantly clear that when equity capital to total assets is used instead of  data 
on CT1 capital to RWA, German and French banks are in far deeper trouble than 
Spanish and Italian banks are.7
In sum, our results reveal that the devil really is in the detail: by using capital ratios 
based on RWA, banks characterized by low and precarious levels of  capital can be made 
Figure 5.1. Evolution of  average leverage ratios for the largest Banks in Spain, Germany, 










2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
IT ES UK FR DE
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bankscope data.
Country Common equity/total assets Core Tier 1 capital/RWAs * Tier 1 capital/ RWAs **
Germany 2.57% 9.70% 13.13%
France 3.10% 9.30% 11.17%
UK 5.13% 10.63% 12.49%
Spain 5.92% 9.90% 10.55%
Italy 6.62% 9.34% 9.86%
Table 5.3. Average capital adequacy ratios by country for the largest banks (see Vestergaard and 
Retana 2013 for details)
Source: Authors’ calculations using Bankscope data.
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to look healthy and strong. In fact, Figure 5.2 illustrates that the cross-country pattern of  
CT1 capital data is fundamentally different from that of  leverage ratios. All four banking 
sectors neatly meet the minimum CT1 capital ratio, with only minor cross-country 
differences, but when it comes to equity capital to total assets, Spanish and Italian banks 
have leverage ratios that are (roughly) twice as high as those of  Germany and France.
The conclusion is, inevitably, that the CT1 capital data released by the EBA obscures 
rather than illuminates relative levels of  undercapitalization in the core Eurozone countries.
IV. European Recapitalization in Perspective
The European bank recapitalization suffered from two key limitations discussed in this 
book (Admati et al., this volume; Haldane, this volume). First and foremost, capital 
requirements continued to be based on RWA instead of  total assets, despite the well-
documented unreliability of  these measures. Second, capital requirements were specified 
in ratio terms, instead of  in absolute terms, allowing banks to shrink assets instead 
of  raising capital.8 In this section, we use as a benchmark for assessing the European 
recapitalization exercise the widespread consensus among scholars that equity capital 
requirements should be in the order of  15 percent of  total assets.
Capital requirements weaker than Basel III though presented as tougher
Two key trends in the recent Basel III revisions of  international standards for bank 
capital regulation were to adopt stricter definitions of  capital, not least concerning what 
Source: Bankscope and EBA.
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counted as high-quality capital, and to adopt a double criterion for minimum capital by 
adding a leverage ratio requirement (Vestergaard and Retana 2013). On both counts, 
the European recapitalization exercise marks a significant setback; we focus here on the 
latter.
Whereas Basel III requires a minimum of  4.5 percent equity capital relative to RWA, 
there was no explicit provision for equity capital in the European recapitalization exercise. It 
was left to the discretion of  European banks to decide how much of  the 9 percent CT1 ratio 
should be met by equity capital and how much by various hybrid instruments considered to 
be high quality. Thus, to compare the capital requirements of  the European recapitalization 
exercise and those of  the Basel III agreement, one must make assumptions to estimate the 
“implied leverage ratio” of  the European recapitalization exercise. We calculated that a 
9 percent ratio for CT1 capital corresponds roughly to a requirement of  2.7 percent equity 
capital to total assets (see Vestergaard and Retana 2013, 33–34). When taking into account 
that the Basel III requirement of  3 percent equity capital to total assets is itself  widely 
criticized for being far too low, the European recapitalization exercise appears anything but 
“tough.”
The CT1 capital category, invented by European authorities for the purposes of  
the stress test and recapitalization exercises, creates more confusion than clarity. Most 
importantly, it makes the European recapitalization exercise appear more progressive 
than it is—while at the same time obscuring whether European banks in fact have 
sufficient levels of  (loss-absorbing) equity capital.
Equity capital requirements far too low  
to significantly enhance resilience
It is disappointing that the European recapitalization exercise did not specify a 
threshold for minimum equity capital funding, and that the level of  equity capital 
implied (through the CT1 requirement) was lower than the recently agreed 
international standard of  at least 3 percent of  total assets. But the problem is a 
much deeper one than merely “undercutting” Basel III. For a healthy and resilient 
banking sector, Basel III is a poor benchmark. Although the Basel Committee sees 
its minimum capital requirements as an essential means “to transform the global 
regulatory framework and promote a more resilient banking sector” (BCBS 2010, 2), 
it is unlikely that capital requirements as low as those of  Basel III will contribute to 
increasing the resilience of  the banking sector.
Although Andrew Haldane noted that Basel III, if  fully adopted, would cause the 
minimum equity capital ratio to “quintuple over the next decade, rising from 2% to close 
to 10% of  RWA for the largest global banks,” he nevertheless stressed that even a loss 
in the value of  a bank’s assets of  only 4 percent “will be enough to render it insolvent” 
(Haldane 2011, 14). This observation is of  course particularly troubling when one recalls 
that many banks experienced losses well above this 4 percent threshold during the global 
financial crisis.9
In late 2010, a group of  20 finance professors published a joint letter in the Financial 
Times, noting that “banks’ high leverage and the resulting fragility and systemic risk 
86 CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS
contributed to the near collapse of  the financial system” and pointing out that Basel III 
was “far from sufficient to protect the system from recurring crises” (Admati et al. 2010). 
“If  a much larger fraction, at least 15 percent, of  banks’ total, non-risk-weighted assets 
were funded by equity,” they argued, “the social benefits would be substantial” (ibid.).
The Basel III ratios for equity capital thus may seem large at first, at least when judged 
by the almost five-fold increase of  this ratio that will result when fully implemented in 
2019, as noted by Haldane. But rather than be impressed with this increase, we should 
be astonished that the requirements have previously been so low that even a quintupling 
can be so far from adequate.
Table 5.4 illustrates the scale of  the inadequacy of  Basel III capital requirements, 
focusing on large international banks (assumed to have total assets three times larger 
than RWA, as the empirical evidence suggests). For such banks, the recommendation of  
15 percent equity capital to total assets translates into a Tier 1 capital ratio to RWA of  
45 percent. Similarly, the current requirement of  Basel III that banks have 4.5 percent 
equity capital relative to their RWA corresponds to a requirement to have 1.5 percent 
equity capital relative to their total assets. Even if  we consider two hypothetical scenarios 
of  fully phased-in Basel III equity capital requirements, where both the countercyclical 
buffer and the G-SIBS surcharges are applied close to their maximum levels, the results 
are far below the levels recommended by scholars: 3 and 4 percent equity capital to total 
assets, respectively.10
What emerges from these considerations is that equity capital requirements would 
have to be quintupled to reach levels recommended by scholars, whether calculated 
relative to total assets (from 3 to 15 percent equity capital) or relative to RWA (from 
9 to 45 percent). Thus, although Basel III, when fully implemented in 2019, will have 
effectively quintupled equity capital requirements (from their current level at 2 percent 
of  RWA to almost 10 percent), a further quintupling will be needed: if  equity capital 
requirements are to be adequate by criteria identified across a range of  studies, they 
should be increased not almost five-fold, but more than twenty-fold (from 2 to 45 percent 
of  RWA) to reach the 15 percent of  total assets threshold.
V. The CRD4: Institutionalizing the Reluctance to Recapitalize?
The Basel III agreement is currently being implemented in Europe in the form of  a 
regulation and a directive: a Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR) and a Capital 
Table 5.4. The scale of  Basel III inadequacy (for large international banks)
Equity capital Basel II Basel III, 2013 Basel III, 2019 * Basel III, 2019 ** Optimal 
equity 
capital 
In % of  risk-
weighted assets
2 4.5 9 12 45
In % of  total assets 0.67 1.5 3 4 15
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BCBS (2010).
 AT THE BRINK OF INSOLVENCY 87
Requirement Directive (CRD), together known as CRD4. The European Commission 
presented its first proposal for the CRD4 in July 2011 and originally all member states 
were expected to have transposed the directive into national law by the end of  2012. 
However, meeting this deadline soon looked unlikely. At an Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) meeting in early March 2013, the Council of  the European 
Union officially endorsed a compromise reached in negotiations between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission. The council mandated the Permanent 
Representatives Committee to finalize negotiations with the European Parliament on 
outstanding technical issues. This means that a final deal is expected later in March, 
and the CRD4 likely will take full effect later in 2013 or by January 1, 2014.
Controversies
Over the past year, the proposed legislation has been subject to debate and negotiation, 
both in the European Parliament and in ECOFIN. This reflects that although the Basel 
III Accord is finalized, its transposition into EU law is not set in stone. Much of  Basel III 
is formulated as minimum requirements and hence the EU may—at least in principle—
decide to adopt stricter rules if  it so wishes.
A key controversy has been whether some countries should be allowed to set higher 
capital requirements than others—in line with the notion that Basel standards are 
minimum capital requirements—or should be explicitly disallowed from doing so, with 
reference to the principle of  having a single European market in financial services. 
Another important debate has focused on whether the EU legislation should “give the 
leverage ratio a much more central role” than proposed in the Basel III agreement and 
in the original European Commission proposal (Lannoo 2012; Masters 2012). Thirdly, 
there has been considerable controversy on the issue of  whether Basel III restrictions on 
what can be counted as “high-quality capital” should be adopted rigorously in the CRD4 
or whether certain exemptions could be made. Finally, some have argued that the CRD4 
should discontinue the practice of  allowing government bonds to be classified as “risk 
free” in calculations of  banks’ total RWA.
The CRD4 is a major setback compared to Basel III
Overall, the CRD4 was expected to substantially replicate the Basel III agreement; the 
minimum capital requirement would be the same, and the new capital buffers and the 
leverage ratio would be adopted more or less as outlined in Basel III. However, there 
are substantial digressions from Basel III, most of  which go in the wrong direction, and 
hence, render the CRD4 a most unfortunate setback relative to Basel III.
Diluting the capital definitions of  Basel III
First, the stricter definitions of  capital agreed in Basel III will most likely be softened in 
the CRD4, as a result of  pressure from German and French banks. More specifically, 
exceptions have been made for the so-called silent participation of  German banks and 
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minority stakes of  French banks in insurance companies, both of  which have somewhat 
questionable loss-absorbency qualities (Goldstein 2012). It will be difficult to assess this 
fully before all technical deals are negotiated and released.
Watering down the leverage ratio
Whereas Basel III stipulates the leverage ratio in terms of  the highest quality of  capital, 
namely equity capital, relative to total assets, the CRD4 waters it down by defining it in 
terms of  Tier 1 capital relative to total assets (Council of  the EU 2013, 3). This most 
probably means that the above-mentioned exceptions made for German and French 
banks will count toward meeting the leverage ratio requirement. Note that in specifying 
its leverage ratio, the CRD4 adopts a capital category that is not only weaker than that 
of  Basel III, but also weaker than the capital category it used for its 2011 stress test and 
the recapitalization exercise—namely, the CT1 ratio.
New systemic risk buffers
The CRD4 adopts the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffers as specified 
in Basel III, but replaces the capital surcharge for global systemically important financial 
institutions (G-SIFIs) with a broader “systemic risk buffer.” The systemic risk buffer will be 
mandatory for G-SIFIs but voluntary for other systemically important financial institutions. 
Member states will be able to apply this systemic risk buffer in the range from 1 to 3 percent of  
all exposures, and up to 5 percent for domestic and third-country exposures. This corresponds 
roughly to the range defined in the FSB capital surcharge for G-SIFIs (1–3.5 percent), but 
opens up for some further capital tightening with respect to domestic exposures.
Introducing maximum capital requirements?
Fourth, and finally, the CRD4 effectively entails a de facto ceiling on capital requirements 
in the Eurozone. The CRD4 will “enable members to impose, for up to two years 
(extendable), stricter macroprudential requirements for domestically authorized financial 
institutions in order to address increased risks to financial stability”—but such measures, 
including the capital requirements above the levels stipulated in the CRD4, will be subject 
to approval by the Council of  the European Union.11 It will be difficult for any member 
state to transgress this line, not least because of  the signal this would send to markets, and 
the heavy costs that would be associated with it, both politically in the EU, and through 
higher funding costs in the market. Whereas the capital requirements of  Basel III were 
always minimum requirements—allowing all countries to set their capital requirements 
at whatever higher levels they wanted—now, in the Eurozone, they seem to have become 
de facto maximum capital requirements instead.
Discussion
A European-wide de facto ceiling on capital ratios is bad news in itself, but all the more 
so given that it is set far too low, relative to what is needed to ensure the resilience of  
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European banking. In more concrete terms, the implications of  the new rules are as 
follows:
The systemic risk buffer can be imposed at different levels for different exposures, 
but assume for simplicity that banks have significantly higher domestic and third-
party exposures than EU exposures, such that the regulator can set the systemic risk 
buffer close to its maximum level—say, at 4.5 percent. In this case, an EU member 
state may impose a systemic risk buffer of  4.5 percent equity capital relative to 
RWA. This will be in addition to the standard minimum capital requirement of  
4.5 percent equity capital relative to RWA, which was stipulated in Basel III and 
adopted in CRD4. In other words, the systemic risk buffer allows a member state 
to raise requirements for equity capital relative to RWA from 4.5 to 9 percent. This 
corresponds, roughly, to a ratio of  equity capital to total assets of  3 percent.
Obviously, the calculation changes if  we add to the capital requirement the two additional 
capital buffers, which are to be gradually phased in from 2016 to 2019—namely, the 
capital conversion buffer (2.5 percent) and the countercyclical buffer (0–2.5 percent). At 
their maximum levels, these buffers allow an additional 5 percent capital to RWA, such 
that the total is 14 percent. This, in turn, corresponds to a maximum ratio of  equity capital 
to total assets of  less than 5 percent, far below the 15 percent ratio recommended in the 
bank capital regulation literature.
If  the CRD4 is adopted in EU legislation along the lines currently discussed, it will 
make it difficult for any EU member country to recapitalize its banks in a substantive 
and serious way. By making recapitalization above the levels discussed above contingent 
on the approval of  other member countries, these new rules will limit the ability of  
individual member countries to insist that their banks recapitalize at such a scale that 
capital buffers large enough to ensure solvency even in adverse scenarios may be built. In 
so doing, it will further institutionalize the European reluctance to seriously recapitalize 
its banks.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Since spring 2011, the EBA has conducted three capitalization assessments: a stress test 
exercise to test a bank’s resilience to an adverse macroeconomic shock, a monitoring 
exercise to assess a bank’s capitalization in terms of  the recently agreed international 
standards (Basel III), and a recapitalization exercise undertaken in collaboration with 
banks and in consultation with national regulators. The culmination of  this process was 
the singling out of  27 banks that were to raise a total of  €76 billion between September 
2011 and June 2012. When publishing the results of  the recapitalization exercise 
in October 2012, the EBA reported that European banking had been successfully 
recapitalized and now was in a much stronger position, with a much strengthened capital 
base and overall resilience.
Our analysis gives occasion to considerable skepticism with regard to this conclusion. 
From the stress tests in 2011 to the recapitalization in 2012, the EBA relied more or 
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less exclusively on capital data relative to RWA, and did not specify requirements for 
minimum levels of  equity capital funding. The literature on bank capital regulation 
regards the leverage ratio—equity capital to total assets—as a much more reliable 
indicator of  banks’ soundness and resilience than ratios based on broader measures of  
capital measured relative to RWA. Therefore, throughout the paper, we compare the 
results of  the various assessments reported by the EBA with data for leverage ratios.
In terms of  bank-by-bank data, we find that the recapitalization exercise in many 
instances in fact did not recapitalize a given bank when measured by equity capital to 
total assets. Only 7 out of  24 banks involved improved their leverage ratios, whereas 
16 banks worsened their capital positions. In opposition to the EBA’s positive assessment 
of  the results of  the recapitalization exercise, we find strong reasons for concern about 
the resilience of  European banking.
Our finding that equity capital levels in European banking are far below the 
15 percent of  total assets recommended by scholars (Admati et al. 2010) is troubling but 
not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that large parts of  European banking are 
undercapitalized, even when the Basel III minimum requirement of  3 percent equity 
capital to total assets is used as a benchmark, despite the fact that this threshold is widely 
considered to be far too low.
This leads to the next key finding of  the report: the least well-capitalized banking 
sector among the larger Eurozone countries is not Spain or Italy, but Germany, closely 
trailed by France. The banking sectors of  Spain and Italy have equity to total assets 
roughly double the size of  those of  Germany and France.
All in all, our results reveal that the devil really is in the detail, and that by using 
ratios based on broader measures of  capital than equity, and measuring it relative to 
RWA instead of  relative to total assets, the EBA has obscured rather than illuminated 
the capitalization of  European banks. The continued reliance on ratios of  Core Tier 
capital relative to RWA allows banks characterized by low and precarious levels of  
capital to appear healthy and strong. Little is achieved by this, other than keeping a game 
going, which will eventually come to an end—namely, the game of  avoiding a serious 
recapitalization of  Europe’s banks.
Unfortunately, this “recapitalization reluctance” has also shaped the European adoption 
of  Basel III. The flawed and reluctant European approach to bank capital regulation 
is now resulting in a European ceiling on bank capital requirements, as part of  a larger 
compromise on the fourth European CRD, which is currently in the final stages of  being 
adopted in EU legislation. If  a ceiling on bank capital is indeed adopted in EU legislation, 
at roughly the levels reported from the negotiations, it will make it more than difficult for 
any EU country to require its banks to have equity capital in excess of  6 percent of  total 
assets. In this way, Europe is about to turn its reluctance to recapitalize its banks into an 
institutionalized commitment to undercapitalized banking in a most unfortunate manner.
The European reluctance to restructure and recapitalize will be costly in many 
ways. Above all, the absence of  substantial recapitalization of  Europe’s banks 
poses a significant systemic risk: a full-blown European banking crisis will have 
enormous private and social costs for all European countries, not to mention global 
repercussions.
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Notes
 1 Admati et al. (2011), Admati and Hellwig (2013), Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010), Blundell-
Wignall and Roulet (2012), Brealey (2006), Goodhart (2010), Haldane (2011, 2012), Harrison 
(2004), Hellwig (2010), Hanson et al. (2010), Miles et al. (2012), Slovik (2011), and Turner (2010).
 2 More specifically, the total effect of  the envisaged shock was a fall in EU real GDP by 
0.4 percent in 2011 and zero growth in 2012. Average unemployment in the EU was projected 
to reach 10 percent in 2011 and 10.5 percent in 2012. Further assumptions included that yields 
on German 10-year bonds were to remain at the baseline level, whereas EU long-term interest 
rates would go up by 66 basis points (on average); and that short-term, interbank interest rates 
in the European money markets would increase by 125 basis points and that stock prices in the 
EU would suffer a negative shock of  14 percent on average.
 3 However, the composition of  the recapitalization is interesting. Only €43.6 billion of  the 
€115.7 billion total recapitalization amount was due to an increase in the core capital position 
of  the banks (EBA 2012a, 10), corresponding to just 38 percent of  the total recapitalization 
reported. The capital impact of  so-called RWA measures corresponded to 28 percent of  the 
total recapitalization amount.
 4 BNP Paribas passes on the 9 percent Tier 1 ratio but fails the other two, while Deutsche Bank, 
Commerzbank, and Societé Generale fail on all three. For a full list of  the banks that would 
have failed the stress test according to the four different criteria, see Vestergaard and Retana 
(2013, Annex B).
 5 In general, small banks are unlikely to have lower capital levels than large banks for a number 
of  reasons, including lower competitive pressure on this particular parameter, and less reliance 
on “risk-weighted asset optimization” strategies.
 6 In terms of  quantitative analysis, a means difference test leads us to reject the null hypothesis 
that the difference in the mean leverage ratio of  German and French banks on the one hand 
and Spanish and Italian banks on the other is equal to zero.
 7 On average, the levels of  leverage of  German banks are not much higher than that of  Dexia 
just before it collapsed.
 8 For an examination of  these problems in the context of  the European recapitalization exercise, 
see Vestergaard and Retana (2013, 27–38).
 9 The IMF estimated, for instance, that the cumulative credit losses of  US banks in the period 
from 2007 to 2010 were in the order of  7 percent of  assets (IMF 2010).
10 The 2019* scenario assumes the imposition of  a 2 percent countercyclical buffer on top of  
the minimum equity capital requirement (4.5) and the capital conservation buffer (2.5), which 
result in a ratio of  9 percent equity capital to RWA. This translates into a 3 percent equity 
capital to total assets ratio. The 2019** scenario assumes the imposition of  a G-SIB capital 
surcharge of  2.5 percent and the countercyclical capital buffer is raised from 2 to 2.5 percent, 
so that a total level of  12 percent of  RWA is reached, corresponding roughly to 4 percent of  
total assets.
11 More specifically, the “Council can reject, by qualified majority, stricter national measures 
proposed by a member state” (Council of  the EU 2013, 3).
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Prior to the recent financial crisis, the failure of  a bank would in most countries be treated 
under the standard law of  bankruptcy applicable to all institutions. Standard bankruptcy 
law is, however, best suited to those instances where the bulk of  the assets are fixed, real 
assets, property, land and buildings, or equipment, such as railroad lines, steel furnaces, or 
airplanes—assets whose nature and value are not affected by the process of  bankruptcy 
itself. Then the bankruptcy can, and does, involve a process of  finding a (highest bidding) 
buyer for the unchanged real assets who can take them over and use them again productively. 
The more a business is built on such real assets, with a relatively assured and stable second-
hand resale price, the more appropriate is debt finance, limited liability equity finance, and 
a continuing market, via takeovers, for ownership in that equity market.
Bankruptcy procedures and governance structures may need to become more 
complicated when the institution is primarily based on intangible capital—intellectual 
know-how—rather than on real tangible assets. Examples are legal and accountancy 
firms, advertising agencies, medical practices, universities, etc. In such cases, with no 
or little ability to constrain and to pre-commit the staff, who possess the human capital, 
by indenture or by slavery, the gone-concern value of  such an institution is often a tiny 
fraction of  its potential going-concern value. In such a condition, debt is, in general, 
not such an appropriate financing vehicle (on what would it be based?), a market for 
ownership of  the institution is more problematical, and partnerships, of  some form, are 
more suitable than a (limited liability) equity base. Normally, however, the failure of  one 
such service provider strengthens its competitors in the market. Not only is competition 
for their output reduced, but they may also be able to pick up displaced and unemployed 
skilled staff  more easily from the failing firm(s). As a generality, the failure of  a service 
provider does not lead to contagion in that sector, whereby the failure of  one firm drags 
others down with it.
Much of  the value of  a bank lies in the intangible value of  being able to allocate funds 
wisely to good investments. It provides financial services, mainly based on the utilization of  
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human rather than fixed capital. Moreover, should the bank be forced to realize its assets 
(or to call in its loans) in order to meet withdrawals, such pressurized sales will worsen 
the position of  other similar banks in a variety of  ways—for example, via the interbank 
market, by causing fear among depositors, by reducing the market value of  their assets, and 
by damaging the general economy. Thus, the failure of  one bank can have a contagious 
impact on other banks, the more so the greater the perceived similarity between the failing 
bank and others like it, which may often be aggravated by microprudential policies that 
encourage self-similarity among banks. With banks undertaking maturity mismatch, they 
are bound to depend, more or less, on confidence in their continued operation. The 
standard bankruptcy procedure will damage such confidence not only in the bank being 
liquidated, but also in other banks that are perceived as similar.
The potentiality for contagion as banks began to fail during the recent crisis soon 
became obvious (Northern Rock, Lehman), and led to a variety of  crisis measures, 
such as guarantees of  bank creditors, both depositors and bondholders, and to forced 
state recapitalization of  banks. But such measures were expensive to taxpayers, at least 
initially, and remained so in some cases, and were resented as they represented a transfer 
from poorer taxpayers to wealthier bankers, and to bank bondholders. The cry has gone 
up: “This must never happen again.”
To some degree, an institution, such as a bank, dependent on both intangible human 
capital and subject to contagion when confidence goes, might seem better suited to a 
partnership, with or without some limit to liability. The problem with partnerships 
is that they restrict the equity capital that can be deployed and, hence, the size of  the 
institutions. Where there appear to be economies of  scale, though their extent in banking 
is a contentious issue, there will be pressure to transform into a publicly listed limited 
company in order to become larger. In any case, contagious failure was rife in systems with 
large numbers of  poorly capitalized small banks, whether partnerships or limited liability 
entities, such as the country banks in the UK in the first half  of  the nineteenth century or 
the unit banks in the USA in the interwar period. Moreover, there is always a temptation 
with a partnership or a mutual company to cash in one’s chips by going public.
Be that as it may (and on this view, there are grounds for reviewing the extent of  
the potential liability of  some or all equity holders of  a bank), one lesson of  the recent 
financial crisis has been that standard bankruptcy procedures are inappropriate in the 
case of  a bank. Instead, we need a special resolution regime (SRR) for banks, enabling 
the financial authorities, in the guise of  an institution set up for that particular purpose 
(whether or not it is part of  the central bank), to intervene in a failing bank to handle its 
demise in a variety of  ways as might seem best—for example, to divide the existing bank 
into good/bad bank segments, to sell the (good) bank to another bank, to run the bank 
itself  (effectively to nationalize it, though only as a temporary expedient), or, at least as a 
last resort, to liquidate it.
The establishment of  an SRR is to be buttressed with two further reforms. The first 
is that the ratio of  potentially loss-absorbing capital to (risk-weighted) assets should be 
greatly increased. There are various potential ways of  doing so, either by requiring a 
higher equity ratio, by increasing the potential liability of  (some or all) equity holders, 
or by forcing certain (non-equity) creditors to transform their claims into equity when 
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failure looms (or possibly well beforehand in the case of  high-trigger CoCos). Largely 
because of  the tax advantage of  debt (relative to equity) and the difficulties banks face 
in raising new equity, not least because of  the continuing uncertainty about the form of  
the regulatory framework, most attention has been paid to proposals that require banks 
to augment their loss-absorbing capital by issuing bail-inable bonds that transform into 
equity when a bank approaches failure.
The second reform involves making advance plans for periods of  extreme difficulties 
for large and systemic banks in the shape of  recovery and resolution plans (RRPs). 
The first part, the “recovery” segment, requires the bank to think how it might be able 
to survive periods of  extreme pressure (e.g. by selling assets or by borrowing, perhaps 
by establishing some kind of  contingent put option). The second part, the “resolution” 
plan, requires the bank to organize its affairs in such a way as to facilitate and expedite 
intervention by the official agency established under the SRR for the purpose of  
resolving failed banks (should the recovery part of  the RRP prove insufficient).
What Should Happen?
•	 Stage	1:	A	bank	gets	into	trouble.	The	prearranged	recovery	plan	kicks	in.	The	bank	
involved sells assets, or borrows as contingently arranged. Liquidity support from 
central bank may be needed.
•	 Stage	2:	Assuming	that	Stage	1	does	not	suffice,	and	the	bank	continues	its	downward	
spiral toward failure. If  the bank has previously established low-trigger CoCos or bail-
inable bonds that are triggered when equity values fall far enough, then these would 
be activated so that the bank obtains sufficient equity to absorb the losses. Liquidity 
support from the central bank will, almost certainly, also be needed.
•	 Stage	3:	Otherwise,	the	bank	will	enter	formal	resolution	under	the	aegis	of 	the	SRR.	
Then the authorities bail in the unsecured creditors with the aim of  recapitalizing and 
refloating the bank using such funds.
•	 Stage	4:	If 	the	forced	recapitalization	from	bail-ins	by	the	SRR	proves	to	be	inadequate,	
then there may have to be recourse to taxpayer funds in the short run—for example, 
to recapitalize the bank—but the intention is that such funding should be recouped 
by a tax/levy on the banks, either from a fund established ex ante or a levy imposed 
on surviving banks ex post. The idea is that any taxpayer assistance should be strictly 
temporary. Again, if  any such failing bank is to be reconstituted, central bank liquidity 
support will, almost certainly, be required.
So far, perhaps so good. What can now go wrong?
What May Go Wrong and What to Do About It
Cross-border, universal banks and the point of  entry
Thus far, we have been implicitly assuming that a bank is a simple institution operating 
within a single jurisdiction and undertaking only one version of  financial intermediation 
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described as “banking.” What happens instead if  the bank has subsidiaries, operating as 
separately capitalized entities in multiple jurisdictions? Alternatively, what happens if  
the bank has several subsidiaries, or associated companies, undertaking several different 
kinds of  financial intermediation, again either in one or multiple jurisdictions, such as 
insurance, investment banking, broker/dealer, retail banking, etc.?
Currently we see two potentially conflicting directions of  travel. First, there is 
the provisional agreement on “Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, 
Financial Institutions” between the Bank of  England and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) (December 10, 2012), which proposes that above any bank—which 
may have subsidiaries and/or associated companies in other jurisdictions, and may also 
be doing other kinds of  (financial intermediation) business—there should be one overall 
controlling holding company. This superior holding company should be the single point 
of  entry for the purpose of  bank resolution. The holding company should, in turn, be 
the level at which sufficient loss-absorbing capital (equity plus bail-inable bonds) be held 
in order to prevent or to limit taxpayer liability.
The second trend is to divide a banking business into different kinds of  activities 
with differing contingent liabilities for taxpayers in the various cases. Thus, the (Vickers) 
Independent Commission on Banking would seek to ring fence a specified retail banking 
business operating in the UK and the rest of  the EU, which the British government would 
be pre-committed to supporting and to maintaining. The remainder of  any associated 
banking business, whether banking (of  any kind) outside of  the EU, or non-retail financial 
intermediation within the EU—for example, investment banking—should then not rely 
on any financial support from UK taxpayers. As a corollary, the differing parts of  the 
bank would need to be separately capitalized with, for example, strict controls over the 
transfer of  funds out of  the (protected) UK retail banking entity into any other part of  that 
business. The implication would then seem to be that Vickers, and the somewhat similar 
Liikanen Report, would require resolution of  a banking business to be done via multiple 
points of  entry with each segment—that is, EU retail banks, EU investment banks, and 
rest-of-the-world (RoW) banks going through separate bankruptcy procedures.
The single point of  entry (BoE/FDIC) approach is far better suited to a globalized, 
cross-border, worldwide financial system. It clarifies responsibility within the authority 
in which the holding company is registered. Presumably, a host country could refuse 
to authorize a banking subsidiary headquartered in a country whose legal system or 
resolution mechanisms were considered unsatisfactory by the host country. Such a system 
should minimize disputes between the authorities in which the (failing) bank operated, 
since the actions would necessarily fall on the home country.
The problem, of  course, has been that with insufficiently capitalized banks, the 
resultant contingent liability on the home country has been greater than their taxpayers 
could bear. The imposition of  losses on what would probably be primarily domestic 
stakeholders through top-down bail-in would probably transfer value from domestic 
stakeholders to foreign creditors, and would be politically difficult. This might be 
acceptable if  all countries were clearly committed to playing by the same rules, but there 
is no certainty, or perhaps even likelihood, of  this. With competitive pressures, current 
constraints on raising equity in a recession, and the banking lobby, all limiting any (rapid) 
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rise in the ratio of  loss-absorbing capital, the best way to limit taxpayers’ contingent 
liability appeared to be to distinguish between those parts of  the bank that the home 
authority would support, if  the worst came to the worst, and those that it would not.
While the incentive for such a division into multiple points of  entry on resolution 
is clear enough, the results are likely to be untidy, and to lead, perhaps intentionally, 
toward greater national fragmentation and protectionism in financial intermediation. 
If  the home authority is to wash its hands of  responsibility for the subsidiaries of  one 
of  its banks outside its own country or region, then one would expect each host country 
not only to require the maintenance at all times of  specific local (trapped) capital and 
liquidity, but also to limit transfers of  funds from the local subsidiary to the rest of  the 
bank.
Meanwhile, the interconnectedness of  investment banks, and hence the likelihood 
of  contagion, is, in general, considerably greater than that of  retail banks. Apart from 
IT and administrative problems, retail banks are relatively easy to divide into good and 
bad parts, thus enabling the refloating or selling off  of  the good parts. In contrast, the 
manifold market and other interconnections of  investment banks make them a nightmare 
to liquidate, as in the case of  Lehman Bros. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the 
externalities and potential contagion arising from the closure and liquidation of  an 
investment bank could be much worse than that arising from the same fate befalling an 
equal-sized retail bank. Thus, the economic advantages of  recapitalizing an investment 
bank as a going concern, whether by taxpayer funds or otherwise, could well be greater 
than doing so for a retail bank. But the political calculus dominates the economic calculus.
Whether the single-point-of-entry (SPE) approach to resolution can survive in a 
financial system in which different parts of  cross-border, universal banks are regulated 
and treated in different ways has yet to be discovered. Of  course, if  the SPE approach 
worked, and was credibly expected to work, always and everywhere, then ring fencing 
would be irrelevant. The fact that ring fencing is up front and central to the structural 
debate on the future of  banking in the EU implies that there is a lack of  confidence 
about the efficacy of  the SPE approach. In what circumstances—for example, when the 
business of  the group and its assets are so rotten throughout that it is impossible to value 
the size of  the hole up front, which is important for determining how far to write down 
debt claims to cover the losses—might SPE not work?
If, in such particular circumstances SPE does not work, then the fall back to multiple 
points of  entry (MPE) and ring fencing might help some of  the subsidiaries providing 
“elemental” services—that is, payments. Seen this way, ring fencing is about making an 
entity super-resolvable, if  a group-wide SPE resolution does not work. To an outsider, 
the regulatory authorities appear to be trying to ride two differing horses (SPE and 
MPE) simultaneously. Such twin-horse riding may be doable, but it is hard for a cynical 
commentator to see how they can be compatible.
More or less identical issues are at stake in the continuing discussions on bank 
resolution within the Banking Union. If  responsibility for meeting losses, beyond those 
that can be absorbed by bank creditors, stays primarily with the nation-state of  that 
bank, then each state will try to limit contingent conditional liability by adopting MPE. 
If, on the other hand, losses in the course of  resolution are met through a European-wide 
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SPE mechanism—say, via the European stability mechanism (ESM)—then there will 
be political difficulties in achieving transfers of  funds from some countries (who regard 
themselves as innocent bystanders) to others (who may or may not have some closer 
responsibility for such failings).
Be that as it may, the earlier the intervention into a failing bank occurs, the more likely 
it would be that the available capital could absorb the losses accrued to that date.
The timing of  intervention
While early intervention may lower the cost of  remedying bank failure, it may also 
prematurely interfere with the ownership, property, and rights of  bank shareholders. So 
there is a need to balance the advantages both to other bank creditors and to society as a 
whole, against the (property) rights of  bank owners (shareholders).
In the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) pamphlet Key Attributes of  Effective Resolution 
for Financial Institutions (October 2011), there is a short, three-sentence section on the 
timing of  such intervention. It reads:
Resolution should be initiated when a firm is no longer viable or likely to be no 
longer viable, and has no reasonable prospect of  becoming so. The resolution 
regime should provide for timely and early entry into resolution before a firm is 
balance-sheet insolvent and before all equity has been fully wiped out. There should 
be clear standards or suitable indicators of  non-viability to help guide decisions on 
whether firms meet the conditions for entry into resolution. (FSB 2011, 3.1)
At first sight, the first two sentences seem inconsistent, with the first sentence emphasizing 
the rights of  shareholders to remain in control until all reasonable hope of  recovery 
has vanished, and the second outlining the advantages within the resolution process of  
quick intervention. I have, however, been led to believe that the first sentence is key, with 
the second sentence simply acting as a qualifier. Thus, the authorities should wait until 
all practicable hope of  recovery has gone, but, once that has happened, they should 
intervene immediately to resolve the failing bank. One issue is who calls the shots. 
Prudential supervisors are prone to delay, whereas resolution agencies would prefer to 
act sooner. The forthcoming role of  the European Central Bank (ECB) as a supervisor 
may serve to expedite the process of  entering resolution.
In my view, the balance has been tilted too far toward respect for shareholders’ rights, 
and away from the wider interests of  other creditors, and of  society. Hope springs eternal 
in the human breast and also in that of  accountants. It is extremely rare for a bank to 
close because the auditor has stated that liabilities exceed assets. Instead, creditors in repo, 
bond, and deposit markets flee, and the bank fails because it cannot find cash with which 
to pay its bills. Banks fail because they run out of  money, not because the auditor finds 
their capital deficient. By the time that effective liquidity constraints force intervention, 
the true mark-to-market value of  a bank, in such distressed fire sale conditions, may 
be severely under water. Thus, present proposals for the timing of  intervention may be 
excessively careful regarding shareholder property rights.
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Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Improvement Act (FDICIA) of  
1991, Congress tried to square this circle by requiring that banks either be closed or 
recapitalized by their shareholders once the (accounting) value of  equity fell below 
2 percent of  total assets (a simple leverage ratio). The idea was that the ability of  
shareholders to recapitalize the bank, rather than lose it when in difficulties, gave them 
sufficient protection if  the bank really did have upside value. The problem, however, lay 
in the reliance on accounting figures for capital. As has been shown, for example by the 
IMF (2009) and by Calomiris and Herring (2011), banks that failed more often than not 
had higher audited capital ratios than those that survived.
The idea was good, but the metric intended to discriminate between banks that were 
likely to fail and those that were likely to survive was badly chosen. Accounting valuations 
have little predictive capacities. As Calomiris has shown, the market value of  equity 
has much greater predictive content for success or failure. The need is to find a better, 
market-based metric that appears to have greater discriminant powers. Such an exercise 
is one facet of  my continuing research agenda. Even if  such a discriminating metric 
can be found, its subsequent new use as a trigger for intervention could lead to changes 
in behavior, via manipulation or otherwise, that would lead to shifts in the relationship 
that could negate or damage the purpose of  the exercise (the Lucas critique; Goodhart’s 
Law). So caution is required.
Nevertheless, present arrangements for the timing of  intervention are unsatisfactory. 
The FSB proposals are likely to delay the event of  such intervention for too long. But 
there is no improved, better, earlier trigger for intervention yet discovered, let alone one 
that is generally agreed upon and accepted.
The coverage of  deposit insurance
During the course of  the recent financial crisis, the top limit for deposit insurance was raised 
to €100,000 throughout the EU. Although this is well in excess of  what any individual would 
normally keep in a bank account, there are occasions when such a sum is temporarily held 
in an individual’s accounts—for example, after or just before the sale of  a home, a divorce 
settlement, the completion of  a will, etc. Sir Mervyn King has several times expressed his 
concern that the apparent unfairness of  potentially penalizing such temporary deposits 
could force a government, ex post facto, to guarantee all deposits at banks, whether investment 
or retail banks. Then, if  bondholders are to be treated pari passu with depositors, this would 
seemingly mean that only subordinate bondholders, or those bondholders where a bail-
inable clause was written into the contract, would be available to absorb losses.
But it might be easy enough to draft a get-out clause for individuals with a temporary 
accumulation. For example, any bank account holder could be covered, say, by up to €5 
million, for a period of, say, one month from the date that that account broached the 
normal upper deposit level, so long as that account holder had not held a sum greater 
than the normal upper limit in that or any other bank account for the previous, say, 
twelve months.1 This would deal with windfalls, while the conditionality would prevent 
institutions with regular, perhaps occasionally large, holdings of  money from being 
automatically protected.
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In fact, concern about the coverage of  deposit insurance should probably relate more 
to institutions than to individuals. What should be done about those institutions caught 
with large deposits just in advance of  major payouts for wages, dividends, takeovers, etc.? 
What about charities just completing their fundraising? While the plight of  individuals 
caught unawares with temporary accumulations of  money may be more newsworthy and 
politically potent, the loss of  wealth by institutions could be much more economically 
damaging.
This latter consideration suggests that there may be a case for depositor preference in 
the process of  bank liquidation; the bank depositor, whether formally insured or not, gets 
paid out by the liquidator before any unsecured bondholder—the doctrine of  pari passu 
would be abrogated in this respect. But in that case, why would any investor want to buy 
a bond junior to a deposit (except at a significantly higher interest rate), when they could 
put their funds with the bank—for example, in a certificate of  deposit form that would 
count as a deposit (for protected status) but would otherwise mimic the characteristics of  
a bond? Would depositor preference totally distort the funding practices of  banks?2
Bail-inable bond and contagion
Many regulators (e.g. Haldane and Hoenig) call for more simplicity in the regulatory 
framework. Yet, at the same time, the authorities are pressing banks to issue more loss-
absorbing bail-inable bonds, or CoCos. Such instruments that can transform under 
certain conditions into equity are by nature far more complex than straight equity or 
simple bonds. Both the uncertainty about whether the trigger may get pulled (and when, 
and how, and by whom) and the complex details of  the trigger and of  the transformation 
are likely to make the instrument less attractive to investors, and thus only saleable at a 
higher yield. So why would any bank want to issue such an instrument? The answer is 
because the authorities are pressing banks to increase their holdings of  loss-absorbing 
capital, and, even at much higher yields, their issue may be preferable to existing 
shareholders, given present market conditions, to an attempt to issue new equity, if  the 
latter is effectively feasible at all.
When the first bank to fail goes under, then, barring delays, perhaps due to legal 
wrangling over their treatment, such bail-inable bonds are likely to do their job in 
meeting the accrued loss, and allowing this bank to continue as a going concern. But it 
will take time to ascertain with any clarity what loss of  value, if  any, has been suffered by 
such bondholders. Meanwhile, the failure of  this first bank will in most cases have raised 
the probability of  default in other similar banks, but to an extent that will be difficult to 
judge. Bail-inable bonds will become more difficult to price, conditional on the failure of  
the first bank. Under these circumstances, the market for new issues of  such bonds will 
become more difficult and perhaps dry up altogether.
Assume that the capital adequacy requirement sets a desired level of  10 percent (of  
risk-weighted assets [RWA]) for equity and another 8 percent for bail-inable bonds. By 
definition, the first failing bank, rescued by triggering those bonds, will now be below 
the joint ratio; the equity ratio may have been restored, but bail-inable bonds have been 
triggered and so will now be zero. As the market for new bail-inable bonds then gets more 
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difficult, banks with such bonds maturing will become unable or unwilling to roll them 
over, and their ratio will start to fall below the desired level. What happens then? What 
(ladder of) sanctions will be imposed on those banks which allow their holdings of  loss-
absorbing capital to fall below the desired level?
It sometimes feels as if  regulators concentrate on each single bank (microprudential 
regulation) and ask themselves how best to handle that single bank should it fall into 
serious difficulties. In contrast, the task of  macroprudential regulators is to ask themselves 
how to protect the system of  banks, conditional on another bank, perhaps one of  the 
biggest and most interconnected, having already failed. It was clear in the aftermath of  
the Lehman failure that that exercise had not been done. The manner in which the 
proposals for bail-inable bonds has been put forward—for example, with no attention to 
(potentially time-varying) ladders of  sanctions—makes me wonder whether the focus has 
remained on the single bank rather than the system as a whole.
The banking resolution fund
The focus of  the exercise to reform bank resolution has been to shift the burden of  
repairing banking losses from the taxpayer to the bank creditor. Particularly since the 
regulators have not seized the chance to enforce early intervention, it remains possible 
that the resultant loss could in some cases exceed the available amount of  loss-absorbing 
capital, even when this has been greatly augmented, as planned. In the immediate short 
run, the only alternatives would be recapitalization by the taxpayer or by a prearranged 
bank fund (nota bene: the bank fund should not be invested in the sovereign debt of  the 
home country, since this would reinforce the bank/sovereign doom loop). Given the 
uncertainty about the future occasion and severity of  a financial crisis, such an ex ante fund 
would probably be insufficient to meet the losses occasioned by a major financial crisis. 
While, in principle, such an ex ante fund could be risk based, in practice, the difficulties 
of  defining risk in a generally acceptable way mean that it is levied on a pro rata basis.
But even if  the taxpayer should still be called upon to meet a severe crisis in the 
short run, the general idea is that the taxpayer should be recompensed by a levy to be 
imposed on surviving banks. But while such a tax is, not surprisingly, politically popular, 
it is structurally unsound. It hits the better-behaved surviving banks, generally in a way 
that does not make them more risk averse at a time (i.e. after the crisis) when they feel 
financially weakest. Moreover, the parameters of  the tax (e.g. how long the banks should 
have to pay back for the cost of  rescue; what the final cost of  the rescue should turn 
out to be; what the relative interest rate to discount future tax flows to the present value 
should be—whatever it may be regarding the cost of  rescue) are all likely to be quite 
arbitrary and subjective at the time of  imposition. So such a bank tax will, once again, be 
determined more by the political rather than by any economic calculus.
Conclusions
The return on equity (ROE) in banking, including the remuneration of  senior staff, was 
greatly raised by leverage. As a consequence, when asset prices (of  MBS) fell, there was 
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not enough loss-absorbing capital to meet that loss. The alternatives were financial chaos 
or taxpayer recapitalization. Although the correct choice between these two was made 
post-Lehman, there was much resentment that such a choice had been forced on us all 
by the preferences of  bankers and bank shareholders.
In the field to which this paper relates (i.e. bank resolution), the attempt is being made 
to shift the burden of  any loss from the taxpayer to bank creditors, first by requiring 
banks to hold a much higher ratio of  loss-absorbing capital to assets, whether measured 
in risk-weighted or in simple leverage format, and, second, by imposing an ex post levy on 
banks to recoup (part of) the earlier cost of  taxpayer recapitalization. The main problem 
is that present market conditions make the issue either of  new equity or of  specifically 
bail-inable bonds more than a little unattractive. The result is that banks are seeking to 
enhance their (required) ratios by a massive process of  deleveraging.
Many have argued that financial intermediation has been excessive. Some reduction 
in balance sheets may, therefore, be welcome. But the full extent of  deleveraging, not 
only in the past but that still in prospect, at a time of  continuing economic stagnation 
is surely disadvantageous. The ultimate achievement of  an equilibrium in which banks 
hold much more equity (as a ratio to assets) is considerably safer and has a much lower 
ROE, and remains highly desirable, yet the dynamic process of  moving toward such an 
equilibrium has been badly handled. It has resulted in massive inconsistencies in policy, 
with banks being urged to increase credit expansion (to domestic borrowers) at the same 
time as they are being required to raise the capital to be held against such lending; the 
UK Funding for Lending Scheme at least attempts to resolve such an inconsistency.
The same desire to protect taxpayers has led to proposals (e.g. the Vickers Report) 
to limit their contingent liability to the support and recapitalization of  domestic retail 
banking. This will lead to further fragmentation and balkanization of  the previous 
globalized financial system. It is hard for me to see how such national preference would 
be compatible with the more global SPE proposal emanating from the Bank of  England/
FDIC for the resolution of  cross-border, universal banks. Indeed, recent US proposals 
for mandatory incorporation of  US-based foreign banking activities into a US subsidiary 
(Federal Reserve 2012) hardly represents a note of  resounding confidence in the efficacy 
of  an SPE approach. No doubt both the US regulatory authorities and the Bank of  
England are subject to internal conflicts and split personalities.
The future not only of  the process for bank resolution, but also of  the structure of  the 
wider financial system, remains in doubt. We may know what kind of  ultimate equilibrium 
state for the financial system we might like to attain, but the empirical evidence clearly 
suggests that we do not have a very clear idea about how best to get from here to there.
Notes
1 Colleagues who know better than me have, however, warned that temporarily higher deposit 
limits for certain groups for certain reasons are legally almost impossible to draft (o.a. principle 
of  equity).
2 The majority of  large global banks are predominantly depositor funded. At the moment, on a 
bank failure, depositors rank pari passu with ordinary creditors—the difference is that (for insured 
depositors) the loss to the depositors flows from the bank to the protection scheme, and thus onto 
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the other banks in the system concerned. This is one of  the most important points about the 
impact of  bank failure—the loss to senior creditors falls (in theory anyway) outside the system; 
the loss to insured depositors falls (by definition) on other banks in the system. Thus, if  you have 
a bank whose funding is 80 percent deposits and 20 percent from other creditors, if  the bank 
fails, 80 percent of  the total loss will be recycled within the banking system concerned. This is 
potentially a trigger for domino default within that system. Depositor preference looks like an 
answer to this, but it is not. This is because in a system with depositor preference, no sane person 
becomes an unsecured creditor of  a bank. This is why the smaller FDIC banks have “dumb-
bell” financing—deposits and secured financings, but no unsecured senior. After a while, this 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; as the FDIC say on their website (FDIC 1988), in a normal 
FDIC resolution, unsecured creditors get 0 percent on their claims. For these banks, once you 
have satisfied secured creditors, 100 percent of  the loss therefore flows back into the national 
banking system through the deposit protection scheme. This can make government intervention 
inevitable.
References
Calomiris, C. W., and R. Herring. 2011. “Why and How to Design an Effective Contingent Capital 
Requirement.” Columbia Business School Working Paper. February.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 1988. Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC 
Experience. Washington, DC: FDIC. Online: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/
history1-10.pdf  (accessed August 14, 2014).
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Bank of  England. 2012. Resolving Globally 
Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions. December 10. Online: http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/documents/news/2012/nr156.pdf  (accessed August 14, 2014).
Federal Reserve. 2012. “Press Release.” Online: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20121214a.htm (accessed August 14, 2014).
Financial Stability Board (FSB). 2011. Key Attributes of  Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial 
Institutions. Pamphlet, October. Online: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_111104cc.pdf  (accessed August 14, 2014).
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2009. “Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring 
Systemic Risks.” Global Financial Stability Report. April. Washington, DC: IMF.

Chapter 7
RESOLVING PROBLEM BANKS:  
A REVIEW OF THE GLOBAL EVIDENCE
Martin Čihák and Erlend Nier
Introduction
Responding to the global financial crisis, many country authorities are considering 
or have made changes in regimes for resolving problem banks. In most cases, this has 
involved carving bank resolution out of  general bankruptcy regimes, and moving toward 
early intervention and resolution regimes specifically designed for banks. Such special 
regimes typically give more powers to central banks and other financial authorities, and 
reduce the involvement of  the judicial system. This chapter provides a brief  review of  the 
reforms in bank resolution regimes around the globe, building on updated information 
from recent global surveys, including the World Bank’s (2013) latest “Bank Regulation 
and Supervision Survey.”
The Case for Special Resolution Regimes
There is a strong case for financial institutions to be subject to a special resolution 
regime (SRR). Banks and other financial institutions play a special role, performing 
financial services fundamental to the functioning of  the economy, and contributing 
to the transmission of  monetary policy. The failure of  financial institutions can cause 
disruption and major negative externalities, such as a liquidity crunch, a fire sale of  
assets, and spillovers via the interbank market. For example, during Japan’s so-called lost 
decade in the 1990s, the effectiveness of  monetary policy was hampered by insufficient 
restructuring of  the banking system (IMF 2009). Introduction of  a sound legal framework 
for the resolution of  financial institutions is likely to increase the speed and decisiveness 
of  efforts to restructure national banking systems, which may come to increase the 
effectiveness of  monetary policy, and the speed of  recovery of  the economy.
The absence or inadequate scope of  resolution tools to deal with failing financial 
institutions was highlighted globally during the financial crisis that started in 2007 
and intensified in the second half  of  2008. Authorities were often confronted with 
two unappealing options: corporate bankruptcy—as chosen, for instance, by the US 
authorities on September 15, 2008 in the case of  Lehman Brothers, a global financial-
services firm—or an injection of  public funds—as chosen by the US authorities in the 
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case of  the American International Group two days later (see e.g. Sorkin 2008; Andrews 
2008). Both of  these alternatives can be very costly. A disorderly bankruptcy can magnify 
the systemic impacts of  the failure of  a financial institution, leading, for example, to a 
loss of  access to key financial services. When the authorities aim to avoid these impacts 
by injecting capital to support the institution, the fiscal outlays incurred in the course of  
an open-ended injection of  capital can also be large (Ayotte and Skeel 2010).
Figure 7.1 illustrates the cases of  “disorderly bankruptcy” and “injection of  public 
funds” under an ordinary bankruptcy regime. An SRR can lead to a net efficiency 
improvement in terms of  the tradeoff  between fiscal costs and containment of  systemic 
(financial stability) impact. It can do so by imposing on shareholders (and potentially debt 
holders) some or all of  the losses that would otherwise be borne by taxpayers. The SRR 
also gives the country authorities more flexibility to explore the tradeoff  between fiscal 
costs and systemic risk containment.
When ordinary bankruptcy is too costly, bankruptcy ceases to be a credible threat. If, in 
the absence of  other options, public infusion of  capital becomes the only alternative, this 
creates moral hazard and reduces market discipline. Empirical research documents how 
institutions expecting to receive public support hold smaller amounts of  tangible common 
equity relative to total assets, on average, thus increasing the likelihood of  failure (Nier and 
Baumann 2006). This research also shows that expectations of  public support reduce the 
force of  market discipline that may go along with enhanced disclosure of  information.
Recent evidence also suggests a strong correlation between the weaknesses of  
supervisory and resolution powers at the national level and the buildup of  financial 
imbalances across the OECD ahead of  the global financial crisis. Using an index of  
supervisory and resolution powers, constructed from information contained in a 
World Bank database, Merrouche and Nier (2010) show that the buildup of  financial 
Figure 7.1. Fiscal cost and systemic impact in resolution regimes
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imbalances, as measured by increases in the size of  banking sector balance sheets relative 
to core deposits, was stronger where national early remedial and resolution powers were 
relatively weak (Merrouche and Nier 2010).
Changes in Resolution Regimes during the  
Global Financial Crisis
There is clearly a recent trend toward introducing specialized bank resolution regimes. 
A prominent example is the regime introduced in the UK in 2009, which gives the banking 
authorities special resolution powers, enabling far-reaching and rapid action without the 
need to seek prior agreement of  shareholders or creditors (Brierley 2009). Similar powers 
exist in Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea, and the USA, where the law provides 
special rules for bank insolvency, administered by the supervisor or the deposit protection 
agency; in many European countries, by contrast, the general insolvency law applies to 
financial institutions, with the extent of  bank-specific modifications to the general law and 
the range of  authority granted to official administrators varying across countries (Hüpkes 
2000). For example, in some European countries, the banking authorities have the right 
to initiate proceedings, but the process is otherwise in the hands of  the bankruptcy court; 
in other cases, the authorities play a stronger role in reorganization, but their powers are 
limited or less clearly defined (Marinč and Vlahu 2011). In particular, shareholders often 
retain the right of  final approval of  any reorganization measures.
Other countries that have recently introduced an SRR or have substantially strengthened 
an existing regime, in addition to the UK, include Denmark, Germany, and Ireland (Čihák 
and Nier 2012). Austria recently strengthened its resolution regime, as did several other 
Figure 7.2. Revisions in countries’ bank resolution frameworks, 2008–11
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Source: Calculations based on the World Bank’s 2011 Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey 
(http://worldbank.org/financialdevelopment).
Note: The survey is based on responses from senior banking supervisors in 142 countries. This figure 
is based on survey question 11.12 (“Have you introduced significant changes to the bank resolution 
framework in your country as a result of  the global financial crisis?”).
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countries, and virtually all the other EU member countries are considering changes or are 
in the process of  revising the relevant legislation (Overhofer and Rath 2012). On a global 
scale, calculations based on the World Bank’s recently updated Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Survey reveal a similar picture (Figure 7.2).
Interestingly, the changes in the resolution regime during the global financial crisis do 
not seem to differ significantly between countries that were directly hit during the global 
financial crisis and those that avoided the direct impact of  the crisis. This is illustrated in 
Table 7.1, which shows country authorities’ responses to questions about banking resolution 
regimes in the World Bank’s latest Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. The table 
includes p-values from tests of  the null hypothesis that the changes observed across countries 
are not significant. The table suggests that while bank resolution was an important area of  
reform after the crisis, countries implemented changes across the board, whether they were 
affected by the crisis or not. This is in line with the findings in Čihák et al. (2012).
Principles and Design of  the Framework
Principles
Based on the review of  crisis and pre-crisis experience, a consensus has begun to emerge 
that a resolution framework should satisfy five basic principles (Čihák and Nier 2013). 
First, it should allow the country authorities to take control of  the financial institution 
at an early stage of  its financial difficulties, through “official administration.” Second, it 
should empower the authorities to use a wide range of  tools to deal with a failing financial 
institution, without the consent of  shareholders or creditors. Third, it should establish an 
effective and specialized framework for liquidation of  the institution that assigns a central 
role to the authorities. Fourth, it should ensure clarity as to the objectives of  the regime 
and define clearly the scope of  judicial review. And fifth, it should promote information 
sharing and coordination among all authorities involved in supervision and resolution.
Table 7.1. Changes in resolution regime introduced in response to the global crisis
Have you introduced significant changes to the bank resolution 
framework in your country as a result of  the global financial 
crisis?
Crisis Non-crisis p-value
a. Introduced a separate bank insolvency framework (% Yes) 11 8 0.77
b.  Implemented coordination arrangements among domestic 
authorities (% Yes)
32 42 0.43
c. Other (% Yes) 74 56 0.16
Source: Calculations based on World Bank’s 2011 Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey (http://
worldbank.org/financialdevelopment). The survey is based on responses from senior banking supervisors 
in 142 countries. See also Čihák et al. (2012).
Note: Following Laeven and Valencia (2012), the “crisis” countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nigeria, Spain, 
Ukraine, UK, and USA (cases of  systemic banking crises); France, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, the Russian 
Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland (borderline cases). T-tests are used to test for the equality 
of  the means (percentage of  “Yes” responses) between crisis and non-crisis samples.
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Scope
Scope, or coverage, is a key aspect of  the SRR. For example, the regime operated in the 
USA during the financial crisis applied only to commercial banks, and did not include 
bank holding companies and other financial institutions, which did not take deposits, 
but may still warrant inclusion in a regime that aims to reduce the impact of  failure of  
systemically important institutions and financial groups. Investment banks—such as Bear 
Stearns and Lehman—are important examples of  such institutions. Other examples 
include Northern Rock and HRE, which relied on wholesale funding to a significant 
extent, but turned out to have systemically relevant implications.
One approach to defining the scope is for the law to enumerate the types of  institutions 
falling within its scope, or to set out criteria and quantitative thresholds that determine 
unequivocally whether a particular institution or group falls within the scope. An 
alternative approach is for the law to set out the scope in more operational terms. This 
can be achieved by giving the resolution authority the power to “designate” particular 
non-bank institutions to fall under the scope of  the regime. Such a designation could 
be made on the basis of  a rigorous but more qualitative assessment of  the systemic risk 
posed by a given individual institution against a suitable set of  criteria. When such an 
assessment is conducted periodically and across all potentially relevant institutions, this 
permits a more dynamic framework that is able to respond flexibly to developments in 
financial markets and changes to the business models of  any particular institution.1 One 
example is the approach taken in the USA, where the law enables the authorities to 
designate financial companies, including bank holding companies and their non-bank 
subsidiaries, as well as systemically important non-bank companies, such as insurance 
companies and securities brokers, as covered by an expanded SRR operated by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).2
Thresholds
The resolution regime needs to specify a regulatory threshold, such that when the 
threshold is crossed, the resolution authority is entitled to take control of  the financial 
institution and start the restructuring. The threshold reflects the essence of  special 
resolution proceedings—to permit the financial stability authorities to intervene in a 
financial institution at an early stage of  difficulty when, while the position of  the financial 
institution has weakened substantially, it may still have positive net worth (IMF and World 
Bank 2009). This contrasts with the “balance sheet threshold” often applied in ordinary 
bankruptcy proceedings, which permits proceedings to be initiated only after net worth is 
close to exhausted. Taking control at an early stage permits the authorities to explore the 
most appropriate resolution option prior to a full deterioration of  capital, while seeking 
to prevent further weakening of  the institution’s condition.
There are many ways in which a threshold can be defined. In the USA, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act specifies a mandatory threshold of  a bank being “critically 
undercapitalized,” defined as a leverage ratio—tangible equity to total assets—below 
2 percent.3 The threshold is mandatory in the sense that the authorities are not only 
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entitled but required by law to take action if  the threshold is breached. Other countries 
apply softer thresholds. The resolution regime introduced through the 2009 Banking Act 
in the UK (discussed earlier) applies a soft threshold, which amounts to a test of  whether 
the bank in question is “likely to fail” the requirements for it to be licensed as a deposit 
taker. The relevant criteria include the “adequacy of  the firm’s resources.”4
The choice between a soft and a hard threshold can draw on the familiar debate on 
“rules” versus “discretion.” A rule can increase commitment to take resolution action 
and therefore reduce the scope for forbearance. Indeed, a hard threshold was introduced 
in the USA to limit what was deemed excessive forbearance on the part of  the authorities 
during the so-called savings and loans crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s (Mayes 2009).
The limitation of  rules is that they cannot fully capture all considerations about 
appropriate actions taken at a given point in time. Having some discretion can allow for 
a fuller appraisal of  the situation and make it easier to incorporate judgment. Indeed, 
discretion may sometimes favor more rapid action—for example, when an institution is 
rapidly deteriorating due to lack of  access to key funding markets, but such deterioration 
is not well captured by the regulatory threshold.
Discretion may increase ex post efficiency by ensuring that the action taken is fully 
appropriate in light of  the situation. A rule can increase ex ante efficiency by limiting 
forbearance and the resulting moral hazard. In practice, an appropriate solution may 
trade off  the two. For example, in Canada, the institution needs to be deemed no longer 
“viable.”5 Excessive dependence on financial assistance, lack of  depositor confidence, 
and capital deficiencies are introduced as indicative criteria of  this threshold having been 
breached.
Early intervention
It is important for actions in the resolution stage to be complemented by “early remedial 
action” by the relevant supervisory agency—that is, a phase of  heightened supervisory 
involvement, aiming to reduce the chance that the resolution stage will need to be 
invoked. This may involve supervisory “assistance” in the design of  a “recovery plan” 
to address incipient financial weakness and the monitoring of  the plan’s execution by 
the supervisory authority. The plan might involve raising private capital, modifications 
to particular lines of  business, and the divestiture of  particular assets. To ensure the 
success of  the early intervention phase, it is important for supervisory authorities to have 
appropriate enforcement actions at their disposal.
It is equally important for the early intervention and resolution phases to be well 
integrated operationally. Operational integration of  the early intervention and resolution 
phases can be facilitated when both the prudential regulation of  systemically important 
institutions and the resolution of  such institutions are assigned to the same agency. 
Where more than one agency is involved in supervision and resolution, this integration 
requires rules governing the exchange of  information between agencies. It also requires 
a high degree of  coordination between all authorities involved. Such coordination should 
involve clear and detailed processes to reach the appropriate degree of  consultation and 
to achieve the aggregation of  views held by different authorities. An example are the 
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rules that govern cooperation between the Canadian banking regulator (OSFI) and the 
Canadian deposit insurance agency (CDIC) along four stages of  an integrated early 
intervention and resolution process. OSFI (2010) describes the four stages of  intensifying 
intervention, the actions that may be taken by both authorities in each stage, and the 
means of  coordination between both authorities.
Tools
Effective resolution requires expanding the set of  tools beyond liquidation and capital 
support. This section discusses tools that should be considered when existing regimes are 
reviewed. Most of  these are available under the existing regimes in the USA, the UK, 
Mexico, South Korea, Canada, and Japan (Brierley 2009).
Acquisition of  the failing institution as a whole is often the most desirable outcome 
when a financial institution is in distress. This solution can provide continuity of  services, 
protect the public purse, and, at the same time, protect the interests of  creditors and 
counterparties, whose exposures to the failing institution are replaced by claims on a 
stronger institution. Importantly, the resolution authority needs to be able to reach a 
private sector sale, even if  the terms of  the sale impose losses on existing shareholders. As 
illustrated, for example, in the case of  the resolution of  the US bank Washington Mutual, 
this can be achieved by assigning the power to effect the transfer of  the institution on 
terms that do not require the consent of  existing shareholders.
Bridge banks are temporary institutions created by the resolution authority to take 
over the operation of  the failing institution and preserve its going-concern value, while the 
resolution authority seeks to arrange a permanent resolution of  the failure. The bridge 
bank tool allows the resolution authority to “bridge” the gap between an institution’s 
failure and the time when a suitable purchaser has been found. This tool may be attractive 
in particular for large and complex organizations, where due diligence examinations of  
assets and liabilities by a potential purchaser can take time, and where it is important 
to keep up critical services, such as payment and infrastructure, provided by the bank 
(Hüpkes 2000). Importantly, under the bridge bank tool, the incumbent management is 
replaced and new management services are contracted for by the resolution authority.
Where some of  the institution’s assets are doubtful, non-performing, or difficult to 
value, it may be challenging to find an acquirer willing to take over the institution as a 
whole. In such cases, the resolution authority needs to have the powers to sell some of  
the assets and liabilities. In a “good bank” solution, only easy-to-value or “clean” assets 
are transferred, in addition to deposits and (a fraction of) the bank’s other liabilities. The 
residual institution is left with the difficult-to-value (“toxic”) assets and the cash raised 
by the transfer. Having been turned into a “bad bank,” the residual institution is owned 
by existing shareholders, whose capital continues to be at risk from a loss in value of  the 
toxic assets.
Alternatively, the resolution authority may want to set up a new entity, such as 
an asset management company under government control, and force the transfer of  
doubtful or toxic assets to that company, which may be in a position to hold on to the 
doubtful assets or have special skills in collecting on or selling these assets into the market.6 
116 CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS
Care needs to be taken to ensure that the transfer occurs at a fair price, which may be difficult 
to determine in stressed market conditions. It is important also to ensure that, while the 
original entity can participate in any upside, it is not left with any residual uncertainty on the 
downside, which could weigh on its cost of  funding, and compromise the success of  resolution.
If  some assets are hard to value, a further alternative is for authorities to sell the 
institution as a whole, but provide some form of  financing or a guarantee to the acquirer. 
Such a guarantee is provided to the acquiring institution, rather than to the existing 
institution and its shareholders, reducing moral hazard, and preserving incentives for 
private risk management.7
As a last resort, the government needs to be able to take temporary public ownership 
of  the failing institution. This may be appropriate where a large amount of  public 
funds need to be made available to stabilize the institution. Temporary public control 
(nationalization) was the main tool used under the Swedish “triage” approach for those 
banking institutions deemed neither “clearly non-viable” nor “clearly viable” during the 
1990s (Čihák and Nier 2012). Temporary public control may be useful if  the banking 
system is highly concentrated and there are limited options for a sale to private bidders. 
However, it is important to ensure that former shareholders take the first loss and do not 
benefit from the assistance provided by the public, that new management is contracted, 
and that the institution is restructured in a way that can restore viability.
Common across these tools is the absence of  a subsidy to existing shareholders. Instead, 
each of  the resolution paths will typically impose losses on shareholders, relative to a 
situation where the bank is bailed out. As argued above, this is useful both to reduce public 
outlays in bank resolution and to increase longer-run financial stability by strengthening 
private incentives for risk management. Moreover, as long as shares in the failing institution 
are widely held, imposing losses on shareholders should not be a greater concern from 
the point of  view of  the stability of  the system than when losses are imposed on the 
sovereign. Finally, relative to ordinary liquidation—the tool commonly used in corporate 
insolvency of  non-financial firms—shareholders would not tend to be worse off  under 
the resolution tools described. In liquidation, shareholders hold the most junior claim and 
typically lose their entire investment. Under the resolution tools described here, the losses 
to shareholders are likewise capped by the amount of  their investment. The liquidation 
value is also a relevant yardstick to compare the shareholder’s position under the use of  
special resolution tools. This is because if  these tools were not used—and in the absence 
of  public support—liquidation of  the bank is the most likely eventual outcome.
Relative to ordinary bankruptcy and liquidation, all resolution tools tend to reduce 
losses borne by creditors, including both senior and junior classes. In a liquidation of  
financial institutions, the recovery on assets is typically low, and low recovery is felt most 
acutely by creditors, while shareholders’ losses are capped by limited liability. Since the 
resolution paths opened up through reorganization are more efficient, such resolution 
will therefore, in the normal course, tend to protect the interests of  creditors.
Losses for creditors may be most likely under the “good bank” approach, where there 
is a partial sale of  “clean” assets to a good bank and this bank also assumes the liabilities—
up to the value of  the clean assets—from the residual bank. In this case, whenever the 
book value of  the difficult-to-value assets exceeds shareholder funds, some (classes of) 
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creditors will, by a simple balance sheet identity, need to remain exposed to the valuation 
risk associated with the remaining assets. From the point of  view of  market discipline and 
longer-term financial stability, letting losses be borne by debt holders is useful. However, 
when other financial institutions hold sizable exposures, uncertainty about future losses 
will increase the vulnerability of  these institutions, potentially contributing to systemic 
risk. One approach to resolving this dilemma is for the resolution authority to buy out 
financial institutions with sizable exposures as part of  the resolution process. Another 
is for the law to prohibit banks from holding each other’s subordinated or senior debt, 
or otherwise to discourage such exposures, through higher capital requirements on 
exposures to other financial institutions, and regulations imposing limits on the size of  
individual exposures, so as to keep knock-on effects at a manageable level.
The above tools differ in the degree to which the public sector assumes valuation 
risks associated with “toxic” assets. The public sector risks are lowest under the “good 
bank” approach and highest under the “temporary public control” approach. However, 
they each avoid the difficulties inherent in solutions that envisage a voluntary sale of  
difficult-to-value assets by the troubled bank to a private bidder. A voluntary sale is 
difficult to achieve because the troubled institution may have better information on its 
portfolio, leading it to place a higher value on the assets than an outside bidder would, or 
because a complex portfolio can be worth more at the margin to the troubled institution 
than to a potential buyer. Moreover, none of  these tools involve a subsidy to the existing 
shareholders of  the failing institution and each therefore preserves incentives for private 
risk management. This contrasts with some of  the asset resolution schemes that have 
been devised to cleanse the financial system of  its legacy assets, which often envisaged 
voluntary sales and sought to incentivize such sales through attractive pricing.8
Beyond the Special Resolution Regime
A central point of  this chapter is that SRRs, while helpful, are far from a panacea. Even 
where country authorities have special resolution powers, as described above, large and 
complex financial institutions may still prove difficult to resolve in an orderly manner. 
This has sparked intensive debate on additional measures that can be taken to address 
the risk of  failure of  institutions that are “too important to fail.” There is an emerging 
consensus that a multipronged and integrated set of  policies is required (Ötker-Robe 
et al. 2011). In other words, the resolution regime is a key, but not the only part of  the 
broader financial stability framework. Prudential supervision has particularly close links 
to the resolution regime: an effective resolution regime helps to make supervision more 
effective, and effective supervision helps to identify and prevent problems in financial 
institutions even before a resolution may be needed.
An important element of  the broader approach is a regulatory requirement for 
systemically important institutions to hold additional capital that can ensure a greater 
capacity to absorb losses and reduce the likelihood of  failure of  such institutions. For 
globally systemically important institutions, the size of  these additional requirements, 
agreed to by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), will amount to up to 2.5 percent of  risk-
weighted assets, to be met with common equity (Fontevecchia 2011).
118 CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS
A number of  studies have called for additional capital requirements that banks could 
meet with debt instruments that convert into equity when the bank is under stress. These 
instruments, known as contingent convertible capital (CoCos), may be less burdensome 
than common equity, since interest payments on debt instruments are usually treated 
as an expense and are therefore tax deductible. Moreover, CoCo requirements can 
have beneficial incentive effects. For example, Calomiris and Herring (2011) argue that 
when conversion is triggered by falls in the market value of  equity relative to assets, 
shareholders have incentives to issue new equity so as to avoid conversion of  convertible 
debt, since conversion is designed to result in a substantial dilution of  shareholders. 
Properly constructed, a contingent capital requirement can thus complement early 
intervention by supervisors.
The FSB (2011) has recommended that supervisors regularly assess the feasibility of  
resolution strategies and be given the power to require appropriate measures to remove 
obstacles to resolvability. This could include powers to require changes to the institution’s 
business structure, systems, and organization to reduce the complexity and costliness of  
resolution. For example, to enable the continued operations of  systemically important 
functions, authorities may need to be in a position to require that these functions be 
segregated in legally and operationally independent entities, so that they can be easily 
separated and shielded from problems of  the group. However, while in the USA, 
the Dodd–Frank Act has given the Federal Reserve fairly broad powers to improve 
resolvability, very few supervisory authorities in Europe (or elsewhere) currently dispose 
of  these powers (Basel Committee 2011).
A number of  countries, including Germany and Sweden, have recently established 
dedicated resolution funds that can contribute to the funding of  costs incurred in 
resolving financial institutions (Tait et al. 2010). The IMF (2010) has proposed for such 
resolution funds to be prefunded by a levy on the non-deposit (wholesale) liabilities of  
financial institutions. These liabilities are not covered by traditional deposit insurance 
schemes, but have proven to be vulnerable to runs. The proposed levies can therefore 
reduce incentives for financial institutions to over-rely on such volatile funding. A further 
advantage of  industry-funded schemes is that they reduce the need for taxpayer support 
of  resolution actions. However, a disadvantage of  resolution funds is that, unlike capital 
requirements, they do not by themselves reduce the likelihood of  failure of  individual 
institutions, and may increase the likelihood of  failure in a pro-cyclical fashion when 
contributions are increased at a time of  systemic stress. Care also needs to be taken that 
resolution funds are used only to support resolution action that wipes out shareholders 
and replaces management, since the availability of  a dedicated fund may otherwise 
contribute to bailout expectations, creating moral hazard.
There is ongoing debate on the merits of  expanding the resolution toolbox beyond 
the tools discussed in the previous section to include bail-in powers—that is, the power 
to write down the claims of  senior unsecured creditors, or to force a conversion to equity 
of  such claims. Such powers were established in Denmark in October 2010 and used in 
the resolution of  Amagerbanken in February 2011 (Schwartzkopff  2011). The benefit 
is that the write-down of  claims can help re-establish the bank as a going concern by 
boosting its equity capital, while shielding taxpayers from losses. These powers also 
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address an anomaly where holders of  senior corporate debt are at risk in insolvency 
proceedings, while the early resolution of  banks often largely preserves the value of  
senior debt. However, the use of  bail-in powers can put strains on both the stricken 
bank’s funding and other banks’ funding, increasing the cost of  replacing maturing 
debt, in particular in stress times when investor confidence is fragile. Moreover, if  
senior debt instruments are held by other leveraged financial institutions (such as other 
banks or money-market mutual funds), a write-down of  senior debt can trigger the very 
systemic repercussions that the introduction of  special resolution powers are meant to 
avoid. To prevent this, it is possible to exempt certain classes of  claims, such as short-
term debt and interbank liabilities, but such exemptions may lead banks to increase the 
share of  exempt liabilities in their funding, requiring mandatory levels of  issuance of  
bail-in debt.
Cross-Border Issues
Handling failures in cross-border financial groups involves additional layers of  
complexity. It can cause significant tensions between home and host countries that may 
stand in the way of  cost-minimizing solutions. Particularly complicated have been cases 
when problems in financial institutions exceeded their home country’s capacity to offer 
support (the Icelandic banks) and the resolution of  truly multinational banks, such as 
Fortis (Fonteyne et al. 2010; Čihák and Nier 2012). In those cases, holding up the letter 
and spirit of  existing cooperation and “burden sharing” arrangements has proven hard. 
Moreover, the crisis illustrated an important challenge for small countries with banking 
sectors that are dominated by foreign-owned financial institutions, where it may be 
difficult to determine the extent to which foreign financial institutions will benefit from 
support put in place by their home countries.
In the European Union, a particular tension arises since cross-border activity 
has been encouraged as a way of  achieving a common market for financial services, 
while the pan-European legal and administrative framework for bank resolution 
and insolvency has been lagging. Moreover, in the absence of  a strong EU-level 
fiscal authority, the resolution of  failing institutions remains the domain of  national 
authorities. A number of  past and present initiatives aim to resolve this tension. 
Čihák and Decressin (2007) pointed out that a resolution regime at the fully 
consolidated level would have to be an element of  a dedicated European regime for 
cross-border financial institutions, which would also need to include (i) a European 
banking license; (ii) a European resolution authority and European resolution fund; 
(iii) a European deposit insurance scheme, covering deposits issued by branches and 
subsidiaries; and (iv) strong supervision under the auspices of  the new European 
Banking Authority, also involving colleges of  supervisors that include both home and 
host country authorities.
Čihák and Nier (2012) provide a further analysis on the subject, noting that while 
national SRRs are only partial and unable to fully address all cross-border issues, 
they do increase the chance of  a successful resolution of  the group as a whole. While 
there is an active international debate on frameworks for the resolution of  financial 
120 CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS
institutions that operate across national borders, no formal international agreement is 
likely in the foreseeable future. Stricter regulation of  cross-border institutions will need 
to be considered as part of  the answer.
Conclusion
There is a strong conceptual case for banks and other systemically important institutions 
to be subject to a special insolvency regime. Standard judicial insolvency regimes do 
not necessarily take into account financial-stability considerations, and are typically 
cumbersome and slow, while in financial crises, speedy and decisive action is necessary.
SRRs can contribute to overall financial stability, and improve the tradeoff  between 
the need to stabilize the financial system and to minimize fiscal costs and longer-run 
costs of  moral hazard. More specifically, by expanding the toolset at the disposal of  
authorities, a special regime may come to facilitate a decisive restructuring of  weakened 
financial institutions, should such an effort be needed as part of  an overall strategy to 
restore confidence in the financial system.
The chapter reviews the international evidence, and identifies features of  a well-
designed and well-implemented bank resolution regime that can be helpful in containing 
the fiscal costs and limiting the impact of  a bank failure on financial stability, both in 
the home country and in foreign jurisdictions. It highlights the issue of  rules versus 
discretion: these regimes provide wide discretion to financial authorities to act in resolving 
the problem bank, but they also need to contain clear rules to ensure that timely action 
occurs, and that it withstands subsequent legal challenges.
The chapter notes that while the conceptual reasons for SRRs for banks are strong, 
such regimes are not a panacea, and need to be complemented by other measures. Also, 
real-life resolution regimes have important limitations and shortcomings that reduce 
their effectiveness. Indeed, reviews of  the post-crisis reforms (e.g. Čihák et al. 2012) 
suggest that the legal and regulatory changes have not yet fully addressed the underlying 
incentive breakdowns highlighted by the global financial crisis.
Notes
1 The IMF, FSB, and BIS (2009) provide guidance on an assessment of  the systemic importance 
of  financial institutions, as presented to the G20 in November 2009.
2 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203. 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010).
3 Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 38, 12 USC, § 18310 (2006).
4 UK Financial Services and Markets Act c. 8, § 296 (2000).
5 Canada Deposit Insurance Act, RSC c. C-3 (1985).
6 This was used when the Swedish government established Securum, a bank founded to take 
on bad assets during the Swedish banking rescue of  1991–92. In 2009, the Irish government 
established the National Asset Management Agency, a bad bank.
7 This tool was used in the resolution of  Wachovia, a large US bank-holding company.
8 Examples are the US Troubled Asset Relief  Program that was originally conceived to relieve banks 
of  their toxic assets through voluntary sales, as well as the German asset relief  scheme, approved 
by the European Commission in July 2009 (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
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do?reference=IP/09/1216, accessed August 14, 2014). Neither scheme was taken up, illustrating 
the difficulties of  cleansing bank balance sheets through voluntary sales.
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Chapter 8
BANK RESOLUTION IN NEW ZEALAND  
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE
David G. Mayes
Although New Zealand is a small country and has a somewhat unusual banking 
system—in that the four largest banks, which form well over 80 percent of  the 
market, are Australian owned, and the next largest, Kiwibank, is effectively owned by 
the government—it has taken some striking steps in bank resolution that make it an 
interesting example for European countries to consider. The overriding precepts of  the 
system are that the taxpayer should not have to pay for bank failure however large the 
bank and that the vital functions of  the large banks have to continue uninterrupted 
despite the failure. Furthermore, since all the systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) are foreign owned, the way in which they are structured must be such that the 
New Zealand authorities can resolve the parts in their jurisdiction satisfactorily, 
irrespective of  what their owners and the Australian authorities decide to do.
For small banks whose individual closure would have no implications for the stability of  
the financial system, the regime is simple. Such banks will simply be closed and the normal 
rules of  insolvency as applied to any other company will be applied. The only difference is 
that the central bank is able to step in and have the bank placed in statutory management 
(an equivalent of  receivership) so that it can control the insolvency process if  necessary. 
While no banks failed in the global financial crisis (GFC) in New Zealand, this form of  
statutory management was applied to the largest of  the finance companies that failed 
(South Canterbury Finance), so the possible process is clear. Other than Kiwibank, none 
of  the other retail banks except the four largest, either jointly or separately, has a significant 
market share. (Kiwibank will presumably be recapitalized by its owner and, as a narrow 
bank, it should not be exposed to high risks, except possibly through its mortgage portfolio.)
For the large banks, the regime is a little more complicated. First of  all, each bank 
must be locally incorporated, separately capitalized, and locally managed. In this way, the 
New Zealand authorities will have the legal authority to resolve it. Secondly, it must be 
capable of  operating on its own within the trading day, independent of  its parent or any 
other significant external supplier. In that way, the New Zealand authorities will have the 
practical ability to resolve it. Thirdly, the process of  resolution that is likely to be applied 
is that the Reserve Bank (the prudential banking regulator and resolution authority) will 
apply for the bank to be placed in statutory management. The statutory manager will then, 
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on a summary valuation of  the bank, apply a conservative write-down to all of  the claims, 
in the order of  priority that would apply in an insolvency, and ensure that the bank can 
continue trading on the next day, without a material break in its operations, and without 
triggering any close-out clauses or other actions that would stop it trading normally. The 
regime has been labeled “open bank resolution” (OBR; see Hoskin and Woolford 2011 for 
an exposition) although its previous name “bank creditor recapitalization”1 also explains 
the process. The statutory manager would not necessarily treat all of  the bank’s operations 
in the same way, as some may not be of  systemic importance, and could form part of  a 
normal insolvency or separate sale, whichever is in the best interests of  the creditors.
Clearly, there are plenty of  practical problems in implementing this form of  resolution 
and these are being addressed at present. In imposing statutory management, the procedure 
is akin to forming a bridge bank, in that the authorities take over the running of  the bank 
until such time as it can be sold to another authorized provider and recapitalized. In the 
meantime, it will probably operate under government guarantee against subsequent loss. The 
taxpayer will hence only be exposed in so far as the write-down of  creditors was insufficient 
or continuing operations results in further losses that were not anticipated. The writing-
down process will start with the shareholders, who are likely to be wiped out entirely unless 
intervention is remarkably quick, and will then move onto the subordinated debt holders, the 
unsecured creditors, and on upwards through the bondholders if  necessary to the point that 
the losses are clearly accounted for. All those written down will receive a residual claim on the 
net assets of  the bank (which will probably be tradable, if  they have any value).
Although somewhat unusual, this all seems straightforward, until one considers the 
depositors. New Zealand has no deposit insurance. Depositors, therefore, are junior creditors 
whose claims will be written down in proportion along with other creditors in the same class. 
Hence, all deposits will be divided into a frozen portion and a continuing portion that can 
be used in normal transactions immediately. This has some heavy IT and “prepositioning” 
requirements on the banks, as they will have to be able to identify the balances in all accounts 
on any given day and perform the separation into the two parts overnight.2
Clearly, these proposed arrangements present a number of  major problems, and the rest 
of  this chapter deals with them. As there have been no bank failures in recent years and no 
experience of  problems in large institutions, these arrangements are untried—fortunately.
The chapter therefore considers just five issues in consecutive sections before concluding:
•	 The	division	of 	the	bank	along	jurisdictional	boundaries	for	systemic	activities
•	 Whether	 one	 can	 have	 a	 resolution	 arrangement	 that	 will	 work	 without	 explicit	
cooperation of  the different jurisdictions involved
•	 Whether	writing	down	the	creditors’	claims	works	better	than	other	forms	of 	bailing	in
•	 Whether	the	resolution	can	take	place	fast	enough	that	it	can	actually	be	done	while	
the bank remains “open”
•	 Whether	OBR	 can	 operate	 without	 provoking	 a	 bank	 run	 because	 of 	 the	 lack	 of 	
deposit insurance
OBR should reduce the cost of  bank resolution in two respects: it should reduce the costs 
to creditors, and in favorable cases to shareholders, as the deadweight cost of  the loss of  
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franchise and the costs of  working out the resolution through insolvency are reduced; and 
it should reduce the systemic impact on the rest of  the economy by limiting the extent of  
any direct contagion through failed transactions and indirect contagion through loss of  
confidence in the banking system as a whole, and uncertainty about where the losses will 
fall. However, by concentrating the cost in the present by bailing in, it may have a larger, 
adverse short-run impact on the real economy than would spreading it over time through 
a tax-financed bailout.3
Splitting the Bank
One of  the keys to the New Zealand approach is the ability of  the authorities to take 
control of  a free-standing entity and resolve it without recourse to other authorities 
or the parent. The EU, with its plans for a banking union, is going in a different 
direction of  trying to get “federal level” authorities that can supervise the banking 
group as a whole, take decisions, and coordinate the different authorities involved 
in the resolution.4 Previously in the GFC, it became clear that the only cross-border 
arrangement that works well is where the home country authorities take on the job and 
allow the whole group to continue. Then none of  the conflicts of  interest about what is 
best for one country, particularly from the point of  view of  systemic stability, need to be 
addressed. In practice of  course, this was the bailout route, although, as in the case of  
the Royal Bank of  Scotland, for example, this can enable the authorities to have quite 
a considerable say over how the group is run since they are the large majority owner. 
European-level constraints, such as the commission’s requirements as the relevant 
competition authority for Lloyds Group to sell off  some of  the branches as a condition 
of  their acquisition of  HBOS, do not appear to offer any constraint on the essential 
feature of  the resolution, which is to keep the bank operating in all countries without a 
break. It is noticeable that the UK and the USA, in the joint statement by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Bank of  England, have continued with 
this view that the practical route to resolving a SIFI is for the authorities responsible for 
the parent organization to tackle it at the group level, including any bail-in (FDIC and 
Bank of  England 2012).
How the new EU ideas will pan out depends very much on the detail—not just in 
the relevant regulations and directives, but in how they are applied. The initial concern 
is that the group should be properly supervised as a single entity, although this will only 
apply to groups that are headquartered in the EU/EEA. It does not necessarily mean that 
there will be a single resolution agency, and the problem may still be how to coordinate 
all the individual jurisdictions.5 If  the intention is to organize a bailout, then this may still 
be straightforward, but as soon as the resolution involves closing or severely restricting 
some parts of  the group, then conflicts of  interest among the countries involved may 
surface. For example, closing a loss-making operation may be in the best interests of  
the creditors as a whole but cause a systemic problem in one country. Conflicts can also 
occur in bailout, as some countries may regard the source of  the difficulties as being the 
fault of  other regulatory authorities or the result of  events that are completely extraneous 
to them, and hence the concern solely of  other regulators/bailout funds. Once the 
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Single Supervisory Mechanism is in place and the problems from the past have been 
satisfactorily dealt with, including adequate recapitalization, then the chance of  such 
blame should be much smaller when supervision is a joint activity led by the European 
Central Bank (ECB).
Conflicts may also be avoided if  bail-in arrangements are sufficiently extensive that 
the entire banking group can continue to operate. In that way, it might be possible to 
avoid the use of  taxpayer funds, especially if  deposit insurance and resolution funds are 
provided by the industry and not by the state, as intended in the Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (RRD). However, such bail-in arrangements would have to be carefully specified 
in the design of  bonds and subordinated debt. In particular, that it could be triggered 
before the bank reaches insolvency.6 Managing a cross-border insolvency would still be 
very difficult. Almost any halfway house between legal and practical separation and a 
single jurisdiction for the whole group looks fraught with difficulty.
Separability, at face value, sounds as if  it runs counter to all of  the ideas of  the 
European single market, but in practice the strict separability required between Australia 
and New Zealand seems to have been of  little consequence for the banks. Staff  move 
between the two jurisdictions—the current and previous CEOs of  one of  the main four 
banks, Commonwealth, are New Zealanders—and many of  the managerial practices and 
products are common. However, the New Zealand banks have by and large maintained 
their own trading names when they have been acquired, and the fact that the absorbing 
of  the National Bank of  New Zealand into the ANZ in early 2013, having been owned by 
it for a number of  years, seems to have lost them some customers, tends to confirm this.7 
Thus, although the literature suggests that economies of  scale are possible until banks are 
very large, there does not appear to be much loss from these sources of  separation. The 
parent will still access capital markets on behalf  of  the group, many investment services 
will be sourced from Australia, and hence many of  the spillovers will still take place.
For large groups, a different dimension of  separability needs to be considered relating 
to non-bank arms, such as insurance, and retail and investment banking activities, but 
here, the New Zealand example has little to offer in the way of  lessons. The stability of  
the main four banks in the GFC relates mainly to their not having participated in risky 
activities and having little exposure to the USA. Many argue this was simply because they 
had no shortage of  profitable opportunities remaining at home and so did not face the 
same “search for yield.”
The high-level group behind the Liikanen Report (2012) were clearly of  the opinion 
that current and indeed proposed requirements for separability in EU banking groups 
was going to be insufficient: “In the Group’s view, producing an effective and credible RRP 
[Recovery and Resolution Plan] may require the scope of  the separable activities to be wider than 
under the mandatory separation” (103; emphasis in original).
Can One Ignore the Australians?
OBR is in part predicated on the idea that what the Australians wish to do, while relevant, 
is not going to constrain New Zealand in its resolution procedures. This seems unlikely. 
While New Zealand operations may only be around 15 percent or so of  the banking 
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group’s activities, they are large enough to have an implication for the whole group, even 
if  only on grounds of  reputation risk. If  an Australian bank has been prepared to let its 
New Zealand subsidiary fold, what does that imply for its overall viability? Thus, the 
Australian authorities are likely to be intervening at the same time. No doubt what they 
would like to do is resolve the group and send New Zealand the bill for its share, based 
perhaps on the share of  assets, much along the lines suggested for European banks by 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009).
It is therefore important to understand how Australia will probably go about a 
resolution. They have made it clear that the four main banks are pillars of  the 
system and will not be allowed to fail. However, they would follow a similar statutory 
management route to New Zealand but without the writing down of  depositors in 
the same way. Australia operates a deposit guarantee scheme. This is unfunded, and 
losses would be met by a government loan in the short run before levies could be 
raised to claw back the losses.8 However, (domestic) depositors are preferred creditors 
in Australia, so the chances of  them making losses eventually are small. Hence, the 
guarantee scheme is only likely to act as a temporary financer of  depositors. Indeed, if  
there is no run, it is not clear that it will have much of  a job to do until the losses are 
very large. The Australian authorities have not made it clear what they will do, except 
that once in statutory management, the bank will need to be recapitalized (Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority 2012). This can come from taxpayers, levies on the 
industry or creditors, or of  course capital injections by a purchaser. Since a bank 
in statutory management can continue to trade with a government guarantee even 
though its liabilities exceed its assets, this can be a viable way forward. Assuming, that 
is, that people find the guarantee credible. If  a bank has a “living will,” the route to 
recapitalization will be rather clearer.
The implications for New Zealand are then interesting. It depends which route to 
recapitalization is going to dominate. A cynical view of  the position would argue that 
because of  reputation risk and the systemic importance of  the financial institutions 
to Australia there is little need for the New Zealand authorities to take much action. 
A problem with one of  the big four banks, even if  it occurred primarily in New Zealand, 
would be handled by Australia with little, if  any, implications for either the New Zealand 
taxpayer or for financial stability in New Zealand as the bank would be kept open. 
Indeed, if  the problem occurred primarily in Australia, the New Zealand authorities 
would have a reasonable case for feeling that they should not have to make any financial 
contribution to the resolution.
The drawback of  any such assessment is that it is a guess, and if  it were to be incorrect, 
the New Zealand authorities would face a crisis if  they were not prepared. Going carefully 
through all the steps in preparing for OBR therefore makes sense even if  the underlying 
guess is that it will never be used. Its mere existence will help in resolution and, more 
importantly, its existence will help in reducing any moral hazard that is currently present. 
If  the banks know that the New Zealand authorities have in place a workable resolution 
scheme that will result in the wiping out of  shareholders and the probable loss to the 
senior managers of  their jobs, then they will be that much more reluctant to take on 
excessive risk.
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Given that this is a bilateral relationship rather than one with the multilateral 
complexity in Europe, one might expect that the two countries would try to produce a 
highly coordinated system even though they are preparing for a contingency that they 
think highly unlikely. Routes to achieve this exist through the Trans-Tasman Council on 
Banking Supervision,9 for example, through which the memorandum of  cooperation was 
signed in 2010.10 While harmonization of  procedures might seem desirable, even if  this 
cannot be achieved, some clear form of  understanding of  what the two countries expect 
of  each other would be normal, even though memoranda of  understanding have been 
shown to have limited value by the GFC. At a minimum, regular testing of  the resolution 
procedures on a cross-country basis would seem a wise precaution.
The first principle of  the Memorandum of  Cooperation on Trans-Tasman Bank 
Distress Management is as follows: “Consistent with the legislation in both countries, 
the participants in responding to bank distress or failure situations, will to the extent 
reasonably practicable, avoid any actions that are likely to have a detrimental effect on 
the other country’s financial system” (2010, 3). But the second principle acknowledges 
the advantages of  cooperation: “A coordinated, cooperative approach involving the 
participants is likely to lead to a more cost effective financial crisis resolution and a 
more effective means of  maintaining financial system stability in both countries than 
one in which the respective participants pursue separate agendas” (4). While the rest 
of  that principle says they will “cooperate, where practicable, in respect of  all stages 
of  resolving a crisis situation, including problem identification; information sharing; 
systemic impact analysis; assessment of  response options; implementation of  resolution; 
public communication; and exit strategy” (4), there is little practical detail, except to 
make it clear that New Zealand will be responsible for what lies within its jurisdiction, 
and Australia will be responsible for the parent and its jurisdiction.
Thus, while the potential for a less costly cooperation exists, it does not seem likely 
that the two countries will move toward it any time soon.
Bailing In
If  there are losses, someone has to bear them. Furthermore, it is generally thought that 
recognizing the losses early and assigning them is much more beneficial to the recovery 
than trying to cover them up and obscure who the holders of  the losses are. Japan is the 
major case in point. However, the conclusions are not that clear, as there is considerable 
debate about whether it is better to try to recapitalize the business as a whole or separate 
it into a good bank and a bad bank (or in the Icelandic case, into a domestic bank and a 
foreign residual).11
The New Zealand arrangements cut through this. First of  all, the statutory manager 
can, if  he thinks that it is in the best interests of  the creditors and of  financial stability, 
place some of  the bank in insolvency, and only resolve part by the write-down of  claims. 
Those written down have a claim on the insolvency estate. Furthermore, the process 
buys time. It returns the bank to operating viability but it does not solve the question of  
recapitalization. In Mayes et al. (2001), we suggest that a write-down could go all the 
way to recapitalization, with those who are written down becoming the new owners of  
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the bank (this appears to be the provision in the RRD as well). The drawback of  this 
arrangement is that there is no reason to expect that the new owners will be “fit and 
proper persons” to run a bank, and hence, there would have to be a transition before the 
statutory manager or his equivalent was prepared to step back from running the bank. 
In the New Zealand arrangements, there is a period after resolution where the statutory 
manager looks for the new owners. Presumably this would be some form of  auctioning 
process such as that which the FDIC performs when it wishes to find new owners for a 
failed institution, but with it being held in an equivalent to a bridge bank in the meantime.
With CoCos or other contracted bail-in arrangements, such as subordinated debt in 
Denmark, it is clear how much debt is available to be turned into equity. With the New 
Zealand arrangements, there is no legal provision in the debt instruments, but their status is 
overruled by the resolution arrangements. (One can readily envisage foreign bondholders 
contesting that through the courts.) There is also no limit to how much might be written 
down except for the size of  the eligible debt. Thus, covered bonds, repos, and all the other 
collateralized transactions would be excluded (again as is proposed in the RRD). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that deposits have to form part of  this pool or one might run out 
of  suitable cover for a major loss—of  the proportion of  Landsbanki or the Anglo-Irish 
Bank, for example. Bertram and Tripe (2012) show, for example, that in the New Zealand 
environment, all wholesale lending might well be covered, so that once the shareholders 
and the subordinated debt holders are wiped out, the depositors will bear the rest of  
the exposure.12 If  smaller depositors were excluded by the de minimis clause, then the 
burden on the remainder could be quite substantial13—certainly substantial enough that 
the political fallout from those being written down would be considerable.14
There is thus a strong incentive to try to make the bail-in arrangements as explicit 
as possible. Clearly, one argument against this might be that this would increase the cost 
of  debt. But with large, strong banks, the cost from existing CoCos appears to be quite 
small. The alternative is to place limits on covered bonds and other secured debt. If  
depositors are going to be in the frontline in most resolutions, this will heighten the risk 
of  a run should the banking system start looking at all weak.
The identity of  those who have to bail in is important, as in periods of  difficulty it is 
important that those who provide capital are not simultaneously weakening the position 
of  other financial institutions. Thus, on the whole, the funds should come from outside 
the banking system unless they come in the form of  a merger or acquisition which is 
acceptable to the authorities. A well-known problem is the merger of  a weak bank with a 
strong bank creating a large weak bank rather than resolving the issue.
Where ownership structures in Europe are more complex, with cross-holdings, 
clearly, formal ex ante agreed bail-in and, indeed, bailout arrangements will become more 
difficult to apply. Knowing that bail-in clauses are likely to activate will alter the value of  
debt shortly before that activation. Whereas depositors can exit, bond holders can only 
sell to another willing purchaser. In this case, a fall in the market value of  the debt will not 
provide too much of  a problem in the way that the decline in share prices does, although 
it might affect its repo usefulness.
The New Zealand scheme therefore faces one problem in this regard. If  the claims 
have been written down but the bad loans are still left on the balance sheet (but at 
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written-down values), a potential purchaser/provider of  the recapitalization may still 
have worries about the likely outcome when the loans are eventually worked out. This 
would therefore make exit from statutory management difficult. However, the problem 
is no different from any other resolution, except possibly for the size, as transferring the 
impaired loans to an asset management company does get rid of  the difficulty. OBR 
thus does not get round this, but then neither does any of  the other plausible routes to 
resolution.
The Liikanen Report (2012) also puts an emphasis on bail-in facilities: “The power 
to write down claims of  unsecured creditors or convert debt claims to equity in a bank 
resolution process is crucial” (viii). One aspect that they draw attention to, given the 
focus of  the report on structure, is where the bail-in occurs. Is it to the parent or to 
the subsidiary? Their concern is that the bail-in goes to the retail bank, as for them that is 
the part that needs to continue. In the present context, it is the retail banking operations 
in each jurisdiction plus any other activities of  the group that are of  systemic importance 
in any jurisdiction that matters. The New Zealand scheme gives the appropriate 
distribution automatically, whereas there are no such guarantees in the EU, which makes 
the idea of  wanting to handle the problem at the EU level all the more understandable.15
The Liikanen Report also agrees that bailing-in options should be explicit:
The Group has come to the conclusion that there is a need to further develop the 
framework, so as to improve the predictability of  the use of  the bail-in instrument. 
Specifically, the Group is of  the opinion that the bail-in requirement ought to be applied 
explicitly to a certain category of  debt instruments, the requirement for which should be phased in 
over an extended period of  time. This avoids congestion in the new issues market and allows the 
primary and the secondary market to grow smoothly. (2012, 103; emphasis added)
This last aspect of  the impact of  introduction has not been considered in the 
New Zealand scheme. On the other hand, the ideas behind OBR have been revealed 
steadily over a decade and the explicit formulation of  the plans does not appear to have 
had any noticeable effect on markets. It is perhaps not so much the cost of  the potential 
bail-in which affects the debt when it is sold as the impact on liquidity when the bail-in takes 
place. Here, the nature of  the bail-in is important. A write-down leaves the bondholder 
with little value in the written-down part. If, on the other hand, this is a debt for equity 
swap, the bondholder will have a stake in the future of  the bank. In both the Nordic crises 
and in a number of  cases in the GFC, investments by governments in failing banks and 
other institutions have paid off, and resale to the private sector has not merely repaid the 
money but offered a rate of  return higher than the cost of  government debt.16
One thing that the Reserve Bank of  New Zealand (RBNZ) has done, which is a 
helpful pointer to others intending to implement bail-in schemes, is to conduct an impact 
assessment (RBNZ 2012). Using an undisclosed model, the RBNZ (2012) assumes that 
the cost of  a banking crisis is 20 percent of  gross domestic product (GDP) for the typical 
case of  a bailout, although a “good” bailout could reduce this a little. Recapitalization 
through the market works best at 12.5 percent, and falling into statutory management, 
and hence into a disorderly failure, is worst at 25 percent of  GDP. While one might 
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dispute all of  these magnitudes, the RBNZ’s view is that a good use of  OBR would also 
deliver a cost of  20 percent of  GDP, and if  it does not go well it could be similar to the 
worst-case 25 percent cost.
Thus, there is no claim that using OBR (bailing in) per se reduces the cost of  failure. 
What they do claim is that because bailing in offers a plausible route forward that puts 
the loss on the shareholders, management, and creditors, there will be much more effort 
to ensure that market-based recapitalizations take place. Hence, the probability of  low-
cost resolutions goes up and the expected costs of  resolutions under an OBR regime as 
opposed to actually having to implement OBR for a specific failure are considerably 
reduced.
Taking this change in probabilities into account, RBNZ (2012) then estimates that the 
overall reduction in cost is likely to be of  the order of  16.5 percent. Table 8.1 reproduces 
the calculations. No doubt the individual numbers are very soft, but they have several 
noteworthy features. First of  all, the banks will have to pay more for their funding and 
this cost will accrue irrespective of  a failure. The costs of  implementing and maintaining 
the capacity within banks for undergoing OBR is trivial by comparison. The largest gain 
comes from OBR being cheaper to apply than a bailout and, of  course, from the lower 
economic cost as a result of  the greater likelihood of  more efficient methods being used. 
It is worth noting that they do not forecast the chance of  requiring a bailout to be zero 
and hence there may still be ongoing costs from increased government debt.
It is not clear that the putative cost of  the RRD or the hoped-for reductions in impact 
are assessed as still being so substantial. If  a SIFI fails, it is likely to be as part of  a more 
general crisis and the impact on the economy is likely to be substantial. What bailing 
in does is shift the incidence across the economy considerably. It is not immediately 
apparent that such a shift is necessarily beneficial for the economy as a whole, nor indeed 
for ordinary people, who are thought to be the victims as taxpayers when a bailout is 
used. A bail-in concentrates the cost as well on a relatively narrow group of  creditors, 
primarily depositors in the New Zealand case. With deposit insurance, that cost is not 
only substantially met in advance through the deposit insurance fund, which is then 
slowly replenished after the event, but it is spread across all depositors, and not just 
those in the failing bank. It is not intuitively obvious whether the impact on people as 
Table 8.1. Estimated impact of  implementing OBR ($mn)
Factor Status Quo OBR available Difference
Economic cost 5492 4764 728
Bailout cost 1703 693 1010 
Government debt service cost 413 172 241
Bank funding cost 282 936 –653
Maintenance cost 0 10 –10
Build cost 0 20 –20
Overall NPV 1294.5
Source: RBNZ (2012).
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depositors or as taxpayers is more or less equitable. The richer in society may have more 
difficulty avoiding tax than they do in finding non-bank deposit vehicles for their savings. 
However, uninsured depositors are hit much harder under a bail-in as they incur all 
the loss upfront, and indeed, with a conservative valuation, face more than 100 percent 
of  it in the short run until the true value is established. As taxpayers they have the cost 
spread over a generation. The same problem applies to other bailed-in creditors. If  these 
happen to be pension funds, then they are likely to have an extended period over which 
to repair the damage, either through increased premiums or through lower benefit rates.
Similarly, hedge funds may be good loss absorbers, but a proper analysis of  the impact 
of  these measures needs to consider on whom the direct cost falls, and what consequences 
this will have on their subsequent behavior. Imposing losses directly on ordinary depositors 
will reduce consumption. While pension funds or taxpayers/the government may have 
to increase their savings rates over the longer term to compensate for the loss, the initial 
impact may be much smaller. Simple net present values will not cover this, as trying to 
limit the downturn in the economy and get back into rapid recovery as soon as possible 
are key policy imperatives.
Swift Action
One of  the great problems in any resolution framework is that it needs to cut in 
early. The role of  all the parties involved (central bank, resolution agency, ministry of  
finance, and supervisor) needs to be clear and regularly tested. Here, the position of  the 
New Zealand authorities, while not unusual, does have some clear advantages in that 
a statutory manager can be appointed before a bank reaches the point of  insolvency. 
The terms under which it can intervene are not precise, but severe undercapitalization 
or inappropriate responses in the face of  coming failure could trigger it. However, there 
are checks in the system of  appointment. The Reserve Bank makes the recommendation 
to the minister of  finance, who then requests the governor-general to implement it. 
Similarly, while there are abilities to claim compensation should the actions of  a statutory 
manager lead to losses, the decisions of  the manager in imposing the resolution cannot 
be reversed, therefore giving certainty to those involved.
What the New Zealand system does not include is any set of  mandatory prompt 
corrective action (PCA) along the lines laid down for the FDIC. Indeed, RBNZ (2012) 
casts some doubt over the plausibility of  such early intervention regimes (including 
implicitly the “recovery” part of  the RRD). One of  the main problems revealed (again) 
in the GFC is the extent to which authorities have put off  reacting—even where there 
was a mandatory requirement in the USA (Garcia 2012; Bair 2012). However, the 
position is similar in most European countries, so one can be reasonably confident that 
intervention is unlikely to take place before the point that the bank is insolvent. However, 
the important question in the present context is the amount of  time the authorities will 
have had to try to put an orderly resolution together.
While the requirements in New Zealand for being able to separate the claims of  the 
creditors into frozen and continuing parts can be put in place overnight and tested on a 
regular basis, if  there has been no serious preparation, the summary assessment of  the 
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financial position of  the bank will be very difficult to do. Even if  claims are being marked 
to market, one can be reasonably confident that the bank’s own assessment of  the value 
of  its assets is likely to be optimistic. One need only observe the enormous inaccuracy 
of  the initial assessment of  the value of  the assets of  Anglo-Irish Bank in 2008 to realize 
how severe the problem might be (Honohan 2010). If  the supervisor/resolution agency 
is not doing preparatory work inside the bank for several weeks before the resolution, 
there is a strong opportunity for difficulty, and possible exposure to taxpayer losses if  the 
write-down of  the creditors’ claims turns out to be insufficient.
It is not clear whether other jurisdictions are putting in place adequate prepositioning 
to be able to handle the resolution of  their largest banks, although the USA has got as 
far as drawing up the specification of  what would need to be in place for this to work. 
Leaving this undone must mean that only a bailout is likely to work in practice unless 
a consolidation is possible, as with the purchase of  Wachovia by Wells Fargo in 2008. 
In this case, Wells Fargo was prepared to take the risk that it was paying too much. 
It could then spend nearly three years absorbing the new organization, with the last 
branches of  Wachovia becoming Wells Fargo in October 2011. The alternative available 
at the time was an assisted purchase by Citi. Again this would have allowed Wachovia 
to be absorbed steadily, but the authorities would not have been able to exit their own 
expenditure rapidly. Of  course in the traditional resolution of  small banks in a closed 
bank resolution, it is still the case that the deposit insurer will not get closure until all 
of  the assets have been sold, and issues relating to all of  the contested claims have been 
worked out through agreement or through the courts.
If  everything is ready and the systems are tried and tested, then it seems likely that 
the necessary computer-based separation of  creditors’ claims into frozen and accessible 
components could be achieved overnight, as well as allowing all transactions in progress to 
be completed on time so there is no disruption to the normal business and no possibility of  
claiming that a default event had occurred. Division into insured and uninsured deposits 
has been practised elsewhere, particularly in the USA, within the necessary timeframe. 
While the USA has handled bigger banks, they have had a larger staff  to do this. The 
size of  team that the RBNZ could put together from its own staff  in a crisis would be 
quite small and they would have no experience of  handling such an event. They could 
perhaps organize a pool of  contingent trained staff  on whom they could call in a crisis. 
While some of  these could be retirees, others might well have other employment. Clearly, 
the idea of  getting any help from Australia is unlikely, as they will be flat out handling 
the problem in the parent bank simultaneously. Getting help from anywhere else would 
take longer to organize.
An Error over Deposit Insurance
There is a serious flaw in the New Zealand arrangements for OBR. New Zealand does 
not have deposit insurance, and hence, as junior creditors, depositors will incur losses in 
the resolution. It is yet to be decided how many depositors may be excluded from this 
threat through the imposition of  a de minimis clause that exempts small deposits from 
any write-down. (Such a de minimis clause makes sense anyway as it would avoid a lot of  
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administrative expense for small sums of  money.) Where any de minimis line is to be drawn 
is not to be disclosed in advance. Even if  it is drawn as high as NZ$20,000 there will still 
be a large number of  depositors affected.
The appropriate strategy for depositors if  there was any sniff  of  doubt about the 
viability of  a bank would be to remove their deposits or at least reduce them to below 
any expected de minimis level. Thus, whereas elsewhere deposits are a stabilizing force 
for troubled banks, this would not be the case in New Zealand. Funding problems 
for troubled banks occur in wholesale markets as informed counterparties first of  all 
demand a premium and then refuse to lend at all as difficulties mount. This inability to 
borrow in wholesale markets then causes banks to approach the central bank as lender 
of  last resort. If  they are thought solvent, the central bank will step into the place of  the 
market, or if  they are thought likely to be insolvent, the process of  resolution will start. 
To organize resolution well, the authorities require quite a long lead time, perhaps as 
much as two to three months if  USA and UK experience is anything to go by. Depositors 
help provide that time period because, since their credit to the bank is not under threat, 
they continue to maintain their loans and the bank can make its cash flow demands. If  
the depositors follow on the wholesale funders quite quickly, this grace period will not be 
possible, and the resolution will be messier and more inequitable as some will have been 
able to withdraw their deposits and others not.
Since OBR relates to the large banks, unless there is very clear evidence that problems 
are related to a specific bank, the chances are that there will be a general loss of  confidence, 
and larger depositors will start removing the money from all banks as a precaution. Thus, 
a manageable problem is turned into a full-blown financial crisis. Almost certainly, the 
government would need to renege on its commitment not to use taxpayer funding.
Thus, not only is OBR likely to be destabilizing, but it is simply unlikely ever to be 
exercised, as the authorities are likely to have to offer a blanket guarantee to depositors 
to prevent a general crisis. Simply having deposit insurance with a fairly high coverage 
ratio would address this problem, although in the event of  a large bank failing, the 
resources required may exceed those held by the deposit insurer. In that case, temporary 
government funding would be required if  the fund is not to default.
The New Zealand authorities seem to have a well-entrenched objection to deposit 
insurance, which will have been reinforced by the rather disastrous introduction of  
temporary deposit guarantees in 2008 (the Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme).17 
The government ended up paying out not just the depositors, but all creditors of  South 
Canterbury Finance, owing to a series of  design failures in the scheme. Nevertheless, in 
the face of  a run on the main banks, especially where most are thought to be solvent, the 
authorities would have no alternative but to introduce a new guarantee scheme. No doubt 
the previous drawbacks will be avoided, but we could expect in practice that individual 
deposits end up being insured up to some quite high value—say, $250,000, where the 
scheme ended up, or $1,000,000, where it started. In this case, there would be a serious 
problem with the exposure of  the taxpayer when the first bank needs to be resolved.
The government will then face the normal dilemma. If  the bank is bailed out, there 
will be no call on the guarantee fund. If  the bank is not bailed out and OBR is applied, 
then the Crown will become liable for the whole write-down of  insured depositors’ funds. 
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Neither sounds attractive. The simplest solution is presumably to introduce the same 
guarantee scheme as Australia or even just introduce depositor preference. Providing there 
are enough available funds, the other creditors will have to meet the banks’ losses under 
OBR ahead of  the depositors. The high size of  such a non-depositor write-down may 
threaten the viability of  the scheme. The Australian arrangements will also be unrealistic 
in that regard if  there are insufficient non-depositor creditor funds after taking account of  
all the carve-outs from repos, collateralized bonds, and other protected financial market 
contracts. The position in Europe depends upon not just whether there is depositor 
preference, but on how deposit insurance is financed.18 If  it is prefunded by the industry, 
the taxpayer will not be called on unless that funding is insufficient and the fund has to 
borrow—temporarily—from the government. If  it is ex post funded by the industry, then 
the temporary government funding is certain. If  it is funded by the government, then 
obviously the taxpayer pays. The addition of  resolution funds as planned in the EU/EEA, 
will increase the chance of  being able to organize the resolution, as it will not be necessary 
to raise that funding either from the deposit insurer or from the other creditors.
Concluding Remarks
While New Zealand’s new OBR proposals are untried, they sound a plausible way 
of  organizing the resolution of  systemically important subsidiaries of  foreign-owned 
banks—provided that the increased threat to financial stability posed by the lack of  
deposit insurance is addressed. The arrangement not only offers a practical solution that 
can be implemented swiftly without the need for taxpayer funding, but it appears to be 
one that does not place large continuing costs on the banking system. Four ingredients 
are necessary for the scheme to work:
•	 A	clear	legal	and	practical	ability	for	the	authorities	to	take	over	the	subsidiary	and	get	
it operating again within the same value day
•	 Adequate	 prior	 preparation	 to	 ensure	 all	 the	 necessary	 IT	 and	 other	 procedures	
required are in place and regularly tested
•	 The	ability	to	write	down	creditors’	claims	and	thereby	organize	a	bail-in	to	keep	the	
vital functions of  the bank operating without material interruption
•	 The	legal	rules	necessary	to	ensure	that	contracts	are	not	closed	by	the	operation	of 	the	
resolution—since some contracts will be written down to zero and others substantially, 
this may pose a problem with other jurisdictions
Rather than ensuring a clear separation so that all authorities can look after their own 
systemic requirements, the EU has decided to pursue the idea of  a “banking union,” 
which would enable a new European-level supervisor, the ECB, to coordinate supervision 
so it can be undertaken for the entire banking group in a single operation. However, 
resolution is not being concentrated in the same way, although the commission has 
suggested itself  for much of  the role (see Endnote 4). However, this only relates to the 
European area plus others who choose to join and to banking not all financial operations 
of  the group (see Endnote 4). Resolution is to be coordinated separately under a Single 
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Resolution Board, based in Brussels, also only covering the European area plus those who 
choose to join. This Board will have access to a Single Resolution Fund contributed by 
the banks themselves in advance. How this will work remains to be clarified and its detail 
will determine its feasibility. Most awkwardly, not all countries are participating, and the 
UK, with the most important banking system in the area, is staying out. Hence, only 
some cross-border SIFIs will be fully covered. New Zealand’s straightforward approach 
may be difficult to apply in this framework.
A plausible scheme that enables systemically important banks to be resolved without 
a material break in their vital operations and without the use of  taxpayer funds is an 
important contribution to financial stability—not simply because of  what it will achieve 
in a crisis, but because it encourages prudence, and makes the chance of  its being called 
upon smaller. Traditional OBR methods applied in the GFC involved injections of  
taxpayer capital, no losses to creditors, and many of  those responsible for the running 
of  the companies kept their jobs. With a much more limited chance of  a bailout, those 
running banks and lending to them, particularly shareholders who are first in line for the 
losses, will be keen to see banks manage their risk better and not encounter the fragility 
of  recent years. Better supervision and the increase in capital and liquidity buffers will 
also contribute to a lower chance of  ever needing the resolution arrangements. That 
does not mean that they should not rapidly now be put in place while the political 
will lasts. As Tucker (2012) puts it, they provide the two “bookends” to a successful 
treatment: reducing the probability of  occurrence at the one end and having a viable 
means of  handling any problems that do nevertheless occur at the other.
Perhaps the most important lesson New Zealand can offer is over how to handle the 
long interim period before the ideal of  the banking union across the whole of  the EU comes 
into being. The UK has stressed the importance of  the authorities in the parent country 
being able to handle the entire problem with a single point of  entry to the insolvency 
proceedings (FDIC and Bank of  England 2012; Tucker 2012) and this would work for 
most EU SIFIs. The problem area is where the banks are large compared to their parent 
countries. There, multiple points of  entry to the resolution process are inevitable, with 
each jurisdiction having to handle its own subsidiaries and manage the costs. Following the 
New Zealand route of  each being able to handle the problems for their own stability until 
the full system comes online would make the transition much more robust, and from the 
estimates of  the costs in RBNZ (2012), it would not add much to the total for a potentially 
important benefit, as it seems so difficult to exit firmly from the problems of  the GFC.
Notes
 1 Harrison et al. (2007) provide a clear statement of  what is required and the main features 
needed for it to work well.
 2 The prepositioning requirements in New Zealand are set out in a 25-page document by the 
RBNZ: “Open Bank Resolution (OBR) Pre-positioning Requirements Policy.” Document 
BS17, September 2013. Online: http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation_and_supervision/
banks/banking_supervision_handbook/5341478.pdf  (accessed August 14, 2014).
 3 OBR actually imposes more than a 100 percent initial impact in the present, as the write-
down will be conservative and it will not be until later that those written down get a further 
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release of  funds as the proceeds of  the insolvency or valuation of  transferred assets are revealed. 
Thus, while the impact of  OBR on creditors, and hence on the real economy, will be a clear 
improvement over a traditional insolvency where payouts depend on the actual and potential 
sale of  assets, it is not so clear how it will rank compared with a bailout as the resolution method.
 4 As of  September 2014, the EU has got as far as agreeing that the ECB should be the overall 
supervisor for banks in the euro area and for other countries who decide to join the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. It is envisaged that the ECB would supervise the banks of  systemic 
importance directly, which would cover 80 percent of  assets, but only one hundred and fifty or 
so banks. (This is embodied in two regulations, one to give the necessary powers to the ECB 
[“Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank 
Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of  Credit Institutions,” 2012/0242 
(CNS), April 16, 2013. Online: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st07/
st07776-re01.en13.pdf, accessed August 15, 2014] and the other [http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PE%2022%202013%20INIT], which amends the Regulation 
on the European Banking Authority to establish its relationship with the ECB and to amend 
the voting rules in the Board of  Supervisors.) The resolution authority would, however, be 
different, and this is laid out in the Recovery and Resolution Directive (2014/58/EU) (http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059, accessed August 15, 
2014) and a separate Single Resolution Regulation (SRR) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806, accessed August 15, 2014). The SRR creates 
a Single Resolution Board independent of  the ECB and a Single Resolution Fund that will be 
built up over 8 years. This board and all the national resolution authorities will have access 
to the full range of  instruments necessary for a resolution including bailing in. Public money 
is only to be used as a last resort and instead resolution funds, contributed by the banks, will 
be available after 8 per cent of  liabilities have been bailed in to cover costs that would not 
normally have been borne by creditors so that nobody is worse off  than they would have been 
in traditional insolvency. Again the SRB would only cover participating countries. Proposals for 
how banking groups might be required to restructure following the Liikanen Report have been 
delayed by the European Parliament elections and the appointment of  a new commission. 
Thus, at this stage, the EU proposals are complex and incomplete.
 5 The European Commission has proposed itself  as the appropriate authority for taking the lead 
in cross-border resolutions, but the Recovery and Resolution Directive does not create such a 
resolution authority as such, as proposed by Mayes (2006) and Schoenmaker and Gros (2012).
 6 The Recovery and Resolution Directive (RRD), as its name implies, addresses this concern upfront 
by seeking to have not just resolution plans for each systemic bank, which would enable orderly 
resolution should they fail, but also recovery plans that give a plausible path for the bank to restore 
capital adequacy and a return to profitability without failing should it experience a severe shock.
 7 There were substantial customer losses when Danske Bank (Denmark) decided to integrate 
Sampo Bank (Finland) rapidly into its systems shortly after acquisition in 2007, although the 
name did not change until 2012.
 8 The Australian authorities have recently announced that they intend to create a resolution 
fund by imposing a levy on the banks in proportion to their asset base. See Chris Bowen, 
press conference, Canberra, August 2, 2013. Online: http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/
DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2013/022.htm&pageID=004&min=cebb&Year=&Doc 
Type= (accessed August 15, 2014).
 9 The council and its terms of  reference are described in http://www.cfr.gov.au/about-cfr/
financial-distress-planning-management/trans-tasman-council-on-banking-supervision.html 
and http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/regulation_and_supervision/banks/relationships/4674137.
html (accessed August 15, 2014).
10 The memorandum is available at http://www.cfr.gov.au/about-cfr/financial-distress-planning-
management/pdf/ttbc-memorandum-of-cooperation.pdf  (accessed August 15, 2014).
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11 See, for example, the debate between Norway and Sweden and Finland discussed in Moe et al. 
(2004).
12 It is clear from Figure 2 in Hoskin and Woolford (2011) that the RBNZ has a very different 
view about the proportion of  claims that are likely to be secured or otherwise collateralized, 
as these are shown as a small minority. They envisage “wholesale financing” as being able to 
contribute substantially to the write-down. Given that the exit of  wholesale financing in what 
Kane (1999) describes as a silent run is usually the direct cause of  the bank failure, this may be 
rather optimistic.
13 The illustration of  the de minimis clause used in the consultative paper is only for $500, which 
would eliminate quite a large number of  small or dormant accounts but would not reduce the 
overall value of  claims substantially. See RBNZ, “Consultation Document: Pre-positioning for 
Open Bank Resolution (OBR),” consultation paper, March 2011. Online: http://www.rbnz.
govt.nz/regulation_and_supervision/banks/policy/4335146.pdf  (accessed August 15, 2014).
14 Denmark is one of  the few countries that have employed a similar technique to OBR. Poulsen 
and Andreasen (2011) show that in the best-known example of  its use, for Amagerbanken, 
unsecured creditors were initially written down by as much 41.2 percent, although the write-
down was later reduced to 33.9 percent and then lower. Such a write-down on depositors 
would cause an outcry.
15 Unless the parent company’s authorities are prepared to undertake the resolution for the whole 
banking group.
16 The Liikanen Report offers one comment on bailing in which is very attractive; namely, that it 
should apply to some of  the remuneration of  the senior executives: “Bail-in instruments should 
also be used in remuneration schemes for top management so as best to align decision-making 
with longer-term performance in banks. The Group suggests that this issue should be studied 
further” (2012, 104). The narrow New Zealand approach does not address this attempt to try 
to align management incentives more with systemic prudence.
17 The auditor-general’s (2011) highly critical review of  the handling of  the scheme covers the 
main concerns.
18 The RRD appears to favour depositor preference.
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COLLATERAL AND MONETARY POLICY
Manmohan Singh
The relative price(s) of  money and collateral matter for financial lubrication in the 
markets. Some central banks are now a major player in the collateral markets. Analogous 
to a coiled spring, the larger the quantitative easing efforts, the longer the central banks 
will impact the collateral market and associated repo rate. This may have monetary policy 
and financial-stability implications since the repo rates maps the financial landscape that 
straddles the bank/non-bank nexus.
Introduction
The importance of  collateral has been investigated in several strands in the theoretical 
literature. One strand is the literature on collateral and default, which has focused 
primarily on the role of  margin and “haircuts” and “fire sales” (Geanakoplos 2003; 
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov 2010). Another strand is on securitization, where 
collateral serves to support specific asset values (Shleifer and Vishny 2011).
This chapter echoes discussions on the supply and demand of  safe assets. Empirical 
evidence that the (demand for) safe-asset share has been relatively stable was postulated 
by Gorton et al. (2012) using flow-of-funds data only. Concerns have been raised about 
the supply of  safe assets. The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report estimated a US$74 
trillion figure for safe assets (April 2012), which would appear to be ample. However, a 
large fraction of  such safe assets is held by buy-and-hold investors and is not available 
for reuse in financial markets. Some market sources conclude that there is little evidence 
to support that good collateral will be in short supply (J. P. Morgan). Others argue that 
there could be such a shortage and that safe assets should be provided as a public 
good to avoid financial instability associated with the private supply of  safe assets. 
This thinking is now being reflected in the US Federal Reserve’s recent reverse repo 
program.
This contribution has three aims. It first clarifies the distinction between the price 
of  money and the price of  collateral. It then discusses the factors driving the demand 
and supply of  collateral. Finally, it highlights the importance of  collateral for monetary 
policy through an updated IS/LM framework. With this, the contribution reflects on the 
prospects for unwinding extraordinary monetary policy interventions.
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Price of  Money and Price of  Collateral
The price of  money and the price of  collateral are set through distinctive practices during 
“normal” times. Central banks use open-market operations—that, when conducted 
through repos, involve collateral—to target a money market interest rate that is consistent 
with their desired path for consumer prices. Now consider collateral or repo rates. Recall 
that collateral rate (or repo rate) is the rate at which cash is lent against collateral for an 
agreed tenor. It is agreed upon by the two parties at t0 or start of  repo. Typically, collateral 
shortage lowers repo rates; collateral abundance increases repo rates. This rate is a proxy 
for collateralized transactions that underpin the financial plumbing between the dealer 
banks/non-banks.
Unconventional monetary policies may sharpen the distinction between the price 
of  money and the price of  collateral during crisis. In some countries like the USA and 
the UK, the price of  money and money market rates are not market-determined if  
central banks decide to pay interest on excess reserves (IOER) to depository institutions. 
Following the Lehman failure, the Fed introduced interest on excess reserves for 
depository institutions. This was intended to place a “floor” (minimum bid) on short-
term liquidity in the corridor system. This creates a wedge between banks and non-
banks, and thus impacts other short-end rates. For example, in the USA, Freddie, Fannie 
and other non-depository institutions are not eligible to deposit excess reserves at the 
Fed and thus do not have access to IOER. However, Fannie and Freddie cannot access 
IOER (25 basis points) that banks can only receive, and, therefore, GSE cash positions 
(and cash positions of  other home loan banks) have largely determined the federal funds 
rate, which trades below the IOER “floor.” This wedge between IOER and the federal 
fund rate is important; the rate on July 29, 2013 was 9 bps, quite far from the likely first 
step in tightening rates.
The IOER in the USA has also been instrumental in keeping a wedge between 
comparable repo rates in the USA and those in the Eurozone (see Figure 9.2). Recently 
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in the Eurozone, collateral/repo rates have dipped below zero; these include German/
French/Dutch and also Danish/Swiss repo rates.1 However, this is not the case with 
collateral/repo rates in the USA. In theory, the price of  “good collateral” should not vary 
across assets except due to technical factors, including “home” bias, the liquidity/depth/
size of  good European collateral relative to the US T-bill market, different types of  QEs 
(Fed vs ECB), the cheapest to deliver collateral, etc. Operation Twist also provided an 
extra dose of  T-bills in 2012 to provide some lift to the GC rates. Thus good collateral 
like US GC rates are still in positive territory relative to good collateral in the Eurozone 
that has been in negative territory. In the USA, it remains to be seen if  cash shifts from 
repo to bank deposits when overnight GC goes negative in. There’s a big psychological 
barrier between explicitly paying for protection and “accepting a lower return” to get 
protection.
The Changing Collateral Space
A great deal of  short-term financing is generally extended by private agents against 
financial collateral. In the “old” global financial system, non-banks were the primary 
actors that allowed reuse of  their collateral in lieu of  other considerations. Earlier 
work has highlighted that the key providers of  pledged collateral to the “street” (or 
large banks/dealers) are hedge funds and custodians on behalf  of  pensions, insurers, 
and official sector accounts, etc. (Figure 9.2).2 In this nexus of  non-banks/banks, 
“supply” of  pledged collateral is typically received by the central collateral desk of  the 
large banks/dealers that reuse the collateral to meet the “demand” from the financial 
system.
When mapping the changing collateral space in Figure 9.2, we assume that the 
debt/GDP of  developed countries will not increase significantly (otherwise the topic 
of  collateral shortage is moot). Also we assume that regulation and collateral standards 
will not become so lax that junk will be deemed as “good collateral” with only a token 
haircut. We also acknowledge a new supply source—the recent reverse repo by the Fed 
that has started to provide collateral to banks and non-banks. We focus on collateral 
“flows,” since whatever the stock of  good collateral, only a fraction flows to markets to 
seek economic rent.
The rectangle in the center of  Figure 9.2 depicts the volume in the old collateral space 
(in the orange area) and illustrates the reduction in collateral volumes as of  end-2012, 
relative to end-2007. The recent crisis has resulted in elevated counterparty risk leading 
to incomplete markets and idle, and thus stranded, collateral pools. Also, some central 
bank purchases of  good collateral have contributed to shrinkage in the pledged collateral 
market from US$10 trillion prior to the Lehman crisis (end-2007) to about US$6 trillion 
(end-2012).
Pledged collateral market (in the old collateral space) is different from some 
“restricted” collateral markets. For example, securitization-based structures (SIVs) that 
have lien against specific pieces of  collateral are impossible to re-pledge. Also the tri-
party repo (TPR) market is a primary source of  funding for banks in the USA, standing at 
US$1.7 trillion (end-2012). It provides banks with cash on a secured basis, with the collateral 
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being posted to lenders—like money-market funds—through one of  two clearing banks: 
BNY Mellon and J. P. Morgan. However, such pledged collateral sits with custodians and 
is not rehypothecable to the street. We ignored such restricted markets in the old collateral 
space, since collateral was not reusable, nor did it have restricted velocity.
The “new” collateral space straddles not only the bank/non-bank nexus (where 
collateral generates a velocity), but other participants who are now significantly 
impacting collateral availability. The increasing role of  central banks, regulations, 
and collateral custodians is significantly changing the collateral landscape. These new 
dimensions involve (i) some aspects of  unconventional monetary policies pursued by 
advanced-economy central banks that remove good collateral from markets to their 
balance sheet, where it is siloed; (ii) regulatory demands stemming from Basel III, 
Dodd–Frank, the EMIR, etc. that will entail building collateral buffers at banks, CCPs, 
etc.; (iii) collateral custodians who are striving to connect with the central security 
depositories (CSDs) to release collateral from silos; and (iv) net debt issuance from 
AAA/AA rated issuers.
Central banks (Figure 9.2, area on left)
Despite the ECB’s efforts to keep the ratio of  good/bad collateral high in the EU financial 
markets, the actions of  the SNB (and other central banks) are at odds with this objective. 
Since the Swiss franc/euro peg in September 2011, the SNB balance sheet has grown 
sizably to about US$500 billion. About half  of  assets now comprise short-tenor “core” 
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euro bonds and equities. This reflects prudent asset-liability management at the SNB.3 
However, the SNB’s bond purchases withdraw the best and most liquid collateral from 
the Eurozone; this reduces the collateral reuse rate, since these bonds are siloed at the 
SNB, and are not pledged in the financial markets. Siloed collateral has zero velocity by 
definition. The ECB has expanded collateral eligibility, which includes lowering the asset-
based securities’ threshold, and relaxing the foreign-exchange collateral requirement 
(i.e. non-euro collateral is eligible).
The Federal Reserve in the USA continues QE3 until labor markets turn around. 
Since the Lehman crisis and since continuing with the QE efforts, the Fed is housing 
about US$2.8 trillion of  “good collateral” (largely US Treasuries and MBS). Under 
Operation Twist (which ended last year), the Fed used to take in long-tenor debt of  
about US$45 billion per month and release short-term treasuries. That program kept 
the total size of  the balance sheet unchanged. Then QE3 expanded the Fed’s holdings 
by another US$45 billion per month of  long-term US Treasuries (without a parallel sale 
of  short-term debt). Thus, along with QE3 buying of  US$40 billion MBS per month, 
the Fed’s balance sheet is expanding by US$85 billion per month. At this rate, the Fed 
could silo over US$1 trillion additional good collateral in 2013 (and beyond, if  there is no 
tapering). This is likely to have first-order implications for collateral velocity and global 
demand/supply of  collateral. However, the Fed’s very recent reverse repo could be a 
game changer on the collateral front.
Other central banks, such as the Bank of  England’s (BoE) QE efforts, have taken 
about £375 billion gilts onto its balance sheet; however, looking forward, the BoE is 
attempting to keep good collateral in the market domain with no more envisaged QE. 
Also, the Bank of  Japan is expected to buy about ¥15 trillion (US$180 billion) of  JGBs, 
between its Asset Purchase Programme and rinban operations; however, JGBs have very 
low velocity since they are not used in “upgrade” trades, and are generally held by 
domestic investors.
New regulations: (Figure 9.2, area on the top)
Regulatory demands stemming from Basel III and Dodd–Frank are expected to demand 
US$2–4 trillion of  collateral. Higher liquidity ratio(s) at banks, along with collateral 
needs for CCPs (and non-cleared OTC derivatives) are some of  the other key regulatory 
changes that will impact collateral markets. These safety buffers will silo the associated 
collateral and significantly drain collateral in the financial markets (see Figure 9.4, top, 
yellow area).
Custodians (Figure 9.2, area on the right side)
The ECB mentions that the Eurozone has €14 trillion in collateral, much of  it locked 
in “depositories” and thus not easily accessible for cross-border use (Figure 9.4, right 
side, pink area). However, Euroclear and Clearstream (the key hubs for Eurozone 
collateral) are working with the local/national CSDs to alleviate collateral constraints. 
The interconnections to the CSDs will be via the Target 2 Securities (T2S) system 
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that will provide a single pan-European platform for securities settlement in central 
bank money. In the USA, J. P. Morgan and the Bank of  New York may also improve 
collateral flows from within the US tri-party system; however, reforms on the tri-party 
system and money market funds will play a role in this effort. Preliminary estimates 
suggest that perhaps US$1–1.5 trillion of  collateral may be “unlocked” via efforts of  
custodians to optimize collateral and build a “collateral highway.” This collateral in 
unlikely to reach markets, but will enhance accounting debt and credits to “break” 
the silo.
Preliminary estimates suggest that perhaps up to €1–1.5 trillion of  AAA/AA quality 
collateral may be unlocked in the medium term via efforts of  custodians to optimize 
collateral and build a collateral highway or global liquidity hub. However, the internal 
“plumbing” (i.e. operations, workflows, technology, staff, etc.) that is required to process 
and manage trillions of  collateral balances needs to be smooth.
Every institution or market is different; there is a lot of  friction in the pipes. Even 
though collateral is allowed to be reused legally, if  a counterparty along the collateral 
chain has not built the system to do anything with it, the collateral gets “stuck” in the 
plumbing. The frictions in aggregate can be quite sizeable and may be another reason 
why the theoretical balances may not add up mathematically.
Even if  this collateral does not reach “large banks/markets,” it allows the collateral 
to leave “CSD silos,” improve efficiency, and enhance accounting debt and credits, and 
reduce the burden on markets to provide collateral for LCR or CCP related regulatory 
buffers. The tri-party elements in Europe (i.e. Euroclear Bank and Clearstream Banking 
SA) also have about €900 billion of  client collateral, but unlike in the USA, there is 
generally no intra-day credit to clients.
In the USA, J. P. Morgan and Bank of  New York (BNY) may also improve collateral 
flows from within the US tri-party repo (TPR) system; however, regulatory reforms on 
the tri-party and money market funds may limit the size of  the collateral market. Money 
market mutual funds (MMMFs) are an important money artery to the US financial 
plumbing system and support about one-third of  the TPR market. If  US regulations 
move this industry toward variable net asset value, then the money artery may shrink. 
Lately, US MMMFs have had increasing difficulty finding balance sheets willing to 
provide investments. That implies that custodial banks such as State Street and BNY 
will likely grow because of  their position as “balance sheet of  last resort” for the MMMF 
industry (unless the Fed’s reverse repo leads MMMFs to shift en masse from the TPR to 
the Fed directly).
In general, central banks, SWFs, and long-term asset managers (life insurance and 
pension funds) desire collateral that has low volatility, but is not necessarily highly liquid. 
These entities should be net providers of  liquidity, either in the form of  cash or liquid 
collateral. But critically, their “need” for collateral is relatively static (or, as providers of  
liquidity, they can dictate that counterparties take a fixed amount). On the other side the 
hedge funds, money market funds (and with the new regulations, the dealer banks too) 
have a dramatically shifting need for collateral and a large number of  counterparties. 
Their needs are for liquid collateral. So a market for collateral upgrades—in theory—
could work.
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New (net) debt issuance: (Figure 9.2, area at the bottom)
Assuming AAA/AA countries have a GDP of  around US$25 trillion and a deficit of  
around 4–5 percent, they have supplied (on average) about US$1 trillion of  new (net) 
debt—sovereign and corporate—every year, with the latest data on the lower side.4 
Database and market contacts suggest that on average about 30–40 percent of  AAA/
AA collateral inventory reaches markets via custodians for reuse (on behalf  of  reserve 
managers, SWF, pensions, insurers, etc.); however, much of  the inventory stays with buy-
and-hold investors. So if  debt/GDP remains on trend in developed countries (i.e. the ratio 
does not increase sizably), new debt stemming from the “numerator” may provide up to 
US$300–400 billion per year to the markets, assuming counterparty risk, especially with 
European banks, does not elevate. Another 5–10 percent of  new inventory (including 
equities) may come via hedge funds. With a collateral reuse rate of  about 2.5 in recent 
years (and now lower at 2.2 due to the various silo(s) in the “new” collateral space), this 
may alleviate collateral shortage by about US$800 billion to US$1.2 trillion per year.
What does all this mean for the new collateral space?
The dwindling number of  AAA/AA entities, and above all, the potential correlations 
between borrowers and the collateral they are pledging, creates quite sharp mismatches 
between what looks like plenty (e.g. Eurozone government bonds), and the extent 
to which anyone wants to actually take them as collateral from a bank in the same 
country. Regulations remain in flux; for example, sub-AAA/AA issuance may likely be 
considered satisfactory collateral. Also, if  there is demand, collateral transformation 
may increase the required supply. On the other hand, debt ceiling issues in the USA 
may entail a more reduced collateral supply in the form of  US Treasuries or bills than 
was the case in the past.
The ECB still holds good collateral (Bunds, Dutch, French bonds and other AAA/
AA-rated securities). Although the fraction of  good collateral has dropped since end-
2011, the ECB’s €3 trillion balance sheet still holds about 20 percent in good collateral (or 
€600 billion). The ECB may want to “rent” the good collateral that they hold, especially 
if  their goal is to keep the good/bad collateral ratio high “in the markets.” So far, the 
ECB has accepted “not-so-good collateral,” and thus improved the good/bad collateral 
ratio in the market by decreasing the denominator. Renting of  good collateral does not 
lower the numerator—the collateral is on loan temporarily. Other EU central banks also 
hold good collateral. Other central banks (e.g. SNB, UK) do not have the same vested 
interest as the ECB in propping up collateral markets in the EU. Interestingly, the Fed has 
started a reverse repo program that will supply collateral to both banks and non-banks.
In summary, the decrease in the “churning” of  collateral may be significant, since 
there is demand from some SIFIs and/or their clients (asset managers, hedge funds, etc.) 
for “legally segregated/operationally commingled accounts” for the margin that they 
will post to CCPs. Post MF Global and Peregrine saga(s), there will be a decrease in 
the “reuse rate” of  collateral, as there is increasing demand from several clients 
(asset managers, hedge funds, etc.) for “legally segregated” accounts. An excellent 
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market-based example is from the Reserve Bank of  Australia (RBA). Their proposal 
manages to cope with the upcoming regulatory changes that will warrant significant, 
additional high-quality liquid assets (or good collateral) without issuing more debt 
securities, unlike discussions in some policy circles (e.g. Gourinchas/Jeanne, BIS paper). 
This committed liquidity facility (CLF) is akin to paying a fee to get the guarantee of  
contingent collateral transformation from the RBA at a penalty rate. Their suggested 
route is akin to collateral transformation, but this would keep the collateral reuse rate 
from declining. In other words:
Demandcollateral = Supplycollateral *collateral velocity
The next section straddles collateral and repo rates to monetary policy via the IS/LM 
framework.
Collateral and Monetary Policy, via the IS/LM Framework
Collateral was not taught in money or monetary-policy textbooks. To the best of  
my knowledge, undergraduate macroeconomic text books still use the IS/LM 
model (investment, saving / liquidity preference, money supply) as a construct to 
demonstrate the relationship between interest rates and real output in the goods and 
services market and the money market. In this model, the intersection of  the IS and 
LM curves is where there is simultaneous equilibrium in both markets (Figure 9.3). 
The horizontal axis represents output or real GDP and is labeled Y. The vertical axis 
represents the real interest rate, i. Since this is a non-dynamic model, there is a one-to-
one relationship between the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate; therefore, 
variables such as money demand, which actually depend on the nominal interest rate, 
can equivalently be expressed as depending on the real interest rate. The point where 
these schedules intersect represents a short-run equilibrium in the real and monetary 
sectors. This equilibrium yields a unique combination of  the nominal/real interest 
rate and real GDP.
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In a simple setting, inward shifts in the IS curve (due to a contraction of  the C + I 
+ G component that decreases output to YB) can be neutralized by shifting LM out 
by lowering (nominal or real) interest rates to attain the initial level of  output YA. The 
pioneering works on the financial-accelerator highlights that endogenous shocks to 
credit markets can initiate cyclical effects to the real economy (Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist, 1996). Specifically, their paper highlights that shocks lead to flight to quality 
and thus higher cost for risky projects; this shifts “in” the IS curve since households/firms 
invest less. Subsequently, the authors show, the financial accelerator can amplify shocks 
stemming from collateral constraints to the economy.
However, financial collateral that substitutes money is different than the general 
collateral modeled in the original research papers. In volume terms, collateral use has 
become over the past decade on par with monetary aggregates like M2. When we 
consider collateral use/reuse in addition to M2 or the monetary base in USA, UK and 
Eurozone, financial lubrication was over US$30 trillion before Lehman (and one-third 
came via pledged collateral). However, post Lehman, the (ongoing) deleveraging in the 
global financial system along with regulatory measures has constrained the availability 
of  collateral (and its reuse). The subsequent decline in both available collateral and 
associated reuse of  collateral was sizable (an estimated US$4–5 trillion).
Financial collateral does not have to be rated AAA/AA, but as long as the securities 
(i.e. debt or equity) are liquid, mark-to-market, and part of  a legal cross-border 
master agreement, they will be used as “cash equivalent.” Such pledged financial 
collateral is difficult to map, but it is a key component of  financial plumbing. The 
collateral intermediation function is likely to become more important over time. In 
the short term, increased counterparty risks (as during 2007–2008 and in Europe 
today) make secured funding more attractive. In the longer term, with more arm’s 
length transactions in an increasingly globally integrated financial system, market 
participants are seeking the security of  collateral to underpin a wider range of  claims. 
New regulations are also likely to increase the demand for collateral-based operations 
(CGFS 2013).
When collateral use drops, financial intermediation slows, with effects similar to the 
drying up of  interbank markets. The stock of  collateral can decline as investors become 
more concerned about counterparty risk, making them less willing to lend securities and 
meaning collateral sits safely idle in segregated accounts. It can also be affected by central 
bank measures, such as large-scale asset purchases, which drain good-quality collateral 
from the system, or a widening of  the pool of  collateral-eligible assets, which increases 
the pledge-ability of  these assets as collateral to the central banks. Collateral velocity—
defined as the volume of  secured transactions divided by the stock of  source collateral—
is affected by counterparty concerns and general risk aversion (due to higher haircuts), 
which then manifest as restrictions on the reuse of  collateral.
The recent collapse in financial collateral (by an estimated US$4–5 trillion) has 
significantly shifted the IS in (re the IS/LM framework), lowering the output to YB and 
decreasing the real interest rate. In turn, QE efforts are shifting the LM curve to the right 
to compensate this decline until the LM curve will intersect with the IS curve at the initial 
output YA. The LM shift due to QE is sizable (and continuing) and along with the IS 
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inward shift, real interest rates may be well below zero (but “optically” due to distortions 
in the money rates that are above zero in nominal terms, we do not see sub-zero real 
rates).
A recent speech by the New York Fed president suggests that the Fed’s QE actions 
may have lowered the nominal rates by an additional 150–200 basis points (Dudley 
2012). So unadjusted real rates (i.e. if  the Fed balance sheet had remained the same at 
US$800 billion as of  end-2007) may be much lower relative to the adjusted real rates (due 
to the expanded balance sheet via QE) that are officially announced and do not factor the 
rate cuts imbedded within QE—the blue and green lines respectively (Figure 9.5). Now 
consider the three most recent tightening cycles in the USA that have averaged close 
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to 400 bps; with a 400 basis points tightening cycle, the new policy rate may anchor at 
2 percent if  it starts from minus 2 percent. Analytically in Figure 9.4, LM shifted out until 
YA is reached at approximately minus 2 percent, and with a 400 bps tightening, the next 
policy rate cycle may stop at 2 percent (unless the balance sheet also returns to the 2007 
size in tandem).
The Collateral Implications of  Exit Strategies
Although there are many variants and interpretations of  “exit,” a key aspect is its impact 
on the part of  the market where non-banks, such as hedge funds or money market 
funds (see Figure 9.6), interact with the large dealer banks to determine the price of  
collateral (the repo rate). Some central banks that have undertaken QE are now holding 
sizable amounts of  high-quality liquid assets (or good collateral) on their balance sheets. 
Through long-term refinancing operations, the ECB has printed money but taken in bad 
collateral. But excess reserves at central banks are not the same thing as good collateral 
that circulates through the non-bank/bank nexus. As a result of  this the non-bank/bank 
nexus over time has begun to give way to a new central bank/non-bank nexus that has 
weakened the market’s financial plumbing and increased shadow banking “puts” to 
compensate for the lack of  good collateral.
Proposals to unwind that inventory of  good collateral come in part to stem any 
shortage of  good collateral. However, such proposals for unwinding will have implications 
for this part of  the market in a way that may cause major adaptations to take place. 
While it is true that sooner or later these balance sheets will have to unwind—either 
voluntarily when central banks release collateral and take in money, or involuntarily as 
the securities held at central banks mature or roll off—unwinding will increase both the 
(money) interest rate and the (collateral) repo rate.
In the USA, the Fed has bought good collateral from non-banks, not banks (Carpenter 
et al. 2013); this has increased bank deposits (that belong to non-banks via the QE money 
they received in lieu of  collateral sold to the Fed). So the effect of  QE-type efforts is to 
convert what had been good collateral into additional bank liabilities (i.e. non-banks’ 
deposits at banks). Now, while QE continues, a variant of  “QE reversal” may happen 
simultaneously through the reverse repo program.
The Fed’s fixed-allotment reverse repo program, inaugurated on September 23, 
2013, is the first official attempt to unwind part of  its balance sheet. The success of  this 
program will be affected by allocation of  balance sheet “space” between banks and non-
banks amidst a tighter regulatory environment. Non-banks’ “balance sheet space” will 
be key to any unwinding of  collateral. With Basel III regulations at the door (especially 
the leverage and liquidity coverage ratio), the banking system is likely to have limited 
appetite for increasing balance sheets. Reverse repos would actually reduce total bank 
balance sheets by the amount of  reverse repo the Fed does with eligible non-banks such 
as MMMF/asset managers.
If  we look at collateral chains as depicted in Figure 9.6 above, at one end there is the 
MMMF investor—the household and corporate wealth pool (the supplier of  money). 
At the other end, after a couple of  loops for transformation and some haircuts and 
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subordination for extra capital, lies the promise to pay made by the borrower—the 
household (mortgage) or hedge fund. The Fed’s reverse repo relieves bank balance sheet 
constraints but short-circuits the chain. The household and corporate wealth pool is 
better off; they get a deposit alternative that is superior to anything available now. The borrower 
pool is worse off  as money will go directly to the Fed, and won’t be transformed into any 
lending to them.
The truth is that excess reserves do not simply become “good collateral” as the central 
bank unwinds its balance sheet. This is primarily because collateral with these non-banks 
via reverse repos cannot be rehypothecated, or onward re-pledged, and thus will not contribute 
to financial lubrication. The reasoning for this is that two clearing banks (J. P. Morgan 
and BNY) can only support rehypothecation of  securities in the tri-party process through 
general collateral finance (GCF), which is an interdealer tri-party service (i.e. banks) for 
members of  the government securities division of  the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC). If  one is not a GCF participant, then they effectively have “read 
only” access to their collateral (except in the case of  default, for which they have a 
separate, more manual process to send securities to the customer custodian to facilitate 
sale).
Only banks are able to rehypothecate collateral received via reverse repo (and 
increase collateral velocity). Thus, the new non-bank/central bank nexus is good for the 
non-banks since the collateral counterparty is the central bank. But it also an extension 
of  the Fed’s existing “put” to the shadows of  the financial system. This has the chance to 
further weaken the financial plumbing between bank/non-banks. At least prior to QE, 
Figure 9.6. Collateral and financial plumbing
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non-banks like MMMFs had to work hard for a positive return (i.e. higher than bank 
deposits) by choosing a good counterparty. Going forward, it is likely that the assets of  
MMMFs will grow, given the guaranteed return from reverse repos (and at odds with 
proposed regulations—like floating NAV—that try to limit the size of  MMMFs).
Central banks that have been taking good collateral out of  the market for sound 
macro reasons will not let the ownership of  these securities go back to the private market 
as it will impact the repo rates (via collateral velocity). However, the market needs the 
collateral services that these securities can offer, which transfers with possession, not 
ownership (for example, under the proposed reverse repo, non-banks will gain ownership 
but not possession to reuse securities). Securities in the market’s possession have velocity; those at 
the central bank do not. There will be a net reduction in overall financial lubrication if  non-
banks are the primary conduits for the Fed’s reverse repo.
Conclusion
Just as water finds its own level, collateral in the market domain generally finds its 
economic rent when it is pledged for reuse. The past few years since Lehman has 
seen major central banks take out good collateral from markets and replace it with 
freshly printed money (except for the ECB, which has printed money but taken in bad 
collateral). Sooner or later, these balance sheets will unwind—either voluntarily when 
central banks will release collateral and take in money, or involuntarily as the securities 
held at central banks mature or roll off. Analytically, the rate of  absorbing money will 
move the LM curve left. Simultaneously the rate of  release of  collateral (in lieu of  
money) will move the IS curve up. So unwind will increase both the (money) interest rate 
and the (collateral) repo rate. As both rates move up, policymakers will attempt to keep 
them close (and not create a wedge between them). This may be another reason why 
the Fed may want to keep an eye on the repo rate and hence its reverse repo program 
(while still doing QE).
Notes
1 Despite the European Central Bank’s (ECB) efforts to take in lower-grade collateral, actions of  
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) (and other central banks) are diluting this objective. After the 
Swiss franc/euro peg, the SNB balance sheet is now almost €500 billion with half  of  the assets 
comprising of  “core” euro bonds and equities. However SNB’s bond purchases withdraw the 
best and most liquid collateral from the Eurozone; this reduces the collateral reuse rate since 
these bonds are siloed at SNB and not pledged in the financial markets. Siloed collateral has zero 
velocity by definition.
2 Hedge funds via their prime brokers allow for collateral reuse as a quid pro quo for the leverage/
funding they receive from dealers. The other non-bank providers of  collateral generally loan 
collateral for various tenors to optimize their asset management mandates. Commercial banks 
are not active in this bank (hence, de minimis).
3 Alternately, the SNB could use foreign exchange or other derivatives to hedge the peg.
4 The Risk Management Association’s (RMA’s) database summarized the inventory on loan to the 
market. See Barclays AAA/AA index and http://www.rmahq.org (accessed August 15, 2014), 
which provides data on securities lending with title transfer.
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Chapter 10




Anxieties about central banks’ interventions in financial markets often arise during 
periods of  crisis. Extraordinary measures may trigger controversies when existing policy 
solutions are difficult to translate across institutional landscapes. The European Central 
Bank’s (ECB’s) decision to initiate the Securities Market Programme in May 2010, as 
governments in the Eurozone’s peripheries faced increasing borrowing costs, offers an 
interesting example. The strongest opposition, mostly although not exclusively voiced 
by German policymakers (including the German representatives on the ECB Governing 
Council), warned that purchases of  government bonds are ill-advised on legal, political, 
and economic grounds, contravening the Maastricht Treaty prohibition of  public debt 
monetization, reducing the urgency for fiscal adjustments and distorting financial markets 
(Belke 2010; Weidmann 2012). According to this account, interventions in sovereign 
bond markets cement the view that the ECB is the only institution that can effectively 
contain a crisis, turning the central bank into a “whipping boy” for political elites hesitant 
to engage with the structural problems underpinning the euro crisis. In turn, the ECB 
attributed its interventions to legitimate concerns with stabilizing disrupted markets 
segments crucial to the transmission of  monetary policy signals rather than as attempts 
to ease governments’ financing conditions. It simultaneously reaffirmed commitment to 
its constitutional mandate, price stability, and a rapid unwinding of  extraordinary crisis 
measures that would allow the return to the pre-crisis policy framework (ECB 2010a; 
Trichet 2009). Two years later, the ECB went further, and announced that it would do 
whatever it takes through the Outright Monetary Transactions program, a commitment 
to buy government bonds in order to stabilize the European financial system.
Theoretical accounts of  central banks’ presence in financial markets distinguish 
between normal and crisis periods. During “normal” times, interventions occur in one 
market, the interbank market, where banks trade liquidity to enforce model-guided policy 
decisions (Allen et al. 2008). Under the efficient market hypothesis, steering the interbank 
rate allows central banks to influence broader financing conditions in the economy. In 
contrast, the theoretical foundations of  crisis interventions are less straightforward. Central 
banks may resort to non-standard interventions once policy interest rates have been 
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lowered to zero (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004). Unconventional measures then require 
the abandonment of  the efficient market hypothesis, forcing an overt re-politicization 
of  central banks’ presence in financial markets. Policy narratives distinguish between 
market-based and bank-based measures that reflect different financial structures (Fahr 
et al. 2011), and, particularly in the ECB’s discourse, the political constraints on exit 
strategies (Bini Smaghi 2009; Trichet 2009).
This chapter instead argues that the ECB has refused to engage systematically with 
the consequences of  European banks’ shift to collateralized funding, well documented 
by the Liikanen Report (2012). Its key premise is that the collateral management 
strategies of  European banks matter for the design of  crisis interventions in general, 
and for understanding the European sovereign debt crisis in particular. The emergence 
of  “coordinated risks” between counterparty (bank) and collateral (sovereign bond) 
on key funding markets raises complex questions about the remit of  central banks in 
monetary unions, and the relationship between banks’ collateral management strategies, 
the unwinding of  extraordinary measures, and the liquidity of  distinctive sovereign bond 
markets. It provides further support for De Grauwe’s (2011) argument that the ECB 
should become the lender of  last resort for governments.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section explores theoretical perspectives 
on central banks’ presence in financial markets during periods of  stability and crisis. The 
chapter then contrasts the increasingly “delocalized” nature of  bank funding markets 
with crisis-contingent “re-localizations,” focusing on the operations of  the key source 
of  collateralized funding for European banks, the repo (repurchase) market. It then 
considers the ECB’s policy decisions since 2008 in light of  the relationship between 
repo markets and the markets for collateral. As a caveat, the chapter does not aim to 
explain the structural imbalances underlying the European crisis, but to highlight specific 
structural changes in financial systems stemming from processes of  financialization (see 
Stockhammer 2011 for a review).
Theoretical Perspectives: Central Banks’ Intervention  
in Financial Markets
The relationship between central banks and financial  
markets during “normal times”
Although the dominant pre-crisis model of  central banking recognized that monetary 
policy works through financial markets (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004), its reliance on 
the efficient market hypothesis rendered the details of  financial intermediation irrelevant 
for the conduct of  monetary policy (Blanchard et al. 2010). The recognition that banks 
played a special role, particularly in the European financial systems dominated by banks, 
gave rise to theoretical discussions about the “bank lending channel” (Kashyap and Stein 
2000), but had little impact in policy practice (Blanchard et al. 2010). Indeed, central 
banks carefully distinguished between monetary policy per se and its implementation in 
financial markets, typically described as liquidity policies. The dominant New Keynesian 
models postulated that monetary policy should focus on setting short-term interest rates 
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to deliver price stability: central banks that anchor expectations of  the short-term interest 
rate path can effectively control investment and consumption decisions (further, in the 
usual transmission mechanism, aggregate demand and price stability), since efficient 
financial markets link short-term to long-term interest rates and asset prices through 
arbitrage. Indeed, pre-crisis policy discussions typically debated the direction and speed 
of  interest rate changes while treating central banks’ liquidity policies as a passive exercise 
of  implementing interest rate decisions (Gonzales-Paramo 2008).
The one instrument–one objective framework, embedded in the ECB’s economic 
pillar and guiding the operations of  most large central banks (Fahr et al. 2011), further 
established that central banks should manage liquidity conditions in one market segment 
to implement interest rate decisions: the unsecured interbank market that redistributes 
liquidity between banks without the guarantee of  collateral (ECB 2010a; Klee and 
Stebunovs 2011). Given the arbitrage assumption underlying the efficient market 
hypothesis, central bank interventions “in more than one market, say in both the short-
term or the long-term bond markets, is either redundant, or inconsistent” (Blanchard et 
al. 2010, 4; also Bini Smaghi 2009). Liquidity policies entail open-market operations that 
adjust the supply of  central bank money to ensure that the overnight interbank interest 
rate tracks closely the policy rate. For instance, the ECB’s overnight target, the EONIA,1 
fluctuated up to 10 basis points above the policy rate, reflecting an aggregate deficit of  
liquidity arising from banks’ funding gaps: loan activity in excess of  retail deposit funding 
(Lenza et al. 2010). Open-market operations have banks as traditional counterparties 
and can take two forms: outright purchases of  debt instruments (usually sovereign bonds 
to minimize risks to the central bank’s balance sheet) or repurchase operations (repos), 
through which central banks lend against collateral, with a commitment to resell the 
collateral at the end of  the repo operation. The design of  open-market operations owes 
more to historical circumstances than firm theoretical foundations: the ECB’s large 
refinance operations pre-crisis (termed MROs—marginal refinancing operations), with 
weekly allotments of  around €300 billion, compared with around $30 billion in the 
USA, a wider range of  counterparties, and eligible collateral (highly rated private and 
sovereign debt instruments), reflect the reluctance to hold large volumes of  sovereign 
bonds given the Maastricht Treaty prohibition of  public debt monetization (Cheun 
et al. 2009).
The relationship between central banks and  
financial markets during crisis
Since the nineteenth century, central bankers have recognized that containing a crisis 
requires decisive intervention in the unsecured interbank market—a good barometer of  
financial distress because concerns with counterparty risk render banks reluctant to lend 
to each other. As historical experience has repeatedly demonstrated, individual banks’ 
difficulties to raise interbank funding may quickly gain systemic dimensions and trigger 
bank runs unless the central bank becomes the lender of  last resort (Goodhart 1994).
But lender-of-last-resort activity may not be enough to address a serious financial 
crisis. When the central bank wants to do more, it typically relies on two theoretical 
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frameworks to guide interventions: the signaling and portfolio-rebalancing channels (Cecioni 
et al. 2011; Lenza et al. 2010). The signaling channel retains the centrality of  the New 
Keynesian concern with anchoring market expectations. For central banks that choose 
to remain strictly within New Keynesian frameworks, a credible commitment to keep 
short-term interest rates low, conditional perhaps on an indicator of  economic recovery, 
should bring long-term interest rates down, and ease financing conditions (Eggertsson 
and Woodford 2003). Through the signaling channel, crisis central banking operates as 
an exercise in expectations management.
Extraordinary circumstances may render central banks reluctant to rely on the signaling 
channel alone once interest rates have reached the zero bound. Instead, unconventional 
central banking may aim to trigger portfolio-rebalancing effects by changing relative 
supplies in different asset markets in order to change asset prices and long-term interest 
rates (Joyce et al. 2010). The effectiveness of  the portfolio-rebalancing channel relies 
on the abandonment of  the efficient-market hypothesis where financial markets treat 
all assets as equal (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004; Borio and Disyatat 2009; Cecioni et 
al. 2011).2 Unconventional policies mean unconventional liquidity policies, since central 
bank interventions in financial markets can no longer rely on the theoretical guidance of  
the efficient market hypothesis, and the interest rate instrument. Policy innovations then 
depend on central banks’ appraisal of  what is legitimate and feasible, decisions mediated 
by institutional and political factors as much as economic theories.
A taxonomy of  interventions: Market vs bank-based measures
Unconventional monetary policy interventions can be market based, involving targeted 
asset purchases, or bank based, through bank-refinancing operations (see Table 10.1). 
Market-based interventions became popular during Japan’s extended period of  deflation. 
Table 10.1. A literature review: Market vs bank-based unconventional monetary policies
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(acceptance of  illiquid 
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Money multiplier Increased bank reserves 
stimulate bank lending
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market funding, restoring 
funding and market liquidity 
Indirect portfolio 
rebalancing 
Activated if  banks use 
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Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) proposed that from a theoretical perspective, the Bank of  
Japan’s purchase of  private and government securities could be geared to change the 
composition of  the central bank’s balance sheet (replacing short-term with long-term 
government securities, termed a credit-easing approach) or to expand it through large-
scale asset purchases (a quantitative easing approach).
The transmission mechanism premises changes in asset prices. Purchases of  long-
term government bonds would lower long-term interest rates by shifting investors’ 
demand to riskier, higher-yielding private assets, particularly where the central bank 
allowed its balance sheet to expand (quantitative easing), and increase the opportunity 
cost of  holding money. The most effective approach to change asset prices would be to 
target the “risk free” or benchmark rate, the interest rate on government bonds (ECB 
2010a; Joyce et al. 2010).
The early literature on quantitative easing recognized that central banks may face 
political difficulties in designing crisis interventions, but associated these with interventions 
in private securities markets rather than government bond markets. Bernanke and Reinhart 
(2004) pointed to the legal frameworks that sought to prevent central banks from assuming 
the credit risks of  illiquid private assets. More importantly, however, they recognized 
that even if  the central bank overcame legal obstacles, its efforts may be ineffective if  
countercyclical fiscal policies pushed the “risk-free rate” on government bonds higher. In 
other words, the early literature recognized that coordination between the central bank’s 
unconventional monetary policies and the government’s fiscal policies were crucial to the 
functioning of  the portfolio channel.3 In contrast, post-Lehman research became more 
explicitly concerned with central bank independence (Blinder 2010). Purchases of  private 
assets could be easily interpreted as industrial policy since these prioritize some economic 
sectors. Purchases of  government bonds in turn may be construed as disincentives for 
governments to pursue fiscal discipline (Trichet 2009) given the “quasi-debt management” 
nature of  outright asset purchases (Borio and Disyatat 2009).
The ECB proposed to address this dilemma by introducing bank-based unconventional 
measures. It claimed conceptual legitimacy by highlighting the analytical importance of  
distinctive financial systems, defined through the traditional market-based and bank-based 
dichotomy (Bini Smaghi 2009). According to this view, bank-based liquidity measures 
rather than targeted asset purchases are better suited to improve credit conditions in 
bank-based financial systems (ECB 2010a; Fahr et al. 2011; Trichet 2009).4
Bank-based interventions, known as long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) in 
the Eurozone, are an extension of  open-market operations. Central banks offer higher 
volumes of  liquidity, at longer maturities, to more counterparties, and with easier 
collateral requirements (ECB 2010a). LTROs can impact the economy through distinctive 
channels. The money multiplier channel assumes that banks would deploy the additional 
reserves provided by the central bank to revive credit activity (Fahr et al. 2011). In this, 
banks act as the passive intermediaries imagined in monetarist theories. In contrast, the 
collateral channel premises more complex banks with lending and trading activities. 
Lending may be restricted if  banks hold illiquid assets (such as asset-backed securities) 
that impair access to market funding. To unblock this channel, the central bank exploits 
the collateral consequences of  bank-based crisis policies. It “liquefies” the bank balance 
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sheet (Bini Smaghi, 2010) by accepting illiquid (lower-quality) private assets as collateral in 
extraordinary liquidity operations so that high-quality collateral5 can be used for private 
market funding. Thus, adjustments to collateral policies contribute to normalizing liquidity 
conditions in financial markets disrupted by increased risk aversion. In order to contain the 
key pitfalls of  relaxed collateral policies, moral hazard, and credit risk, collateral is marked 
to market (valued at market prices); in addition, the central bank may impose a haircut 
as protection against asset price volatility by subtracting a percentage from the market 
value of  the collateral.6 Additionally, bank-based measures can indirectly trigger portfolio-
rebalancing effects similar to market-based measures if  private banks use the liquidity 
obtained from the central bank to purchase sovereign or private debt (see Table 10.1).
Exit strategies
Central bank interventions in financial markets require metrics for policy success. 
During normal times, central banks use one financial metric: liquidity operations 
maintain the unsecured interbank interest rate in a symmetrical corridor around the 
policy rate (typically 25 basis points). In contrast, “unconventional” commitments may 
be guided by financial or economic variables (Cecioni et al. 2011). The “extreme” case 
for market-based measures would be a ceiling on the yield of  a particular instrument, 
such as a long-term government bond (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004), or a particular 
risk spread (for instance, between commercial paper and T-bills). In this case, the central 
bank commits to unlimited purchases at the announced yield or spread. Alternatively, 
outright purchases can be tailored to broader goals: overcoming deflationary pressures 
(as in Japan) or economic growth. Bank-based measures similarly engender a variety of  
possible commitment scenarios, contingent on banks’ collateral portfolios, judged to be 
effective for resuming bank lending or for a return to “normality” in financial markets 
(ECB 2010a).
Once the underlying objective has been achieved, central banks are confronted with 
the political economy aspects of  unwinding extraordinary measures. The “exit” literature 
portrays market-based measures as politically contentious since central banks must decide 
whether to hold assets to maturity, or to immediately sell these to avoid the potential 
inflationary consequences of  oversized balance sheets (Lenza et al. 2010). Decisions have 
to reconcile the moral-hazard dimension of  central bank support with political pressures 
to delay exit because of  concerns about the impact on recovery (Borio and Disyatat 
2009). In contrast, bank-based measures are applauded for engendering an automatic 
exit mechanism that diminishes the scope for political pressures (Fahr et al. 2011; Trichet 
2009). With a predetermined maturity for bank-based liquidity injections, balance sheets 
adjust automatically for all counterparties when banks return the borrowed liquidity, 
and central banks the collateral pledged. The consequences of  exiting bank-based crisis 
strategies for banks reliant on collateralized funding are rarely considered since it is 
assumed that restored market liquidity will allow banks to easily redeploy the collateral 
pledged with the central bank to raise market funding (ECB 2010a).
In sum, while discussions of  unconventional monetary policies identify various 
difficulties arising from “weak” theoretical foundations, it is suggested that these 
 ECB AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLATERAL 163
vary across heterogeneous financial structures (Fahr et al. 2011; Lenza et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the distinction “bank versus market 
based” might be artificial, the result of  strategic choices central banks rely on to justify 
controversial policies given particular constraints that impact their ability to adopt policies 
formulated in different contexts. Indeed, mutations usually occur when policies travel 
across institutional landscapes (Peck and Theodore 2012). For instance, outright asset 
purchases are often the result of  explicit decisions to bypass banks since these may use the 
additional liquidity to deleverage rather than expand credit, as the Japanese experience 
demonstrated (Borio and Disyatat 2009). Similarly, bank-based measures cannot avoid 
politicized choices since there is little theoretical guidance for decisions about the type 
of  risky private assets acceptable as collateral, the duration of  extraordinary liquidity 
injections, and the timing of  exit strategies—in this last case, the central bank must judge 
what represents a “normalization” of  financial markets in the wake of  a prolonged 
financial crisis.
The reversibility of  extraordinary measures is portrayed to be an important difference, 
opposing an automatic mechanism for bank-based liquidity measures with the potentially 
controversial decisions to offload assets acquired through direct purchases. Yet, the 
discussion of  exiting bank-based measures, as for example in Belke (2010), Lenza et al. 
(2010), or Fahr et al. (2011), neglects one key consideration: the collateral consequences 
of  reverting to “normal” liquidity policies. Indeed, the important question that arises 
is what happens if  central banks’ measure for policy success—the “normalization of  
financial and economic conditions”—is not simultaneous with fully restored liquidity in 
the markets for collateral accepted by the central bank under exceptional circumstances. 
If  collateral markets are still suffering, the central bank’s exit may leave banks unable to 
substitute central bank funding with market funding on similar collateral requirements. 
This question goes to the core of  the ECB’s policy dilemmas since 2008 in the context of  
European banks’ funding.
Strategies of  Bank Funding and Collateral Management Strategies Bank funding 
strategies are under-studied in mainstream and critical analysis of  monetary policy 
during crisis. During normal times, the efficient market hypothesis premises that assets are 
perfectly substitutable everywhere. Bank-based crisis policies that invoke the multiplier 
mechanism portray banks as tied to the decisions of  the central bank. Similarly, the 
“collateral channel” discussions demonstrate little concern for distinctive collateral 
markets, again suggestive of  the perfect substitutability assumption.
Yet increasingly, central bank research grapples with the consequences of  changing 
financial landscapes, an important theme in the economic geography literature addressing 
the financial crisis (Wojcik 2011). The ECB (2008) recognized that new business models 
in banking blur the traditional bank vs market-based dichotomy, as noted in the 
discussions between economic geography and varieties of  capitalism (see Dixon 2011). 
The departure from traditional banking involves an increasing reliance on non-deposit 
sources of  funding (i.e. larger funding gaps) coupled with strategies to minimize credit 
risk through off–balance sheet activity. Indeed, the ECB (2010b) contrasts the growing 
importance of  cross-border, wholesale bank funding in the Eurozone to the segmentation 
of  retail banking (less than 5 percent of  overall lending to non-banks came from 
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cross-border banks) throughout the pre-Lehman period. As Figure 10.1 suggests, 
European banks became increasingly less dependent on traditional retail funding 
(relatively less so for Spain), covering funding gaps from wholesale market sources either 
through the issue of  debt securities7 or through borrowing from external or domestic 
short-term interbank money markets—particularly for the French, German, and Italian 
banking systems. While national funding-gap figures mask important differences between 
individual banks’ business models (e.g. large German banks are more reliant on market 
funding than smaller banks; see Hardie and Howarth 2009), their usefulness rests on 
indicating the substantial reliance on (cross-border) wholesale money markets, often 
associated with centralized funding models for transnational European banks (Bruno 
and Shin 2012).
Indeed, it is increasingly recognized that leveraged cross-border banking rather 
than central banks set the stance for financial conditions in financially integrated 
economies (Bruno and Shin 2012; Kamin 2010).8 Global banks can circumvent 
central banks’ attempts to tighten credit conditions by resorting to delocalized funding 
strategies—through cross-border borrowing on wholesale markets with lower costs of  
funding or by activating cross-border internal markets to mobilize liquidity (Cetorelli 
and Goldberg 2011). For instance, the unprecedented involvement of  European banks 
in the US financial system before Lehman relied on their ability to tap wholesale US 
funding markets (Bruno and Shin 2012). Rather than the transmission mechanism in 
standard equilibrium models, Adrian and Shin (2009) argue that central bank decisions 
increasingly matter more through the “risk-taking channel.” Low policy interest rates—
as during the pre-Lehman period of  price stability, known as the Great Moderation—
contribute to more aggressive risk taking by cementing banks’ confidence that short-term 
market funding can be easily rolled over.
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Bank funding strategies thus become an important channel for the propagation of  
financial distress across different financial systems (Bruno and Shin 2012; Gorton and 
Metrick 2009). Paradoxically, however, the burgeoning literature documenting the 
erosion of  central bank influence over national financial conditions is largely silent about 
the policy implications of  a crisis-contingent process through which market-reliant banks 
become re-embedded in the national economy through two distinctive mechanisms.
Sovereign funding costs as benchmark for banks’  
debt issuance during crisis times
During “normal” times, the cost of  issuing new debt typically reflects issue-specific 
and bank-specific factors. In contrast, bank and sovereign funding conditions become 
closely correlated in times of  crisis; a key reason that the literature on market-based 
unconventional measures invokes support for direct central bank interventions to lower 
sovereign yields (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004; Cecioni et al. 2011; Joyce et al. 2010). 
According to the BIS (2011), in European countries heavily affected by the sovereign 
debt pressures since 2010, as much as 50 percent of  the spread on new bank bond 
issuance reflected the conditions of  the home sovereign, and only 10 percent reflected 
bank-specific factors. This creates conflicting incentives for banks with lower-rated 
domestic sovereigns: the willingness to purchase home government bonds may reduce 
their borrowing costs (by reducing sovereign yields), but it may prompt other market 
participants to curtail funding because of  concerns with banks’ exposure to the sovereign. 
Under such conditions, the structure of  the banking system acquires new relevance for 
the design of  unconventional monetary policies. Large cross-border banking groups may 
issue debt through their subsidiaries located in jurisdictions with better-rated sovereigns. 
Without this avenue, banks have to rely on either central banks or secured market funding 
to cover funding gaps, where access depends on the quality of  collateral that banks can 
pledge from their portfolios.
Repo (collateralized market) funding and  
collateral management strategies
Repo markets are funding markets where banks or other financial institutions exchange 
liquidity (typically short-term) against collateral. A private repo transaction is similar 
to central bank repo transactions in that the provider of  liquidity requires collateral to 
make short-term funding available, thus reducing both counterparty and credit risk. Repo 
markets are crucial to delocalized market-funding strategies: the use of  collateral enables 
the growth of  cross-border wholesale funding, since risk management strategies no longer 
require the detailed assessments and relationships that are characteristic of  unsecured 
interbank lending. Indeed, private repo markets have rapidly grown to represent a much 
larger source of  private liquidity than the unsecured interbank market traditionally used as 
the target of  monetary policy implementation on the premise that it determined financing 
costs (Klee and Stebunovs 2011). For example, the August 2008 outstanding value of  
Eurozone unsecured interbank transactions rose to around €120 billion (Heijmans et 
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al. 2010), compared with €6 trillion (around 70 percent of  Eurozone GDP) in the repo 
segment, a ratio similar to the USA (Klee and Stebunovs 2011), and evidence of  what 
Bini Smaghi (2010) termed the rise of  “collateralized finance.” In comparison to the 
predominantly short-term repo markets, the largest source of  long-term secured funding 
for European banks, the covered bond market, where banks issue securities against a pool 
of  assets, reached €2.4 trillion before Lehman (Beirne et al. 2011).
Private repo transactions involve two types of  collateral: sovereign and private debt 
securities. General collateral (GC) repos are done for funding purposes and the cash 
lender accepts any security in its class as collateral. In contrast, “special” repos reflect 
the cash lender’s preference for a particular security, usually to cover shorting positions. 
Repos can be conducted on bilateral terms, between two parties (over the counter), 
or through a tri-party agreement, where a clearing bank intermediates between the 
collateral provider and the cash lender (Copeland et al. 2011). Similar to central bank 
repos, collateral quality determines the haircut so that lower-rated collateral bears higher 
haircuts. To avoid the under-collateralization arising from fluctuations in collateral 
value, repo transactions are usually marked to market daily. This renders perceptions 
of  collateral liquidity essential to collateral management strategies: when collateral falls 
in price (equivalent to a rise in yield for sovereign bonds), the cash borrower may be 
required to post additional collateral, thus increasing the cost of  repo funding.
US repo market growth is attributed to the increasing importance of  non-bank 
financial institutions (shadow banks) (Pozsar 2011). In contrast, the European repo market 
is dominated by large European banks, trading primarily at short maturities (under a 
month). The different institutional setup translates into a different sovereign GC collateral 
framework; whereas in the USA or UK, sovereign GC collateral refers to a homogeneous 
basket of  sovereign debt instruments, the European sovereign GC rates are compiled on 
a basket of  sovereign bonds issued by any of  the euro area countries (Hördahl and King 
2008). Indeed, regulatory efforts to allow collateral use across Eurozone jurisdictions 
enlarged the pool of  sovereign GC collateral available for repo transactions, rendering 
sovereign bonds the most important form of  marketable collateral for European banks. 
The ECB’s collateral policies before the crisis further contributed to this process. As 
the ECB accepted a wide range of  sovereign and high-quality private collateral, banks 
redirected sovereign collateral to private repo transactions. Thus, the share of  sovereign 
assets in euro-denominated collateral used for ECB repos fell from around 40 percent in 
2003 to around 10 percent by 2008, but dominated private repo funding markets: around 
80 percent of  private repos were securitized by sovereign instruments, a share that has 
remained constant since early 2000 (ECB 2010b). This offers a clear indication of  the 
importance of  collateral-driven activity in sovereign bond markets: by 2008, the European 
repo market was similar in size to the Eurozone sovereign debt market, at around €6 
trillion. In rough terms, up to 80 percent of  outstanding sovereign debt instruments 
were used in private repo transactions.9 German debt instruments collateralized around 
25 percent of  repo transactions, followed by Italian (12.4 percent), French (11 percent), 
Spanish (5 percent), and Belgian (3 percent) instruments (ICMA 2008).
For the Eurozone, the increasing importance of  repo markets has two important 
consequences. First, it clarifies European banks’ pre-crisis willingness to increase exposure 
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to European governments other than those in their home country and disregard the 
credit risk associated with individual sovereign borrowers despite the repeated violations 
of  the Growth and Stability Pact.10 Indeed, bank reliance on market funding renders 
collateral portfolio diversification as a key driver of  bank demand for sovereign debt 
issued outside the home jurisdiction (Bolton and Jeanne 2010). Given the institutional 
setup of  the repo market, European banks with large funding gaps increased exposure 
to other European sovereigns, since any sovereign collateral enabled access to sovereign 
GC repo funding. Stress-test figures for 2010 (before the contagion from the Greek crisis) 
indicated that at one end of  the international diversification spectrum, less than 40 
percent of  Belgian, Dutch, or French banks’ sovereign debt portfolios consisted of  home 
sovereign—in contrast to Greek, Spanish, and Italian banks that mostly held debt issued 
by their own government (see Figure 10.2).
Second, perceptions of  funding risk in repo markets can impact the liquidity of  collateral 
markets (Hördahl and King 2008). In US repo markets, the post-Lehman risk aversion 
narrowed acceptable collateral to increasingly scarce “safe haven” government bonds. 
Yet this is not the only possible scenario. Collateral management strategies can amplify 
stress in sovereign bond markets, particularly in monetary unions with independent fiscal 
policies, because of  the importance of  perceptions of  collateral liquidity (Bolton and 
Jeanne 2010; Hördahl and King 2008; Gorton and Metrick 2009; BIS 2011). Well-rated 
sovereigns (such as Germany) reap “collateral premiums” as repo-related demand for 
high-quality collateral preserves market liquidity and lowers financing costs (Bolton and 
Jeanne 2010). In turn, concerns about the impact of  countercyclical fiscal measures on 
perceptions of  sovereign risk reduce collateral-driven demand for lower-rated sovereign 
bonds that might not be eligible, or require high haircuts, in private repo transactions. 
The European repo market offers a good example of  such crisis-contingent collateral 
discrimination: the spread between single-A-rated Greek and AAA-rated German 
overnight repo rates on 10-year sovereign collateral widened from around zero basis 
Figure 10.2. The share of  foreign government bonds in banks’ sovereign bond portfolios












Source: Data from BIS (2011).
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points before Lehman to more than sixty basis points by October 2008, similar to Irish–
German spreads (Hördahl and King 2008). Lower-rated sovereigns may thus be trapped 
in a vicious cycle as collateral concerns reduce demand for sovereign debt instruments, 
particularly if  repo collateral is marked to market daily. Increased scrutiny of  collateral 
portfolios paradoxically may render private banks reluctant to hold own government 
debt in order to avoid becoming part of  correlated risks on the repo market between 
counterparty (bank) and collateral (sovereign bond), even though higher home sovereign 
yields feed into higher costs on banks’ unsecured debt issuance. The extent to which 
coordinated risks become significant depends on the degree of  internationalization 
of  banks’ portfolio of  sovereign bonds: the higher holdings of  home sovereign debt 
instruments (as for instance in Spain, Greece, or Italy), the higher the adverse effects on 
bank secured funding costs stemming from pressures in the sovereign bond market.
Indeed, in contrast to the pre-crisis celebration of  the improved risk management 
strategies available through collateralized funding, the collapse of  Lehman Brothers 
drew attention to the crisis-contingent nature of  private liquidity creation: uncertainties 
associated with collateral and counterparty risk increased difficulties of  rolling over 
short-term repo funding (Gorton and Metrick 2009). The distinctive choices about the 
design of  crisis interventions, particularly the collateral consequences, become critical 
when private liquidity can only be replaced by central bank liquidity. The repo market 
then becomes a conduit of  banking funding pressures into sovereign funding pressures, 
and vice versa, complicating central bank attempts to stabilize banks’ funding markets 
without stabilizing sovereign debt markets, as the ECB policy experiments since October 
2008 suggest.
Understanding the ECB’s Dilemmas
The ECB’s actions since the onset of  the financial crisis have been bold, and yet 
firmly anchored within the medium-term framework of  our monetary policy 
strategy. (Trichet 2009)
Since October 2008, the ECB’s policies often underwent changes of  trajectory, reflecting 
the complex political context of  its policy formulation on one hand, and the ongoing 
attempts to create, at European level, an institutional framework well equipped to 
address banking or sovereign risk on the other hand. The ECB combined bank-based 
with market-based measures and unsuccessfully attempted, on at least three separate 
occasions, to exit its extraordinary crisis measures (see Table 10.2). Furthermore, bank-
based liquidity injections played a far greater role, in quantitative terms, than outright 
asset purchases (see Figure 10.3).
Despite the challenges of  stabilizing markets heavily impaired by Lehman’s collapse, 
2009 was the least politically difficult year for the ECB. Bank- and market-based measures 
sought to mitigate European banks’ difficulties to access market funding after Lehman’s 
collapse (ECB 2010a; Trichet 2009). As banks tapped extraordinary liquidity facilities 
offered first through the Enhanced Credit Support Strategy (October 2008) and then the 
three, one-year LTROs announced in May 2009, demand for one-year liquidity reduced 
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Nature of  commitment Interactions with funding markets




maturity (3 to 6 months); 
relaxed collateral 
requirements
Allow collateral substitution given 
sovereign collateral discrimination in 
European repo markets
LTRO I (May 2009) Three 1-year LTROs
(Jun, Sep, and Dec 09)
Lengthen liquidity planning horizon 
(Trichet 2009) and collateral 
substitution
LTRO II (May 2010) One 6-month LTRO  
(May 2010)
Address tensions in markets for 
collateral and possible contagion
LTRO III (Oct 2011) Two 1-year LTROs  
(Oct and Dec 2011)
Mitigate scarcity of  eligible collateral 
(Draghi 2011) and collateral 
discrimination; immediate and 
temporary effect on Spanish and Italian 
yields
LTRO IV (Dec 2011) Two 3-year LTROs (Dec 
2011 and Feb 2012); relaxed 
collateral requirements
Market-based crisis measures
Covered Bond Program  
I (May 2009 to Jun 2010) 
and II (Nov 2011 to Oct 
2012)
Commitment to volumes
CBPP I = €60 bn
CBPP II = €40 bn
(Hold to maturity)
Lower cost of  funding in the covered 
bond market, a long-term source of  
market funding for European banks
Securities Market 
Programme (May 2010; 
suspended by Jan 2011; 
restored in Jul 2011)
Sterilized, one-off  purchases; 
no commitment to volume; 
no disclosure of  originator  
of  instrument
Restore liquidity in sovereign bond 
markets important for bank funding 
(collateral); temporary effect on low-
rated sovereign yields
Outright Monetary 
Transactions (announced  
Aug 2012)
‘Do what it takes’: purchase 
of  government bond 
markets, conditional on  
IMF agreement 
No interventions yet; strong signaling 
effect that stabilized government bond 
markets across Eurozone
Exit strategies Exit narrative Interactions with market funding
LTRO phasing out 
announced (Dec 2009) 
Stabilized market  
conditions
Increased collateral scrutiny as return 
to market funding dependent on market 
perceptions of  collateral quality




according to credit ratings  
of  collateral to protect  
ECB from credit risk
Increased costs of  using lower-rated 




Return to interest rate as 
policy instrument to tackle 
inflation
Interest rate risk
Table 10.2. The ECB’s unconventional crisis policies
Note: LTRO = long-term refinancing operations.
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substantially from the June LTRO operation (around €350 billion) to the September 
and December auctions (see Figure 10.3). Furthermore, the ECB adopted a small-scale 
asset purchase programme in the European covered bond market, a source of  long-term 
secured market funding (Beirne et al. 2011).
The LTROs further contributed to the stabilization of  collateral markets in two 
distinctive ways. First, relaxed collateral requirements would allow banks to use 
sovereign bonds in private repo markets (Trichet 2009), although the impact of  collateral 
reallocations was limited by the small share of  sovereign collateral used for accessing 
ECB funding pre-crisis (around 10 percent, see Cheun et al. 2009). Second, banks used 
ECB liquidity to purchase government bonds because these offered attractive yields in a 
context of  scarce profit opportunities (Lapavitsas et al. 2010), and to strengthen collateral 
portfolios that would allow them to replace ECB funding with market funding once 
the ECB initiated its exit measures. Indeed, perceptions of  risk attached to the Greek 
and Irish collateral improved in European repo markets, reversing the post-Lehman 
reduction in volumes (BIS 2011). Furthermore, spreads between different European 
sovereign yields narrowed despite several factors pushing governments’ funding costs 
higher, including the ECB’s refusal to purchase sovereign debt similar to high-income 
peers after March 2009 (Dale et al. 2010) or the “timely, temporary and targeted” fiscal 
activism in Europe supported by the European Commission (2009). Encouraged by the 
apparent stabilization of  financial markets and concerned about inadvertently feeding 
a return to excessive risk-taking behavior, the ECB announced the phasing out of  its 
extraordinary liquidity injections in December 2009 (ECB 2010a; Fahr et al. 2011).
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The ECB faced different policy challenges throughout 2010. The Greek crisis worsened 
banks’ access to market funding, threatening to derail its phasing-out strategy and resulting 
in politically unpalatable choices: the stabilization of  bank-funding markets would now 
involve “bailing out” both banks and governments if  the ECB was to explicitly intervene 
in markets for collateral.
Funding through unsecured markets reduced because of  worsening risk perceptions 
(reported in the financial press as the “disappearance of  the interbank market”) while 
collateral discrimination reappeared in private repo markets, this time spreading to other 
lower-rated European sovereigns (Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain) that together provided 
around 20 percent of  overall Euro repo collateral (ICMA 2011). The BIS (2011) 
reported that the share of  repo transactions collateralized by Greek and Irish sovereign 
bonds halved by June 2010, whereas the ECB (2010b) recognized the emergence of  
“two highly correlated risks” (bank and sovereign) that increased banks’ difficulties to 
raise repo finance collateralized by the debt of  their own sovereign. The correlated risk 
between counterparty (bank) and collateral (sovereign) particularly affected Greek and 
Spanish banking systems, where foreign government debt amounted to less than 10 
percent of  banks’ overall government debt portfolios (Bolton and Jeanne 2010). Despite 
these adverse developments in funding and collateral markets, further worsened by the 
automatic unwinding of  the first (and largest) one-year LTRO injection in June 2010, 
the ECB ostensibly maintained its commitment to exit strategies. Its initial response 
reflected the European consensus that Greece alone was responsible for resolving its 
crisis (Featherstone 2011). Indeed, bailout negotiations unfolded during April 2010 
without envisaging a direct role for the ECB. Then, after intense political pressure, on 
May 3 the ECB relaxed collateral constraints to accept downgraded Greek sovereign 
(guaranteed) debt, under the proviso that a European political solution had to cement 
the credibility of  the fiscal consolidation plan. A week later, it introduced the second 
type of  market-based measures—the Securities Market Programme (SMP)—committing 
to purchase Eurozone government bonds in the secondary market, and reabsorb the 
additional liquidity through sterilizations to avoid any associations with the quantitative 
easing programs in the USA and UK. The ECB portrayed outright purchases as 
temporary measures undertaken to stabilize market segments crucial to the transmission 
of  monetary policy signals (ECB 2010a), refusing to make any commitments to volume 
or to disclose the nationality of  the targeted markets.
It is important to point out that the intense criticism leveled at the SMP for 
discouraging fiscal discipline (Belke 2010; Gerlach 2010) rarely recognizes that sovereign 
bond purchases throughout 2010 were of  a much smaller volume than bank-based 
liquidity injections, and were negligible compared to the overall size of  the European 
sovereign debt market (€60 billion compared to €6 trillion). Indeed, the pace of  
purchases slowed markedly after June 2010 even as sovereign spreads again widened to 
pre-SMP levels. This suggests that the ECB viewed the SMP as a temporary setback to its 
exit strategy, rather than as a strategy to contain collateral contagion affecting banks that 
were reliant on market funding or as a subsidy to “deviant” governments. Indeed, once 
the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) was established in June 2010, the ECB 
warned governments to assume responsibility for banks addicted to its extraordinary 
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liquidity injections and recast its policy problem strictly through the impediments that 
“addicted banks” placed on its exit strategy (Financial Times 2010).
The consequences of  neglecting the collateral implications of  exit strategies came in 
sharp focus during Ireland’s bailout. Unlike Greece, Ireland did not fit the “irresponsible 
government” narrative neatly, since it had a strong fiscal position before 2008, and had 
adopted a harsh austerity program since 2009. Its crisis reflected the banking sector’s 
reliance on short-term market funding to finance a housing bubble. The Irish banking 
system was particularly affected by exit strategies, having to replace €130 billion of  ECB 
liquidity with market liquidity while pressures mounted in the Irish sovereign bond market as 
LCH Clearnet, a key repo market intermediary, repeatedly raised haircuts on Irish sovereign 
collateral throughout October 2010 (BIS 2011). Although it recognized that “correlated 
risks” between counterparty and collateral excluded Irish banks from private funding 
markets (ECB 2010b), the ECB refused to restore the marketable collateral properties of  
Irish sovereign debt; as Figure 10.3 shows, no significant sovereign bond purchases occurred 
during that period. Instead, it pushed for an international bailout plan that would enable the 
Irish government to finance the recapitalization of  its banking sector. The ECB’s reluctance 
to resume extraordinary crisis measures continued even as increasingly apocalyptic scenarios 
accompanied the Portuguese bailout in April 2011, the second Greek bailout, and the Italian 
and Spanish sovereign bond market pressures in June 2011. Indeed, throughout the first 
half  of  2011, the ECB increased interest rates (March 2011), suspended SMP purchases, 
and introduced differentiated haircuts depending on collateral quality. This last measure 
was particularly detrimental to funding markets, analysts argued, because prudent central 
banking increased the costs of  posting lower-rated sovereign bonds as collateral, reinforcing 
the collateral discrimination prevailing in private repo markets (Mandy 2011).
The ECB eventually recognized the urgency of  addressing the scarcity of  eligible 
collateral (Draghi 2011), particularly considering speculations about an imminent Italian 
bailout after several large Italian banks were downgraded in September 2011. The second 
largest in Europe, the Italian sovereign bond market provided around 10 percent of  
collateral circulating through the European repo market (ICMA 2011). The ECB had two 
policy choices to mitigate collateral scarcity. In the radical scenario—later materialized in 
the OMT commitments—outright bond purchases could underpin a firm commitment 
to stabilize collateral markets. Alternatively, it could revive its 2009 strategy, using bank-
based LTROs as indirect support for collateral markets conditional on banks’ willingness 
to increase holdings of  sovereign debt. Initially, it appeared that the ECB had chosen the 
radical option, resuming SMP purchases at a pace comparable to the Greek bailout moment 
(see Figure 10.3). However, by October 2011, it became clear that the institution was failing 
to reconcile the scale of  required interventions with the opposition to the SMP purchases: 
interest rates on German collateralized repos entered negative territory, indicating the scarcity 
of  German sovereign collateral, while risk aversion reduced the use of  Italian sovereign 
collateral in private repo markets (ICMA 2011). This eventually prompted the ECB to 
resume bank-based measures, reintroducing one-year LTROs in October 2011, and then 
three-year LTROs in December 2011 (see Table 10.1). The immediate effects echoed the 
2009 sovereign-bank loop. Bank demand for three-year LTRO liquidity, similar to the first 
LTRO (June 2009), translated into lower Italian and Spanish spreads to German yields and 
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stabilized repo markets (FT Alphaville 2012). Predictably, however, tensions re-emerged in 
the Spanish sovereign bond market once the Spanish government recognized that it would 
not be able to comply with the initial austerity targets because of  the worsening economic 
outlook. The threat to Spanish and Italian government bond markets, both important 
suppliers of  collateral to European repo markets, eventually prompted the ECB to announce 
that it would do whatever it takes to stabilize government bond yields, through the Outright 
Monetary Transactions program announced in August 2012.
Conclusion
Central banking turns into an overtly politicized, highly contestable policy terrain during 
crisis. The chapter discussed two reasons for this. First, central banks cannot rely on 
well-established theoretical foundations to design crisis interventions. Second, policy 
implementation, a usually obscure subtheme of  central banking, comes to the fore of  
policy discussions, since central banks are compelled to assume a far more prominent 
role in financial markets once the traditional policy instrument, the interest rate, can no 
longer be manipulated to mitigate the adverse consequences of  financial tensions. When 
the communicative task changes from signaling the direction of  interest rate changes, 
central banks rely on bank- vs market-based dichotomies and concerns with political 
consequences of  exit strategies to explain policy decisions.
The chapter argued that the analysis of  central banking during crisis should be 
extended to consider the importance of  banks’ collateral management strategies in the 
context of  delocalized funding strategies. During periods of  stability, financial integration 
enables banks to circumvent the constraints of  domestic monetary policy decisions by 
resorting to cross-border wholesale funding. In the Eurozone, the success of  systematic 
regulatory efforts to integrate wholesale funding markets rendered European sovereign 
bonds as the key source of  marketable collateral for secured funding, and thus contributed, 
perhaps inadvertently, to increased depth, liquidity, and yield convergence in Eurozone 
government debt markets. Before the crisis, banks could raise short-term liquidity in the 
rapidly growing repo markets on identical terms for German, Greek, or Irish collateral.
Since Lehman, however, the reliance of  European banks on short-term secured market 
funding has tested the political limits of  the existing institutional architecture. Initially, it 
appeared that bank-based liquidity measures successfully restored banks’ access to market 
funding, lengthened banks’ funding horizons, and mitigated the negative consequences of  
post-Lehman sovereign collateral discrimination in private repo markets. Yet, the Greek fiscal 
deficit scandal in late 2009, simultaneous with the ECB’s initiation of  exit strategies, exposed 
an unresolved conflict at the heart of  a monetary union with integrated funding markets: exit 
strategies may increase stress in short-term repo markets when tensions prevail in markets 
for collateral, and vice versa, as banks are unable to substitute central bank funding with 
market funding on similar collateral requirements. The trajectory of  the European sovereign 
debt crisis demonstrates that the constraints on the central bank’s ability to stabilize collateral 
markets can have adverse effects for both bank and government funding conditions.
From this perspective, the return to long-term extraordinary liquidity injections in 
December 2011 and then the OMT announcement postponed rather than addressed 
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the crucial institutional question for Europe: how to sustain the strict separation between 
monetary and fiscal policy, if, during crisis, what the ECB must do in order to improve 
funding conditions for market-based banks is to commit to intervene in sovereign bond 
markets. The fiscal-pact approach preserves the status quo by implicitly assuming that 
governments should, and can, assume responsibility for the stability of  sovereign bond 
markets even in the new mode of  key collateral markets. This is equally problematic 
when contrasting the short-term nature of  collateral management strategies with the 
time lags involved in fiscal adjustment typically associated with welfare states.
Notes
 1 The ECB computes the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) as a weighted average of  
all overnight unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market settled daily before 
6 p.m. CET.
 2 Bernanke and Reinhart (2004: 86) argue that where “liquidity or risk characteristics of  securities 
differ, so that investors do not treat all securities as perfect substitutes, then changes in relative 
demands by a large purchaser have the potential to alter relative security prices.”
 3 Such ostensibly limited concern with the inflationary consequences of  monetizing government 
debt appeared to be vindicated by Japan’s experience: the Japanese central bank spent five 
years (2001–2006) and ¥35 trillion to reverse deflationary pressures. In policy practice, this 
allowed several large central banks (the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of  England) to invoke the 
Japanese experience and introduce large-scale asset purchases in the aftermath of  the Lehman 
collapse (Lenza et al. 2010). The early credit-easing measures were accompanied by purchases 
of  sovereign bonds under quantitative easing programs initiated in early 2009 (Joyce et al. 2010).
 4 Banks amount to around 70 percent of  European non-financial companies’ external financing, 
compared with around 20 percent in the market-based system, such as the USA.
 5 High-quality collateral refers to marketable debt instruments “accepted by both policy makers and 
market participants for all activities that require the use of  collateral” (Levels and Capels 2012, 5), 
typically with a credit rating above BBB- for sovereigns and AA- for corporate and covered bonds.
 6 For example, a 0.5 percent haircut implies that for every €1 million worth of  collateral, a bank 
will get €995,000 of  ECB liquidity in return.
 7 Including residential-backed mortgage securities, commercial mortgage-based securities, 
covered bonds, and collateralized debt obligations.
 8 Kamin (2010, 19) put it as follows: “Thus, ironically, the more successful is monetary policy at 
stabilizing inflation, the less effective may monetary policy actions appear to be at influencing 
financial conditions.”
 9 Singh (2011) documents that most legal jurisdictions allow for reuse of  collateral in repo 
transactions. A rough estimate places the velocity of  collateral for the US repo market at 
around 3 percent before the crisis, decreasing with deleveraging. Even so, this would suggest 
that between 40 and 80 percent of  outstanding government debt in the Eurozone was deployed 
in collateral management strategies of  European banks.
10 Despite the 97 instances of  excessive deficits before 2008, 60 of  which would have warranted 
sanctions according to the Stability and Growth Pact (EEAG 2011), bond markets discarded 
the credit risk associated with individual sovereign borrowers.
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Chapter 11
THE BACKSTORY OF THE RISK-FREE  




Collateral has since antiquity been used as a safeguard for contractual obligations, such 
as debt. But how did debt, and in particular government debt, itself  become the most 
common form of  collateral in the financial system? In other words, how did government 
debt become “safe”? The safety of  sovereign debt corresponds to the establishment of  
sovereign creditworthiness: from sovereign bonds being charged a significantly higher 
interest rate than commercial loans in the Middle Ages to circulating “unsecured”—
that is, no longer requiring additional security in the form of  either collateral or a high 
interest rate but trading merely on “full faith and credit.”1 As such, sovereign safety has 
underwritten the rise of  collateral-based finance in the twentieth century and plays a 
crucial role both for financial lubrication and financial stability.
Premised on the government’s power to tax and print money, modern finance theory 
and standard economics have treated the safety of  sovereign debt as an assumption that 
has been fundamental to the main pricing models for stocks and derivatives in the form 
of  the risk-free asset. Economic history at the same time, however, tells us that “there is 
no such thing as a perfectly safe sovereign” even if  the “whole development of  capitalist 
institutions can be seen as a succession of  attempts at addressing the problem of  the 
production of  safe assets” (Flandreau 2013, 24). Safety, as Alberto Giovannini, advisor 
to the European Commission from 1996–2010, notes, “is, of  course, a relative concept, 
being determined by human perceptions” (2013, 3). How can one make sense of  both 
these stories: sovereign safety as an axiom of  modern finance as well as its historical 
contingency, relativism, and dependency on perception?
Much can be learned in this regard from the vantage point of  the “increased 
questioning of  sovereign debt representing a genuine risk-free rate” (BlackRock 2011a) 
that has spread in the wake of  the sovereign debt crisis. The first thing pointed out at 
numerous conferences over the last few years speculating on the consequences of  the 
waning of  the risk-free asset in the form of  sovereign debt is generally that sovereign 
bonds, strictly speaking, were never entirely risk free, not only in the sense of  duration 
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and inflation risks, but also in the sense of  credit risk. But, as Jaime Caruana, general 
manager of  the Bank for International Settlements, put it in January 2013, sovereign risk 
was so low that investors were willing and able to behave “as if  that debt was risk-free” 
(2013, 4). “As if ” can be said to indicate two things: 1) a hypothesis, but also 2) a fiction 
and, more specifically, a “working fiction”—that is, a fiction that is not identified with 
falsehood but treated “as if ” it were real.2
This chapter argues that, in order to understand the axiomatic presence of  sovereign 
safety in modern finance theory against its historical relativism, attention needs to be 
turned to that which the discipline of  history has traditionally sought to distinguish itself  
from: the genre of  fiction. Drawing on influential studies in the field of  “new economic 
criticism,” the chapter traces in particular the role of  fictional realism in making the 
financial fictions of  fiat money and sovereign bonds creditworthy. What is hereby 
illustrated is that economic credibility is anchored in wider cultural determinants, and 
sovereign creditworthiness is crucially related to changing criteria of  credibility of  fiction.
Section II will draw out two contradictory purposes of  economic history, to show that 
sovereign safety is relative as well as to explain how it came about; Section III will offer a 
doubtless partial yet nonetheless significant account of  a different source of  public credit 
in the form of  the forgotten special relationship of  literature and economics. Section IV 
will formulate some conclusions.
II. The Mystery/History of  Sovereign Safety
How does economic history treat the emergence of  the safety of  sovereign debt? Two 
rather different endeavors can be made out. On the one hand, economic historians point 
out that sovereign debt crises and defaults over the centuries abound and since the early 
nineteenth century have tended to occur in waves: from the 1870s, the 1890s Baring crisis, 
to the interwar crisis that represented the largest wave of  sovereign defaults in history, 
the 1980s debt crisis in Mexico, 1990s East Asia crisis and the crises in the 1990s and 
early 2000s in Latin America. The intention thus is to reveal what Kenneth Rogoff  and 
Carmen Reinhart have termed the “this time is different” syndrome as unfounded, based 
primarily on the “failure to recognise the precariousness and fickleness of  confidence” 
(2009, x) and the firmly held assumption that “crises do not happen to us, here and now” 
(15). Similarly Marc Flandreau (2013) points to earlier attempts at calculating sovereign 
risk and classifying sovereigns according to safety at the end of  the nineteenth century 
only to show how easily these calculations were upset by political and historical events. 
Sovereign safety, one might infer from these accounts, is “ahistorical.”
On the other hand, historical sovereign defaults notwithstanding, it is possible to make out 
a different narrative of  a gradual process of  what might be termed sovereign accreditation 
(or, in other words, a process of  amnesia of  a default-laden history). The hallmark of  
sovereign creditworthiness may here be defined as two sides of  the same coin: 1) the 
voluntary repayment by the sovereign and 2) the voluntary investment in sovereign bonds. 
The first is captured by the peculiar legal definition of  sovereign solvency as both “ability 
and willingness to pay” and has puzzled economic theory to some extent: why would a 
self-interested sovereign borrower ever repay if  he cannot be coerced to do so? Rational-
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choice explanations have resorted to reputation as a disciplining factor to ensure future 
lending (e.g. Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz 1986), but these entail the presumption that 
borrowing continues infinitely: if  a terminal year was specified, the borrower would refuse 
to pay but lenders recognizing this would also not lend; by backward induction for all years, 
the thought experiment shows that reputation can only be valuable if  there is uncertainty 
about the terminal year (Kolb 2011, 4), thus implying a normalization of  indebtedness.
But why did reputation not serve as a disciplining factor in the Middle Ages for 
sovereigns to repay their debt? Economic history has more to add on this account in its 
depiction of  the shifting character of  sovereign bonds from forced loans to voluntary 
loans: bonds, long-term debt and secondary markets in government debt were features 
already of  the Italian city-states, but their labeling as “public debts” (cf. Ferguson 2009) 
has been termed a distorting anachronism of  a forced loans system (Kirshner 2006). 
Although the Latin term debitum publicum was widely employed by civilian jurists in 
the late Middle Ages it “did not refer to government debt for the simple reason that 
it meant the opposite: monies owed by the taxpayer to civitates” (2006, 3). These loans 
received interest, which was distinguished from usury and reconciled with canon law as 
“compensation (damnum emergens) for the real or putative costs arising from a compulsory 
investment” (Ferguson 2009, 72). The first market in government debt was created in 
1345 in Florence as a result of  government insolvency: unable to repay its debt, Florence 
consolidated its outstanding obligations into one fund and decreed that credits could 
henceforth be transferred to third parties. That way creditors could redeem their 
investment but it remained a forced contribution in the first place, premised on the moral 
and patriotic duty of  the citizenry to its government. The emergence of  public credit, in 
the sense of  a primary and voluntary market in government bonds based on trust, in the 
return of  principal and payment of  interest is dated to the British post-revolutionary 
government at the end of  the seventeenth century. Two institutional developments were 
critical: 1) the parliamentary guarantee of  government loans following the Glorious 
Revolution of  1688, turning the royal debt into “debts of  the nation” or “national debt”; 
and 2) the foundation of  a central bank with the Bank of  England in 1694. In different 
ways, these two changes instigated understandings of  the “public” that are still with 
us today: as parliamentary space of  public opinion and legislative control and in the 
form of  the public knowledge of  financial markets. The first has been said to incite 
“credible commitment” (North and Weingast 1989) in contrast to medieval royal loans, 
which were made upon security of  estates belonging to the crown and mortgaged to 
the lender and hence, as Doubleday notes, “public in name but private in fact—private 
transactions in which the people were not implicated” (1847, 42). Regarding the second, 
it was paradoxically the newly created and “privately owned Bank of  England (that) 
transformed the sovereign’s personal debt into a public debt and, eventually in turn, into a 
public currency” (Ingham 2004, 128).
Yet one needs to be careful to explain the accreditation of  sovereign debt in terms 
of  the neat threshold of  private and public implied here, as these categories did not 
function in the same way as they are conceived of  now. At the time the much debated 
“public credit” was seen as coterminous with the emerging financial market and more 
generally understood to refer to all new paper instruments or new forms of  “virtual” 
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property (Moore 2004, 87) emerging in the “financial revolution” including stocks and 
shares, promissory notes, and insurance services (Dickson 1967). This was partly because, 
as Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999) elaborate, government debt was “liquidified” 
through the indirect capitalization via the three main joint- stock companies of  the 
Bank of  England, the South Sea Company, and the East India Company:3 these issued 
shares on the stock market and loaned funds to the government so that buying a share 
represented an indirect investment into the national debt (1999, 373).4 The London 
stock market had been highly “illiquid” during the seventeenth century due to high 
transaction costs and the cumbersome transferal of  title5 but by the early eighteenth 
century turned “very active, highly centralised, and extremely liquid” (370) while direct 
forms of  government lending such as annuities and lotteries remained illiquid (373). The 
correspondence of  stock prices of  the South Sea Company with the French Mississippi 
Company marked a structural interdependence that further tied national credit to the 
financial market (Mitchell 2008). Next to this signification of  public credit that confounds 
the modern public/private divide, in particular paper money was seen by contemporaries 
as “national debt by another name” (De Bolla, 1989, 117). It is in the sense, therefore, 
that the “publick Faith” (Mitchell 2008, 125) in all new financial instruments was at stake 
in the development of  sovereign credibility.
Even when considered in terms of  the wider implications of  public credit, sovereign 
credibility was not a sudden discovery of  virtue and linked to a wide array of  political 
and cultural influences: de Goede (2005) for example has described the mastery of  “Lady 
Credit”—the female personification under which public credit was debated in seventeenth 
and eighteenth century Britain—as crucially hinged on the invention of  “financial man”; 
particularly through the new technique of  double-entry bookkeeping, the speculative 
temptations of  “Lady Credit” were disciplined, producing the “public credit” of  the 
gentleman and in turn the public credit of  the nation. Other significant factors were the 
consolidating political competition between the emerging parties of  Whigs and Tories 
(Carruthers 1996), the reform of  tax collection and administration (Brewer 1990), the 
moral legitimization of  the insurance trade (Lobo-Guerrero 2012), as well as the dramatic 
increase of  the credibility of  contract as such during the eighteenth century (Muldrew 
1998), and the pre-existence of  a stable monetary standard and thus homogenous 
monetary space in Britain (Ingham 2004). Over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
the British national debt is said to have transformed from a “poorly coordinated, 
heterogeneous, illiquid and expensive pool of  funds into a modern-style national debt” 
(Quinn 2006, 1) providing the “blueprint of  public credit” and the precedent of  modern 
fiscal credibility. The occurrence of  sovereign defaults notwithstanding, there was a 
marked difference to the earlier, “financial and commercial distractions which prevailed 
when States openly violated their solemn contracts, laughed at their obligations, and 
appeared insensible of  the disgrace of  disregarding their plighted honour” (New York 
Times 1865). Where previous sovereigns resorted to coercion justified by the necessity of  
war to preserve freedom and independence, contemporary debts had come to be seen 
as “by definition inherently lawful and legitimate,” eliminating justification by higher 
norms (cf. Kirshner 2006, 15).6 Since the 1940s, so-called “advanced economies” have 
not defaulted on their debt (Economist 2009)7 and sovereign creditworthiness as a concept 
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developed into a combination of  “risk free” in theory and liquid in practice that enabled 
the investment company BlackRock, in a reassessment of  sovereign bonds in 2012, to 
identify four “traditional” elements characterizing sovereign debt as an asset class: 1) an 
apparently riskless rate of  return upon which all other assets trade at a risk premium; 2) 
a very high degree of  liquidity, whereby government debt assumed high-powered money 
characteristics; 3) its function as a reference point for the valuation of  virtually all other 
asset categories; and 4) its role as a safe-haven asset during times of  market stress.
If  debt as a “conditionality spanning the future” (Lepinay 2007: 95) entails uncertainty, 
the price of  which is paid in the form of  interest, the peculiar phenomenon of  liquid debt 
has come to be instilled with the certainty (and unprofitability) of  the present—as Keynes 
held, interest is not a reward for saving but for parting with liquidity ([1936] 2008, 108). 
Liquidity, as Lepinay notes, is “an index of  a common world” and depends on plausible 
narratives and trust, while periods of  high volatility are described as “moments of  high 
uncertainty about the definition of  individuals and goods, moments in which stable 
ontologies crumble” (2007, 99). The next section will turn attention to those cultural 
determinants that contributed to imbue financial instruments with plausible narratives 
and trust.
III. Fiction and Public Credit
This chapter argues that a neglected but fundamental dimension to the underwriting 
process of  sovereign credit hinges on concurrent transformations in the genre of  fiction. 
Particularly fruitful work on the historical connections between financial and literary 
fictions has been undertaken in the field of  the “new economic criticism” (NEC), an 
Anglo-Saxon movement in literature studies beginning in the 1990s influenced by Marc 
Shell (1978, 1982), Jean-Joseph Goux (1973, 1994) and Kurt Heinzelman (1980) that set 
out both to “unveil the buried metaphors and fictions” of  the discipline of  economics as 
well as investigate the economic—for example, exchanges of  tropes and metaphors—
as the ordering principle of  literary works (Woodmansee and Osteen 1999, 3–4). As 
Nicky Marsh states, “The paradox of  credit, its transmutation of  the insubstantial into 
the substantial, has been a productive one for literary critics as it suggests an obvious 
parallel with the action of  literature itself ” (2010, 1). Thus financial instruments like 
fiduciary money and stocks are understood as forms of  writing, and subject to “credit” 
in the sense of  conferred belief  in the same way as literary fiction (Shell 1999, 53). Both 
drew a substantial attribution of  credit from the new technology of  print. As Mary 
Poovey’s (2008) work has shown, economic and literary fictions not only share common 
features and principles but they were not explicitly or consistently distinguished until 
the mid-eighteenth century. Financial instruments and “economic” and “imaginative” 
writing presented a “continuum” in which objective data and imaginative or rhetorical 
representations were not differentiated. Thus, “A shipping list was identical in format 
to the lists that appeared in poetic blazons or satiric catalogues, for example, and the 
promissory note used to acknowledge a debt contained phrases that also appeared in 
fictional texts” (2008, 2). Early writings on credit mixed “satire, analogy, allegory, polemics, 
history, pseudologic, irony, panegyric, parody and news reporting” (Backscheider 1981), 
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and early political economic texts shared many features with the literary form of  the 
novel (Poovey 2008, 92). According to Poovey, it was the gradual differentiation of  these 
two genres of  writing based on stabilizing a distinction between fact and fiction that 
effected the naturalization of  credit instruments—that is, a state where their feature as 
forms of  writing has “passed beneath the horizon of  cultural visibility” (2008, 4) and the 
historical linkage between the genres of  economic and imaginative writing was erased. 
Neither economic nor imaginative writing lost their visibility as writing in the same way 
as financial instruments: yet the authority of  economic writing came to be based in 
characterizing itself  as writing that was transparent, describing economic and financial 
matters, while imaginative writing sought evaluation in terms of  internal criteria and 
disclaimed any reference to the real world. The thus propelled fact/fiction distinction 
was modeled on, and always bore close reference to, a similar distinction between valid 
and invalid monetary tokens (2008, 80)—a relationship still evident today when financial 
claims are revealed as fraudulent.
It is not merely the differentiation of  economic and imaginary writing and credit 
instruments, however, that fostered public credit, but particularly the special relationship 
that continued between these as they evolved. Thus a critical role in the underwriting 
of  public credit is accorded by a number of  authors to changes brought about by 
the realist novel (Brantlinger 1996; Vernon 1984; Thompson 1996; Poovey 2008). As 
political economy—the “adjacent legislating discourse” of  public credit—dropped its 
early theories of  the intrinsic value of  coins in favor of  nominalist views of  the value 
of  paper money over the eighteenth century, the concept of  intrinsic value “migrated 
generically from political economy to the novel, which asserts and regrounds intrinsic 
value” (Brantlinger 1996, 156). The sincerity of  the novel warrants the secure investment 
of  the reader, who can “give as full credit to the narrative as to ‘the funds’ because it will 
contain nothing extravagantly romantic, sensational, or improbable” (1996, 156). The 
crediting effect of  fictional realism functioned precisely not because it claimed to imitate 
reality but because it created a second world like reality with plots and characters marked 
by probability in the sense of  verisimilitude (Poovey 2008). Rather than real referentiality, 
the novel performed a fictive referentiality and thus “helped readers practice trust, 
tolerate deferral, evaluate character, and in a general sense, believe in things that were 
immaterial” (2008, 89). This implied a major transformation of  the criteria of  credibility 
of  fiction: where the classical plausibility of  fiction was premised on its moral content, 
and truth or lie decided on its (im)morality, the novel grounded plausibility in the internal 
criteria of  text such as unity and consistency of  character, “enabling us to conjecture what 
a Person of  the Drama will do in the future, from what already he has done in the past” 
(James Harris, quoted in Poovey 2008, 116). This development of  character, from outside 
features based on the legibility of  physical marks to characteristics of  inner depth, was 
a central feature of  the novel, providing a “means by which cultural coherence was 
produced” and the ground for the inexhaustible re-readability of  literary works since the 
nineteenth century (Lynch 1998, 17). While earlier pastoral fiction had defended itself  
against the latent accusation of  lying by depicting clearly fantastical and unreal events, 
making its fictional status transparent, the modern novel—though equally self-conscious 
of  its fictive character—grounds its plausibility in a structured coherence that surpasses 
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that of  reality: it represents the conditions (not observable in the real world) under which 
something appears realistic: as Esposito states, “To be realistic, the novel cannot be 
real” (2007, 17). By thus reforming the criteria of  credibility, the novel contributed to 
the “increasing acceptance of  increasingly realistic fictional realities” (2007, 13), or in 
Vernon’s words, as “money was becoming more fictional, fiction was becoming […] more 
realistic” (1984, 18). The era of  the “final generalisation—and general acceptance—of  
credit as a basic, unavoidable aspect of  modern money and modern economic processes” 
(Brantlinger 1996, 139) that comes with the rise of  realism further entails a peculiar 
disconnection of  public and private credit. Social critical discourse begins to portray the 
negative effects of  a society defined by monetary relations in “private” terms, while the 
governmental institutions responsible for producing the paper currency and creating and 
managing the national debt come to be seen as “virtuously constructive” (1996, 157): in 
the Victorian realist novel the focus changes from government bankruptcy to the private 
insolvency of  “spendthrift, shiftless individuals” and to country banks as opposed to the 
central bank. Allusions to the national debt are rare, and if  made, refer to the “security” 
of  the money the characters have invested in “the funds” (1996, 155). Later eras of  
modern and postmodern cultural criticism are similarly directed at the commodity 
fetishism and consumer society associated with the Second Industrial Revolution, and 
since the nineteenth century public credit has not been perceived as a visible target. 
That is, while the novel seems to have played an instrumental part in providing the 
credit economy with plausible narratives and models for “character,” it underwrote the 
credibility of  government debt as much by letting its fragility “disappear.”8
Brantlinger points to the irony that despite the novel’s powerful structural role 
in eliciting public credit it generally sought to undermine the sociopolitical as much 
as the literary status quo, and its “intrinsically novelistic” character was directed 
against the state–founding theme of  the epic; yet this did not prevent its inclusion in 
the canons of  “national literature” (1996, 155). Public credit seems not only to have 
been paradoxically promoted through discourses intended as critique and attempts 
of  “unmasking,” but its hallmarks also to have been born from crisis: the first market 
in government debt in medieval Florence, the creation of  the Bank of  England, and 
the first paper money era in 1797 were all born out of  insolvency. The normalizing 
role of  crisis, which should be seen to instigate a new norm rather than re-establish 
a predefined norm, can also be seen at work in the aftermath of  the sovereign debt 
crisis of  2010–2012: until then sovereign creditworthiness was defined in terms of  size 
and liquidity, as represented by the closest proxy to the safe asset in the form of  the 
US Treasury. This particular view also informed a practice of  bond indexing based 
on issuance weighting, or market capitalization, that weighed bond portfolio shares 
according to the countries who issued the most debt. Index funds based on issuance 
weights trace their origins to the capital asset pricing model, introduced by Sharpe 
in 1964, that suggests that the market portfolio—the capitalization-weighted portfolio 
of  all assets—should have the highest return per unit of  risk (Goldsticker and Lowell 
2012, 4). This definition is increasingly being challenged, and bond indexes based on 
capitalization, liquidity, and demand are now accused to overweight large issuers of  
liabilities and thus to “reward failure […] and penalize success” (BlackRock 2011c, 16). 
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BlackRock in particular has promoted new criteria for sovereign creditworthiness 
in launching its own sovereign risk index as a deliberate move away from issuance 
weighting: the most creditworthy countries are here not the most liquid but the most 
isolated from external shock, such as Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.9 As this last 
point demonstrates it is not contemporary fiction that is seen to exert the most palpable 
influence on sovereign creditworthiness and as much as the realist novel has coined a 
“semantic of  the modern” (Esposito 2007, 12), the present interlinkages of  economic 
theory, monetary policy, fiction, and financial instruments remain to be defined further.
IV. Conclusion
There is an obvious discrepancy between the assumption of  sovereign safety in 
economic and financial theory on the one hand and economic history that tends to 
question the “givenness” of  sovereign safety on the other. Yet both need to be explained. 
Rather than denouncing economic theory for its “unrealistic” abstractions such as the 
efficient market, homo oeconomicus, and the risk-free asset, the aim of  this chapter was to 
better understand the phenomenon of  “working fictions” of  the economy. Recourse to 
modern finance theory/standard economics or economic history alone is not capable of  
supplying an answer, and misses a critical dimension of  the accreditation of  sovereign 
debt that took place in the wider cultural context. The “securitization” of  sovereign 
debt (Quinn 2006) occurred not only in the broader domain connoted by the historical 
term “public credit” and thus requires a careful treatment of  the modern terminology 
of  public/private. Public credit as such was mediated, negotiated, and supported by 
a differentiation of  a continuum of  “writing,” broadly speaking, into the economic 
and imaginary genres that we are familiar with, as well as the “invisibility” of  credit 
instruments as writings that their taking at face value implies. Here the genre of  fictional 
realism is argued to have developed critical features to support plausible narratives of  
public credit in the form of  a new conception of  probability, the evolution of  character 
and self-referentiality that redefined the criteria of  credibility of  both financial and 
literary fictions. As a result, as Heinzelman put it, “fictions work even when they are 
recognised as fictions” (1980, 101). This is not to say that crucial economic debates such 
as the bullionist controversy in the nineteenth century have not influenced perceptions 
of  sovereign credit, or that the developments presented here were the only determining 
factor in the perception of  sovereign safety. Yet the forgotten linkage of  financial and 
imaginary fictions suggests that it is in the wider history of  the public/private and fact/
fiction distinctions as well as in their co-evolution that one should seek to place a history 
of  sovereign safety.
Notes
1 In the fifteenth century, Italian banks charged Charles VIII of  France an interest rate of  100 
percent on war loans while charging Italian merchants 5–10 percent, and the Bank of  England’s 
first loan to government carried double the interest of  that at which it discounted trade bills 
(Haldane 2009b, 1).
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2 See Vaihinger, The Philosophy of  “as if ”: A System of  the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of  
Mankind (1911) for a seminal analysis of  the productive, heuristic function of  fiction in the sciences.
3 Of  the three, two were explicitly created to fund the public debt: the Bank of  England in 1694 
and the South Sea Company in 1711, while the East India Company, incorporated since 1600, 
loaned funds to the government from 1709.
4 Joint-stock companies in themselves somewhat defy the modern public/private distinction as 
they were central colonizing forces equipped with their own armies and authorized to extend 
and defend their trade routes (de Goede 2010).
5 The most active trader in Royal Africa Company stock (John Bull) traded 13 times from 1672 to 
1679 (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999, 370).
6 The moral connotation nonetheless endures: for a modern recurrence of  a patriotic rationale 
for investing in government bonds see Aitken’s (2006) analysis of  US savings and defense bonds 
in the name of  national security during the Cold War.
7 With the exception of  Greece’s default on March 9, 2012, which triggered sovereign CDS 
payments.
8 Other underwriting factors were of  course the establishment of  a national reserve system and 
the status of  the pound/dollar as global reserve currencies: yet even here liquidity relies on the 
fiction that all promises-to-pay in circulation could be converted simultaneously—the realization 
of  that illusory guarantee is the classic motivation for the bank run.
9 The overall methodology is more complex but the result is a new sovereign risk global order 
where the traditional safe haven countries figure in the medium range of  the index and emerging 
economies such as Singapore, Chile, and Taiwan feature in the top ten.
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Part 4
WHERE NEXT FOR CENTRAL BANKING?

Chapter 12
CENTRAL BANKING POST-CRISIS: WHAT  
COMPASS FOR UNCHARTED WATERS?
Claudio Borio
Introduction1
Central banking will never be quite the same again after the global financial crisis. The 
crisis will no doubt prove to be one of  those rare defining moments in the history of  this 
institution—an institution that, from its faltering first steps in the seventeenth century, has 
grown to become widely regarded as indispensable.
At first glance, central banks have emerged as the great winners among policy 
institutions. They have been rightly hailed as saviors of  the global financial system: their 
swift and internationally coordinated action, through liquidity support and interest rate 
cuts, prevented the system’s implosion. And they have gained much broader powers: no 
one questions any longer their crucial role in financial stability, which is being hardwired 
into legislation, while some are regaining the regulatory and supervisory functions lost in 
previous decades.
And yet, beneath this glittering surface, the picture is less reassuring. The crisis has 
shaken the foundations of  the deceptively comfortable central banking world. Pre-crisis, 
the quintessential task of  central banks was seen as quite straightforward: keep inflation 
within a tight range through control of  a short-term interest rate, and everything 
else will take care of  itself. Everything was simple, tidy, and cozy. Post-crisis, many 
certainties have gone. Price stability has proven no guarantee against major financial 
and macroeconomic instability. Central banks have found themselves reaching well 
beyond interest rate policy, aggressively deploying their balance sheet in a variety of  
“unconventional” monetary policies. As a result, the line between monetary and fiscal 
policy has become blurred precisely at a time when public sector debts are ballooning 
and sovereign risk is rising again. And many increasingly question the very ability of  
central banks to maintain inflation within acceptable ranges, notably to avoid deflation. 
Nor is the boom underway in the price of  gold precisely a vote of  confidence in the 
international monetary system.
The years ahead will be a period of  experimentation in central banking (Goodhart 
2010). Central banks face a threefold challenge: economic, intellectual, and 
institutional. First, they will operate in a hostile economic environment. The Great 
Moderation has ushered in the Great Recession. Mature economies will carry the 
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long-lasting scars of  the crisis, while emerging economies may well continue to boom 
and face problems not dissimilar to those that heralded the crisis elsewhere. Second, 
central banks will take decisions in full knowledge that their benchmark macroeconomic 
paradigms have failed them. These paradigms, and the macroeconomic models that 
underpin them, provided no guidance to anticipate, ward off, or fight the crisis. The 
crisis has exposed a chasm between the theory and practice of  policy. Third, central 
banks will have to adjust their policy frameworks while preserving their reputation 
and independence in an environment in which that independence is likely to come 
under increasing threat. As central banks cope with the legacy of  the crisis and take 
on broader tasks, governance arrangements will face considerable strains. And the 
threat of  rising public debts and sovereign risk will loom large, raising the specter of  
fiscal dominance. In other words, they will need a new compass with which to sail in 
largely uncharted waters.
What follows explores these challenges in search of  a compass. It argues that the 
compass should have three characteristics. First, the tight interdependence between 
monetary and financial stability will need to be much more fully recognized and policy 
frameworks adjusted accordingly. This, in turn, will require bolder steps to develop 
analytical frameworks in which monetary factors play a core role, not a peripheral one 
as hitherto—an intellectual rediscovery of  the roots of  monetary economics. Second, 
there should be a keener awareness of  the global, as opposed to purely domestic, 
dimensions of  those tasks. The common view that keeping one’s house in order is 
sufficient for global stability should be reconsidered (Padoa-Schioppa 2008). This calls 
for an intellectual shift that is analogous to the one that has already occurred in financial 
regulation and supervision, from a microprudential to a macroprudential perspective. 
Finally, the autonomy of  central banks will need to be protected and strengthened. 
An overarching challenge will be to manage expectations, recognizing the limitations 
of  policy as a tool to manage the economy. Central banks were never as powerful as 
generally believed. To pretend otherwise risks undermining their credibility and public 
support.
Section I discusses the evolution of  the intellectual backdrop, comparing the pre-crisis 
prevailing consensus with the post-crisis more heterogeneous picture. Section II puts 
forward a number of  working hypotheses to guide the search for a new compass. Section 
III draws their implications for the adjustments to policy frameworks, and explores the 
remaining challenges and open questions.
I. The Evolving Intellectual Backdrop
Historically, albeit with important differences over time and across countries, monetary 
and financial stability have been core central bank objectives (De Kock 1974). At the cost 
of  some oversimplification, the prevailing pre-crisis consensus had gravitated toward a 
“narrow” view of  central banking, heavily focused on price stability and supported by a 
belief  in the self-equilibrating properties of  the economy. Post-crisis, a shift back toward 
a broader view, more in line with the historical origins of  the institution, has been gaining 
ground.
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Pre-crisis
In intentionally highly stylized terms, glossing over differences across central banks in 
order better to highlight the nature of  the shift underway, the prevailing pre-crisis view 
of  central banking can be summarized in four propositions.2
Price stability is sufficient for macroeconomic stability. If  central banks succeed in stabilizing 
inflation in the short term (say, over a two-year horizon), and absent major exogenous 
“shocks,” such as from fiscal policy, the economy will broadly take care of  itself. This is 
the strong version of  the view that price stability is the best contribution monetary policy 
can make to macroeconomic stability. It is the belief  that underpinned inflation targeting 
and that drew strength from the “Great Moderation”—the long period of  low output 
volatility and low and stable inflation that most industrial countries enjoyed before the 
crisis. Analytically, this strong version found comfort in the canonical macroeconomic 
models of  the day, in which the only departure from a fully equilibrating and well-functioning 
economy took the form of  price rigidities (Woodford 2003; Walsh 2010).3
Almost as a corollary, there is a neat separation between monetary and financial-stability 
functions. True, as ultimate providers of  liquidity, central banks have always been seen 
as indispensable in crisis management—the lender-of-last-resort role that Bagehot 
popularized. But the previous view permitted the decoupling of  the two functions in 
crisis prevention: monetary policy would take care of  price stability while regulation and 
supervision would take care of  financial stability. Moreover, regulation and supervision 
did not need to be a central bank task. After all, the prevailing “microprudential” 
orientation of  regulation and supervision—mainly focused on the soundness of  individual 
institutions—was regarded as sufficient to ensure the stability of  the system as a whole 
(e.g. Borio 2010). This did not call for a close understanding of  the nexus between the 
financial system and the macroeconomy or of  market dynamics—areas in which central 
banks had a natural comparative advantage. Analytically, it was essentially a partial 
equilibrium approach.
A short-term interest rate is sufficient to capture the impact of  monetary policy on the economy. 
Specifically, policy was seen as operating exclusively through the control of  a short-term 
(often overnight) interest rate that, together with expectations about its future path, fully 
determined the term structure of  interest rates (e.g. Svensson 2003). Supporting the 
practical relevance of  this view, it was believed that the probability that central banks 
would have to drive policy rates to zero in nominal terms was remote (Orphanides and 
Wieland 1998): the Japanese experience was dismissed as an aberration and as the result 
of  policy mismanagement (Ahearne et al. 2002). Analytically, this view was based on the 
assumption that, as a first approximation, government securities at different maturities 
are perfect substitutes. If  so, changes in their relative supply would have little effect on 
yields.
If  each central bank looks after its own economy, the global monetary stance will also be appropriate. 
This specific version of  the “keep your house in order” doctrine is, in effect, analogous to 
the reasoning behind the microprudential approach to financial stability: make sure that 
each institution on a standalone basis (read “country”) is sound and the whole financial 
system (read “world”) will be sound. All central banks had to do was to ensure price 
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stability in their own economy and let the exchange rate float (e.g. Rose 2007). A possible 
exception involved very small and highly open economies, which could achieve the same 
result by pegging to the currency of  a credible low-inflation, larger economy. Analytically, 
in its strongest form, the proposition drew strength from models that assume that goods 
produced in different countries, and assets denominated in different currencies are 
perfect substitutes while market participants do not make systematic expectational errors 
(the “law of  one price” and “uncovered interest parity,” respectively).
Post-crisis
The post-crisis intellectual backdrop is more heterogeneous and in flux. It may be 
summarized by three areas of  agreement and two of  disagreement.
It is now generally agreed that low and stable inflation does not guarantee financial and 
macroeconomic stability. After all, the seeds of  the global financial crisis were sown during 
the Great Moderation. Hardly anyone disputes that the crisis is best seen as the bust of  a 
major financial cycle whose upswing lasted at least a whole decade. In the economies at 
the origin of  the turmoil, the upswing saw a major expansion in credit and asset prices, 
especially those of  real estate. Leverage grew in both overt and hidden forms on the back 
of  aggressive risk taking. Balance sheets became overstretched. The boom did not just 
precede but caused the subsequent bust, as the financial imbalances unwound.
It is also agreed that “cleaning” the debris through monetary policy is costly and that 
interest rate policy is not enough. Contrary to what was commonly believed, aggressive 
reductions in interest rates have not been sufficient to avert the enormous costs of  the 
crisis and to reignite a solid recovery. And central banks have scrambled to deploy their 
balance sheets to influence longer-term interest rates and broader financial conditions, 
such as credit terms and credit spreads (so-called unconventional monetary policies or, 
more precisely, “balance sheet” policies; Borio and Disyatat 2010). Hence, the large-scale 
purchases of  government and private sector assets, such as mortgage-backed securities, 
or the unprecedented extension of  large-scale, long-term liquidity support to the banking 
sector.
Finally, there is a consensus that the regulation and supervision of  financial institutions need to go 
beyond a microprudential perspective and adopt a macroprudential orientation, with central banks playing 
a key role (e.g. G20 2009; CGFS 2010; Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Borio 2010). This means 
that regulation and supervision should focus squarely on the financial system as a whole, 
not on individual institutions. And they should take fully into account the potentially 
amplifying feedback between the financial system and the macroeconomy that lies at 
the heart of  financial instability (“procyclicality”). By virtue of  their specific know-how, 
central banks are naturally seen as key players in macroprudential frameworks. Major 
efforts are underway nationally and internationally to put such frameworks in place.
This, however, is where the consensus stops. The areas of  disagreement are equally 
important.
There is no agreement on whether or how far monetary policy regimes should be adjusted to 
lean against the buildup of  financial imbalances. One view is that monetary policy regimes 
should continue to focus on price stability, much as they did before the crisis. To be sure, 
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macroeconomic models should be augmented to better capture the interplay between 
financial factors and the real economy. But financial stability is best ensured through the 
newly established macroprudential frameworks (e.g. Bean 2009; Bernanke 2009). To do 
otherwise would risk overburdening monetary policy and compromising its credibility. 
An alternative view, which is gaining ground, is that implementing a macroprudential 
framework can help, but that it is not sufficient. The role of  monetary policy is simply 
too important (e.g. Trichet 2009; Shirakawa 2010; Bloxham et al. 2010; Issing 2011).4
Nor is there agreement on the proper role of  monetary policy, be it interest rate or balance sheet 
policy, in the aftermath of  a financial crisis. One view is that policy should be as accommodative 
as possible, driving policy rates to zero, and committing to keep them there for as long 
as it takes while deploying the central bank’s balance sheet aggressively. Another view 
highlights the collateral damage of  such an accommodative stance if  kept beyond the 
crisis management phase (e.g. BIS 2010; Hannoun 2010; Borio and Disyatat 2010). After 
all, if  the origin of  the problem was too much debt, how can a policy that encourages the 
private and public sectors to accumulate more debt be part of  the solution (see below)?
II. A Way Forward? Working Hypotheses
The areas of  disagreement reflect genuine difficulties in adjudicating between competing 
hypotheses. The debate has just started. To choose a compass for the way forward, 
however, it is necessary to take a stand, based on a specific reading of  the available 
evidence, limited as this may be. What follows, therefore, highlights three observations 
best regarded as working hypotheses.
First, monetary policy contributed significantly to the financial crisis. It stands to reason that 
if  monetary policy responds only to near-term inflation pressures, and these remain 
subdued or even decline during an unsustainable financial boom, then policy will pose 
no resistance, and could even encourage the buildup of  imbalances (e.g. Borio and White 
2003; Borio 2009).5 After all, monetary policy sets the universal price of  leverage in a 
given currency area.
There is considerable, albeit by no means undisputed, evidence supporting this view. 
The years that preceded the crisis saw unusually and persistently low policy rates, even 
negative in real terms—the lowest since the 1970s. For the USA, for instance, according 
to some estimates, these rates were also lower than the typical reaction function consistent 
with maintaining stable inflation (e.g. Taylor 2008)6—let alone, therefore, with leaning 
against the buildup of  imbalances (Borio and Lowe 2004). In addition, there is growing 
empirical evidence that low interest rates may encourage risk taking—the so-called risk-
taking channel of  monetary policy.7 The effect is strongest when rates are unusually low 
by historical standards for long periods or agents anticipate that monetary policy will 
be eased to counteract the unwinding of  the imbalances, providing a form of  (fuzzy) 
insurance.
Second, an aggressive and prolonged easing of  monetary policy, through interest rate and balance-sheet 
measures, to respond to the bust of  a major financial boom has serious limitations. These limitations 
reflect the nature of  the economic contraction and its impact on the transmission 
mechanism of  policy.
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Not all recessions are born equal. The typical recession during the first decades 
following World War II in advanced economies was triggered by a monetary tightening 
to fight inflation or balance-of-payments crises. The upswing was relatively short and, 
with financial systems heavily regulated, the recession did not trigger a major financial 
crisis or involve large debt and capital overhangs. Even when debt burdens were large 
and financial strains emerged, higher inflation and rising nominal asset values reduced 
them over time.
The current recession is quite different. The preceding boom was much more 
prolonged, the subsequent debt and asset price overhang much larger, the financial sector 
much more seriously affected, and inflation much lower before and after. The Japanese 
experience of  the early 1990s is the closest parallel. There is considerable cross-country 
evidence that banking crises tend to be preceded by unusually strong credit and asset price 
booms (see below), that those crises go hand in hand with permanent output losses (BCBS 
2010),8 and that subsequent recoveries tend to be slow and protracted (e.g. Reinhart and 
Rogoff  2009; Reinhart and Reinhart 2010). In all probability this reflects a mixture of  
an overestimation of  potential output and growth during the boom, the corresponding 
misallocation of  resources, notably capital, the headwinds of  the subsequent debt and real 
capital stock overhangs, and disruptions to financial intermediation. Fiscal expansions in 
the wake of  the crises can add to these problems by piling government debt on top of  
private debt and sometimes threatening a sovereign crisis.9
All this reduces the effectiveness of  monetary policy in dealing with the bust and 
exacerbates its unwelcome side effects. These become apparent once the easing is 
taken too far after averting the implosion of  the financial system. The economy needs 
balance sheet repair, but very low interest rates together with ample central bank funding 
and asset purchases delay the recognition of  losses and the repayment of  debt.10 Too 
much capital has been accumulated in the wrong sectors, but the easing tends to favor 
investment in the very long-lived assets in excess supply (e.g. construction). The bloated 
financial sector needs to shrink, but the easing numbs the incentives to do so and may 
even encourage punting. The financial sector needs to generate healthy earnings, but as 
short-term interest rates approach zero and the yield curve flattens, they compress banks’ 
interest margins11 unless banks take on more interest rate and, possibly, sovereign risk; 
and as long-term rates decline, they can generate strains in the insurance and pension 
fund sectors. Thus, as the easing continues, it raises the risk of  perpetuating the very 
conditions that make eventual exit harder. A vicious circle can develop.
Put differently, when dealing with major financial busts, monetary policy addresses 
the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of  the slow recovery. It alleviates the 
pain, but masks the illness. It gains time, but makes it easier for policymakers to waste it.
This analysis suggests that, when considering the boom and bust phases together, 
financial cycles may be giving rise to a new form of  time inconsistency (e.g. Borio and 
White 2003). We are all familiar with time inconsistency in the context of  inflation. In this 
case, taking wages and prices as given, policymakers may be tempted to produce inflation 
in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to raise output and employment, as prices and wages 
catch up (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Over time, inflation trends higher without lasting 
gains in output or employment. In the case of  financial cycles, the end result can be 
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a downward trend in policy rates across cycles and increasing resort to balance sheet 
policies without any gains in terms of  financial and macroeconomic stability. Moreover, 
this form of  time inconsistency is even more insidious. During the boom phase, the lag 
between the buildup of  risks and the materialization of  financial distress is considerably 
longer than that between excess demand and inflation (e.g. Borio 2010). And while there 
are constituencies against inflation, none exists against the inebriating feeling of  getting 
richer. During the bust, failure to repair balance sheets can leave central banks with little 
choice but to seek to gain time. In both cases, the costs are incurred immediately and are 
quite visible; the benefits accrue much later and may even be hard to establish ex post.
All this raises serious political economy challenges for central banks. One institutional 
answer to the problem of  time inconsistency is to ensure that central banks are sufficiently 
insulated from the political cycle. This is a key, though not the only, justification for central 
bank operational independence. Unfortunately, financial busts and an aggressive and 
prolonged monetary response to them can undermine such independence. If  governments 
allow public debt to grow beyond sustainable levels, pressures to compromise the central 
bank’s independence will grow at some point in order to avoid default. If  central banks 
engage in extensive balance-sheet policy, that independence will come under threat even 
earlier. Purchases of  private sector claims open central banks to the criticism of  favoring 
some sectors at the expense of  others, and those of  public sector claims to that of  having 
become subservient to the government. Either way, balance sheet policy can put central 
banks’ budgetary independence and reputation at risk as they take on financial risks. And 
while assets may not be perfect substitutes, their substitutability is quite high. As a result, 
operations have to be very big, or expected to be big, in order to have significant and 
long-lasting effects on risk premia and relative yields. This heightens the vulnerability to 
financial risks and political economy pressures (Borio and Disyatat 2010; Stella 2010).
The specific drawbacks of  balance sheet policy reflect a simple fact. The central bank 
has a monopoly over interest rate policy, not over balance sheet policy. Almost any balance 
sheet policy can or could be replicated by the government; conversely, any balance sheet 
policy the central bank implements has an impact on the consolidated government sector 
balance sheet. Balance sheet policy needs to be viewed as part of  this larger balance 
sheet. For example, the central bank may purchase long-term bonds, but its efforts 
could be frustrated if  government debt managers lengthen maturity in order to lock in 
unusually low yields (e.g. McCauley and Ueda 2009). In this context, the very meaning of  
operational independence becomes somewhat unclear. The line between monetary and 
fiscal policy becomes blurred.
Third, to keep one’s house in order is not enough.12 This follows from two considerations.
For one, flexible exchange rates provide only limited insulation from policies pursued 
in large economies. For many economies, especially small, highly open ones with large 
manufacturing bases, the exchange rate is too important a price to be allowed to fluctuate 
freely—hence the so-called fear of  floating (Calvo and Reinhart 2002).13 And the 
exchange rate is subject to those very forces that can lead to domestic financial instability: 
destabilizing cross-currency flows are the mirror image of  the destabilizing financial 
imbalances that build up and unwind within individual currency areas (e.g. Borio and 
Disyatat 2011). The outcome is currency overshooting.
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In addition, and more generally, there is a sense in which the whole is more than the 
sum of  its parts. In a highly globalized world, in which markets for goods and services, for 
factors of  production, and for financial instruments are tightly integrated, purely country-
centric approaches to understanding the workings of  the economy and formulating 
policies are bound to be inadequate. A more globe-centric approach is called for. 
Quite apart from being influenced by the interlinkages between countries and currency 
areas, aggregate outcomes will be different depending on whether several countries are 
experiencing similar conditions or not. In other words, correlations of  conditions across 
countries, or exposures to common, “global” factors matter a lot.14 And those global 
factors, while appearing as independent of  each country’s actions (“exogenous”), are 
inevitably influenced by their collective behavior (“endogenous”).
This has significant policy implications. Prospects for output strength or weakness, 
inflation or disinflation,15 financial stability or instability cannot be evaluated purely 
as the bottom-up sum of  each country’s conditions assessed on a standalone basis; 
this, by construction, underplays the role of  common factors and interlinkages. A more 
top-down approach is needed. And the risk of  fallacies of  composition should not 
be underestimated: actions that may appear reasonable from an individual country’s 
perspective need not result in desirable aggregate outcomes. Analytically, this calls for a 
shift equivalent to that which has already occurred in regulation and supervision, from a 
micro- to a macroprudential perspective: individual countries cannot be “safe” unless the 
global economy is safe and their safety can only be assessed in a global context.
One way of  illustrating this point is by reference to inflation. It is quite common 
for countries to treat commodity price increases as “imported,” and hence exogenous, 
sometimes even formally excluding them from the price index used as a guide for 
monetary policy (e.g. a measure of  “core inflation”). This is reasonable from a partial 
equilibrium perspective. But the commodity price increase itself  may also be the result 
of  the aggregate monetary policy stance for the world, in which all countries participate. 
And being determined in auction markets, commodity prices are more flexible than 
prices of  goods and services. They are thus more likely to be the first to adjust, acting 
as a signal of  aggregate demand pressures, and hence of  limited economic slack for the 
world economy—a possible harbinger of  further inflationary pressures down the road. 
This is the experience of  the early 1970s (OECD 1977) and may also help to read what 
is happening at the time of  writing (early 2011).16
As a second illustration, consider the run-up to the recent crisis and its aftermath, 
which highlights the role of  exchange rates in particular (e.g. Borio and Disyatat 2011). 
Unusually, low policy rates in the core industrial countries in the years preceding the 
crisis were transmitted to the rest of  the world through resistance to exchange rate 
appreciation, either in the form of  foreign exchange intervention or a reluctance to increase 
policy rates. This either put further downward pressure on long-term rates in industrial 
economies, via reinvestment of  the intervention proceeds, or loosened conditions in those 
economies that kept policy rates low. The end result was to reinforce and generalize the 
unusually accommodative global monetary policy stance at a time of  record global growth 
(Figure 12.1). This arguably amplified the global credit and asset price boom, magnifying 
and extending the damage of  the subsequent bust. And post-crisis, the extraordinarily loose 
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policy stance in mature economies is again inducing potentially destabilizing cross-currency 
and capital inflows into booming emerging markets, while the gap between world growth 
and interest rates has widened again (Figure 12.1). In other words, ceteris paribus, and as a first 
approximation, exchange rate changes per se simply redistribute global demand; but they can 
have a first-order effect on it through the monetary (or fiscal) policy response that they induce.
Figure 12.1. Very accommodative global monetary conditions







































Sources: IMF; OECD; Bloomberg; national data; BIS calculations and estimates.
(a) G20 countries; weighted averages based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates.
(b) Real policy rate minus natural rate. The real rate is the nominal rate adjusted for four-quarter 
consumer price inflation. The natural rate is defined as the average real rate 1985–2005 (for 
Japan, 1985–95; for Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and 
South Africa, 2000–2005; for Argentina and Turkey, 2003–2005) plus the four-quarter growth in 
potential output less its long-term average.
(c) In percent.
(d) From 1998; simple average of  Australia, France, the UK, and the USA; otherwise only Australia and 
the UK.
(e) Trend world real GDP growth as estimated by the IMF in WEO 2009 April.
(f) Relative to nominal GDP; 1995 = 100.
III. A Way Forward? Implications for Central Banking
The previous analysis helps identify the broad contours of  a new compass to guide central 
banks in the years ahead. At the same time, it leaves open some troubling questions.
Proposed adjustments to policy regimes
First, edging closer to lasting monetary and financial stability requires adjustments to 
current policy frameworks to constrain the buildup of  financial imbalances even in 
the context of  low and stable inflation. Part of  the answer is establishing fully fledged 
macroprudential frameworks, with central banks playing a leading role.17 But beyond this, 
it is necessary to adopt monetary policy strategies that allow central banks to tighten so 
as to lean against the buildup of  financial imbalances even if  near-term inflation remains 
subdued (e.g. BIS 2010; and Caruana 2010).18 Neither of  the two policies, on its own, 
is up to the task. In particular, expectations about what a macroprudential framework 
can achieve on its own are unrealistically high (Borio 2010). As a result, a “narrow” 
conception of  central banking and monetary policy is not a valid blueprint for the future.
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Second, there is a need to reconsider monetary policy responses to the financial 
busts that follow the unwinding of  imbalances. The prevailing view, which envisages 
very aggressive and prolonged monetary easing, underestimates the resulting collateral 
damage in both economic and political economy terms. Monetary policy should 
pull out all the stops to prevent the implosion of  the system as the crisis erupts. But 
thereafter, as the focus shifts from crisis management to crisis resolution, the priority 
should be policies to repair balance sheets and facilitate the necessary adjustments in 
the real economy (e.g. BIS 2009; Borio et al. 2010). Only then can the effectiveness of  
monetary policy be fully restored. The end result would be a more symmetric evolution 
of  policy rates than that seen over the past decade, during which policy rates have 
gradually trended to zero: a greater increase during the boom and a smaller reduction 
during the bust.
Third, the operational independence of  central banks should be strengthened. 
Otherwise, it is not possible to address effectively the consequences of  financial cycles. 
Operational independence is critical for both their monetary and macroprudential policy 
functions: it protects central banks from the political economy pressures that undermine 
their ability to take the punchbowl away as the party gets going. To be sure, this also 
calls for drawing a clear distinction between crisis prevention and crisis management, 
something which is often overlooked. In crisis management, the role of  the government 
is inevitable; in crisis prevention, the autonomy of  those in charge of  macroprudential 
decisions is essential.19
Finally, ways need to be found to internalize the externalities associated with 
monetary policy spillovers across currency areas and with individual central bank 
contributions to global monetary conditions. A precondition is to recognize fully the 
importance of  these effects—the shift to a more top-down, global, analytical approach 
discussed above that resembles the one from a micro- to a macroprudential orientation 
in regulatory and supervisory frameworks. One’s house cannot be in order unless the 
global village is too.
Challenges and open questions
The challenges ahead are huge. It is one thing to identify the broad outline for the 
direction of  policy; it is quite another to generate the necessary intellectual consensus 
and to implement the corresponding adjustments. Consider each in turn.
At a minimum, to promote a new intellectual consensus we need better analytical 
frameworks and better technical tools.
The mainstream analytical frameworks at policymakers’ disposal are unable 
to incorporate the necessary elements systematically. The role of  monetary and 
financial factors is too peripheral in today’s macroeconomic models. In particular, the 
paradigms do not capture the essence of  what Wicksell ([1898] 1936) called “pure 
credit” economies. This is the true essence of  current fiat money arrangements, in 
which the creation of  credit, and hence of  purchasing power, is only constrained by 
the central bank’s control over short-term rates (Borio and Disyatat 2011). The models 
are, in effect, “real” models disguised as “monetary” ones.20 In addition, the critical 
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influence of  risk perceptions and attitudes toward risk in fuelling expansions and 
driving contractions is largely absent. Default,21 debt overhangs, and the misallocation 
of  physical capital are not meaningfully included. And the role of  global factors is 
badly underestimated.
Even short of  developing better macroeconomic models, there is scope to improve 
further the technical tools that can help implement policies. Real-time indicators of  
the buildup of  financial imbalances play a critical role. These can guide decisions 
concerning when to tighten monetary and macroprudential policies in order to 
constrain unsustainable booms even if  inflation remains subdued. In recent years, 
considerable progress has been made (e.g. Borio and Drehmann 2009; Alessi and 
Detken 2009). That said, further work would increase policymakers’ degree of  
comfort with the feasibility of  these strategies. A deeper empirical understanding of  
the relationship between the financial and business cycles could usefully complement 
this line of  work. And as the authorities deploy more actively macroprudential tools, 
such as adjustments to capital buffers, loan-to-value ratios, and margin standards, 
they will learn more about their efficacy relative to monetary levers (e.g. MAG 2010; 
BCBS 2010; and CGFS 2010).
But the main challenges ahead are not analytical or technical; they are of  a political 
economy nature.
First, in the years ahead, the independence of  central banks is likely to come under 
growing pressure. The importance of  operational independence for macroprudential 
authorities has so far not been fully appreciated. In addition, in some jurisdictions, the 
aggressive monetary policy response, seen as consistent with current mandates, may, 
over time, paradoxically sap that independence. As already noted, balance sheet policies 
inevitably blur the line between monetary and fiscal policy. A legitimate question is how 
far such policies could be transferred to government agencies (e.g. Stella 2010). Moreover, 
persistently ultra-low interest rates could undermine the fiction that interest rate policy, 
in contrast to balance sheet policy, is neutral and does not have significant distributional 
effects.22 Not least, the very low returns on savings can generate serious intergenerational 
tensions, as they thwart savers’ efforts to accumulate assets for their retirement. And all of  
this is occurring as public sector debts in many economies threaten to continue rising along 
an unsustainable path (e.g. Cecchetti et al. 2010; IMF 2010), raising the specter of  “fiscal 
dominance.” The problem is not new, but the challenge no less daunting because of  that.
Second, the prospects for deeper international policy cooperation are not bright. 
International policy cooperation has had a checkered history. Countries have profoundly 
different analytical approaches to the issues at stake, even when the political colors of  
the day may not be all that dissimilar. And even if  the approaches are consistent, 
the notion of  “enlightened self-interest” remains a hard political sell domestically. As 
history teaches us, only in very special circumstances can cooperation arise. Nor is 
there any guarantee that it will be rooted in the right analytical view of  the world.
If  we are to make progress toward a more successful model of  central banking, 
it is critical to be realistic about what central banks can and cannot achieve. No 
monetary and financial regime in history has proved up to the task of  delivering 
lasting monetary and financial stability—neither the gold standard nor the fiat 
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standard that followed. Despite the restless search for reliable anchors in the financial 
and monetary spheres, the goal has remained elusive (Borio and Crockett 2000). 
Valiant attempts to put the system on “autopilot,” through strict rules that limit the 
authorities’ discretion, have failed. And the exercise of  discretion has also not yielded 
the hoped-for benefits.
At a minimum, therefore, there is a need to manage expectations. During the Great 
Moderation, central banks sometimes came to be seen as all-powerful by the markets and 
the public at large. Nor, in all honesty, did they do much to dispel that belief. Now that the 
crisis has struck, they are facing enormous pressures to prove that they can manage the 
economy, restore full employment, ensure strong growth, and preserve price stability. 
This, in fact, is a taller order than many believe, and one that central banks alone cannot 
deliver. To pretend otherwise risks undermining their credibility and public support in 
the longer run.
Conclusion
Back in 1990, Paul Volcker entitled his Per Jacobsson lecture “The Triumph of  Central 
Banking?” He was taking his cue from Arthur Burns’s own go at the subject a decade 
earlier, in which he had reflected on the “anguish” of  the central banking community 
as it struggled unsuccessfully to bring inflation down (Burns 1979). It was extraordinary, 
Volcker noted, how much the world had changed and the reputation of  central bankers 
had improved. But the question mark in the title was important. He remained, at heart, 
skeptical about how long-lasting that success would be. In the years that followed, the 
triumph appeared to become ever more solid and the question mark to dissolve in the 
Great Moderation. And yet, in many respects, what he called “unfinished business” at 
the time is still unfinished business today. It has proved to be the Achilles heel of  central 
banks’ success: financial stability—which he always mentioned in the same breath as price 
stability—and exchange rates. The speech was remarkably prescient for those who wanted 
to hear.
If  one had to choose a fitting title for a corresponding lecture today, it would probably 
be: “The Doubts of  Central Banking.” The certainties of  the Great Moderation have 
gone. And there is much soul searching, although the temptation to hark back to the 
deceptive simplicity of  the pre-crisis world is strong. Some core propositions command 
agreement. Alongside price stability, central banks cannot relinquish responsibilities for 
financial stability and should play a key role in the macroprudential frameworks being 
put in place. And their operational autonomy in pursuing price stability should be 
safeguarded. Beyond that, however, disagreement exists concerning how far monetary 
policy should incorporate financial-stability considerations, both during the buildup of  
the risks, and following the materialization of  financial distress. And there is a danger 
that the greater involvement in financial stability, their bloated balance sheets, and 
ballooning public sector debts will threaten central banks’ independence. How to meet 
these challenges in what is bound to be a more hostile environment remains an open 
question.
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This essay has put forward a compass to help central banks sail in the largely uncharted 
waters ahead. That compass is based on a tighter integration of  the monetary and 
financial-stability functions, a keener awareness of  the global dimensions of  the tasks, 
and stronger safeguards against threats to central bank independence. Above all, there 
is a need to manage expectations, recognizing the limitations of  our ability to manage 
the economy and of  what central banks can achieve. There will always be “unfinished 
business,” and it will be far from marginal.
Postscript23
The previous essay was largely written at the end of  2010; two and a half  years later, 
how has the situation changed? Of  course, two and a half  years amount to hardly more 
than a heartbeat in the life of  an institution. Even so, it is worth taking stock of  the main 
developments since then.
The conclusion is that, judged against the benchmark of  the suggested compass, 
progress has been limited at best. Several risks bear watching. And at least one of  them—
that of  central banks becoming overburdened—has already materialized.
By way of  background, what follows first highlights some stylized facts about the 
recent economic environment and central bank policy. It then explores the extent to 
which the proposed compass has been followed. Finally, it turns to an assessment of  the 
possible reasons for this and of  the risks ahead.
I. Some Stylized Facts
First, the economic environment. At the time of  writing, the picture remains at least 
as challenging as it was at end-2010 (Borio 2013). To be sure, there are signs that, after 
a natural period of  private sector deleveraging, some of  the large mature economies 
that experienced domestic financial booms and busts, and that were at the origin 
of  the crisis are recovering, not least that of  the USA. But darker clouds prevail. In 
particular, globally, the threat from high private and public sector debt looms large 
(BIS 2013a and Figure 12.2). In some of  the countries whose banks were exposed 
to the crisis largely through cross-border, as opposed to domestic exposures, banks’ 
balance sheet repair is lagging, notably in Europe. At the other end of  the spectrum, 
several emerging market economies and smaller advanced economies, especially 
commodity exporters, exhibit troubling signs of  late financial-cycle risks, following 
strong domestic financial booms. And concerns with public sector debt are hardly 
abating. Admittedly, in the euro area, a welcome lull has followed the most acute 
phase of  the sovereign crisis, reflecting to a considerable extent extraordinary central 
bank short-term measures (see below). But fiscal consolidation has been timid, and in 
some countries has been put on the back burner. As a result, public sector debt-to-
GDP ratios have generally continued to increase. Moreover, in those countries that 
have been experiencing financial booms, underlying fiscal vulnerabilities have been 
masked.
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Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; DataStream; Global Financial Data; national data.
(a) Advanced economies: Australia, Canada, Denmark, the euro area, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA; emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Chinese Taipei, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
(b) Weighted average based on 2005 GDP and PPP weights.
(c) Sum across the economies cited.
Next, central bank policy. Central banks in many advanced economies have explored 
further the limits of  monetary policy in an effort to support demand and, in the euro 
area, to ward off  the risk of  a breakup (e.g. BIS 2013a and Figure 12.3).
For one, central bank balance sheets have ballooned further. In particular, large-
scale asset purchases of  government debt have continued, notably in the USA and UK. 
The Eurosystem’s daring Outright Monetary Transactions have provided assurance of  
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purchases of  government debt from countries in difficulties subject to certain conditions—
by far the most effective measure in calming euro area markets. The Bank of  Japan has 
announced a bold new program combining large-scale asset purchases and a doubling of  
the monetary base. And the accumulation of  foreign exchange reserves has continued, 
albeit lately at a slower pace. As a result of  all these measures, for instance, central banks 
are estimated to hold no less than one-third of  all US Treasuries outstanding.
In addition, with interest rates at their effective zero lower bound in a number of  
jurisdictions, central banks have relied even more on forward guidance to drive down 
yields at longer maturities and to reassure markets. Going beyond vague references to 
“extended periods” or announcements of  exits linked exclusively to the evolution of  
inflation, at least one central bank so far, the Federal Reserve, has established thresholds 
related to the behavior of  a real variable—unemployment. Discussion of  the possibility 
of  shifting to a nominal GDP target (Woodford 2012), especially prominent in the UK, 
has reflected the same underlying objective: how to provide further accommodation 
when traditional measures are reaching their limits.
II. How Far Has the Compass Provided Guidance?
What about the extent to which the suggested compass has been followed? This compass 
proposes three adjustments to pre-crisis policy regimes. First, fully integrate financial-
stability considerations in monetary policy frameworks, based on a less asymmetric 
stance over the course of  the financial cycle. This means leaning more strongly against 
financial booms even if  near-term inflation remains under control, and easing less 
aggressively and persistently during busts. Second, strengthen safeguards for central 
bank independence. Finally, internalize the externalities associated with monetary policy 
spillovers across currency areas and with individual central bank contributions to global 
monetary conditions. Progress has been uneven across areas and, on balance, limited. 
Consider each in turn.
No doubt, the intellectual recognition that monetary policy has a role to play in 
constraining the buildup of  financial imbalances has been gaining further ground. Increasingly, 
central banks have been making more explicit statements to that effect,24 and even 
acknowledged having shaded policy accordingly (e.g. Ingves 2010). In fact, the possibility 
of  relying on monetary policy is slowly becoming the new consensus.
That said, actual policy decisions have been quite timid in practice. Moreover, the 
temptation to rely exclusively on macroprudential policies has proved irresistible. This 
has been so even in countries that are philosophically more favorably disposed toward 
resorting to changes in interest rates to address financial booms, such as several in 
Asia (see also below).25 As a result, relying on macroprudential measures has been 
the rule in those countries that have experienced the buildup of  financial imbalances 
post-crisis.
Similarly, in practice, there has been only limited appreciation of  the limitations 
and possible collateral damage of  extraordinarily easy monetary policy in addressing financial busts 
and the concomitant balance sheet recessions (see Bech et al. 2012 for empirical 
evidence). Admittedly, the limitations have been increasingly debated and highlighted 
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(e.g. IMF 2013; Rajan 2013; Volcker 2013; Trichet 2013). Similarly, a growing number of  
central banks have, to varying degrees, recognized their existence (e.g. Praet 2012; Dale 
2013; Weidmann 2013). Moreover, at least one central bank, Norges Bank, has adjusted 
its framework to explicitly include such costs (Olsen 2013; Norges Bank 2013; Sveriges 
Riksbank 2013). That said, it is hard to trace in actual policy decisions a significant 
footprint of  these considerations.
All central banks fully recognize the importance of  retaining independence so as to 
preserve long-term economic stability. The issue has received a great deal of  attention 
as central banks have assumed further responsibilities in financial stability, not least 
in the light of  their new macroprudential tasks. At the same time, the governance 
arrangements in place have not recognized the distinction between crisis prevention 
and crisis management: the degree of  involvement of  ministries of  finance in this area, 
which is often substantial, is the same in the two phases. And the inroads central banks 
have made in balance sheet policies have blurred further the line between monetary and 
fiscal policies, making them more vulnerable to political economy pressures that could 
undermine their autonomy.
Not surprisingly, internalizing the externalities associated with monetary policy 
spillovers has proved beyond reach. Apart from legitimate analytical disagreements, it is 
here that the clash between national mandates and the collective interest of  the global 
community is starkest. As noted in the essay, the conjunction of  extraordinarily easy 
monetary conditions in advanced economies with resistance to exchange appreciation 
elsewhere has arguably resulted in an unduly easy global monetary policy stance.26 And 
the situation has not changed over the last couple of  years. At the global level, policy 
rates, even adjusted for inflation, have been trending down for decades, even as the 
trend growth of  the world economy—a common yardstick to gauge their appropriate 
level—has picked up. Likewise, more refined yardsticks that seek to take into account 
output and inflation—so-called Taylor rules—indicate that policy rates are globally 
unusually low (Figure 11.3, from Hofmann and Bogdanova 2012).27 And partly as a 
result of  purchases at the long end of  the yield curve and foreign exchange intervention, 
bond yields have declined further.28 Focusing on the behavior of  inflation, rather than 
on the buildup of  financial imbalances, may again have been providing a false sense of  
comfort.
III. Assessment of  Outcomes and Risks
There are several reasons why the compass has, so far, provided only limited guidance to 
actual policy decisions. Some are of  a more analytical nature. There are disagreements 
about the diagnosis of  the ills afflicting the global economy and the efficacy of  policy. 
Moreover, while progress has been made in formally incorporating financial factors into 
macroeconomic paradigms, it has been necessarily slow. This obviously raises the bar 
for the comfort level central banks require before they can adjust their policies. Other 
reasons are of  a more political economy nature. One should not underestimate the 
pressure central banks have come under to fill the void that other policies have created 
(BIS 2013a; Caruana 2013a, 2013b).
 CENTRAL BANKING POST-CRISIS 207












Source: Hoffmann and Bogdanova (2012).
The Taylor rates are calculated as i = r* + p* + 1.5(p-p*) + 1.0y, where p is a measure of  inflation, y is a 
measure of  the output gap, p* is the inflation target, and r* is the long-run level of  the real interest rate. 
For an explanation on how this Taylor rule is calculated, see Hoffmann and Bogdanova (2012).
In addition, there is a catch-22 dilemma concerning communication. One of  the 
implications of  the suggested compass is that central banks should be more forthcoming 
in acknowledging the limitations of  their policies, especially when confronted with 
balance sheet recessions. But doing so would open them up to the criticism that they 
are undercutting those policies’ very effectiveness: confidence can be important, at 
least in the short run. This could undermine the central banks’ perceived competence, 
legitimacy, and ultimately, independence. Not acknowledging the limitations, however, 
would raise the very same risk in the long run, once their ineffectiveness is inevitably 
revealed.
Of  course, the compass may not be the right one. It is quite legitimate to argue 
that macroprudential policies, on their own, may be sufficient to address the financial 
imbalances; that monetary policy is, after all, more effective than suggested here in 
addressing financial busts without collateral damage; and that the “own house in 
order” doctrine is still the best guide to policymaking even in a highly integrated global 
economy.29 In this case, and possibly even if  some of  these propositions do not hold, the 
evolution of  the picture since the essay was written would be reassuring.
But if  the compass is a valid one, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that there are tangible 
risks, some of  which may well have already materialized at least to some extent. Let me 
mention five interrelated ones (Borio 2013). The first three pertain to central banks in 
general, the last two to their interaction internationally.
The first is the time inconsistency risk highlighted in the essay. Policies that are too timid 
in leaning against financial booms but that respond aggressively and persistently to 
financial busts may end up leaving the authorities without any ammunition left over 
successive financial and business cycles. Importantly, this applies not just to monetary 
policy, but also to fiscal and prudential policies (Borio 2013, 2014). The fact that central 
banks keep exploring the outer limits of  monetary measures, that fiscal positions are 
on an unsustainable long-term path in several jurisdictions, and that resistance to the 
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implementation of  tougher capital and liquidity prudential standards for banks has been 
fierce are all symptoms consistent with the materialization of  this risk.
The second is the risk of  overburdening central banks. Indeed, as argued in the most 
recent BIS Annual Report (BIS 2013a), this risk has already materialized.30 If  monetary 
policy is ill-equipped to address balance sheet recessions, it follows that relying heavily 
on it is not the right response. Extraordinarily easy monetary policy cannot repair 
balance sheets, cannot ensure the long-term sustainability of  public finances, and 
cannot address the real-economy constraints that hold back robust sustainable growth, 
not least those associated with the misallocation of  resources during the preceding 
financial booms (Borio 2014; Caruana 2013a; BIS 2013a). As discussed in the essay, 
monetary policy can gain time; but it cannot address these underlying problems. And, 
in some respects, it can actually make it easier to waste time because of  the incentives 
it inevitably generates.31
The third is the risk of  an insidious “expectations gap” becoming entrenched, between 
what central banks are expected to deliver and what they can deliver (Borio 2013, 2014; 
Caruana 2013a, 2013b). A vicious circle can develop. As policy fails to produce the 
desired effects and adjustment is delayed, central banks come under growing pressure 
to do more. An “expectations gap” yawns open. All this makes the eventual exit more 
difficult and may ultimately threaten the central bank’s credibility. One may wonder 
whether some of  these forces have not been at play in Japan, a country where the central 
bank has not yet been able to exit and has felt compelled to adopt increasingly bold steps.
The fourth is the risk of  financial developments derailing the global economy once again. It is possible 
that the financial booms that have taken root in several emerging market economies and 
also some commodity exporting countries could generate unwelcome financial busts. And 
this could occur before the mature economies most affected by the Great Financial Crisis 
and its aftershocks are completely out of  the woods. Signs of  late financial cycle risks are 
not particularly encouraging (Caruana 2012b, 2013c). All this could cause serious strains 
in the global economy and put further pressure on exchange rate relationships, which are 
already quite strained, as indicated by unwelcome references to “currency wars.”
But the ultimate risk is that of  yet another epoch-defining change in the underlying economic regimes 
that hold the best promise for long-term prosperity, viz. a global economy that is integrated 
in real and financial terms, underpinned by monetary regimes that deliver long-lasting 
price stability (Borio 2013). As historians such as Niall Ferguson (2010) and Harold James 
(2009) keep reminding us, such disruptive changes often occur quite abruptly and when 
least expected. So far, institutional setups have proved remarkably resilient to the huge 
shock of  the Great Financial Crisis and its tumultuous aftermath. But there are also 
troubling signs that globalization may be in retreat, as states struggle to come to grips 
with the de facto loss of  sovereignty. Meanwhile, the consensus on the merits of  price 
stability is fraying at the edges. As memories of  the costs of  inflation fade, the temptation 
to get rid of  the huge debt burdens through a combination of  inflation and financial 
repression grows. Taking all these hard-won gains for granted is the surest way of  losing 
them. This would be an especially hostile world for the institution of  central banking. But 
it is a possibility that should not be ruled out if  monetary, fiscal, and prudential policies 
fail to adjust sufficiently to address the risks posed by financial booms and busts.
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Conclusion
Two and a half  years after the previous essay was written, central banks are experimenting 
further in search of  a new compass. This search is bound to continue for the foreseeable 
future. The waters they are navigating are treacherous. And at least one compass—the 
one put forward in the original essay—is pointing to growing hazards. The stakes are 
high. Navigating those waters successfully will require great intellectual acumen, wisdom, 
and, as always, a dose of  good luck.
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10 For example, given the low cost of  forbearance, very low interest rates may disguise underlying 
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latest credit crisis.
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16 Very low interest rates may also have an impact on at least some commodity prices by inducing 
portfolio shifts, including by encouraging a search for yield.
17 See Tucker (2011) for how the relationship between macroprudential and monetary policy has 
been addressed in the new institutional structure in the UK, in which the central bank plays a 
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18 Operationally, this calls for extending policy horizons beyond the roughly two-year ones typical 
of  inflation-targeting regimes and for giving greater prominence to the balance of  risks in the 
outlook (Borio and Lowe 2002). The reason is that the lag between the buildup of  systemic 
risks and the emergence of  financial distress is considerably longer than the lag associated with 
keeping inflation under control. And as the timing of  the unwinding of  financial imbalances is 
highly uncertain, extending the horizon should not be interpreted as extending point forecasts 
mechanically. Rather, it is a device to help assess the balance of  risks faced by the economy, and 
the costs of  policy action and inaction in a more meaningful and structured way.
19 Many central banks already combine monetary policy functions with responsibility for 
regulation and supervision of  individual institutions; as a result, they face risks to their 
reputation and independence. In principle, responsibility for the system as a whole should 
involve less reputational risk, as the authorities would be insulated from individual failures 
caused by idiosyncratic factors. Moreover, relying on well-designed macroprudential overlays, 
in the form of  explicit adjustments to the calibration to prudential instruments, could help to 
retain some distance (BIS 2009; Borio 2010). For an in-depth discussion of  the governance 
implications of  central bank responsibilities for financial stability, see BIS (2011b).
20 See Schumpeter (1954) and Kohn (1986) for useful discussions of  the distinction between 
“monetary” and “real” models.
21 An observer who has been stressing the importance of  including default in a meaningful way 
is Goodhart (2004).
22 It is hard to see how central banks could resist pressures to keep interest rates ultra low and use 
the balance sheet aggressively unless inflation increases from its current very low levels. And in 
a world in which the globalization of  the real economy and rise of  the new emerging market 
giants has dealt a big blow to the bargaining power of  labor, inflation may well remain subdued 
even if  the true underlying resource slack measured in terms of  potential output is not large.
23 I would like to thank Boris Hofmann and Andy Filardo for helpful comments and suggestions. 
The views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of  the BIS.
24 See, for instance, Stevens (2012), Carney (2013), King (2013), Stein (2013), Ingves (2013), 
Olsen (2013), Wheeler (2013), Kim (2013), Bank Negara Malaysia (2012), Menon (2013), and 
Subbarao (2013).
25 One should qualify the statement substantially if  the set of  monetary policy tools is extended 
to cover the active use of  reserve requirements, which has been quite common.
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26 Caruana (2012a) elaborates on the underlying mechanisms and final outcomes in detail. On 
this, see also Taylor (2013).
27 The conclusion would be stronger if  one took into account three factors that are not 
incorporated in the benchmarks shown in the graph: the impact of  balance sheet policies; that 
of  forward guidance; and that of  financial imbalances on potential output, as financial booms 
may make output unsustainable even if  inflation remains under control (Borio et al. 2013).
28 At the time of  writing (October 2013), the sovereign bond yields in the jurisdictions that are 
home to the main international currencies are off  their lows. In June, what markets took as 
indications that the Federal Reserve would start to “taper off ” purchases in the near future 
produced tremors in global financial markets and a backup in sovereign yields across the board 
(BIS 2013b). The Fed subsequently clarified that markets had misunderstood the message, 
providing reassurance that any exit was still distant. As a result, yields partly retraced their 
movement. The episode was a vivid reminder that exiting policies in all probability will not be 
a smooth affair (e.g. Caruana 2013b).
29 A natural concern with monetary policy going beyond the “own house in order” doctrine is that 
this could undermine central banks’ independence and make them hostage to unwarranted 
considerations. This, for instance, was the reason for the Bundesbank’s long-standing resistance 
to G7 international macroeconomic policy coordination attempts. The Bundesbank was 
concerned, and justifiably so, that they could undermine its ability to preserve price stability. 
Any mechanisms to internalize spillovers should address these concerns effectively. See, for 
instance, Eichengreen et al. (2011).
30 Orphanides (2013) reaches the same conclusion, exploring the issues exclusively from the 
perspective of  ensuring price stability.
31 It may not be a coincidence that some of  the countries in which fiscal adjustment since the 
crisis has been smaller are also those in which central banks have been more active in large-
scale purchases of  government bonds; see BIS (2013a).
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Chapter 13
RECONCEPTUALIZING CENTRAL BANK  
UNCONVENTIONAL POLICIES: LONG  
POSITIONS ON NO-GROWTH  
CAPITALISM
Ismail Ertürk
Convergence to Central Bank Unconventional Policies in  
Core Capitalist Countries after the 2007 Crisis
Central banks in core capitalist countries have acquired unprecedented economic 
significance and monetary policy powers following the 2007 crisis. Their traditional 
lender-of-last-resort role after the collapse of  Lehman Brothers in 2008 was not 
temporary, but instead has turned into an almost long-term blank check underwriting the 
post-crisis recovery in the USA, the Eurozone, and the UK. In 2012, the Bank of  Japan 
joined to its counterparts in the USA and Europe in monetary policy extremism when 
the newly elected prime minister, Shinzō Abe, announced his radical economic recovery 
package, now popularly known as Abenomics, to inflate the Japanese economy—through 
massive quantitative easing programs by the central bank—out of  its deflationary 
state. Consequently, since the 2007 financial crisis, all central banks in major advanced 
economies have converged into a policy consensus that has turned them into public 
institutions holding significant amounts of  sovereign risk on their balance sheets through 
large-scale asset purchase programmes in both liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs). Both types of  capitalism that were distinguished 
in the varieties of  capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) by their institutional 
characteristics in growth dynamics are unable to generate desired economic growth, and 
have been constrained in fiscal policy choices due to high budget deficits since 2007. The 
BIS economist Claudio Borio (2011) sees this policy experimentation in all high-income 
countries as central banks trying to navigate in “uncharted waters” with theoretically 
suspect macroeconomic models. Such central bank activism is well beyond the 
imaginations of  the free-marketer Alan Greenspan, who introduced the term “mopping 
up” in the context of  recurring asset bubbles since the early 1990s, or the Keynesian 
Hyman Minsky, who assigned to central banks the role of  restoring stability in capitalism 
after inevitable endogenous cycles of  Ponzi schemes (Greenspan 1999; Minsky 1986). 
According to Steve Keen, “Bernanke’s dilemma is that he is living in a Minskian world 
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while perceiving it through Friedmanite eyes” (Keen 2009, 8). Keen’s observation can 
be easily generalized to include all other central bank governors in post-crisis advanced 
capitalist countries. Institutional economist Zeev Rosenhek (2013) underlines this 
ideological dilemma of  central bankers by analyzing the sense-making practices of  
the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA and the European Central Bank (ECB) in their 
responses to the financial crisis. According to Rosenhek (2013, 270): “These sense-
making frames did not represent an overall rupture from the premises of  the neoliberal 
mode of  governance; yet, by qualifying them and calling for their reconsideration, they 
undermined to some extent their hitherto hegemonic status among dominant actors in 
the global political economy.”
Therefore, the urgency to keep the financial system from collapsing by using improvised 
monetary policy tools increasingly complicates the reference points in economic theory 
by which central banks are traditionally justified and analyzed. Such interpretative 
and evaluative difficulties that central banks create for the observers is not limited to 
academics. Fellow central bankers and market participants frequently also voice their 
critical views about the effectiveness and consequences of  the unconventional central 
bank policies. Masaaki Shirakawa, the pre-Abenomics ex-governor of  the Bank of  
Japan, warned against the unrealistic expectations from central bank quantitative easing 
policies: “To raise potential economic growth isn’t the job of  the central bank—it is the 
job of  the government. But there isn’t much of  an effort from either the government or 
the private sector to come up with a precise new template for growth” (Sender 2012). 
Another central banker, the president of  Bundesbank, Jens Weidman, commented that 
emergency measures of  central banks may become “a convenient analgesic for prolonging 
an unsustainable status quo” (Weidman 2012). Unofficial commentators on central bank 
activism can be harsher in their criticism of  unconventional central bank policies. A 
seasoned hedge fund manager, Stanley Druckenmiller, when interviewed by the Financial 
Times, said that “Mr Bernanke is running the most inappropriate monetary policies in 
the history of  the free world” (McCrum and Harding 2013). Against this background of  
diverse skepticism about central banks’ unconventional policies, I will now describe and 
discuss how they have evolved in the USA, the UK, and the EU since the 2007 crisis.
The Rise of  Unconventional Central Bank Policies
Central banks in the USA, the UK, and the EU responded to the banking crisis that 
started in the summer of  2007 by providing liquidity to the banking system under 
their traditional lender-of-last-resort role. Such liquidity support operations involved 
extending the scope of  existing facilities by longer-term lending, and by accepting higher-
risk and non-tradable bank assets as collateral against such lending. Paul Fisher, one of  
the executive directors at the Bank of  England who is in charge of  the balance sheet 
consequences of  the Bank of  England’s policies, called these liquidity support operations 
a “game changer” in central banking (Fisher 2010). The ECB also acknowledged the 
“game changer” nature of  its support for the financial system: “Since the intensification 
of  the financial crisis in September 2008 and of  the sovereign debt crisis in August 
2011, and against the background of  rapidly receding inflationary pressures, the ECB 
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has introduced a number of  measures that are unprecedented in nature, scope and 
magnitude” (ECB 2013).
In the immediate aftermath of  Lehman’s collapse, the creditworthiness of  
counterparties in the interbank market was difficult to assess, and banks consequently 
stopped lending to each other, causing systemic disturbances in financial markets. In order 
to restore financial stability, the Fed started buying commercial paper and asset-backed 
commercial paper in the USA, Bank of  England commercial paper and corporate bonds 
in the UK, and ECB covered bonds in the Eurozone. As the financial crisis deepened 
and unfolded in unexpected ways in different countries, central banks expanded their 
purchases of  financial assets in kind and size. In the USA, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) started buying government-sponsored enterprises’ (Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae) debt, mortgage-backed securities, and longer-term Treasury securities 
(see Figure 13.1). In 2008, in one month between mid-September and mid-October, the 
Fed increased its liquidity and credit facilities to the US financial institutions by a multiple 
of  almost twenty from US$23.5 billion to US$441.4 billion. The sudden jump in the 
Fed’s total assets around September 2008 was due to the swap facilities through which it 
had provided US dollars to other central banks during the height of  the liquidity crunch 
in global interbank markets. Through such facilities, the Fed first provided US$14 billion 
in December 2007 and then the facility became permanent, reaching a peak of  US$583 
billion in December 2008 soon after the collapse of  Lehman. Starting from January 
2009, the Fed started to buy mortgage-backed securities to stabilize the mortgage markets 
and keep the borrowing costs low. The Fed’s holding of  mortgage-backed securities 
reached the dizzying heights of  US$1.1 trillion by May 2010 from a negligible size of  
US$5.6 billion in January 2009. From November 2010 onward, the Fed’s quantitative 
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easing policy shifted from the purchase of  mortgage-backed securities to the purchase 
of  government securities, almost doubling from US$776.5 billion in November 2010 to 
US$1.6 trillion in August 2013.
The Bank of  England started quantitative easing, purchasing government debt by 
issuing central bank money in March 2009. The ECB, on the other hand, was not 
mandated to buy government debt in large quantities directly. Therefore, in October 
2008, it started providing unlimited liquidity to the Eurozone banks through its “enhanced 
credit support” program. Under this program, the ECB provided fixed-rate loans to banks 
for periods from one week to one year. In May 2010, the ECB started buying, in limited 
quantities, government bonds under its Securities Markets Programme. As the euro crisis 
worsened in the fall of  2011, with the downgrading of  credit ratings of  French banks 
and the French government when the yields on Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds 
reached 7 percent p.a., the ECB began its long-term refinancing operation (LTRO) by 
providing collateralized loans of  up to three years totaling about €1 trillion to some eight 
hundred Eurozone banks, UK banks, and industrial companies. The major objective 
of  the LTRO was to save the euro by reducing yields on especially Italian and Spanish 
government bonds that reached 7 percent p.a. The banks in the Eurozone periphery 
were also expected to use such cheap funds from the ECB to lend to private companies 
and households to help economic recovery.
Consequently, between 2008 and 2012, over a four-year period, the balance sheets of  
the central banks of  core capitalist countries expanded significantly through purchases 
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of  public and private credit risk through (i) quantitative easing programs—buying public 
debt through the creation of  central bank money; (ii) collateral swaps—swapping lower-
quality securities of  banks with higher-quality government bonds; and (iii) loans to banks 
against eligible collateral, which can be anything from government bonds, to residential 
mortgage-backed assets, to loans to SMEs. The balance sheets of  the Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of  England increased between July 2007 and August 2012 from about 6 
percent of  GDP, to about 18 percent and 25 percent of  GDP, respectively. Over the same 
period, the balance sheet of  the European System of  Central Banks (ESCB; all central 
banks in the Eurozone plus the ECB) increased from about 12.5 percent of  GDP to 
about 32 percent of  GDP (see Figure 13.2).
Central Banks’ Long Position on a Low-Growth Capitalism
The unconventional policies of  central banks in core capitalist countries that involved large-
scale asset purchases since the 2007 crisis ultimately aimed to stimulate economic growth 
by keeping credit markets functioning and interest rates low. The macroeconomic models 
of  the transmission mechanism that link asset purchases by central banks to economic 
growth assume that multiple economic variables—confidence of  economic agents, 
portfolio rebalancing by investors to achieve desired risk and return outcomes, etc. (see e.g. 
Joyce et al. 2011)—will collectively respond positively to the monetary easing. However, 
comprehensive evidence supporting such transition mechanisms does not exist. Although 
mainstream academics tend to agree that quantitative easing reduced yields on government 
bonds (Li and Wei 2012) and may have lowered the unemployment rate in the USA (Chung 
et al. 2011), there remains a significant amount of  skepticism about both the measurement 
of  and evidence on the effectiveness of  transmission mechanisms. At a conference that 
the Bank of  England organized to evaluate the effectiveness of  unconventional monetary 
policies and quantitative easing, the conclusions drew attention to uncertainties in outcome 
and shortcomings of  the theoretical models. Unconventional central bank policies pose, 
even for the central banking community itself, more questions than answers:
The use of  unconventional monetary policy may have a number of  unintended 
consequences. These include, for example, financial market distortions, exit 
problems, and the potential loss of  central bank independence and credibility […]. 
Many participants discussed the links between asset purchases and fiscal policy, but 
there has been little theoretical work to date that looks at the interactions between 
the fiscal and monetary authorities in periods where the latter is making asset 
purchases. (Joyce 2012, 54)
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) economist Claudio Borio also questioned 
the theoretical rigor and practical relevance of  the macroeconomic models behind 
unconventional central bank policies:
The mainstream analytical frameworks at policymakers’ disposal are unable to 
incorporate the necessary elements systematically. […] The models are, in effect, 
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“real” models disguised as “monetary” ones. In addition, the critical influence 
of  risk perceptions and attitudes toward risk in fuelling expansions and driving 
contractions is largely absent. Default, debt overhangs and the misallocation of  
physical capital are not meaningfully included. And the role of  global factors is 
badly underestimated. (Borio 2011, 10)
The IMF, in its 2012 Financial Stability Report, raised its own concerns about the unintended 
consequences of  unconventional policies that the macroeconomic models could not 
predict:
The sizable presence of  central banks in the long-term government securities 
markets may limit the room for further policy manoeuvre, and may constrain 
central bank flexibility in smoothly unwinding current monetary policies. This can 
lead to a loss of  asset safety in real terms and to higher currency risks. Large-scale 
asset purchases can also have an adverse effect on the political incentives to improve 
fiscal discipline because the back stop of  central bank purchases keeps interest rates 
and thus funding costs low. (IMF 2012, 21–2)
The theoretical transition mechanism assumes that low yields in bonds will cause a 
portfolio adjustment, and that investors will shift to riskier asset classes and especially to 
stocks. Higher stock prices and low borrowing costs will then cause private investment 
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and economic growth. Figure 13.3 shows that quantitative easing in the USA and the 
UK succeeded in raising the asset prices in the stock market but failed to have a similar 
effect on GDP. Both in the USA and the UK stock market indices recovered to their 
pre-crisis levels, but the GDP in the UK is still below its pre-crisis level, and in the USA 
just over it. However, the US GDP seems to be driven primarily by residential real estate 
due to very low borrowing costs that may not be sustainable. Richard Fisher, president 
of  the Federal Reserve Bank of  Dallas, confirmed the weakness of  recent growth in the 
US economy:
Currently, much of  the monetary base has piled up in the form of  excess reserves of  
banks who have not found willing or able borrowers. Other forms of  surplus cash 
are lying fallow on the balance sheets of  businesses or being deployed in buying 
back shares and increasing dividend payouts so as to buttress company stock prices. 
(Fisher 2013, 7)
As Figure 13.4 shows, private investment in both the USA and the UK, as a percentage 
of  GDP, is still well below the pre-crisis level.
Large-Scale Asset Purchases as a Long Position  
on Low-Growth Capitalism
As a consequence of  unconventional policies, also known as balance sheet policies, central 
banks hold a substantial amount of  fixed-income securities on their balance sheets. 
Figure 13.4. The US and the UK stock market indices and private investments as a 
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For example, the Bank of  England’s balance sheet consists almost entirely of  UK 
government debt in the form of  gilts. As of  March 8, 2012, £291,270 million of  the 
£291,670 million of  total asset purchases under the Asset Purchase Facility were gilts, and 
the rest, £400 million, were corporate bonds (BoE 2012, 8). Since March 2009, under 
the Asset Purchase Programme, the Bank of  England has become the major purchaser 
of  new government bond issues in the UK while the shares of  pension funds, insurance 
companies, and other financial institutions declined. Long-term and low-yielding gilts 
are not attractive investments for asset managers in the private sector, but the Bank of  
England increases its long position on a government with a deteriorating budget and 
current account deficits. The Federal Reserve, too, has accumulated a long position on 
the US government by holding long-term, low-yielding government bonds. At the end 
of  January 2012, about 40 percent of  the Bank of  England’s’ holdings of  gilts and about 
30 percent of  the Federal Reserve’s holdings of  government bonds were long term (IMF 
2012, 23). According to the IMF, such long positions of  the Bank of  England and the 
Federal Reserve on their governments pose serious risks for fiscal discipline: “Large-scale 
asset purchases can also have an adverse effect on the political incentives to improve fiscal 
discipline because the back stop of  central bank purchases keeps interest rates and thus 
funding costs low” (IMF 2012, 22). Therefore, not only do central banks in core capitalist 
economies hold securities of  sovereigns with low GDP growth and deteriorating credit 
ratings, they also potentially increase moral hazard for sovereigns that issue low-yielding 
and long-maturity debt. The chief  economist of  Citigroup, Willem Buiter, called the 
Federal Reserve “the biggest moral hazard machine ever seen in human history” (Financial 
Times, July 17, 2009).
The unconventional policies of  central banks also expose them to the credit risk 
of  banks. For example, the Bank of  England uses the government securities on its 
balance sheet to provide high-quality collaterals to the financial institutions that face 
funding problems in interbank markets. The Special Liquidity Scheme of  the Bank of  
England, which lasted from April 2008 to January 30, 2012, allowed the UK banks 
and building societies to swap their unmarketable mortgage-backed and other private 
sector securities for UK Treasury bills for up to three years. The Bank of  England 
replaced the special liquidity scheme with the operational standing facility and 
discount window facility. In addition, the Bank of  England introduced indexed long-
term repo operations in June 2010 to provide central bank reserves against collateral. 
The collateral involved in such mechanisms with risky financial institutions can be 
sovereign bonds or private sector securities. As the Eurozone crisis worsened, the Bank 
of  England signaled its willingness to increase its support for the UK financial sector 
by introducing the extended collateral term repo facility (ECTRF) in December 2011 
and by launching its £80 billion “funding for lending” program in July 2012 to provide 
cheap, long-term funding of  between £80 and £160 billion to the UK banks. Under 
the ECTRF, the Bank of  England can provide liquidity in extreme shock conditions 
in the form of  central bank reserves against a broader range of  risky collateral. With 
its “funding for lending” scheme, the Bank of  England provides cheap, long-term 
funds to the UK banks if  they use these funds to provide credit to the private sector 
and households. Since 2007, the long position of  the Bank of  England on the UK 
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economy has not only become bigger in size, but has also become riskier, as it commits 
itself  to providing liquidity to the financial institutions with liquidity problems. The 
Bank of  England has developed risk-management practices for the collateral it accepts 
from the banks, and uses various methods to construct eligibility criteria for collateral, 
valuations of  collateral, and haircuts for collateral. Since in most cases there is no 
market-produced information on these three variables, the Bank of  England uses its 
own pricing models to value the collateral (John, Roberts, and Weeken 2012, 59). The 
Federal Reserve and the ECB, too, use their own models to value the collateral that 
they accept against loans they make to the risky, and, in many cases, undercapitalized 
banks. Given that the capitalist financial system came to the brink of  total collapse 
because the intellectual capital of  the financial elite failed miserably in pricing risk, the 
presumption that central banks have superior skills in risk pricing in an unaccountable 
way when holding securities worth about 25 percent of  GDP is hubristic to say the 
least. The tools and algorithms of  central banks in acquiring sovereign debt and 
private bank risks are not properly understood or discussed, causing concerns about 
their consequences. For example, the IMF economist Singh, in a co-authored paper, 
raised the following concerns:
Swaps of  “good” for “bad” collateral may become part of  the standard toolkit. If  
so, the fiscal aspects and risks associated with such policies—which are virtually nil 
in conventional QE swaps of  central bank money for treasuries—are important 
and cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the issue of  institutional accountability 
and authority to engage in such operations touches at the heart of  central bank 
independence in a democratic society. (Singh and Stella 2012, 16)
Figure 13.5. Long-term refinancing operation of  the European Central Bank
LTROs covering  
Eurozone bank term






debt maturing in 2012
€630 bn
LTROs used for






0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Source: IMF (2012, 77).
226 CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS
The ECB’s long position on the Eurozone economy also increasingly consists of  poor-
quality assets. The share of  non-marketable assets in the ECB’s total holdings has 
become the largest component, reaching 23 percent in 2011 (ECB 2012, 85). And the 
€1 trillion LTRO of  the ECB in 2012 basically provided funding for the Eurozone 
banks that would be unable to renew maturing debt in credit markets in 2012. As Figure 
13.5 shows, the ECB’s LTRO covered 63 percent of  the 2012 maturing term debt of  
the Eurozone banks. According to the IMF: “The three-year ECB loans progressively 
came to be viewed as a crucial measure to curb the tail risk of  disastrous bank failures” 
(2012, 21).
Conclusion
What the central bankers and the mainstream commentators from the media 
and academia problematize as unconventional monetary policy, which is beyond 
conventional lender-of-last-resort bank-rescue activities and open-market operations, 
and has resulted in bloated central bank balance sheets with unpredictable future and 
present macroeconomic risks, this paper, alternatively, conceptualizes as the “central 
bank long position on no-growth capitalism.” This paper argued that this is a medium- 
to long-term capitalist growth problematic that defines the nature of  post-2007 
conjuncture where central banks have morphed into super-economic institutions both 
in imagination and practice in all varieties of  capitalism. Such conceptualization of  
central bank unconventional policies in present-day capitalism also theoretically differs 
from a Minskian view of  central banks in an endogenously unstable capitalism. The 
reconceptualization of  central banks in this paper is different from a Minskian view for 
two reasons: (i) The current post-bubble debris on bank balance sheets is different to 
non-performing loans to private companies in a Minskian expansionary period. The 
current debris of  financial assets that the central banks are trying to mop up consists of  
the subprime lending-related securities created by a banking system that originated and 
distributed home loans, and fed itself  from the income streams and valuations in a vortex 
of  financial innovation, such as with collateralized debt obligations (see Engelen et al. 
2011). (ii) Unlike an unproblematic exit of  central banks from a Minskian post-bubble 
balance sheet cleansing, our current central bank technocrats lack both theoretical 
and technical exit strategies from the unconventional monetary policies. What we are 
experiencing is a temporal capitalist space that is being dangerously formed by forces 
beyond the theoretical and policy imagination of  both Minskians and neoliberals, 
who unconvincingly advocate central bank independence as a politically neutral, 
universal economic efficiency. Uncannily, this central bank–led capitalist conjuncture is 
legitimized by an unusual intellectual coalition of  New Keynesians and neoliberals. For 
example, only recently, both Keynesian Paul Krugman and neoliberal Financial Times 
writer Sebastian Mallaby agreed on the urgency of  much bigger quantitative easing as 
the remedy for avoiding a prolonged capitalist depression of  1930s magnitude (Wolf  
2012; Mallaby 2012). Krugman proposes adding another US$2 trillion on the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet by purchasing a wider range of  assets including more private 
sector liabilities. Mallaby does not put a number on a further and bigger quantitative 
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easing by the Fed, but he is equally bullish about increasing both the size and riskiness 
of  its long position by urging a “quantitative easing of  game-changing magnitude” 
(Mallaby 2012). Mallaby basically supports an earlier policy position by the president of  
the Federal Reserve Bank of  San Francisco, John Williams, who recommended another 
round of  quantitative easing with the Fed buying mortgage-backed securities rather 
than Treasuries, as this riskier longer position would be more effective. Williams goes 
a couple of  steps further than Krugman and Mallaby in his idea of  central banks as 
holders of  the long position on the economy by advocating an open-ended quantitative 
easing: “The main benefit from my point of  view is it will get the markets to stop 
focusing on the terminal date [when a program of  purchases ends] and also focusing 
on, ‘Oh, are they going to do QE3?’ Instead, markets would adjust their expectation of  
Fed purchases as economic conditions changed” (Harding 2012).
There are, however, increasingly alarming voices coming from policy circles. In its 
2012 Annual Report, the BIS harshly depicted the long-term risks to the global economy 
and economic recovery in core capitalist economies from increasing the long positions 
of  central banks:
In the core advanced economies, if  the economy remains weak and underlying 
solvency and structural problems remain unresolved, central banks may come 
under growing pressure to do more. A vicious circle can develop, with a widening 
gap between what central banks are expected to deliver and what they can actually 
deliver. This would make the eventual exit from monetary accommodation harder 
and may ultimately threaten central banks’ credibility. (BIS 2012, 48)
The BIS’s position reflects its influential economist Claudio Borio’s long-standing 
criticism of  the narrow technical consensus on the effects of  the central bank balance 
sheet policies: “But the main challenges ahead are not analytical or technical; they are 
of  a political economy nature” (Borio 2011, 11). Bill Gross, the co-founder and co-chief  
investment officer of  Pimco, one of  the largest asset management firms, emphasizes the 
risks created by unconventional policies of  central banks in the global financial system:
Functioning yes, but perhaps not so moderately or smoothly—especially since 
2008. Policy responses by fiscal and monetary authorities have managed to prevent 
substantial haircutting of  the $200tn or so of  financial assets that comprises our 
global monetary system, yet in the process have increased the risk and lowered the 
yield of  sovereign securities which represent its core. (Gross 2012)
Most commentators on unconventional balance sheet policies of  central banks, as the position 
of  a Keynesian such as Krugman above shows, believe in the technical expertise of  central 
banks in preventing the collapse of  the financial system. The pivotal role of  central banks in 
post-crisis capitalism, however, needs to be challenged for allocative and distributive reasons. 
Unconventional central bank policies prevent the reform of  a dysfunctional banking system 
that fails to perform its allocative role, as bank credit does not flow to private companies. 
Low interest rates punish savers financially but support borrowers.
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Chapter 14
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
CENTRAL BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS: 
WHAT ARE CENTRAL BANKS FOR?
Sheila C. Dow
Introduction
The specification of  central banking functions and the institutional arrangements within 
which these functions are performed are open for discussion. The need for changes in 
central bank goals and operations in the face of  the financial crisis has opened up issues 
which, during the Great Moderation period, had been regarded as long settled.
One of  these issues concerns the goals of  central banks. While inflation targeting 
had been applied for some time by many central banks, the new economic environment 
seems to many to warrant an alternative; candidates for an alternative include nominal 
gross domestic product (GDP) targeting, unemployment targeting, and promoting 
financial stability. But here we consider the merits of  a range of  goals pursued 
simultaneously, with potential conflicts addressed by means of  judgment. Further, while 
we will emphasize the importance of  the role of  central banks, it will be recognized 
that they cannot exercise direct control, either of  macroeconomic aggregates or of  the 
financial sector. In attempting to achieve their goal(s), central banks have always had 
to tailor their policy instruments to the changing character and strength of  financial 
markets. The liberalization and globalization of  finance since the 1970s, and then the 
financial crisis, dramatically altered both the scale and sophistication of  financial markets 
and the relationship between central banks and financial institutions. But, while such 
developments challenge the effectiveness of  traditional instruments of  monetary policy, 
care must be taken not to exaggerate the power previously exercised by central banks. 
Even before the 1970s, central banks could only influence the level of  credit and money 
in the economy, not control it.
A further issue concerns the institutional arrangements within which central banks 
pursue their goals and in particular the case for central bank independence. The 
return of  central banks to major open-market operations in sovereign debt has eroded 
previous efforts to separate monetary policy and fiscal policy. At the same time, central 
bank activities have had their own direct political consequences, including substantial 
redistribution of  income. There are good reasons therefore to revisit the presumption 
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that central bank independence is beneficial. We will explore this issue in the light 
of  recent experience. But rather than limiting our discussion to the interdependence 
between fiscal policy and monetary policy, we extend the discussion to an issue which 
lay at the heart of  the banking crisis: the role of  the state in providing for society’s need 
for money and credit, which brings us back to the goals for central banks. What are 
central banks for?
We will see that how we discuss the role of  central banks and the appropriate design 
of  institutional arrangements depend crucially on the theoretical framework employed. 
The general equilibrium approach which has dominated the economic literature on 
monetary policy and institutional design is ahistorical, founded on assumptions of  well-
informed, atomistic, narrowly rational behavior within a stable equilibrium system; the 
classical dichotomy, which separates the real from the financial, has been a critical feature 
of  this approach for the analysis of  central banking. Attention will be drawn here, rather, 
to the significance of  social conventions, both in terms of  expectations about the behavior 
of  institutions, but also in terms of  markets valuing assets under uncertainty. This 
alternative approach embeds interdependencies between real and financial variables, 
between fiscal policy and monetary policy. The first approach treats the complications of  
policy practice as separable from, but nevertheless directed by, theory (Colander 2002), 
while we will consider them a necessary element in theory, which is to be useful for policy 
and institutional design (see further Dow 2012a).
We will consider these pressing current issues for the future of  central banking by 
taking a historical approach, revisiting the rationale for central banking and its relations 
with the state on the one hand, and banks and society more generally on the other. In 
the process, we will consider the role of  collateral and in particular the possibility of  
sovereign debt no longer being regarded as a safe asset. This is part of  the more general 
problem of  an insufficiency of  good collateral, given the fiscal problems of  governments 
and the massive size of  the financial superstructure. Put another way, there is not enough 
reason for confidence in the value of  assets.
A major factor in the buildup to the crisis was an overconfidence in the value of  
assets, which was unwarranted given the weak knowledge base on which such valuations 
rested. But the fall in capital values during the crisis meant that there was good reason 
to be concerned about the exposure of  retail banking to risk, and the requirement for 
government involvement in bailouts; reasonable doubts about value thus spread to some 
sovereign debt. We will thus consider the role of  central banks in relation to government 
in terms of  collateral. In the process, we consider collateral broadly, as an asset which 
may be intangible and where claims on it may not be legally enforceable (such as the 
source of  value of  bank deposits). We thus focus on collateral as the basis for confidence 
in the financial system.
Banking History and the Role of  Collateral
It is important to understand the history of  banking and central banking, not only 
in order to understand how we arrived at the current situation, but also because past 
experience has been a crucial factor in determining social conventions, in particular the 
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degree of  trust and confidence (in collateral, broadly defined) which lies at the heart of  a 
successful system (see further Chick and Dow 2013).
In many countries, retail banking and then central banking arose from the sovereign’s 
need to borrow, but in others they emerged (where there was a sufficient basis of  trust) 
in response to society’s need both for an alternative to specie and for credit. Banks were 
able to supply the need for banknotes, and then checking deposits, through the provision 
of  credit. Money thus arose from the social relation between borrower and lender, which 
included crucially an assessment of  default risk (whether or not protected by collateral).1 
As confidence in lenders increased, this new money in the form of  notes, and then 
checking deposits, was inside money because there was a matching liability on the part 
of  the bank. There was confidence in lenders’ liabilities, based on the nature of  bank 
assets: specie, secured and unsecured loans, and corporate and government debt. But 
these assets were limited as collateral because they were not all liquid; fractional reserve 
banking meant that not all demands to liquidate deposits could be met. The system 
nevertheless worked as long as there was further collateral in the form of  confidence in 
bank money as a social relation (based on confidence in the banks’ capacity to manage 
risk and thus to convert deposits to cash on demand), such that the redeposit ratio was 
high. This kind of  confidence is not calculable, as in mainstream theory, but is a social 
convention, based on experience.2 In time, the obligation to redeem deposits with specie 
lapsed.
Chick (1986) explains how central banking evolved to support the emergence of  a 
banking system. The banking system as a whole could face a crisis if  there was a shortage 
of  liquidity in aggregate such that, even with an interbank market, the banks would be 
unable to meet their liabilities. Because of  the risk of  contagion in expectations, runs could 
occur on some banks because of  problems identified with other banks. Confidence in 
banks to honor their liabilities in cash meant that bank liabilities were not generally called 
in but rather continued in circulation. But the valuation of  bank assets rests ultimately 
on judgment, since there are no demonstrably true measures of  default risk. So revisions 
of  judgments with respect to some banks’ assets might reasonably alter judgments about 
other banks’ assets. Further, the valuation of  bank assets that reassured depositors was 
more generally endogenous to the system: if  loans were called in and collateral acquired 
on an economy-wide scale, asset values would fall, increasing default risk, and reducing 
protection against it. A liquidity problem can turn into a solvency problem.
To protect themselves from more minor calls on their assets, the banks held some assets 
regarded as comparatively or perfectly safe from collapse in capital value: short-term 
government debt and deposits with the central bank. The latter, together with central 
bank notes, were regarded as outside money. The central bank had a matching liability, 
but this was disregarded because, if  there was risk of  default, the central bank could 
call on the resources of  government. The relationship was mutual. Where central banks 
managed government debt and the government’s bank account, governments could 
avoid default by borrowing from the central bank. The central bank was thus the lender 
of  last, if  not first, resort for the government. But, following recent experience of  central 
bank independence and the withdrawal of  the facility, the fiscal position of  governments 
has become a substantial concern for the viability of  commercial banks. Until now, the 
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lender-of-last-resort facility was generally the subject for debate only as a matter between 
central banks and commercial banks; now it is also an issue for governments.
The role of  collateral in sharing risk up until recent decades was relatively well defined, 
though it was still subject to variations in the value of  collateral. It was a major element in 
bank loan contracts whereby the specialized knowledge of  the borrower on the part of  the 
lender led to a mutually satisfactory agreement as to how the borrower would compensate 
the lender in the event of  default. Otherwise, collateral in the form of  state support for 
banking and for the economy more generally was imperfectly specified, but it nevertheless 
inspired the convention of  confidence. The success of  the banking system, supported 
by the central bank, thus provided a good foundation for the massive growth of  non-
bank financial intermediaries and securities markets, based on confidence in the value of  
sovereign debt, the practices of  the central bank, and the real assets of  the economy.
But now the role of  collateral in bank lending contracts is more diffuse and also more 
complex in the relations between the state and the private sector. Debt valuation came 
to rely less on the types of  client relationship previously at the core of  bank lending 
and more on pricing based on quantified risk models; transaction costs fell accordingly, 
encouraging a much wider participation in lending. The securitization encouraged by 
the introduction of  capital adequacy requirements in the 1980s distributed the risk away 
from the originator of  loans. Collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps 
further redistributed risk, such that the knowledge of  the original borrower and collateral 
became ever more diffuse. Further, the globalization of  finance meant that the collateral 
ultimately backing assets could be located in a wide range of  countries of  which borrowers 
might have limited knowledge, rendering the ultimate borrower even more anonymous. 
This diffusion was compounded by the sheer scale of  the financial superstructure relative 
to the collateral base represented by the real economy and the support of  the state.
In retrospect, markets realized the weak knowledge base on which these assets had 
been acquired and bets placed; the connection between structured product valuation and 
the value prospects of  the underlying assets was very tenuous such that the valuation relied 
more on an amorphous (and as it turned out, unwarranted) confidence in financial-sector 
pricing. When that confidence was punctured, the value of  collateral fell dramatically 
across the board. Contrary to the conventional view—based on the efficient markets 
hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model—that any deviation of  prices from their 
“true” value would be reversed by market processes, defaults and the freezing of  markets 
in particular assets ensued; these were discontinuities which further eroded confidence. 
The social conventions which had been built up to support the financial system thus 
broke down, resulting in a financial crisis. This challenge to confidence in market forces 
refocused attention on central banks for a solution to the crisis. Central banks were thus 
forced to address the policy goal of  financial stability rather than inflation control and to 
design new instruments fit for this purpose.
Central Banks and Financial Stability
While maintaining financial stability had continued to be one of  the formal roles of  
most central banks during the Great Moderation period, in practice it had taken a 
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back seat to the primary role of  inflation targeting, a development dubbed historically 
as “idiosyncratic” (Epstein 2013) or an “aberration” (Cobham 2012).3 Indeed, the 
content of, and emphasis on, a range of  different functions of  central banks has varied 
over the decades (Goodhart 2011; Buiter 2012; Cobham 2012). These functions have 
included the provision of  a safe money asset; regulation, monitoring and supervision 
of  the banking system; exchange rate management; debt management; and lending 
to government as required, subject to maintaining the value of  the currency.4 These 
functions can be summarized as promoting financial stability as the basis for private 
sector decision making. But in addition, as Epstein (2013) points out, central banks in 
developed and developing countries have also played an active part in supporting, and 
indeed promoting, economic development, in particular by encouraging commercial 
bank lending to finance investment in particular sectors and regions. Measures have 
included credit controls, capital controls, exchange rate management, and financing the 
state.
Central banks have thus historically played an important part in promoting economic 
goals alongside financial stability.5 Following the narrowing of  central bank functions in 
recent decades around the inflation-targeting function, central banks have now reverted 
to a much wider range of  functions in order to address the current crisis; while the form 
of  the instruments may differ, the principles arguably are close to what was normal in 
many countries before the Great Moderation.
The focus on inflation targeting had meant inattention in particular to the role of  
banks, and how their practices may impact on the financial system, and on the real 
economy. Deregulation had meant that, while retail banks had traditionally held loan 
contracts along with (primarily sovereign) debt, now they had securitized loans, and also 
extended their asset base to include structured products that had a weak backing of  
collateral. Bank regulation had become focused almost exclusively on capital adequacy 
ratios, based on an assumption that the risk profile of  bank assets was measurable and 
that the assets counted as capital were of  sound value. But violent swings in asset prices, 
and thus valuation of  collateral, challenged these assumptions and damaged confidence 
in the operations of  the financial sector. If  the role of  the central bank as promoting 
financial stability founded on the provision of  a safe money asset is to be taken seriously, 
then the first task is to ensure a sound retail banking system which inspires confidence in 
their liabilities.
Because many have identified the root of  the banking crisis in the development of  
universal banking following deregulation dating from the 1970s, there is much support 
for some kind of  ring fencing of  traditional retail banking operations from other financial 
activities. According to the report by the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking 
(2011; the Vickers Report), for example, only retail banks would have the liquidity 
support of  the central bank, but with the quid pro quo of  strict regulation, for example, 
of  levels of  liquidity and capital. Retail banks could thus continue to reap the benefits 
of  fractional reserve banking, which gives them the capacity to engage in medium- 
and long-term debt contracts in advance of  deposits, thus financing increased capital 
expenditure. But this privilege comes at a cost, associated with regulatory restrictions on 
portfolios, and the cost of  higher liquidity holdings and capital than in recent decades. 
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It was because of  the costs of  retail bank regulation and the increasing competition from 
non-bank financial intermediaries that banks pressured governments to deregulate them. 
Indeed, the buildup to the crisis was a symptom of  a shift in power from central banks 
to commercial banks.
For some commentators, a reversal of  that shift to the status quo ante is not enough. 
Other proposals have thus been aired which would put the provision of  money more or 
less completely into the hands of  the central bank, effectively putting an end to fractional 
reserve banking altogether (see e.g. Kotlikoff  2010; Jackson, Dyson, and Hodgson 2013). 
If  the cause of  the crisis is identified as being too much credit, the solution is seen to 
be the removal of  the capacity of  retail banks to create credit. Yet it is credit to finance 
speculation, causing asset bubbles, that has been seen as the problem rather than credit 
to finance productive activity. Full nationalization of  banking could ensure the direction 
of  credit to productive purposes only (an opportunity missed currently in the UK, where 
two major retail banks have substantial public ownership). Nevertheless, credit would still 
be provided outside retail banking, even if  not created in advance of  deposits. Indeed, 
even outside the net of  liquidity support from the central bank, what can be classified 
as “shadow banking”6 has already increasingly provided substantial proportions of  total 
credit, and narrow banking proposals would, if  anything, encourage even more recourse 
to shadow banking.
The role of  the central bank can be seen partly in terms of  redistributing risk. Much 
of  the discussion of  bank reform with respect to the “too big to fail” problem has been 
focused on reducing the risk exposure of  the public sector. Beyond that, the proposals to 
segment retail from investment banking, with the lender-of-last-resort facility available 
only to the former, aim to minimize its risk, even at the expense of  increasing it in 
the latter. In effect, according to this view central banks should aim to protect retail 
depositors by providing collateral in the form of  access to liquidity in the repo market. At 
the same time, central banks should aim to provide retail banks with sufficient protection 
to encourage them to lend to business. But the danger is that the interconnectedness 
of  financial markets would spread instability from non-retail banking to retail banking, 
threatening the provision of  a safe money asset and the capacity to lend to business. 
There is the danger of  a fallacy of  composition such that, at one end of  the spectrum, 
there could be a systemic collapse of  asset values across the board, while at the other 
end, there could be a run on retail banks for which fractional reserves provide inadequate 
protection. While separating off  retail banking has been presented (e.g. by King 2009) as 
a mechanism for making banks small enough to fail, to contemplate retail bank failure 
would subvert the goal for central banks of  providing a safe money asset (without the 
need for calculative assessment by the general population). The goal rather should be to 
have banks too well regulated and supervised to fail.
Nevertheless, separating off  retail banking (either in the private sector or moving it 
into the public sector) would not be a solution to the possibility of  systemic collapse in 
asset markets. The success of  retail banking in the past provided a secure foundation 
on which all the rest of  the financial superstructure grew, and grew exponentially. As 
Chick (1986) explains, it was the success of  mutual support between central banks and 
retail banks that encouraged the growth of  non-bank financial intermediaries; but then 
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retail banks lobbied, successfully, for deregulation to allow them to compete. Investment 
banking was then increasingly conducted alongside retail banking within “universal” 
banks and subject to its own regulation. But shadow banking added a further, largely 
unregulated, layer to this inverted pyramid, stoking the boom in asset markets and paving 
the way for the crisis. The success of  retail banking, when combined with deregulation, 
thus carried the seeds of  its own destruction. As Minsky (1986) had argued, stability 
breeds instability. The danger continues to lie particularly in the capacity of  shadow 
banking to take up the slack left by the ring-fenced retail banks but without the liquidity 
support of  the central bank. Successfully ring-fenced retail banking would ensure that 
a safe money asset was provided, but it would still leave the wider scope for financial 
instability. Therefore, while ring fencing would be a step in the right direction, it would 
not on its own be enough to prevent a further crisis.
It is insufficient therefore to aim to redistribute risk, but in addition, the aim for central 
banks should be to reduce risk in aggregate. Macroprudential policies aim to reduce 
aggregate risk by stabilizing bank portfolios directly—for example, by countercyclical 
capital adequacy requirements or by limiting leverage ratios. Such policies carry their 
own risks; as Minsky had explained in Schumpeterian terms, regulatory constraints are 
a spur to innovation. Haldane (2012) accordingly argues for macroprudential regulation 
to be as simple as possible (e.g. limits on the size of  institutions) because of  the danger 
of  unintended consequences, what he calls the “risk of  backdoor complexity.” Even ring 
fencing retail banking might be subverted in a way which even complex regulation would 
find it difficult to control.
Admati and Hellwig (2012) identify bank capital as the fundamental weakness 
that threatens to spread risk around the system (increasing systemic risk), and thus 
advocate markedly higher capital requirements. Again, while increased capital would 
encourage more confidence in banks’ capacity to absorb losses and thus reduce the 
risk of  banking crises, it is by no means sufficient to prevent or resolve crises caused by 
liquidity constraints (Tymoigne 2010). In particular, it does not address the problem 
of  financial activity outside the regulatory net, which stricter regulation of  course 
encourages, and its capacity to create unwarranted swings in asset prices, and thus 
liquidity problems.
Frydman and Goldberg (2011) argue that the focus of  monetary policy should be 
on stabilizing asset markets, given that imperfect knowledge prevents markets from 
equilibrating themselves. Mehrling (2011) also sees risk spreading across the system, 
arising from unstable asset prices and even frozen asset markets. Shadow banks, which 
provide capital markets with essential credit, operate matched books with the aid of  
derivative products (unlike fractional reserve retail banks) but are still vulnerable to 
price swings beyond the risk measures of  derivatives. He argues therefore that central 
banks should act as “dealer of  last resort” in order to provide liquidity to a range of  
asset markets and to stabilize asset prices. Just as we argued above that the capacity for 
credit creation provided by fractional reserve banking potentially performs a vital social 
function, so potentially does the rest of  the financial system. But this potential is only 
reached if  unstable asset markets do not divert financial activity into self-reinforcing asset 
bubbles (and crashes).
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But it is important not to confine the discussion to financial institutions and financial 
markets. The risk of  value fluctuations (particularly in a downward direction) also arise 
from real economic activity. While uncertainty prevents markets from identifying “true” 
asset values, such that conventional valuations prevail, these valuations are not purely 
subjective. While these valuations may take on a life of  their own for a considerable 
time (as in the long boom prior to the crisis), eventually reality (particularly in the form 
of  defaults, but also new data on real economic conditions) breaks through. Against 
this backdrop of  conventional valuations, the state of  banks’ expectations about real 
conditions influences their willingness to extend credit to business activity rather than 
financial activity. Expectations with respect to the real economy, and actual levels of  
output and employment, are also influenced by the government’s fiscal stance, which in 
turn is influenced by market pressures. Aggregate risk can thus be addressed by increasing 
confidence in asset valuation, not just on the basis of  financial-market behavior, but 
grounded in evidence of  public sector efforts to support the economy, which can include 
the efforts of  the central bank.
Fiscal policy is relevant, not only in terms of  its effect on real economic conditions, but 
also in terms of  the sustainability of  sovereign debt. The rapid growth of  the financial 
superstructure had increased the need for collateral as a way of  giving confidence to 
asset holders. At the same time, the crisis eroded confidence in a range of  assets that 
might have inspired confidence, and this has extended to sovereign debt. There is a 
particular problem for the Eurozone: that its design allowed for a range of  sovereign 
debt of  varying quality, while maintaining a common interest rate policy. This has been 
a concern from the start (see e.g. EC 1990), but it was overridden by the priority to 
proceed with monetary union. This priority can be seen as primarily political, yet there 
was an argument current in the early days of  discussion of  monetary union by those 
dubbed the “monetarists” that monetary union itself  would generate the forces for 
economic convergence. The Maastricht Treaty sided with the “economist” argument 
that convergence was a precondition for monetary union. Nevertheless, the varying 
perceived quality of  sovereign debt within the Eurozone has caused a crisis situation, 
to be addressed by the European Central Bank (ECB). Some of  the doubts about the 
value of  sovereign debt arise from the necessity, given central bank independence, for 
any central bank involvement in government finance to require public negotiation and 
dispute. We therefore turn now to the issue of  central bank independence.
Central Bank Independence
While central banks have perforce become more interventionist again in order to deal with 
the crisis, the institutional framework is very different from before the Great Moderation 
in that central bank independence in some form is now the norm.7 When central 
banks were not independent, intervention was generally designed by government and 
implemented by central banks. Thus, for example, Goodhart (2011, 140) characterizes 
the role of  the Bank of  England during the period of  the 1930s to the 1960s as being 
to provide policy advice, to administer a system of  controls, and to manage markets. It 
was accepted that there was a simple accounting relationship between fiscal policy, its 
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finance by borrowing from the central bank or by central bank issuance of  sovereign 
debt, central bank management of  the stock of  public debt, and monetary policy; the 
resulting scope for conflict had to be managed.
But the new era of  intervention is being implemented within a sometimes 
uncomfortable process of  negotiation between governments and independent central 
banks. For those who anticipate a continuing need for intervention, or simply accept the 
accounting interdependencies between fiscal policy and monetary policy, independence 
poses problems, particularly for systems of  governance (as in the UK), which are otherwise 
highly centralized. For those who regard the current era of  intervention as a temporary 
response to an exogenously generated crisis, normality (including inflation targeting) can 
soon be restored, including full central bank independence. It is time to revisit the reasons 
why the norm of  central bank independence was promoted in the first place.
The Maastricht Treaty provided the impetus for central banks in Europe to be made 
independent, even if, as in the UK, membership of  the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) was not pursued. The rationale, as provided in the summary of  European 
Community research on EMU (EC 1990), was that an independent central bank 
was more likely to achieve price stability, because it would be free from the political 
temptation to try to engineer a boom for electoral purposes. Political independence 
would thus enhance credibility in inflation targeting. The Maastricht conditions specified 
that, in order to make central bank independence sustainable, governments would need 
to accept restrictions on fiscal deficits. The argument was that either financing large 
deficits or dealing with a financial crisis if  governments were forced to default would 
threaten central bank independence; this would damage the capacity of  the central bank 
to meet its inflation target.
The argument for central bank independence (and for fiscal constraints on governments) 
was accordingly expressed in terms of  the primacy attached to the inflation target.8 The 
foundation for this argument is general equilibrium theory, which portrays real outcomes 
(production levels, employment, etc.) as determined in the long run by real productive 
capacity. Because fiscal policy in general is seen as interfering with equilibrating market 
forces, thus reducing growth, limits on fiscal policy are seen as having beneficial real 
consequences. Money and prices are separable from the real, but they have the capacity 
to interfere with real equilibrating forces in the short run by confusing expectations; an 
unexpected increase in the money supply, for example, can raise false expectations of  
conditions which warrant increased production levels and new investment, which later 
need to be reversed. The inflation that is assumed to follow inevitably from an increased 
rate of  growth in the money supply thus imposes costs that reduce growth.
The central bank independence literature has thus been focused almost exclusively 
on measuring success in relation to controlling inflation.9 The ultimate test is taken to 
be how far inflation is lower in countries with more independent central banks. While 
the EC (1990) research reported the outcome of  these studies as “clearly” indicating a 
positive relationship between degree of  independence and success in inflation control, 
there has in fact been a conflicting range of  conclusions drawn from the data in the many 
subsequent studies. Indeed, in any case, questions arise as to the direction of  causation 
between central bank independence and inflation. Thus, even judged in narrow terms 
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against the inflation target, the case for central bank independence is by no means 
unassailable.
The primacy of  the inflation target also distracted attention from the central bank 
goal of  financial stability, which in many cases continued as a formal requirement, even 
if  abandoned in practice as unnecessary, given the presumption of  efficient markets 
(see further Borio 2011). There was a concern that pressure to set interest rates with 
an eye to financial stability could conflict with inflation targeting (see e.g. Goodhart 
and Schoenmaker 1995). While there is inevitably scope for conflict between the two 
goals, the response in terms of  institutional arrangements was conditioned by a second 
theoretical separation, between monetary policy and bank regulation. The former 
was based on general equilibrium macroeconomic theory, which dealt in aggregates 
without reference to financial institutions,10 while bank regulation was taken to refer to 
microeconomic theory of  banks as firms and/or institutional theory. The outcome was 
thus an institutional separation between monetary policy on the one hand and bank 
regulation and supervision on the other, just as monetary policy had been institutionally 
separated from fiscal policy.
But these separations broke down in the face of  the crisis, exposing the weakness of  
their theoretical foundation. Monetary policy in the form of  setting the official (repo) rate 
proved to be powerless in the face of  escalating rate premia on interbank lending and 
even of  the drying up of  the interbank market. Banks’ collateral in the repo market was 
viewed as involving the real possibility of  default risk in an environment of  collapsing 
asset values and highly leveraged portfolios, and thus brought about high-risk premia 
as a markup on the official rate. Monetary policymakers turned to asset purchases 
(quantitative easing) in an effort to drive down long rates—without the effect on inflation 
predicted by general equilibrium theory. While these purchases included private sector 
debt, the bulk took the form of  sovereign debt. Given the fiscal costs of  bank bailouts 
and the fiscal effects of  the recession arising from the bank crisis, this surge of  central 
bank funding proved to be crucial. While in the past sovereign debt had been regarded as 
a safe asset for underpinning credit creation by banks, now the risk of  sovereign default 
had become a real possibility, further undermining banks’ own collateral. It was central 
banks’ actions that formed a backstop insofar as they could inspire confidence in their 
capacity to manage the crisis together with governments; this confidence provided the 
broad collateral that has allowed the financial system to survive the crisis (so far).
But the process of  addressing interdependencies was made more difficult by the 
institutional separation between monetary policy and fiscal policy on the one hand 
and between monetary policy and bank supervision on the other. This has been the 
case particularly in the Eurozone, where overcoming institutional separations requires 
multilateral, international negotiations. If  in fact the crisis was in part at least caused 
by these institutional separations, then the case is even stronger to develop new, formal 
institutional arrangements which address the inevitable interdependencies between 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, debt management, and bank regulation and supervision, 
as well as more generally between real and financial variables. To do so requires an 
articulation of  a different type of  theoretical framework that takes seriously the real 
experience of  monetary policy and bank regulation, and the importance of  institutional 
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arrangements, as in the body of  work of  Goodhart, Haldane, and Borio, and work in 
the post-Keynesian tradition, of  which a few examples are Arestis and Sawyer (1998), 
Bibow (2009), Chick (2013), Dow (2013c), Dymski (2010), Gabor (2011), Kregel (2009), 
and Morgan (2009).
Any theory abstracts by setting conceptual boundaries—for example, between 
the macro and the micro levels. But where these separations are not mirrored in 
reality, any policy advice based on these separations may be seriously misguided. 
The classical dichotomy, purported to hold between real and financial variables, had 
been critical for institutional (and policy) design, yet the evidence of  the financial 
and economic crisis has demonstrated that this dichotomy does not hold in reality. 
This general equilibrium approach, which provided the rationale for independent 
central banks, is expressed in terms of  the rational expectations view that monetary 
policy in the form of  interest rate setting would be transmitted to the general price 
level by means of  expectations, which accorded with rational expectations general 
equilibrium modeling itself. Any financial instability would be the result of  some 
external shock. Such shocks have been explained variously as real technology shocks, 
or some kind of  irrationality captured by the terms “uncertainty” or “animal spirits,” 
or even by sunspots (see further Dow 2013a, 2013b). According to this approach, the 
central bank can promote stability by efforts to keep expectations as close as possible 
to long-run equilibrium values, which are themselves determined by other, real forces. 
Indeed, financial instability had previously been explained by deviations of  money 
supply growth from its equilibrium path, something which central bank independence 
was explicitly designed to prevent.
New Keynesian theory has reinforced the importance of  central bank communications 
as a means of  ensuring that information is as far as possible symmetric. According to this 
view, the current financial crisis is explained by various factors that distorted markets 
and their capacity to equilibrate naturally. Of  these, the main distortions have been 
identified as asymmetric information about risk, on the one hand, and the moral hazard 
created by the lender-of-last-resort facility provided by central banks on the other. The 
aim is to make the subject matter as close as possible to the general equilibrium world, 
so that markets may themselves promote financial stability. The role of  the central bank 
remains one of  interest rate setting in order to meet an inflation target, such that real 
expectations are not distorted by inflation uncertainty. For New Keynesians, the classical 
dichotomy holds, at least in the long run. There is no reason for the central bank not to 
be independent.
But we have seen the central role played by confidence (in banks and in the central 
bank) in the successful functioning of  the financial system and in the economy it serves. 
Confidence is only robust if  backed up by real experience, and the most profound, recent 
real experience has been of  financial and economic crisis. This experience has made 
clear the interdependencies between the government’s fiscal stance and the value of  
sovereign debt, restrictions on and monitoring of  bank behavior, monetary policy, and 
the viability of  the banking system. More generally this experience has demonstrated the 
interdependencies between financial stability and economic stability. Confidence is only 
now gradually being restored through the experience of  central banks intervening in 
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sovereign debt markets, attempting direct bank lending, and being more actively engaged 
in promoting financial stability by designing new macroprudential policies.
While in some countries, as in the UK, institutional change has already occurred in 
recognition of  the need for central banks to be more actively engaged with the goal of  
financial stability, the need for more formal recognition of  the need for coordination 
between government and central banks has not been addressed. Yet, the importance of  
sovereign debt as collateral for the banking system, and thus of  debt management, means 
that central banks are dependent on the fiscal stance of  governments when aiming to 
provide a secure financial system as well as pursuing monetary policy. At the same time, 
in pursuing their goals with respect to growth and economic development, governments 
are dependent on central banks. During the Great Moderation period, this was taken 
to mean dependence on central bank success in meeting an inflation target. The crisis 
has demonstrated that such success cannot prevent financial instability and indeed 
that prioritizing inflation control may actually facilitate a crisis (Borio 2011). Once the 
potential contribution of  the financial sector to growth and development is more fully 
recognized and understood, there is scope for considering a range of  policy instruments 
for central banks, such as a more active role in directing credit.
The new skepticism about the capabilities of  market forces in allocating credit paves 
the way for considering how central banks might produce more socially beneficial 
outcomes. Indeed, such thinking is already evident in the actions of  many central banks. 
But then, since it was inflation targeting that was the basis for central bank independence, 
a move toward wider goals addressed to economic as well as financial conditions calls 
for the relationship between central banks and governments to be reconfigured in order 
for these goals to be pursued as effectively as possible. This is not to argue that central 
banks should be completely subservient to government. Central banks could be assigned 
a goal such as financial stability, for which they can then be advocates; as Borio (2011) 
argues, a financial-stability goal may require central banks insisting on “taking away the 
punchbowl” in the face of  booming asset markets, something which may be politically 
unpalatable to government. Rather it is a matter of  designing institutional arrangements 
to both reflect and manage the real interdependencies between fiscal policy, debt 
management, monetary policy, and financial regulation.
Within this more complex account of  behavioral and institutional interdependencies, 
it is misguided to seek a “better” macroeconomic model or to seek an alternative singular 
quantitative target and policy instrument (Morgan 2009). Rather, models and policy 
instruments should be regarded as simply some of  the tools available to central banks 
in a pluralist approach to knowledge and to policy. For this purpose, it is important to 
draw on theory which recognizes interdependencies in real economic relations and 
the importance of  institutional arrangements for processes. Further, the institutional 
arrangements and logistics of  policy design and implementation require input from 
theory as to behavior within institutions and as to the role of  judgment. Policy is more 
effective the more robust the knowledge base and the mechanisms for communication, 
implying recourse to microeconomic theory of  financial market behavior as well as 
attention to signs of  systemic instability at the macro level. Finally, if, as this line of  
argument suggests, central banks go beyond the pursuit of  a single, quantified target set 
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by government, then they are engaging in active policymaking, such that independence 
from the democratic process becomes an important issue again.
Conclusion
The urgent need for a policy response to the crisis highlighted the limitations of  a central 
bank being required to put a priority on inflation targeting and relying on official rate 
setting as the policy instrument. The crisis demonstrated that central banks needed to 
return to their traditional role of  regulating and monitoring bank behavior, as well as 
managing government finance and public debt, thus internalizing the interdependencies 
with monetary policy. The provision of  a safe money asset and the capacity for banks 
to finance capital investment requires a sound basis for depositors to redeposit and for 
banks to lend—that is, good collateral on the part both of  banks and their customers. 
This requires good bank regulation and monitoring, reliable sovereign debt, and a sound 
economy; these in turn rely on financial stability. In other words, the central bank and 
the government are interdependent. Central bank independence, designed explicitly for 
inflation targeting, is no longer fit for the expanded purposes of  central banks, given their 
interdependencies with government policy.
Returning to a broader set of  functions will inevitably involve conflict and therefore the 
exercise of  judgment. Markets prefer clarity and the absence of  uncertainty. But economic 
processes are complex and central bank knowledge is inevitably uncertain. Further, central 
banks can only influence developments; attempts to control them by regulation will 
generally prompt innovation designed to subvert them. It is important therefore to adopt 
a “belt and braces” approach to promoting financial stability, with a range of  regulatory 
measures acting alongside efforts to stabilize asset prices. Reducing risk in aggregate is the 
most effective way to deal with a massive financial superstructure built on a limited stock 
of  real capital—that is, to address the problem of  insufficient collateral. Success would 
provide a sound basis for private sector decision making and thus for economic growth.
Notes
 1 It was the securing of  debt by collateral that Heinsohn and Steiger (2006) identify as the sign 
of  monetization of  the economy; the collateral was both productive in itself  and also generated 
new credit.
 2 It was a notable feature of  the banking crisis beginning in 2007 that there was very limited 
public knowledge of  the system of  deposit insurance; the safety of  bank deposits was taken for 
granted. Only when the risk of  default became real did the safety of  bank deposits become a 
matter of  any calculation.
 3 Even where central banks had additional formal goals, along with inflation targeting, with 
respect to financial stability and economic stability, the potential conflicts between these goals 
tended to be resolved in recent decades (up to the crisis) by giving primacy to the inflation 
target.
 4 Goodhart (2011) includes in the latter function constraining the financing of  the state in 
normal times.
 5 This interventionist role has waxed and waned over time. There has tended to be a pattern of  
a less interventionist stance before a crisis, followed by arguments for a more interventionist 
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stance to resolve the crisis; Epstein points out that current debates on the role of  the central 
bank mirror those in the 1930s, when events similarly required interventionist central banking.
 6 There is a range of  opinion as to how exactly to define shadow banking, e.g. whether it includes 
investment banking.
 7 The USA is a notable exception. But there governance is dispersed among a range of  agencies to 
allow a system of  checks and balances in a way that would be difficult to achieve in other, more 
centralized systems. Among other countries, the degree of  independence is highly variable.
 8 While this was the main rationale, other possible rationales include preventing governments distorting 
fiscal policy because of  their ability otherwise to borrow easily and cheaply from the central bank.
 9 Quantifying the degree of  independence has required particular attention, given the different 
organizational arrangements and conventions in different countries.
10 As Borio (2011) points out, these models were effectively real rather than monetary models; see 
further Morgan (2009).
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IS NEW GOVERNANCE THE IDEAL 
ARCHITECTURE FOR GLOBAL  
FINANCIAL REGULATION?
Annelise Riles1
Introduction: Regulatory Pluralism and the  
Interrelationship of  Legal Regimes
The central transnational regulatory challenge of  the moment is how to manage large 
cross-border institutions that can jeopardize the health of  the entire global economy. 
So-called global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) are cross-border 
institutions that are so large or interconnected that they are potentially too big to fail 
(TBTF). Equally importantly, such institutions are subject to multiple, overlapping, and 
even sometimes conflicting legal regimes.
From the legal perspective, the challenge G-SIFIs pose to global financial regulation 
is the problem of  the interdependence of  regulatory regimes in a global system that 
is inherently pluralistic. The threat of  regulatory arbitrage that underlies much of  the 
push for the harmonization of  financial regulation is plausible only if  legal regimes are 
sufficiently fungible and interconnected on the one hand, and yet sufficiently different 
in regulatory substance or approach on the other, that in some circumstances they can 
become viable alternatives from the market participants’ point of  view. Conversely, where 
markets are interconnected, one approach to regulatory oversight in one jurisdiction 
produces externalities in other regulatory regimes.
This article examines the way the international financial regulatory system is 
addressing this challenge, as exemplified by one of  the prime organs of  global financial 
regulation today: the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The G20 launched the FSB as its 
technocratic arm of  policy creation and implementation in 2009, transforming an earlier 
organization. Its core functions and methodologies are coordination, standard setting, 
implementation of  global standards, and identification and assessment of  cross-border 
financial risks.
One cannot but be impressed with the sheer volume of  initiatives the FSB has 
undertaken since its relaunch, and by the remarkable leadership, energy, and acumen 
behind these. In this article, I take the FSB as a target of  critical analysis precisely because 
the FSB represents arguably the state of  the art in international financial governance: it 
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is an experimental, purposeful, and energetic institution that deploys the most innovative 
international financial regulation methodology today.
The FSB’s approach, like that of  most domestic and international regulators, is to 
tackle discrete, pressing problems through tailored policy initiatives—for example, 
determining which banks should be designated as G-SIFIs, drafting rules on executive 
compensation, or deciding how much and what kind of  capital such banks should be 
required to set aside. These are complex questions that leave little time for an “eagle’s eye 
view” of  all of  this activity taken as a whole. And yet, built into the structure of  the Basel 
Accords and of  the numerous activities of  the FSB, there nevertheless is an inchoate 
but distinct ambition that this activity will ultimately add up to a larger global financial-
governance project.
Thus, it is important to carefully consider the sum of  all these parts, to reflect 
on where this flurry of  activity is leading, and to evaluate whether the implied 
target of  these activities is sufficient to face future financial crises. The question of  
regulatory form—of  the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of  the emerging global 
financial architecture—remains surprisingly underexamined by both academics and 
policymakers. For example, to date, the FSB has never clearly articulated, let alone 
defended, its model of  regulatory form—what I will call the new governance (NG) 
architecture.
We know that regulatory architecture—the form regulation takes (i.e. rules versus 
standards, hard law versus soft law, penalties versus rewards, etc.)—impacts upon the 
efficacy of  regulatory initiatives, the legitimacy of  regulation, and its distributive effects. 
For example, self-regulation is a regulatory architecture that was once taken for granted 
by many as the best way of  achieving certain regulatory objectives, and yet it is widely 
acknowledged today that it has clear limitations. Indeed, the understanding that regulatory 
architecture matters is precisely the premise of  NG initiatives (described in Part III): for 
its proponents, NG offers a more effective and just regulatory form for achieving the 
same substantive policy goals that one might pursue through either so-called command-
and-control regulation or self-regulation.
This article aims to initiate a debate and propose a research agenda regarding the 
emerging form of  international financial governance architecture. It does so by bringing 
together what is known in other legal and social scientific fields about the particular 
regulatory technologies deployed by the FSB. The aim of  this article is not to propose an 
alternative architecture, but rather to lay the groundwork for thinking through alternatives 
by suggesting how we might approach a more careful diagnosis of  the potential problems 
with the current approach.
It is often taken for granted that the current system is the only plausible alternative 
to an older form of  governance sometimes disparaged as “command and control” 
regulation. This older view is, to some extent rightly, seen as outmoded and ill-suited to 
current regulatory challenges. However, it is sometimes then assumed that any criticism 
of  the current approach is also an implicit argument for a return to command and 
control, or conversely, that a criticism of  command and control is in itself  an argument 
for NG regulation, as if  there can only be two possibilities. A more rational approach 
might consider the strengths and weaknesses of  the NG approach on its own terms. 
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Only once we evaluate the efficacy of  the current model can we determine whether it is 
indeed the best option and how it might be reformed.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Part II, I describe the pervading understanding 
of  “the problem” of  G-SIFIs at successive layers of  complexity, and then discuss what 
kind of  practical policy response to this problem is entailed in the regulatory approach 
of  the FSB. In Part III, I analyze the problems and solutions outlined in Part II from the 
standpoint of  the body of  regulatory theory that most directly corresponds to (and has 
most directly influenced) this approach. This body of  regulatory theory—the so-called 
NG literature—claims developments in global financial governance as a prime example 
of  its applications, and has indirectly influenced the architecture of  global financial 
governance via models borrowed from initiatives in Europe and the USA.
In Part IV, I evaluate NG as implemented by the FSB as an architecture of  international 
financial governance. Experts in financial regulation who have focused on the effects of  
particular NG initiatives prior to and since the financial crisis are far less enthusiastic 
than proponents of  NG about its practical prospects for success in this area. Indeed, 
much of  the initiative for current transnational rule making derives from concerns 
about the potential pitfalls or limitations of  pre-financial crisis, NG-style initiatives as 
applied in the USA and in Europe to the relationship between regulators and financial-
market participants. And yet ironically, at the very moment at which the FSB is busy 
creating rules and procedures to supplement the failures of  pre-2008 domestic regulation 
that, in many North Atlantic countries, was largely inspired by NG, the FSB is itself  
applying much of  the same regulatory architecture, with little critical evaluation, to the 
relationship between international and domestic regulators—as a tool of  international 
regulatory coordination. To make matters worse, in the process of  transposing NG into 
a tool of  international regulatory coordination, some of  the most innovative aspects of  
NG have been lost, diluted, or disregarded in practice.
As described in the conclusion (Part V), a preliminary hypothesis emerges from this 
analysis: NG mechanisms may be effective in resolving some kinds of  problems caused 
by the interrelationship of  legal regimes in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are 
unlikely to be suitable to all problems. This in turn suggests an agenda for future research: 
detailed study of  the precise conditions in which NG tools may or may not be effective in 
international financial governance is sorely needed.
Part II: The FSB Approach to Global Financial Architecture
A. The challenge of  G-SIFIs as a problem of   
international legal coordination
As mentioned at the outset, the challenge of  G-SIFIs is that they are difficult to control 
from the perspective of  any singular jurisdiction, and yet their failure can have serious 
consequences for the entire global economy. The regulation of  G-SIFIs is therefore 
an inherently transnational problem that demands both practical coordination among 
regulators and an understanding of  how national and international regulatory regimes 
interact. The proposed responses to the risks posed by G-SIFIs can be divided into 
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the operationally desirable but politically unpalatable on the one hand and the more 
politically feasible but difficult to operationalize on the other.
Option 1: Break up the G-SIFIs
If  certain institutions are too systemically important and complex to fail, then the most 
logical proposal is to break them up into smaller entities. Several prominent academic 
commentators, and even some prominent market participants, have questioned whether 
the increasingly large size of  financial conglomerates contributes to wider economic 
welfare to a degree that is proportionate to the global economic externalities they impose. 
Legal scholars, likewise, have proposed that existing antitrust law might be used to break 
up some of  these conglomerates (Reich 2010). However, most policymakers believe that 
this approach is, for the moment, unfeasible due to the opposition of  powerful financial 
institutions (Krugman 2010).
Option 2: Government liquidation or nationalization in conditions of  crisis
If  the failure of  a G-SIFI spreads risk throughout the financial system and imposes 
costs on taxpayers, another logical proposal would be to give regulators the authority to 
nationalize or liquidate banks whose capital ratio falls below a certain level. However, 
again, many observers believe this is politically unfeasible at least in the USA due to the 
public’s distaste for government ownership of  private assets and regulators’ fear that 
liquidation is an admission of  regulatory failure.
Option 3: Preparedness
The dominant approach, therefore, has been to focus on drafting firm-specific plans for 
a more orderly resolution of  these institutions. This is the approach embodied in the 
American Dodd–Frank legislation, as well as in the focus on identifying G-SIFIs, and 
requiring that they hold up to an additional 2.5 percent of  capital in reserve, in addition 
to the amount enshrined in the Basel III Accords and implemented in recent framework 
documents promulgated by the FSB.
The centerpiece of  this approach is the imposition of  additional capital requirements 
on G-SIFIs, both to guard against and ultimately insulate taxpayers from bearing the cost 
of  resolution. Other proposals include mandating that financial institutions create “living 
wills” that purport to define how they would be resolved at times of  crisis and shifting the 
burden of  loss to bond holders by mandating that certain categories of  bonds stipulate 
that they will convert to ordinary shares when a bank’s capitalization drops to a certain 
level (so-called CoCos). There are also proposals to impose additional taxes on G-SIFIs 
to create a fund that would cover resolution costs or to ask other financial institutions to 
cover the cost of  the bailout of  one of  their peers after a crisis.
Problems remain with these efforts to prepare for the next failure of  a G-SIFI. 
First, many question whether the preparations are enough. Lehman itself, for example, 
probably would not have been required to post the additional capital requirements 
demanded of  G-SIFIs under the current regime. CoCos raise a host of  problems, from 
how to price such instruments, to whether they are open to legal challenge, to their 
possible contagion effects at times of  crisis. More generally, planning for the future is 
difficult and the experience of  past crises is not always a good guide.
The corollary: Coordination among regulators
The backstop to this preparedness approach therefore is better coordination among 
regulators with the hope that it will lead to increased trust and coordination during a 
future crisis. This focus on building channels for coordination and information sharing 
responds directly to the failures of  coordination between US and UK regulators during 
the Lehman crisis. Yet commentators and policymakers alike have decried inadequate 
levels of  information sharing regarding G-SIFIs among national regulators.
In particular, the failure of  a G-SIFI creates potential conflicts of  interest between a 
G-SIFI’s home jurisdiction and the host jurisdictions in which the G-SIFI does business. 
In a situation of  G-SIFI failure, regulators and courts are often tempted to favor their 
own nationals over other creditors. Because home and host regulators anticipate such 
behavior at moments of  the failure of  a G-SIFI, they may be reticent to share information 
for fear of  creating tactical advantages for other jurisdictions.
Hence, the problem of  coordination between home and host regulators is a central 
focus of  the FSB. Its stated task is to “significantly step up cooperation amongst authorities 
to prepare feasible and credible G-SIFI resolution plans.”
B. The limits of  harmonization as a coordination technique
In order to understand why NG emerges as an appealing regulatory architecture for the 
FSB as it addresses these coordination problems, it is necessary to understand what NG 
innovates against—international harmonization. Up to now, most attempts at financial 
regulatory coordination have emphasized a more classical, international legal solution 
to coordination: harmonized rules agreed upon at the interstate level and translated 
into substantially similar national laws by domestic legislatures or enforced by domestic 
regulators.
Why did this kind of  formal harmonization traditionally seem like a necessary 
form of  coordination? As domestic regulators in jurisdictions such as the USA pursued 
domestic reforms, they confronted a steady drumbeat of  threats that markets would 
respond to additional regulatory burdens by moving business to jurisdictions that do 
not have heightened regulatory requirements (Gonzalez and Schipke 2011). National 
regulators responded to this threat of  regulatory arbitrage by attempting to ensure that 
other jurisdictions had roughly the same regulatory burdens (Eubanks 2010). Thus, 
international harmonization of  regulatory standards has traditionally been seen as the 
necessary corollary of  domestic regulatory reform.
In practice, this causes numerous problems. First, harmonization typically takes 
the form of  substantive rules, such as capital adequacy requirements for systemically 
important financial institutions. One practical reason for the emphasis on harmonizing 
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rules at the Basel Committee and the FSB is that rules are relatively easy to identify, 
describe, and produce compared to regulatory standards or practices. Yet harmonized 
rules mean little if  the degree of  supervision concerning adherence to those rules varies 
widely from one jurisdiction to another.
A related problem with harmonization as an international governance structure is a 
pervasive lack of  support from domestic politicians, banks, the public, and even regulators 
in many jurisdictions for rule making at the international level. Global agreements require 
domestic support for implementation; but in many jurisdictions, domestic constituencies 
have proven profoundly skeptical of  newly harmonized rules. The consequence is often 
the practical impossibility of  full compliance.
Likewise, the lack of  will for coordination among regulators themselves—the sense of  
national competition that often pervades the sense of  the common good—also impedes 
harmonization efforts. Unwillingness on the part of  national regulators to adhere to 
internationally harmonized standards is likely to be even stronger in cases of  emerging 
markets not represented at the FSB or the G20.
For all these reasons, even many proponents of  international legal harmonization 
agree that full or substantial harmonization of  regulatory standards in the short to 
medium term is likely impossible. Yet many commentators and policymakers also argue 
that even if  it were achievable, harmonization is not desirable in the first place.
First, different jurisdictions face different conditions. For example, as Jeffrey Gordon has 
noted, the US focus on the liquidation of  G-SIFIs reflects options available to US regulators 
given the size of  the US economy and of  the Treasury relative to the size of  failing financial 
institutions that may not be available to other countries (Verstein and Romano 2011). For 
other countries, the focus rather must be on preventing the failure of  institutions that are 
“too big to save” through higher capital adequacy requirements and bail-ins.
Equally importantly, where systemic risk is created by “herd mentalities” in which 
market participants pursue common strategies, different regulatory approaches may act 
as stopgaps against contagion by incentivizing different business models. As Takafumi 
Sato, former commissioner of  Japan’s Financial Services Agency, explained, “A global 
community adopting a uniform platform is vulnerable to a virus, as we have witnessed 
during the current financial pandemic. Capital adequacy regulations should be designed 
to foster diversity in business models” (Sato 2009).
On these points, experts interested in international financial regulation would likely 
benefit from more active engagement with state-of-the-art international regulatory theory 
more generally. The inability of  regulators to deliver on promises made in international 
forums in the face of  domestic pressure is a well-documented problem. Competition 
among national representatives and the lack of  will for coordination among regulators 
is another problem that repeats itself  in numerous international regulatory fields. These 
problems have been addressed in different ways and with varying degrees of  success 
at different periods in international legal history—from state-to-state agreements to the 
construction of  international institutions, to the development of  customary international 
law (Krisch and Kingsbury 2006). Moreover, an extensive literature on global legal 
pluralism now demonstrates that legal pluralism is a given condition of  transnational 
legality that cannot ever be entirely eliminated. In fact, this literature demonstrates that 
pluralism has numerous advantages and must be incorporated into transnational legal 
governance. The challenges posed by global harmonization initiatives in international 
financial regulation are not unique to this field.
C. Three key elements of  FSB methodology
The FSB has acquired credibility as a site for coordinating financial regulatory standards 
and for creating soft law mechanisms to ensure compliance. However the FSB’s formal 
legal authorities are extremely limited. The FSB charter only grants the FSB authority 
to “assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system,” to “promote coordination 
and information exchange,” “monitor and advise on market developments,” and “advise 
and monitor on best practice in meeting regulatory standards.” As if  to underline the 
point, the final article of  the charter states, “This Charter is not intended to create any 
legal rights or obligations” (FSB 2009).
With these limited powers, how does the FSB tackle a coordination problem that 
standard international legal tools have proven incapable of  resolving? The FSB’s 
approach is innovative. It aims to address, on one hand, the interrelatedness of  domestic 
regulatory systems, and on the other hand, the political difficulties associated with 
achieving and implementing international consensus on harmonized rules through a 
new set of  institutional tools borrowed directly from recent innovations in the EU and 
the USA. Three principal kinds of  initiatives deserve attention: standard-setting projects, 
peer review, and cross-border, firm-specific coordination.
Standard setting
In theory at least, the FSB circumvents some of  the problems of  harmonization 
initiatives by emphasizing broad standards or “best practices” for regulators rather than 
hard rules. Standards are seen as preferable tools of  global financial regulation because 
they allow for pluralism within a framework of  common baselines and shared regulatory 
values. Standards are also viewed as more flexible than rules and hence more able to 
accommodate unforeseen future problems.
Yet in practice, these standards seem to shade into a regime that takes on more and 
more of  the trappings of  traditional international legal rules and norms. In the area of  
G-SIFIs, for example, the FSB in October 2011 promulgated what then chairman Mario 
Draghi ambiguously described as “a new international standard [for the resolution of  
financial institutions] as a point of  reference for consistent reform of  national resolution 
regimes” (Draghi 2011). In this slippery language, a mere standard or “point of  reference” 
also becomes something more than that—the basis for “consistent reform” and “a new 
international standard.”
Peer review
Peer review is a soft law technique for implementing harmonized regulatory standards. 
Countries report on their progress in implementing particular standards, and these 
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reports are in turn evaluated by a committee of  peers. The secretariat engages those who 
fail to comply in a “confidential dialogue” that can ultimately lead to public “naming and 
shaming” (Walter 2010). An FSB “scoreboard” on its website “tracks progress across the 
full range of  reforms” (Draghi 2011).
The FSB’s own official objectives for peer review span a number of  analytically 
disparate purposes, from the rather benign goal of  information exchange, to the more 
interventionist goal of  evaluating FSB members’ adherence to their commitments, to 
norm building, to evaluating the content of  international regulatory standards and 
approaches themselves. The last of  these is important to the peer-review ideal: as 
NG proponents Sabel and Zeitlin explain, the peer-review process creates a kind of  
accountability that “anticipates the transformation of  rules in use.” In the future, the 
FSB promises even “more intense monitoring in priority areas: the Basel capital and 
liquidity framework; OTC derivatives market reforms; compensation practices; G-SIFI 
policy measures; resolution frameworks; and shadow banking” (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).
Peer review as practiced by the FSB is a governance regime that carries only a possible 
reputational sanction. What defines this particular implementation of  peer review as a 
mode of  governance is not so much the sanction, as the regularized practice of  periodic 
and extensive self-evaluation and reporting requirements. On this front, the FSB has 
instituted a busy schedule of  self-reporting requirements whereby national regulators 
must complete questionnaires concerning their regulatory activities and their compliance 
with international standards.
For example, a questionnaire developed for a thematic review on risk governance 
contains approximately fifty detailed questions, to be answered by busy national regulators 
in just over one month. The questionnaire is posted on the website but responses are not 
public. Although the questions are framed as merely for information-gathering purposes, 
many assume a clear normative framework and set of  policy preferences, and the survey 
prompts national regulators into a kind of  self-evaluation according to those policy 
preferences. For example, question 1.1 reads:
Please describe your jurisdiction’s overall approach to assessing firms’ risk governance 
frameworks (e.g. legislation, regulation or supervisory guidance). Please provide links 
to relevant documents. Has your jurisdiction evaluated whether such guidance is 
consistent with the BCBS or OECD principles on corporate governance or other 
recommendations provided by the industry? (FSB 2012, 3)
The message is clear: member states should be evaluating themselves according to 
international standards. Regulators completing this survey may find it embarrassing to 
answer any part of  this question in the negative. Moreover, “risk governance” is defined 
quite specifically in the questions to include the internal institutional structures in place 
within private firms for monitoring and managing risk. Regulators may also find it 
uncomfortable to have to admit to their global peers that financial institutions in their 
jurisdiction do not have exactly this kind of  organizational structure for managing risk. 
Hence, the peer-review process of  answering these questions also encourages regulators 
to set up similar levels of  review among the market participants they regulate.
Supervisory colleges
A third architectural innovation worthy of  mention is the so-called supervisory colleges 
aimed at the cross-border regulation of  individual financial institutions and in particular 
the coordination of  home and host regulators.
What is new here, from the standpoint of  international law, is that regulation is not 
generally applicable, but is specific to a particular non-state actor: regulators convene 
to develop specific protocols for information sharing concerning a specific financial 
institution. Rules, procedures, and information sharing across borders are being 
developed—tailored and applicable only to one particular target of  regulation. In the 
environmental or security context, by way of  contrast, one does not create environmental 
regulations that apply to only one polluter, or security laws that apply to only one terrorist 
organization (even if, in practice, general rules are often created in response to a specific 
case). Thus, the model dispenses with the traditional formal model of  regulation in favor 
of  something more pragmatic, and it also recognizes that regulation is conducted by 
real people—and that personal relationships among regulators is as significant a source 
of  regulatory stability and strength as, for example, sanctions against governments for 
failure to share information might be.
D. Conclusion to Part II
In sum, the FSB responds to the challenges of  an interrelated but plural global regulatory 
environment with some new tools and approaches borrowed largely from the European 
experience in coordinating among diverse regulatory authorities within the EU. These 
tools and approaches are not particularly legal in nature; indeed, the FSB has minimal 
formal legal authority over its members. They are rather pragmatic and problem 
oriented. And they are sociologically and institutionally grounded: they emphasize 
relationships, reputations, and the gradual evolution of  norms and standards through 
repeat encounters.
Part III: The New Governance Approach
The FSB initiatives described in the previous section draw powerfully on one popular 
body of  regulatory theory known as NG.
A. What is new governance?
The term “new governance” captures a variety of  regulatory approaches that emphasize 
a shift away from so-called command-and-control regulation toward more reflexive, 
collaborative, and experimental forms of  governance. Here, the task of  government is to 
coordinate and facilitate collective information sharing and learning.
While the term has been applied to a broad range of  processes and practices, 
according to Ford, there are three related convictions that underlie most NG strategies 
implemented in the EU and USA: (i) an emphasis on “learning by doing” that includes 
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structured learning processes that pull experience into the creation of  regulation in self-
reflexive ways; (ii) a recognition of  the necessity for regulatory revisability, as documented 
in practices such as notice-and-comment rules, which allow for quick decisions by relevant 
actors; and finally, (iii) humility about the fact that regulators cannot know more about 
everyday operations than the practitioners themselves (Ford 2010a).
One classic element of  the NG approach to regulation is to set broad targets and 
allow regulated entities to reach those targets in their own ways. Another key value of  
the NG approach is its emphasis on experimentation and collaboration. In the USA, 
the concrete impetus for this new approach to regulation lies in the search by center-left 
academics and policymakers in local, state, and national government for a pragmatic 
response to market-based critiques of  the legitimacy of  state regulation. On this point, 
the NG argument is that markets cannot always be counted on to produce the kind of  
efficient and welfare-maximizing coordination that neoliberals imagined would emerge 
through the institution of  price. On the other hand, NG is not a call for a return to state 
control: it takes seriously neoliberal critiques of  the inefficiencies and injustices of  state 
“command and control” and therefore seeks a “third way” between free markets on the 
one hand and state regulation on the other.
What this highlights is that the architecture now used by the FSB to coordinate among 
national regulators was developed first to address a problem in relations between state 
regulators and private parties that were the target of  regulation. Thus the deployment 
of  NG techniques by the FSB stretches those techniques further to address the state–
state relations—relations between national regulators, mediated by an international 
organization, and the compliance of  national governments with international law.
B. Addressing the democracy deficit
The standards for evaluating or ranking jurisdictions are often produced by “expert 
committees,” and hence in the NG approach, non-elected technocrats yield considerable 
implicit power through such instruments. As such, NG is open to standard domestic 
criticisms of  international organizations as undemocratic and unaccountable to domestic 
constituencies.
But for NG proponents, one great promise of  the approach is its contribution to 
the challenges of  creating legitimacy and accountability for international institutions 
directed by non-elected experts. Sabel and Simon (2006) write in “Accountability without 
Sovereignty” that peer review actually provides better popular accountability than the 
traditional formal “principal–agent” model of  democratic accountability because the 
deliberative process entailed in peer review entails a more substantive and meaningful 
form of  accountability than formal electoral accountability.
C. Conclusion to Part III
Many of  the core values of  NG, such as fostering regulatory pluralism, mutual learning, 
and principled-based self-regulation are admirable. In theory, NG represents a substantial 
innovation over traditional approaches to international law and institutions because it 
addresses the political difficulties with creating binding rules at the international level. 
And yet the observations of  experts in financial regulation concerning some applications 
of  these approaches, together with social scientific and legal studies of  the outcomes of  
NG approaches in other areas of  international regulation suggest that the reality of  NG 
may be somewhat different from the theory. In the next section, we explore these studies, 
and their implications for the FSB.
Part IV: New Governance in Practice: A Critical Appraisal
Despite all the framework agreements, all the peer-review documents, the supervisory 
college meetings, and networking opportunities, many regulators privately confess to 
considerable skepticism about how much progress really has been made on cross-border 
coordination in the case of  a failing G-SIFI since 2008. The view of  many seems to be that 
if  a systemically important financial institution were to fail today, the level of  coordination 
would be the same, or only slightly better, than at the time of  the Lehman crisis.
This should give us pause for thought. If  these regulators are correct in their 
skepticism, then one might ask whether all this novel activity is really delivering enough 
value to justify the tremendous time and expense involved. Surprisingly, to date, no 
serious empirical research on this subject has been undertaken in the area of  global 
financial regulation. The intuitive appropriateness of  the NG model has more or less 
been taken for granted by regulators.
In the absence of  such research, this part draws together what can be known about 
the strengths and weaknesses of  the NG architecture in two ways. To begin with, NG 
methods were deployed in many sectors of  domestic financial regulation prior to the 
crisis of  2008, and the weaknesses of  these methods in the domestic context are widely 
appreciated. Remarkably, the same methods are now being redeployed in transnational 
financial governance.
This time, the targets of  regulation are not private firms, but domestic regulators in 
FSB member jurisdictions, and it is possible that this difference somehow eliminates the 
problems documented in the domestic context. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
this difference exacerbates the problems: a review of  the implementation of  NG by the 
FSB suggests a number of  ways in which, in this new application, NG has actually lost 
some of  its more innovative aspects. Secondly, I analyze the known aspects of  the FSB 
governance structure. Where appropriate in this section, I draw analogies to available 
research on the application of  NG techniques in other fields of  transnational regulation. 
This analysis suggests both some potential weaknesses of  NG as an architecture of  
international financial governance overall, and also some possible conditions for 
determining when the method might be most effective and when it might not.
A. Lessons learned from new governance in  
financial regulation prior to 2008
Few NG experts claim any substantive knowledge of  international financial regulation. 
The exception is Ford (Ford 2011, 2010b), whose work lies squarely at the intersection 
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of  both fields. Ford’s survey of  three recent examples of  failure or underperformance 
of  NG-style financial regulation prior to the financial crisis gives us a more limited and 
pessimistic picture of  how NG might be used in financial regulation. One example 
is regulators’ past reliance on market participants’ own risk-management models to 
determine the nature and size of  risks in the global economy. Although from a NG 
perspective this might have seemed like a wonderful collaborative approach to regulation, 
Ford (2010b, 281) concludes that “regulatory faith in industry actors’ competence, if  not 
literally their bona fides, proved to have been misplaced to catastrophic effect.”
From this and other examples, Ford finds a number of  potential weaknesses in the 
NG approach, at least as it has been applied to date in real-world financial regulatory 
contexts. First, information-based governance relies too heavily on regulated parties 
for information. Second, the enthusiasm in the NG project for local experimentation 
assumes too quickly that industry representatives will make choices that are in the 
public interest. Third, the NG emphasis on coordination fails to fully take into account 
how powerful market participants may be, relative to regulators, both in terms of  their 
influence over the political process, and their ability to shape the dominant consensus 
about how markets should be regulated.
B. Practical shortcomings in the application of   
new governance by the FSB
Ford’s research highlights potential concerns about NG as applied pre-2008 to public 
regulation of  private market participants. And yet, just at the moment at which these 
failures are widely acknowledged, the same regulatory methods are being applied at 
the international level to coordination among national and international regulators. 
Moreover, a review of  the application of  NG by the FSB suggests new challenges to 
regulatory success and ways in which some of  the more innovative or hopeful dimensions 
of  NG actually have been lost in translation.
Limited participation
NG posits an expanded community of  stakeholders in which regulatory legitimacy is 
generated by including as many possible interested parties in the process of  creating 
and implementing standards. But the FSB remains a closed organization that purports 
to make standards that apply to non-members as well as members. Some important 
emerging economies, including economies which are touted as possible relocation sites 
for financial institutions seeking to avoid North Atlantic regulatory burdens, do not 
participate in the FSB process. This poses a serious challenge to the FSB’s legitimacy.
Likewise, the NG approach imagines collective governance in which all viewpoints are 
heard and coordinated. Yet in the FSB, although decisions are made by consensus, in practice 
some members have considerably more authority than others. In the individual committees in 
which important policies are often debated and drafted, the representation of  North Atlantic 
regulators is still unduly large in relation to these economies’ global market share.
Limited public–private coordination
As described above, one of  the central innovations of  NG was its emphasis on new forms 
of  collaboration between public and private actors. Yet, so far, the FSB process has mainly 
engaged representatives of  governments and international bureaucracies, with private 
parties participating only through more attenuated opportunities for public comment.
This exclusion of  private actors is unfortunate because it fails to recognize the practical 
authority of  organizations such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
in constructing their own forms of  international financial governance beyond the state. 
The FSB’s initiatives to address the problem remain in the embryonic stage.
Standards slide into rules
Another innovative aspect of  NG theory was its emphasis on governance through broad 
standards rather than rules. In practice, however, the FSB regime is increasingly rule 
oriented, leading to a number of  problems.
One of  the problems with rule-based governance—precisely the problem NG sought 
to address—is that rules can easily be diluted or ignored altogether at the national 
implementation phase and hence impose weighty compliance monitoring costs on 
regulators. Despite the fiercely committal language in FSB reports and communiqués, 
the FSB lacks any formal power to hold member states to agreements they have made at 
the international level.
Another problem with rules is that they encourage private actors to “game” 
the system or develop other forms of  resistance. This was the global experience 
with capital adequacy standards under Basel II, where market participants devised 
all kinds of  financial products and accounting methods to “game” the regulatory 
standards.
In theory, peer review is meant to address this problem of  non-compliance. Yet in 
practice, peer review also has its limits. For example, participation in peer review is still 
largely voluntary in many practical respects. Although the FSB charter states that peer 
review is a requirement of  membership, the FSB peer-review handbook acknowledges 
that volunteers will be taken first, and in practice to date, country peer reviews have been 
strictly voluntary.
Pluralism slides into harmonization
A related innovation of  the NG approach was its emphasis on regulatory pluralism; yet 
in practice, the FSB is moving toward greater emphasis on compliance with harmonized 
rules and practices. Consider, for example, the following official explanation of  the 
new FSB standards on SIFIs. According to the then secretary-general Draghi, the new 
standards were:
designed to address gaps in legal frameworks and tools for effective intervention in 
failing systemic firms, including those that operate in multiple jurisdictions, and to 
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remove impediments under existing national law to cross-border resolution. Their 
implementation will require legislative changes in many jurisdictions. (Draghi 2011, 2)
As one FSB report explains, likewise, peer reviews are now “focused on the implementation 
and effectiveness of  international financial standards and of  policies agreed upon within 
the FSB.”
Problems with the sociological approach
One innovation of  NG, as we saw, is its emphasis on sociological rather than legal tools 
for achieving outcomes. Yet some observers query whether, in the case of  international 
financial regulation, a community of  regulators who are collectively committed to 
careful deliberation and individually susceptible to group pressure when they fail to meet 
international targets is in fact so easily achieved.
Learning slides into surveillance
And these limitations to deliberation lead to another problem. One of  the greatest 
values of  NG tools such as peer review is the opportunity they provide for comparison 
and learning. In practice, peer review often slips into a tool of  surveillance in which 
participants evaluate themselves and submit to evaluation according to how closely 
they conform to a given standard—leaving little opportunity to deliberate about the 
appropriateness of  the standard itself. Although in theory NG supports a plurality of  
regulatory approaches, often it is used more to monitor and self-monitor according to a 
predetermined policy or institutional choice.
Equally importantly, the unexamined common sense solutions found in 
jurisdictions that exercise larger influence at the FSB secretariat continue to dominate 
to the exclusion of  other possibilities and at a cost to the international legitimacy 
of  the organization as a whole. A failure of  deliberation and the transformation 
of  NG instruments into tools of  surveillance exacerbates problems of  democratic 
accountability.
Audit culture
Finally, although NG tools can be effective means of  learning and consensus building, 
many regulators suggest a degree of  frustration with the volume of  paperwork produced 
by NG initiatives, and a concern that the time demands of  these assignments do not 
produce sufficient practical rewards.
In an era of  seriously curtailed government budgets, time spent on peer review, on 
international meetings, and on information exchange is time that is not available for 
other regulatory initiatives. Furthermore, many of  these reviews in turn make requests 
for information that place demands on market participants, and these demands have 
also mushroomed to the point that risk-management staff  in some banks claim to spend 
almost half  of  their time responding to regulators’ requests for information—often so 
that such information can be sent to international organizations.
Social scientists have begun to explore the costs of  so-called audit cultures or audit 
societies—governance systems rooted principally in self-reporting strategies. These costs 
include lost labor resources devoted to wasted reporting efforts, but they also include 
information overload, “anxious preoccupation with how one is seen by others,” and an 
erosion of  trust within institutions.
The reasons why such processes may begin to seem like “paperwork” rather than true 
exercises in deliberation relate once again to how these tools become standardized and 
institutionalized into fairly rigid models. This suggests that at a minimum more attention 
needs to be paid to designing a peer-review and self-monitoring process that fosters 
meaningful dialogue and deliberation by making room for respondents to challenge the 
terms of  the question or the assumptions behind the review itself.
Part V: Conclusion
The attention of  policymakers, market participants, and many of  their interlocutors in 
the academy has focused on the details of  particular policy initiatives of  the moment 
without much regard for the wider sum of  the regulatory parts. The predominant 
architecture deployed by the FSB—the NG architecture—may have been chosen largely 
by default, and perhaps without sufficient critical analysis or empirical study.
However, recent coordination challenges surrounding financial regulation in the 
EU that have surfaced in the past year, together with the weaknesses of  the American 
collaborative approach to regulation demonstrated by the financial crisis of  2008, 
suggest that at a minimum this model should not be adopted without reflection. The 
aim of  this article therefore has been to initiate a debate about the range of  available 
approaches, and the strengths and weaknesses of  each in international financial 
regulation to be deployed by the FSB in particular, as it addresses the challenges of  
G-SIFIs.
Thus, a preliminary hypothesis for future research emerges from this analysis: 
NG mechanisms may be effective in resolving some kinds of  problems caused by the 
interrelationship of  legal regimes in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely 
to be suitable to all problems. That is, at the very least, a robust international financial 
governance structure necessitates some other kinds of  international legal arrangements 
alongside NG mechanisms. This hypothesis merits empirical study, and also suggests the 
need for debate about the full range of  possible legal alternatives for a global financial 
architecture. In short, the general validity of  the NG model should not simply be accepted 
as an untested and unchallenged article of  faith.
A. Possible avenues for reform
The research into uses of  NG techniques in other international institutional contexts, 
together with lessons learned from the application of  NG techniques by national regulators 
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to domestic financial markets, does preliminarily suggest that a number of  reforms of, or 
limitations on, NG mechanisms might improve their efficacy. These include:
A more inclusive process
More attention should be paid to the form through which consensus about such reform 
initiatives as capital adequacy requirements for G-SIFIs is reached in the first place. 
Market participants point out that they have very few opportunities even to learn 
about negotiations at the FSB, let alone to participate in them meaningfully, until after 
the agreement is complete. While the FSB rule-making procedure allows for a public 
comment period, market participants argue that they have little sense of  whether their 
comments have any impact on outcomes at all. The same is largely true of  domestic 
legislators.
One of  the lessons of  recent innovations in international law and institutions is that 
bringing a wider range of  actors into the negotiation process creates far greater success at 
the implementation stage. One early example of  the use of  soft law techniques to create 
global consensus was the United Nations World Conference model, in which national 
delegations were expected to include representatives from a wide range of  governmental 
and non-governmental organizations, and in which virtually any legitimate non-
governmental organization was allowed to participate as an observer to the process. In 
practice, such conferences have proven to be quite successful in generating broad and 
deep consensus for reform in individual nations on difficult social topics.
Of  course it may not be possible to open up the financial regulatory process to 
this extent. Many national regulators express a need for a space for discussion and 
coordination away from the political pressures they experience from market participants 
in which to construct rules that serve the wider social good. Regulators involved in the 
FSB rule-making process have concerns about the impact of  openness on the ability to 
reach consensus, on how confidential information can be shared, and even on potential 
questions of  sovereignty and national security in opening this process to a wider range of  
public and private actors. While these are legitimate concerns, the exclusion of  the full 
range of  interested parties from the negotiations creates its own practical costs as well as 
challenges to the legitimacy of  the consensus reached through NG methods.
There is also another reason to favor openness in the FSB process. A broader and 
more diverse FSB membership could be a benefit to better governance by helping to 
preserve the plurality and diversity of  views that is vital to the success of  NG techniques. 
Ironically, the premise of  NG, that through such techniques a broad base of  stakeholders 
can and should be enrolled in decision-making processes, has been sidelined as NG has 
been translated into an international regulatory structure at the FSB.
Better procedural regulation of  NG processes
We saw that although the ideals behind NG are often laudable, the implementation can 
stray far from those ideals. We also saw that NG processes impose substantial burdens 
on national regulators and on the private sector. Finally, we saw that there are increasing 
concerns about the legitimacy of  the authority of  a small group of  technocrats at the 
FSB secretariat and of  small, unelected subcommittees of  the FSB plenary.
Concerns about similar processes in other international institutional contexts has 
led legal scholars to ask whether this explosion of  law making within international 
technocratic organizations should not be subject to greater procedural safeguards, just 
as the rule of  law requires subjecting domestic administrative agencies to procedural 
safeguards. Kingsbury and his colleagues in the Global Administrative Law project at 
the NYU Law School have identified this “accountability deficit” as a primary target for 
international legal reform across numerous policy areas (Krisch and Kingsbury 2006).
These safeguards could include, for example, greater disclosure about the positions 
national representatives take at international meetings, more detailed rules concerning 
the process of  agreement at meetings and the process of  producing and evaluating 
peer-review reports that would constrain bureaucrats’ discretion and provide greater 
opportunities for input from a wider range of  participants, more detailed rules concerning 
standards of  proof  and evaluation in reaching conclusions, and opportunities for some 
higher or alternative level of  appeal for review of  FSB procedures.
More narrowly tailored assessment tools
Comparative research in other fields suggests that NG methods are most effective when 
the problem they seek to address is very narrowly tailored. In such cases, peer review 
can be more focused, and discussions in supervisory colleges can be more specific and 
meaningful.
Greater resources for monitoring and deliberation activities
Finally, many of  the problems associated with implementing NG ideals stem from lack 
of  adequate resources.
B. Recommendation
Mount a cross-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional research project aimed at evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of  the FSB experience with NG methodologies to date, and at 
identifying the conditions under which those methodologies are successful, and those in 
which they require supplementation with other methods.
What is needed now is a detailed study, based upon several case studies of  particular, 
specific regulatory or compliance initiatives that would provide a detailed, empirical 
picture of  how NG methodologies are currently being used both from the point of  view 
of  the FSB secretariat and committee structures, and from the point of  view of  national 
bureaucracies and national interest groups in several representative jurisdictions. The 
focus should be on the microprocesses by which consensus over compliance is or is not 
reached. The few studies we have suggest that the process of  reaching consensus between 
peer-review committees and regulated states is a far more complex process than the 
official procedures suggest, and that there is some room for variation and contestation. 
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The emphasis should be on the relationship between these microprocesses and “issues 
of  implementation, effectiveness, and local impact” across different jurisdictions with 
different market challenges and regulatory approaches. This requires a detailed, objective 
picture of  the social and institutional processes at work in regulatory technologies such 
as peer review, standards making, and supervisory colleges. What is the experience 
of  regulation by those who are subject to these processes and how does it shape their 
behavior? How do these practices alter or realign existing power dynamics in the market 
and among nations? Under what precise conditions are such practices effective and when 
are they ineffective?
Since the very problem to be studied is the efficacy of  questionnaire- and committee-
based information-gathering processes, this study cannot rely entirely on such processes. 
Rather, what is needed is a combination of  observational and interview-based methods. 
On the basis of  this empirical information, it will be possible to determine when NG 
techniques are the ideal governance tools in international financial governance and when 
they should be supplemented with other kinds of  governance tools.
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